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Part I of this dissertation proposes an implicature-based theory of individual-level
predicates. The idea is that we cannot say '#John is sometimes tall' because the sen-
tence triggers the scalar implicature that the alternative 'John is always tall' is false
and this implicature mismatches with the piece of common knowledge that tallness
is a permanent property. Chapter 1 presents the idea informally. This idea faces two
challenges. First, this scalar implicature must be mandatory and furthermore blind
to common knowledge. Second, it is not clear how this idea extends to other prop-
erties of individual-level predicates. Chapter 2 makes sense of the surprising nature
of these special mismatching implicatures within the recent grammatical framework
for scalar implicatures of Chierchia (2004) and Fox (2007a). Chapter 3 shows how
this implicature-based account can be extended to other properties of individual-
level predicates, such as restrictions on their bare plural subjects, on German word
order and extraction, and on Q-adverbs.
Part H of this dissertation develops a theory of update rules for the OT on-line algo-
rithm that perform constraint promotion too, besides demotion. Chapter 4 explains
why we need constraint promotion, by arguing that demotion-only update rules are
unable to model Hayes' (2004) early stage of the acquisition of phonology. Chap-
ter 5 shows how to get constraint promotion, by means of two different techniques.
One technique shares the combinatoric flavor of Tesar and Smolensky's analysis of
demotion-only update rules. The other technique consists of adapting to OT results
from the theory of on-line algorithms for linear classification. The latter technique
has various consequences interesting on their own, explored in Chapter 8. Chapters
6 and 7 start the investigation of the properties of update rules that perform promo-
tion too, concentrating on the characterization of the final vector and on the number
of updates.
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Abstract of Part I - Predicates such as 'tall' or 'to know Latin', which intuitively denote per-
manent properties, are called INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL PREDICATES. Many peculiar properties of this
class of predicates have been noted in the literature. One such property is that we cannot say '#John
is sometimes tall'. Here is a way to account for this property: this sentence sounds odd because
it triggers the scalar implicature that the alternative 'John is always tall' is false and this implica-
ture mismatches with the piece of common knowledge that tallness is a permanent property. This
intuition faces two challenges. First: this scalar implicature has a odd status, since it must be surpris-
ingly mandatory (otherwise, it could be cancelled and the sentence rescued) and furthermore blind
to common knowledge (since the piece of common knowledge that tallness is a permanent property
makes the two alternatives equivalent). Second: it is not clear how this intuition could be extended
to other properties of individual-level predicates. Part I of this dissertation defends the idea of an
implicature-based theory of individual-level predicates by facing these two challenges. Chapter 1
presents the idea informally. Chapter 2 tries to make sense of the surprising nature of these special
mismatching implicatures within the recent grammatical framework for scalar implicatures of Chier-
chia (2004) and Fox (2007a). Chapter 3 shows how this implicature-based line of reasoning can be
extended to other properties of individual-level predicates, such as restrictions on the interpretation
of their bare plural subjects, noted in Carlson (1977), Milsark (1977), and Fox (1995); restrictions
on German word order and extraction, noted in Diesing (1992); and restrictions on Q-adverbs, noted
in Kratzer (1995).
14 CONTENTS
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Problem: restrictions on i-predicates
Predicates such as those in (l a) intuitively denote permanent properties, while those in (lb) denote
properties not necessarily permanent. Milsark (1974) dubs possibly temporary predicates like 'avail-
able' in (lb) as STATE DESCRIPTIVE predicates and persistent or permanent predicates like 'tall' in
(la) as PROPERTY predicates; Carlson (1977) calls them STAGE LEVEL predicates (henceforth: s-
predicates) and INDIVIDUAL LEVEL predicates (henceforth: i-predicates), respectively; I will stick
to Carlson's terminology, because it has had more success in the subsequent literature.
(1) a. to be tall, to be related to Chomsky, to know Latin, ...
b. to be available, to talk to Chomsky, to study Latin, ...
An impressive list of linguistic facts have been pointed out that set the two classes of predicates
apart. The overall picture is that s-predicates can do many more things than i-predicates can do:
there are configurations where s-predicates are judged fine but i-predicates are not (e.g. adverbial
quantification, 'there'-insertion, perception sentences, etc.) and there are readings that are judged
available with s-predicates but not with i-predicates (e.g. the existential reading for their BPSs,
the episodic reading, etc.). To illustrate, I review a few of these facts in the rest of this section;
see Fernald (2000) for a comprehensive review. A theory of i-predicates should thus answer the
following question: why is it the case that i-predicates cannot do the many things that s-predicates
can do? This is the question addressed in part I of my dissertation.
Adverbs Contrary to s-predicates, i-predicates do not admit adverbial quantification of any quan-
tificational force, as shown in (2) and (3).
(2) a. John is sometimes available.
b. #John is sometimes tall.
(3) a. John is always available.
b. #John is always tall.
Kratzer (1995) adds the observation that adverbial quantification with i-predicates turns fine in the
presence of bare plurals or indefinites, as shown in (4).
(4) a. Firemen are sometimes / always tall.
b. A fireman is sometimes / always tall.
Modification Contrary to s-predicates, i-predicates do not allow temporal modifiers such as 'after
dinner', as shown in (5b).
(5) a. John is available after dinner.
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b. #John is tall after dinner.
Kratzer (1995) and Musan (1997) discuss the case of temporal modification through tense morphol-
ogy. They note that sentence (6b), with the i-predicate 'tall' in the past tense, triggers the inference
that John is dead, while sentence (6a), with the s-predicate 'available', does not. Following Musan
(1997), I will refer to this inference as the LIFE-TIME EFFECT.
(6) a. John was available, no life-time effect
b. John was tall. life-time effect
Bare plural subjects Milsark (1977) and Carlson (1977) point out the contrast in (7): the bare
plural subject (henceforth: BPS) 'firemen' of the s-predicate 'available' in (7a) admits both the
generic reading ("Firemen are usually available people") and the existential reading ("There are
firemen who are available"); the BPS of the i-predicate 'tall' in (7b) instead lacks the existential
reading and only allows the generic one.
(7) a. Firemen are available. B-BPS, GEN-BPS
b. Firemen are tall. *3-BPS, GEN-BPS
Fox (1995) adds the surprising observation that this restriction on the readings of BPSs of i-predicates
is waived when BPSs are embedded under a universal quantifier: as expected, the BPS 'Jewish
women' of the i-predicate 'to be related to Chomsky' of sentence (8a) lacks the existential reading;
in sentence (8b), the definite 'Chomsky' has been replaced by the universal quantifier 'every Jewish
man' and the BPS 'Jewish women' of sentence (8b) does admit the existential reading, provided that
the universal object is assigned wide scope ("For every Jewish man there are Jewish women related
to him").
(8) a. Jewish women are related to Chomsky. *B-BPS
b. Jewish women are related to every Jewish man. B-BPS
German word order Diesing (1992) points out the contrast in (9): the BPS 'Feuerwehrminner'
('firemen') can sit both at the left and at the right of the particles 'ja doch' ('indeed') in the case of
the s-predicate 'verftigbar' ('available'), as shown in (9a) and (9b); but it can sit only at the left of
'ja doch' in the case of the i-predicate 'intelligent', as shown by the contrast between (9c) and (9d).
(9) a. ... weil ja doch Feuerwehrminner verfiigbar sind.
... since PARTs firemen available are
b ... weil Feuerwehrminner ja doch verfiigbar sind.
c. ... *weil ja doch Feuerwehrmanner intelligent sind.
... since PARTs firemen intelligent are
d. ... weil Feuerwehrmiinner ja doch intelligent sind.
1.2 The idea: blind and mandatory mismatching implicatures
The solution to this problem which I will defend in this work hinges on the idea of blind and manda-
tory scalar implicatures that mismatch with common knowledge. This idea was first introduced in
the literature by Hawkins (1978, 1991) and criticized by Heim (1991), Percus (2006) and Sauerland
(2008). In this section, I introduce the idea in a nutshell, by reconstructing its history.
Hawkins' puzzle Hawkins noted the oddness of sentences such as those in (10).1 Intuitively, the
oddness of these sentences is due to the fact that we know that the victim had a unique father, that
our tent has a unique weight, and so on. In all these cases where the restrictor is known to denote a
singleton, we cannot use the indefinite 'a' but have to use the singular definite 'the' instead.
I Naively assuming that there is a specific judgment of "oddness", I use the diacritic '#' to signal it.
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(10) a. #John has interviewed a father of the victim.
b. #A weight of our tent is under four lbs.
c. #Fred lost a nose in the war.
d. #I didn't buy the house because a roof was leaking.
e. #I peered into a center of the flower.
f. #I climbed to a top of the tree.
Consider for instance Hawkins' sentence (10a), repeated below as (1 la), together with its fine variant
(1 ib). Assume that 'a' is a standard existential quantifier. Then, there is no contradiction between
sentence (11a) and the common knowledge that the victim had a unique father. Thus, we might
have expected that an utterance of sentence (1 la) would have been "additively integrated" with the
common knowledge that people have only one father, thus boiling down to the statement that John
has interviewed the father of the victim, precisely as stated by sentence (11 b). But that doesn't
happen.
(11) a. #John has interviewed a father of the victim.
b. John has interviewed the father of the victim.
The oddness of Hawkins' sentences (10) thus seems to suggest that these sentences somehow trigger
an ANTIUNIQUENESS INFERENCE that the restrictor NP is not a singleton or that it is not known to
be a singleton. Once this inference is in place, we can straightforwardly account for the oddness of
Hawkins' sentences (10) by means of the piece of reasoning in (12).
(12) a. On the one hand, Hawkins' sentences (10) somehow trigger an antiuniqueness inference.
b. On the other hand, common knowledge ensures that uniqueness holds.
c. In conclusion, the oddness of Hawkins' sentences (10) follows from the mismatch be-
tween the inference in (12a) and common knowledge in (12b).
But what is the nature of this antiuniqueness inference? in other words, how can the first step (12a)
of the preceding account be made explicit? Let me dub this question as HAWKINS' PUZZLE. To
answer it, we need to go through our typology of inferences, and decide which one fits best the case
of the antiuniqueness inference triggered by sentences (10). Let me consider three different options
in turn.
The naive solution: antiuniqueness as a presupposition Sentences (13a) and (14a) trigger the
inference that the corresponding sentences (13b) and (14b) are common knowledge. These infer-
ences are called PRESUPPOSITIONS.
(13) a. The father of the victim arrived late.
b. The victim has one and only one father.
(14) a. John knows that this solution is wrong.
b. This solution is wrong.
A rather straightforward solution to Hawkins' puzzle is to assume that the anti-uniqueness inference
triggered by sentences (10) is a presupposition. In other words, the standard semantics for 'a' as a
bare existential quantifier is wrong, and should be replaced with the presuppositional variant (15), ac-
cording to which 'a' presupposes that its restrictor is not a singleton. Let me call ANTIUNIQUENESS
PRESUPPOSITION the presupposition carried by 'a' according to (15). Note that this presupposition
is the negation of the presupposition usually associated with the singular definite article.
(15) [a] j= AP.AQ: IPI > 2. P n 0
Under this assumption (15) that antiuniqueness is a presupposition, the general explanation scheme
(12) can be made explicit as the account in (16).
(16) a. On the one hand, Hawkins' sentences (10) trigger the antiuniqueness presupposition.
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b. On the other hand, common knowledge ensures that uniqueness holds.
c. In conclusion, the oddness of Hawkins' sentences (10) follows from the mismatch be-
tween the presupposition in (16a) and common knowledge in (16b).
In other words, (16) says that the oddness of Hawkins' sentences (10) is an instance of the very well
known phenomenon of presupposition failure.
Against the naive solution Plausible as it might look at first sight, this solution to Hawkins' puzzle
turns out to be on the wrong track, as shown by the following three arguments. A first argument,
due to Heim (1991, §2.1.3), is based on sentences (17). Heim notes that sentence (17a) does not
presuppose there to be at least two 20 ft. long catfishes: "whoever asserts or hears [(17a)] may very
well assume that Robert was lucky enough to catch by far the longest catfish in the world"; nor does
sentence (17b) presuppose that the speaker has two pathologically nosy neighbors: the sentence
"leaves quite open how many pathologically nosy neighbors I have and in no way discourages the
hope that it's only one." Of course, these intuitions about sentences (17) are incompatible with the
hypothesis that 'a' bears the antiuniqueness presupposition (15).
(17) a. Robert caught a 20 ft. long catfish.
b. A pathologically nosy neighbor of mine broke into the attic.
A second argument, due to Sauerland (2003c, 2008), is based on the contrast in (18). As Saurland
points out, sentence (18a) suffers from presupposition failure, since the uniqueness presupposition of
the singular definite article 'the' projects universally (under plausible assumptions on presupposition
projection under 'every'; see for instance Heim (1988) for discussion) and it thus fails in the scenario
considered, where some applicants have written more than one paper. If 'a' had an antiuniqueness
presupposition as in (15), then sentence (18b) would be incorrectly predicted to suffer from presup-
position failure too, since this presupposition would be expected to project universally as well and
thus to fail in the scenario considered, where some applicants have written only one paper.
(18) Context: several candidates applied. Some have written only one paper, others have written
more than one. The selection committee decides:
a. #Every candidate should send his paper.
b. Every candidate should send a paper of his.
Let me add a third argument on top of these two, based on sentence (19). Intuitively, this sentence
sounds odd because it mismatches with the piece of common knowledge that people have two eyes
of the same color. Crucially, the antiuniqueness presupposition (15) of 'a' would be trivially satisfied
in the case of sentence (19) and thus cannot play any role in accounting for its oddness. This suggests
that something else is needed, also in the case of Hawkins' sentences (10) we started with.
(19) #An eye of the victim is blue.
In conclusion, adding the antiuniqueness presupposition (15) to the semantics of 'a' doesn't quite
seem right, because of Heim's argument (17) and Sauerland's argument (18); nor useful, because it
misses the generalization that (19) feels odd in the same way that Hawkins' sentences (10) do. Let's
thus abandon (15) and stick with the more traditional semantics for 'a', according to which it is a
plain existential quantifier. We are thus back to square one: what is the nature of the uniqueness
inference triggered by Hawkins' sentences (10)?
Hawkins' solution: antiuniqueness as a scalar implicature Sentences (20a) and (21a) trigger
the inference that the corresponding sentences (20b) and (21b) are false. These inferences are called
SCALAR IMPLICATURES.
(20) a. John did some of the homework.
b. John did all of the homework.
(21) a. John met Mary or Sue.
1.2 The idea: blind and mandatory mismatching implicatures 19
b. John met Mary and Sue.
Hawkins's suggests that the antiuniqueness inference triggered by sentences (10) is a scalar impli-
cature. Thus, the general explanation scheme (12) becomes the account sketched in (22).
(22) a. On the one hand, sentence (1 la) triggers the scalar implicature that the speaker is not in
a position to utter (1 1b), i.e. does not know whether the victim had a unique father.
b. On the other hand, common knowledge entails that people have a unique father, namely
that (11 a) cannot be true while (11 b) false.
c. In conclusion, the oddness of (11 a) follows from the mismatch between the scalar im-
plicature in (22a) and the common knowledge in (22b).
The idea sketched in (22) might cope well with the last two challenges for the presuppositional
account (15) discussed above. Sauerland's problem in (18) has obviously disappeared, since now
we can assume the standard nonpresuppositional semantics for 'a'. Of course, Hawkins' reasoning
(22) predicts that Sauerland's sentence (18b) triggers the antiuniqueness inference that it is false that
every candidate wrote a unique paper and thus sentence (18b) should sound odd in a context where
every candidate wrote a unique paper. This prediction is right. To see that more clearly, let me switch
to the formally analogous example (23b). Sentence (23a) is from Roberts (2003), who in turns takes
it from Kadmon (1987). Sentence (23b) is the minimal variant with the definite replaced by the
indefinite. It seems to me that (23b) sounds odd, namely it mismatches with the piece of common
knowledge that all unicycles have a single wheel.
(23) a. Every unicycle had a spoke missing from the wheel.
b. #Every unicycle had a spoke missing from a wheel.
Finally, we might reasonably hope that this account (22) can be extended to the case of the odd
sentence (19) too.
Against Hawkins' solution According to Grice (1975), scalar implicatures are rational pragmatic
inferences triggered by the Maxim of Quantity (24). Let me quickly review the core idea of the
proposal with the classical cases (20) and (21): sentences (20b) and (21b) are stronger than sentences
(20a) and (21a), in the sense that the proposition denoted by the former is a subset of the proposition
denoted by the latter; thus (20b) and (21b) are more informative than (20a) and (21a), under any
plausible construal of informativeness; by the maxim of Quantity (24), the speaker would thus have
used these more informative alternatives, had he judged them true; since he didn't use then, then he
must have judged them false.
(24) Among a set of alternatives, use the most informative sentence you believe to be true.
The first step (22a) of Hawkins's account says that the antiuniqueness inference triggered by sen-
tences (10) is a scalar implicature. To make this step of the account compatible with Grice's account
of scalar implicatures, Hawkins assumes a Russellian non-presuppositional semantics for the definite
article, whereby a sentence containing a singular definite entails existence and uniqueness. Thus,
a sentence with a singular definite is usually stronger than the corresponding sentence with an in-
definite. Yet, this move is by far not sufficient to make Hawkins' proposal compatible with Grice's
theory of scalar implicatures. Heim (1991, §2.1.3) notes that the first step (22a) of Hawkins's ac-
count is incompatible with Grice's theory of scalar implicatures because of the issue summarized
in (25).2 I will call (25) the BLINDNESS ISSUE: why should the Maxim of Quantity be blind to
common knowledge? I will sharpen the issue further in subsection ??.
2Here is Heim's passage: "The standard examples of scalar implicatures are usually derived from the Gricean conversa-
tional Maxim of Quantity ('Make your contribution as informative as is necessary given the purpose of the conversation!').
At this point, however, our analogy breaks down, since no such derivation seems possible for the non-uniqueness implicature
of the indefinite article. If it is already known that each person has only one father, [(1 Ia)] conveys exactly the same amount
of new information as the corresponding sentence with the definite article [(1 lb)]. Lack of informativeness can therefore not
be the reason for the inadequacy here".
Introduction
(25) BLINDNESS ISSUE. Within the Gricean theory, scalar implicatures are triggered by a viola-
tion of the maxim of Quantity. Being a pragmatic maxim, Quantity compares an utterance
to its alternatives with respect to their informativeness. But because of common knowledge,
utterances of (1 la) and (1 ib) convey exactly the same information. Thus no violation of
Gricean Quantity can arise by uttering (1 la) instead of (1 Ib).
Another issue that makes Hawkins' reasoning (22) hardly compatible with Grice's theory of scalar
implicatures is (26). I will call (26) the MANDATORINESS ISSUE: why should these mismatching
implicatures be mandatorily derived? Heim's problem in (17) illustrates this issue: why is it the
case that the indefinite in sentences (17) does not trigger the anti-uniqueness scalar implicature that
sentences (10) trigger?
(26) MANDATORINESS ISSUE. Within the Gricean theory, scalar implicatures are pragmatic in-
ferences. Hence, they have a weak status: they are optional, cancellable, and suspendable.
Thus, it is not at all clear why the mismatching implicature is kept in place and an utterance
of (11 a) deemed odd, rather than the implicature cancelled or suspended or never computed,
and thus the utterance rescued.
Grice's original approach has been developed, formalized, and defended by a number of authors,
such as Horn (1972), Gazdar (1979), Sauerland (2004c), Spector (2007c), Horn (2005), Russell
(2006), and Geurts (2009), among others. These various neo-Gricean implementations all share
the core idea of a pragmatic derivation of scalar implicatures: grammar pairs each sentence with
a plain meaning and scalar implicatures are then computed on the basis of this meaning by an
extragrammatical procedure rooted in general-purpose principles of rationality. As far as I can see,
the two issues laid out in (25) and (26), which arise when Hawkins' suggestion (22) is implemented
within Grice's theory, also arise within any other pragmatic theory of scalar implicatures. 3 Let me
state this point explicitly, as in (27) and (28). I conclude that Hawkins's account (22) is intrinsically
incompatible with pragmatic approaches to scalar implicatures.
(27) GENERALIZED BLINDNESS ISSUE. If implicatures are computed by a pragmatic engine,
how can this engine be blind to common knowledge so as to distinguish between alternatives
that are equivalent given common knowledge?
(28) GENERALIZED MANDATORINESS ISSUE. If implicatures are computed by a pragmatic en-
gine, how can this engine be robust enough to mandatorily force the mismatching implicature
in place?
Heim's reaction to the incompatibility between Grice's theory of implicatures and Hawkins' reason-
ing (22) was to reject the latter, and to sketch an alternative account for the oddness of sentences
(10), which has nothing to do with scalar implicatures.
Heim's solution: antiuniqueness as an anti-presupposition Sentence (29a) triggers the infer-
ence that the corresponding sentence (29b) is false or at least not taken for granted. Following
Percus (2006) and Chemla (2008), let me call inferences such as the one illustrated in (29) ANTI-
PRESUPPOSITIONS.
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(29) a. John believes that Mary is pregnant.
b. Mary is pregnant.
Sauerland (2008) argues that anti-presuppositions are not presuppositions by means of the contrast
in (30), analogous to the one in (17) considered above. The oddness of the continuation in (30a)
3As pointed out to me by A. Kratzer (p.c.), this claim is not quite accurate for the case of Gazdar (1979). His system
dispenses altogether with Grice's Maxims, so that the current statement (25) is moot in the case of Gazdar. Yet, his definition
of"context update" (pp. 131-132; definitions XVI-XVII) is unable to derive the mismatching implicature needed by Hawkins
to account for the oddness of sentence (1 la). Furthermore, Gazdar's system does warrant a certain degree of mandatoriness
to implicatures, since he assumes that when an implicature and a presupposition mismatch, it is the implicature that wins over
the presupposition rather than the implicature being cancelled by the presupposition (see also subsection 2.5.2 below).
4Sauerland (2008) calls these inferences IMPLICATED PRESUPPOSITIONS.
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shows that the factivity presupposition triggered by 'know' projects universally from underneath the
universal quantifier 'every'. If the anti-factivity inference of 'believe' in (29a) were a presupposition,
then it would be expected to project universally too. But this prediction is contradicted by the fact
that the continuation in (30b) is perfectly fine.5
(30) a. Every audience member knows that his support was crucial for the team.
... #But only John's support was indeed crucial
b. Every audience member believes that his support was crucial for the team.
... But only John's support was indeed crucial
If anti-presuppositions cannot be encoded directly into the semantics as presuppositions, they must
come about in some more indirect way. There seems to be agreement in the literature that anti-
presuppositions come about through some sort of "competition" with corresponding presupposi-
tional alternatives. For example, that the anti-factivity inference of sentence (29a) somehow comes
about through "competition" with the alternative (31) whose predicate 'know' carries a factivity
presupposition. But what is exactly the nature of this competition?
(31) John knows that Mary is pregnant.
At this point, anti-presuppositions start to look very much like scalar implicatures. Yet, it has been
suggested that they are not scalar implicatures. On the one hand, the hypothesis that the anti-factivity
presupposition of sentence (29a) comes about as a scalar implicature triggered by competition with
the presuppositional alternative (31) runs into the issue (32), which is reminiscent of the Blindness
issue noted above in (25) or (27) with the first step of Hawkins' reasoning (22).6
(32) If the factivity presupposition carried by (31) is satisfied, then it is already common knowl-
edge that Mary is pregnant and thus it is not clear why (31) should count as more informative
than (29a) and thus preferable from the point of view of the maxim of Quantity (24). If the
factivity presupposition carried by (31) is not satisfied, then the alternative (31) would be
infelicitous and it could thus hardly compete with (29a).
On the other hand, Sauerland (2008) provides some empirical arguments that anti-presuppositions
behave differently from scalar implicatures. For instance, he notes that "a [... ] contrast between
implicatures and [anti-presuppositions] is their projection through negation. [Anti-presuppositions]
just like conventional presuppositions are not affected by negation. [Anti-presuppositions] clearly
contrast with scalar implicature in this way. Scalar implicatures are reversed in the scope of negation
and other downward entailing operators." To illustrate this special behavior of anti-presuppositions,
Sauerland notes that the anti-factivity anti-presupposition of sentence (29a) does not disappear when
'believe' is embedded in a DE environment, as in (33).
(33) I doubt that John believes that Mary is pregnant.
5 Another way of checking whether anti-presuppositions are presuppositions or not is to use the "Hey, wait a minute" test,
devised in von Fintel (2003) building on Shanon (1976). As shown in (i), true presuppositions pass the test. My judgment
concerning (ii) is not sharp. But I am inclined to say that the "Hey wait a minute" continuation in (ii) is worse than in
(i). If this judgment is correct, then the "Hey, wait a minute" test too shows that anti-presuppositions do not pattern with
presuppositions.
(i) A: John knows that Mary is pregnant.
B: Hey wait a minute: I didn't know that Mary is pregnant.
(ii) A: John believes that Mary is pregnant.
B: #Hey wait a minute, I though that we knew whether she is or not.
Further evidence that anti-presuppositions are not presuppositions is provided in Yatsushiro (2005). Following for instance
Sauerland (2008), she assumes that the existence inference triggered by 'every' is a presupposition while the antiuniqueness
inference triggered by 'every' is an anti-presupposition. She reports the following finding on 16 English speaking children in
the age range 3:11-5; 11: "The subjects responded adult-like 72% of the time [...] for the items testing for the knowledge of
the existence presupposition, whereas they responded 32% of the time [...] for the anti-uniqueness presupposition."
6 Schlenker (2006) offers a detailed discussion of this issue (32), based on the refined notion of common ground of
Stalnaker (2002).
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Since anti-presuppositions are neither presuppositions nor scalar implicatures, they must be a third
class of inferences, derived by an independent, dedicated mechanism. The core of this mechanism
is the idea that the use of presuppositional items is tightly constrained by dedicated principles, such
as the one loosely stated in (34) after Heim (1991). Following Sauerland (2008), I refer to (34)
as MAXIMIZE PRESUPPOSITION (henceforth: MP). The anti-factivity presupposition triggered by
(29a) thus arises by MP-competition with (31). MP is, in a sense, a variant of the maxim of Quantity
(24) that applies at the level of presuppositions. Yet, the two principles crucially differ in nature: the
maxim of Quantity (24) can be construed as a pragmatic, extra-grammatical principle that follows
from general principles of rationality; because of the issue in (32), MP must instead be construed as
a principle of grammar.
(34) Among a set of alternatives, use the felicitous sentence with the strongest presupposition.
Having enriched our typology of inferences with anti-presuppositions, we can now go back to
Hawkins' puzzle. If we assume the standard presuppositional semantics for the definite article
'the', then it is natural to construe the anti-uniqueness inference triggered by the indefinite 'a' in
Hawkins' sentences (10) as an anti-presupposition triggered by MP-competition with the singular
definite article. Under this assumption, the general scheme (12) becomes the account in (35).
(35) a. On the one hand, sentence (1 la) triggers the anti-presupposition that it does not follow
from common knowledge that the victim had a unique father.
b. On the other hand, common knowledge entails that people have a unique father.
c. In conclusion, the oddness of (11 a) follows from the mismatch between the anti-presupposition
in (35a) and the common knowledge in (35b).
The conclusion of the existing literature, with the partial exception of Schlenker (2006), seems to be
that anti-presuppositions are a separate, special class of inferences; that they are derived by a dedi-
cated grammatical constraint such as MP (34); and that the proper account of Hawkins' sentences is
in terms of anti-presuppositions, as in (35). See Sauerland (2008), Percus (2006) and Chemla (2008)
for refinements of this line of reasoning. And for other applications besides Hawkins' sentences
(10), see for instance Sauerland (2002, 2003a,c, 2004a), Schlenker (2005), Amsili and Beyssade
(2006), among others.
Against Heim's solution In a (p.c.) reported in Schlenker (2006), E. Chemla makes the point
that MP is too narrow in coverage because it does not extend to cases of oddness intuitively similar
to (10), where nonetheless presuppositions plausibly do not play any role. Let me discuss a slight
variant of Chemla's argument. 7 Consider sentence (36a), next to one of Hawkin's sentences (10),
such as the one repeated in (36b). Sentence (36a) is a small variant of sentence (36b), in which the
indefinite restricts a plural noun instead of a singular one. Both sentences sound odd: sentence (36a)
mismatches with the piece of common knowledge that people have only two parents; sentence (36b)
mismatches with the piece of common knowledge that people have only one father. Let me thus
investigate this small extension of Hawkins' puzzle.
(36) a. #Some parents of the victim got married (to each other) in the spring of 1972.
7 Chemla original argument was based on (i).
(i) John assigned the same grade to all of his students...
#He gave an A to some of them.
I cannot use this example (i) to argue against MP. In fact, in section 2.4 I will have to resort to the assumption that plural
definites trigger a HOMOGENEITY PRESUPPOSITION. Thus, sentence (ii) carries the presupposition that either John gave an
A to all of his students or he gave an A to none of them.
(ii) He gave them an A.
Thus, sentence (ii) does carry a presupposition that the original sentence (i) does not carry, and therefore MP (34) does
account for the oddness of the original sentence (i). To overcome this slight technical problem, I have replaced Chemla's
example (i) with the variant (36a), where the homogeneity presupposition is neutralized by the fact that that the predicate 'to
get married (to each other)' is collective.
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b. #John interviewed a father of the victim.
Hawkins' accounts for the oddness of sentence (36b) by competition with the corresponding sen-
tence with the indefinite replaced by the definite. Hawkins's reasoning straightforwardly extends to
the case of (36a), as made explicit in (37).
(37) a. On the one hand, sentence (36a) triggers the scalar implicature that the speaker is not in
a position to utter the corresponding sentence with the indefinite replaced by the definite,
i.e. the speaker does not know whether all parents of the victim got married in 1972.
b. On the other hand, common knowledge entails that people have only two parents, namely
that the truth of sentence (36a) entails the truth of the corresponding sentence with the
indefinite replaced by the definite.
c. In conclusion, the oddness of sentence (36a) follows from the mismatch between the
scalar implicature in (37a) and the common knowledge in (37b).
Heim accounts for the oddness of sentence (36b) by MP-competition with the corresponding sen-
tence with the indefinite replaced by the definite. Let me argue that Heim's account does not extend
to (36a), and is thus too narrow in coverage. As far as I can see, there are three relevant alternatives
for MP-competition with sentence (36a) to be considered, listed in (38).8
(38) a. The parents of the victim got married in the spring of 1972.
b. The two parents of the victim got married in the spring of 1972.
c. ?Both parents of the victim got married in the spring of 1972.
For the case (36b) of the singular noun, I have considered the alternative obtained by replacing the
indefinite with the definite and let MP make leverage on the uniqueness presupposition triggered by
the latter. But in the case of plural nouns, the alternative (38a) with the definite does not do the work,
since there is no uniqueness presupposition in the case of plural nouns. One might still invoke MP
with respect to the existential presupposition of the definite in (38a). But this strategy can hardly be
on the right track. Consider the variant of sentence (36a) in (39), obtained by replacing the plain
indefinite with a partitive. This variant (39) sounds just as odd as the sentence (36a) that I started
with. Yet, both (39) and the alternative (38a) now bear the existential presupposition, and thus MP
really has nothing to work on. In any case, the existential presupposition of the alternative (38a)
doesn't really seem to be playing any role here: the intuitive reason why sentence (36a) sounds
odd is that it mismatches with the common knowledge that people have two parents, not with the
common knowledge that people do have parents.
(39) #Some of the parents of the victim got married in the spring of 1972.
This failure with the alternative (38a) might suggest to slightly modify this initial alternative (38a)
as in (38b). If indeed (38b) were an MP-alternative of (36a), then the oddness of the latter could
be accounted for by the fact that the alternative (38b) carries the presupposition that the victim had
exactly two parents. But I think that this strategy does not work, because it is implausible that
(38b) is an MP-alternative of (36a). In fact, assume by contradiction that (38b) were indeed an MP-
alternative of (36a). If 'some' and 'the two' are alternatives, then a fortiori should 'the' and 'the
two' be alternatives as well, since they are even "closer to each other", so to speak. But the latter
cannot be MP-alternatives. In fact, if 'the' and 'the n' were MP-alternatives, then the fine sentence
(40) would be incorrectly ruled out by MP, as noted by Chemla (2006).
(40) Philippe broke the fingers of his left hand.
Finally, I submit that the alternative (38c) does not do the work simply because 'both' forces a
distributive reading which is incompatible with collective predicates, such as 'got married (to each
other) in 1972'.
8Here and throughout this work, italics in the examples is used to highlight to the reader some special features of the
example, not to signal focus. In order to signal focus, I use the subscript 'F'.
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Back to Hawkins' proposal The main reason for abandoning Hawkins' reasoning (22) had to
do with its incompatibility with a theory whereby scalar implicatures are construed as pragmatic,
extra-grammatical inferences, as stated in (25)-(26) and (27)-(28). Yet, the pragmatic theory of
implicatures has recently been challenged for independent reasons and an alternative grammatical
theory of scalar implicatures has been suggested, in works such as Chierchia (2004), Fox (2007a),
Chierchia (2006a), and Chierchia et al. (to appear), among others. According to this alternative the-
ory, scalar implicatures are derived through a purely grammatical algorithm. For instance, according
to Fox's (2007) implementation of this idea, scalar implicatures are brought about by a covert version
of 'only' syntactically realized at LF. The goal of chapter 2 is to argue in favor of Hawkins' account
(22) from the perspective of this new grammatical theory of implicatures. I will try to put forward a
variant of the grammatical theory of implicatures that copes with the Blindness issue (25)-(26) and
the Mandatoriness issue (27)-(28). Furthermore, I will argue that, once the Blindness issue is taken
care of, the related issue in (32), against construing anti-presuppositions as plain scalar inferences,
is neutralized. Finally, I will argue that Sauerland's empirical arguments that scalar implicatures
and anti-presuppositions have different empirical properties, such as the one in (33), does not hold
against closer scrutiny. I will thus suggest that anti-presuppositions are not a special, separate class
of inferences but run-of-the-mill scalar implicatures, with the only special but irrelevant property
that they are triggered by presuppositional alternatives.
1.3 The solution: i-predicates and scalar implicatures
The version of the theory of scalar implicatures developed in chapter 2 provides the background
for a theory of i-predicates based on blind and mandatory scalar implicatures that mismatch with
what common knowledge encodes about i-predicates. Predecessors of this idea are Musan (1997),
Maienborn (2004) and Percus (1997, Chapter 2). I sketch the idea in a nutshell in this section.
The classical solution As reviewed in Subsection 1.1, the s-/i-predicates distinction has many
grammatical reflexes. Thus, it looks like the distinction should be grammatically encoded. Various
ways to encode this distinction into grammar have been suggested in the literature. A sample is
provided in (41).
(41) a. Kratzer (1995): an i-predicate lacks a Davidsonian argument, contrary to s-predicates.
b. Chierchia (1995): an i-predicate bears a special feature that forces local agreement with
a covert generic operator which mandatorily binds the Davidsonian argument of the i-
predicate.
c. Diesing (1992): an i-predicate is selected by a special inflectional head that requires the
subject of the i-predicate to be base generated directly in [Spec, wP], rather than in [Spec,
vr'P] as it is the case for s-predicates.
Kratzer (1995) suggests that the s-/i-predicates distinction is encoded as a distinction in argumental
structure, as in (41a). The ban in (2) and (3) against 'sometimes' or 'always' with i-predicates thus
immediately follows from the fact that these adverbs have nothing to quantify over in the case of i-
predicates. Chierchia (1995) suggests that the s-/i-predicates distinction is encoded as a distinction in
syntactic features, as in (41b). Thus, the Davidsonian argument of an i-predicate is always bound by
a covert operator and therefore inaccessible to overt adverbs, thus accounting for why 'sometimes'
or 'always' are banned in the presence of i-predicates. Diesing (1992) suggests the further syntactic
characterization (41c). She shows how to derive from this assumption the restriction on the readings
of BPSs of i-predicates in (7) as well as the restriction on German word order in (9).
An alternative solution In chapter 3, I will explore a very different take on these facts. Let me
take at face value the initial intuition that the i-predicates (la) denote properties that are necessarily
permanent, contrary to s-predicates. In other words, what is special about the i-predicate 'tall' is
that it cannot happen that a given individual, say John, happens to be tall at some times in his life
span but not at some others, i.e. the situation depicted in (42a) can never hold. Let me generalize
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this situation by saying that an arbitrary unary Predicate is HOMOGENEOUS w.r.t. a Restrictor iff it
cannot happen that some elements in the Restrictor satisfy the Predicate and some others don't, i.e.
the situation depicted in (42b) can never hold. Thus, I am assuming that all that's special about the
i-predicate 'tall' is that it is homogeneous w.r.t. John's life span. 9
(42) a. times when John is alive b. Restrictor
times when John is tall Predicate
As noted at the end of section 1.1, a theory of i-predicates should account for why i-predicates cannot
do the many things that s-predicates can do. If all that's special about i-predicates is that they are
homogeneous, then there should be no properties peculiar to i-predicates; rather, all properties of i-
predicates should extend to arbitrary homogeneous predicates. Chapter 3 argues that this prediction
is borne out. I will consider various properties of i-predicates, such as those previewed in section
1.1, and I will show that each one of them formally corresponds to some of the cases considered
in chapter 2, that contain a homogeneous predicate that is not an i-predicate. If indeed there are no
specific properties of i-predicates, then specific assumption on i-predicates such as (41) cannot be
on the right track, because they do not extend to arbitrary homogeneous predicates. In chapter 3,
I will thus try to do without such specific assumptions and to derive instead the proper theory of
i-predicates as a theorem of the more general theory of oddness independently developed in chapter
2. Let me preview the argument by discussing informally a couple of cases.
Adverbs . Consider again the odd sentence (2b), repeated below in (43a), together with the odd
sentence (44a), that has nothing to do with i-predicates.
(43) a. #John is sometimes tall.
b. John is tall.
(44) a. #Some Italians come from a beautiful country.
b. Italians come from a beautiful country.
In chapter 2, I will suggest that the oddness of sentence (44a) can be accounted for by means of
the informal piece of reasoning in (45), which is identical to the piece of reasoning in (22) used by
Hawkins (1991) to account for the oddness of his examples (10).
(45) a. On the one hand, sentence (44a) triggers the scalar implicature that the speaker cannot
presume that all Italians come from a beautiful country.
b. On the other hand, common knowledge entails that all Italians come from the same
country, hence (44a) cannot be true without all Italians coming from a beautiful country.
c. In conclusion, the oddness of sentence (44a) follows from the mismatch between the
scalar implicature in (45a) and common knowledge in (45b).
The predicate 'to come from a beautiful country' is homogeneous w.r.t. to the restrictor 'Italians',
in the sense that the situation depicted in (46), where some Italians come from a beautiful country
while some others do not, cannot hold.
9 Actually, the scenario represented in (42a) mismatches with common knowledge for two different and unrelated reasons.
The first reason is the one mentioned in the text, namely that (42a) depicts a scenario where there are some times in John's
life span when he is tall and some others when he is not. The second reason is that (42a) depicts a scenario where there
are times when John is tall but not alive. This second reason is completely irrelevant to my point. From this perspective, I
should have actually made the set corresponding to "times when John is tall" be a (proper) subset of the set corresponding
to "times when John is alive" in (42a). The reason why I have not drawn (42a) that way is to stress the analogy with other
cases that have nothing to do with i-predicates. For instance, in the case of (46) I do not want the set corresponding to "comes
from a beautiful country" to be a subset of the set corresponding to "Italians", because there might be other countries that are
beautiful, besides Italy.
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(46) Italians
comes from a beautiful country
The two cases (43a) and (44a) are thus completely parallel: an existential quantifier binds the ar-
gument of a predicate that is homogeneous w.r.t. the corresponding restrictor. In chapter 3, I will
take advantage of this parallelism and suggest that literally the same account (45) carries over to the
oddness of sentence (43a), as in (47). Thus, the ban against existential quantifiers with i-predicates
follows as a special case of the general ban against existential quantification over the argument of a
homogeneous predicate.
(47) a. On the one hand, sentence (43a) triggers the scalar implicature that the speaker cannot
presume that John is always tall.
b. On the other hand, it follows from common knowledge that tallness is a property stable
through time, hence (43a) cannot be true without John being always tall.
c. In conclusion, the oddness of (43a) follows from the mismatch between the scalar im-
plicature (47a) and common knowledge (47b).
The parallelism between i-predicates and arbitrary homogeneous predicates extends to universal
quantification. Consider the odd sentence (3b), repeated below in (48a), together with the odd sen-
tence (49a), which has nothing to do with i-predicates.
(48) a. #John is always tall.
b. John is tall.
(49) a. #Every Italian comes from a beautiful country.
b. Italians come from a beautiful country.
In chapter 2, I'll suggest that the oddness of sentence (49a) can be accounted for by means of a piece
of reasoning once more analogous to Hawkins' piece of reasoning (22): assume that the alternative
(49b) contains a generic operator binding the variable introduced by the bare plural 'Italians'; fol-
lowing Fodor (1970), von Fintel (1997) and much subsequent literature, assume that this generic
operator triggers the HOMOGENEITY PRESUPPOSITION that either all or no Italians come from a
beautiful country; thus, an utterance of the odd sentence (49a) triggers the implicature that this
homogeneity presupposition is false; but this implicature mismatches with the piece of common
knowledge that all Italians come from the same country. In chapter 3, I will suggest that this same
account straightforwardly carries over to the oddness of sentence (48a), since its alternative (48b)
too contains a covert generic operator that quantifies over the time argument of the i-predicate 'tall'
and carries an homogeneity presupposition that John is either always or never tall.
Bare plural subjects Consider the lack of the existential reading of the bare plural subject of
sentence (7b), repeated below in (50a), together with the odd sentence (51a), which is a variant of
an example discussed by Percus (2001), and has nothing to do with i-predicates.
(50) a. Firemen are tall.
b. Some Firemen are tall.
(51) Context: five different competitions were held separately, Monday through Friday; both John
and Bill know that the same guy won all five of them:
M T W T F
winner: x x x x x
John wants to know more about this amazing guy, and thus asks Bill for more information.
Bill replies as follows:
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a. #On every day, a/some fireman won.
b. A/Some fireman won on every day.
Contrary to the case of the fine sentence (51b), the existential quantifier over firemen in the odd
sentence (5 1la) has narrow scope with respect to the universal quantifier over days, because of overt
fronting of the latter. In chapter 2, I will derive the oddness of sentence (51a) from this scope
configuration by means of the informal piece of reasoning in (52), which is identical to the piece of
reasoning in (22) used by Hawkins (1991) to account for the oddness of his examples (10). For the
time being, let me not worry on how exactly the scalar implicature in (52a) is derived.
(52) a. On the one hand, an utterance of (51a) triggers the implicature that the stronger alterna-
tive (5 1b), with the opposite scope configuration, is false;
b. On the other hand, common knowledge entails that the same guy always won, hence
(51a) cannot be true without (51b) being true too.
c. In conclusion, the oddness of (51a) follows from the mismatch between the scalar im-
plicature in (52a) and the common knowledge in (52b).
The predicate 'win' is homogeneous in the context considered in (51), in the sense that the situation
depicted in (53), where a given individual, say John, won on some days of the week but not on some
others, cannot hold. Furthermore, it is crucial that the indefinite 'a/some fireman' has scope below
the universal quantifier 'on every day' in the odd sentence (51a), since sentence (51b), where the
scope is reversed, is acceptable.
(53) days of the week
days at which John won
The two cases (50) and (51) are thus completely parallel. In fact, the predicate 'tall' is homogeneous
with respect to the time argument. Furthermore, the alleged existential bare plural subject of sentence
(50a) could only have the narrowest scope, because of a general tendency of existential bare plurals
to always take the narrowest possible scope, exemplified by well known contrasts such as the one in
(54), from Carlson (1977).
(54) a. Some dogs hung around my house all last week. B-dogs > all last week.
b. Dogs hung around my house all last week. *B-dogs > all last week.
In chapter 3, I will take advantage of this parallelism and suggest that literally the same account
(52) carries over to the lack of the existential reading of the bare plural subject of the i-predicate of
sentence (50a). I give a rough sketch of the reasoning in (55). Here, I am assuming that, if a sentence
is ambiguous and one of its two readings is odd, the sentence is fine but the odd reading gets hidden.
(55) a. The existential bare plural subject of sentence (50a) has narrow scope with respect to the
operator that binds the time argument of the predicate, because that is always the case
with existential bare plurals; thus, sentence (50a) with the bare plural subject construed
existentially triggers the scalar implicature that the corresponding sentence (50b) with
wide scope existential quantifier over firemen is false.
b. But common knowledge entails that, if at every time there is a fireman who is tall at that
time, then there has got to be a fireman who is tall at every time.
c. The unavailability of the existential reading of the bare plural subject of (50a) thus fol-
lows from the mismatch between the scalar implicature (55a) and the common knowl-
edge (55b).
In chapter 3, I will show that this account extends to various other facts concerning bare plural
subjects of i-predicates, such as Fox's contrast (8) and the restriction on German word order (9).
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1.4 Implications
The following two claims (56) have been defended in the recent literature. Chierchia (2006b) and
Fox (2007a) among others defend claim (56a): they suggest that scalar implicatures arise because
of a syntactically realized exhaustivity operator. Chierchia (2004) and Krifka (1995) among oth-
ers illustrate (56b): they suggest an account for NPIs and their intervention effect based on scalar
implicatures. Part I of my dissertation contributes to both claims (56).
(56) a. Scalar implicatures must be derived within grammar, rather than in the extra-grammatical
domain of pragmatics.
b. A grammatical theory of scalar implicatures can be used to provide a semantic account
for various grammatical facts.
In chapter 2, I will contribute to claim (56a). I will discuss various cases of odd sentences and I will
argue that their oddness follows from the fact that they trigger scalar implicatures that mismatch with
common knowledge, as initially proposed by Hawkins' account (22) for the oddness of sentences
(10). Building on a remark by Heim (1991), I have noted that, in order for this account to work, it is
crucial that strengthening be blind to common knowledge. And that this hypothesis makes no sense
within the pragmatic theory of scalar implicatures. I will try to make sense of this hypothesis within
a framework where scalar implicatures arise through a syntactically realized operator. The debate
between the pragmatic and the grammatical approaches to scalar implicatures is currently alive in
the literature: see Sauerland (2004c), Russell (2004), Horn (2005), Geurts (2009) among others,
for a defense of the original pragmatic approach; see Fox (2007a), Chierchia (2007) and Chierchia
et al. (2007) for a defense and various implementations of the grammatical approach. To the extent
that my defense of Hawkins' proposal will be successful, it will contribute to this debate, providing
evidence in favor of the grammatical framework and against the pragmatic one. In chapter 3, I will
contribute one more example of (56b). As sketched in (41), various facts pertaining to i-predicates
have been so far accounted by dedicated grammatical assumptions. I will suggest that all that's
special about i-predicates is that it follows from common knowledge that they are homogeneous
w.r.t. time. To make my point, I will try to argue that various properties of i-predicates extend to
arbitrary homogeneous predicates. And I will derive various properties of i-predicates from the
version of the theory of scalar implicatures independently defended in chapter 2. I will thus provide
one more example of an account based on scalar implicatures for facts that had been so far accounted
for through core grammar.
Chapter 2
Oddness by mismatching scalar
implicatures
Sentence (57) sounds odd because it somehow mismatches with the piece of common knowledge
that all Italians come from the same country. How does this mismatch happen? As reviewed in
section 1.2, this question is not trivial, and it has been indeed the topic of an intense debate in the
very recent literature. In this chapter, I will address this question.
(57) #Some Italians come from a beautiful country.
To illustrate my take on this question, let me turn to the case of the odd sentence (58). I think that
there can hardly be any debate on the source of the oddness of this sentence: it sounds odd because
it says' that some but not all Italians come from a beautiful country, which is false in every world
compatible with the piece of common knowledge that all Italians come from the same country. This
has got to be the reason for the oddness of sentence (58). No debate in this case!
(58) #Only someF Italians come from a beautiful country.
A recent theory of scalar implicatures says that scalar implicatures are not a post-grammatical, prag-
matic phenomenon. Rather, scalar implicatures are derived in the syntax by appending to LFs a
phonologically covert variant of 'only', notated EXH and called the EXHAUSTIVITY OPERATOR.
Thus, the pair of (57) and (58) can be made more explicit as in (59). Faced with the parallelism in
(59), it is tempting to say that the initial sentence (57) sounds odd for exactly the same obvious rea-
son why sentence (58) sounds odd. Namely, because its LF (59a) says that some but not all Italians
come from a beautiful country. This is of course just a restatement of Hawkins' account (22).
(59) a. #EXH some Italians come from a beautiful country.
b. #Only some Italians come from a beautiful country.
The goal of this chapter is to investigate how far does this intuitive idea get. Section 2.1 starts with
simple cases and formalizes the idea: it reviews from the literature the idea that scalar implicatures
are derived in the grammar by means of a covert exhaustivity operator and addresses the Blindness
issue (25)/(27) and the Mandatoriness issue (26)/(28) on this theoretical background. Section 2.2
turns to cases where mismatch with common knowledge arises not from a single implicature but
rather from the coordinated action of a whole bunch of implicatures. Section 2.3 discusses cases
where the scalar item that triggers the mismatching implicature is embedded underneath some other
operator, paying particular attention to the case where the embedding operator is downward entail-
ing. Section 2.4 explores the hypothesis that anti-presuppositions should be subsumed under the
general case of scalar implicatures. Finally, section 2.5 collects various miscellaneous issues. None
of the examples considered in this chapter have anything to do with i-predicates. In chapter 3, I will
turn to i-predicates and argue that their properties can be derived as a theorem of the more general
SIgnoring the issue of the division of labor between presupposition and assertion in the proper semantics of 'only'.
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theory of oddness developed in this chapter, since each one of the properties of i-predicates consid-
ered in the next chapter will turn out to formally correspond to one of the examples studied in this
chapter.
2.1 The basic case
The two sentences in each pair (60)-(64) are contextually equivalent. Yet, the (a) sentences with
'some' sound odd while the contextually equivalent (b) sentences with the definite sound fine. 2
Example (61) is adapted from Percus (2001); example (62) is due to a (p.c.) by E. Chemla reported
in Schlenker (2006); example (63) is due to Spector (2007a).
(60) Mary is conducting a survey on names and last names of Italian children. She knows that all
children inherit the last name of their father; hence, all children of a given couple share the
same last name. This week, she has interviewed the children of five couples, A through E,
in order to record their names and last names...
a. #Some children of couple C have a long last name.
b. The children of couple C have a long last name.
(61) Alluding to the Marx Brothers:
a. #The mother of one of them was named Minnie.
b. Their mother was named Minnie.
(62) In a department where every professor assigns the same grade to all of his students:
a. #This year, prof. Smith gave an A to some of his students.
b. This year, prof. Smith gave an A to his students.
(63) Speaking of the atoms of a molecule which cannot be separated:
a. #Some atoms went right.
b. The atoms went right.
(64) a. #Some Italians come from a beautiful country.
b. Italians come from a beautiful country.
The two sentences in (65), from Fox (2004), are contextually equivalent, since common knowledge
ensures that (65a) with the small numeral is equivalent to (65b) with the large numeral. Yet, (65a)
with the small numeral sounds odd while (65b) with the large numeral sounds fine.
(65) John has an odd number of children...
a. #He has two children.
b. He has three children.
The two sentences in the two pairs (66) and (67) are contextually equivalent, since common knowl-
edge ensures that the (a) sentences with disjunction or with a single disjunct are equivalent to the
corresponding (b) sentences with conjunction. Yet, the (a) sentences with disjunction or with a sin-
gle disjunct sound odd while the equivalent (b) sentences with conjunction sound fine. Example (66)
is due to Hurford (1974).
(66) John and Mary travelled from Vienna to Paris together...
a. #John or Mary travelled by train.
b. John and Mary traveled by train.
(67) John and Mary travelled from Vienna to Paris together...
a. #John traveled by train.
2 For the case of (64), I assume that sentence (64b) contains a generic operator which is akin to the definite article; see
Ferreira (2005) for a discussion of parallelisms between the definite article and the generic operator. The pattern is more
uniform in Italian, where sentence (64b) would have a definite.
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b. John and Mary traveled by train.
In this section, I formalize the idea that the (a) sentences just listed feel odd because they contain a
covert 'only'. Subsection 2.1.1 reviews from the literature the hypothesis of a covert 'only'. Sub-
section 2.1.2 addresses the Blindness issue (25)/(27). Subsection 2.1.3 addreses the Mandatoriness
issue (26)/(28).
2.1.1 First step: covert 'only'
According to the neo-Gricean framework, grammar pairs each sentence with a PLAIN MEANING
and scalar implicatures are then computed on the basis of this meaning by an extra-grammatical pro-
cedure rooted in general-purpose principles of rationality. Chierchia (2004), building on Landman
(1998), Levinson (2000) and Cohen (1971), questions this approach by arguing that it fails to ac-
count for a pattern of implicatures in embedded contexts. He then goes on to sketch a very different
framework, whereby scalar implicatures are derived through a purely grammatical algorithm, to be
conceived of as a grammaticalization of the standard Gricean reasoning. Thus, grammar pairs each
sentence with both a plain meaning and a STRENGTHENED MEANING, namely the plain meaning
enriched with its scalar implicatures. Fox (2007a) notes that the strengthened meaning of sentences
(68a), (69a) and (70a) can be paraphrased as the plain meaning of the corresponding sentences (68b),
(69b) and (70b), with overt 'only'.
(68) a. John bought three houses.
b. John only bought threeF houses.
(69) a. John did some of the homework.
b. John only did someF of the homework.
(70) a. John talked to Mary or Sue.
b. John only talked to Mary orF Sue.
The situation in (68)-(70) is similar to the one in (71). English has an overt distributivity operator
'each', that makes it possible in (71b) to apply the distributive predicate denoted by 'tall' to the plural
individual denoted by the definite subject 'the kids'. Sentence (71a), without the overt operator
'each', sounds completely equivalent to the corresponding sentence (71b). A standard strategy to
account for this parallelism is to assume that English has a phonologically covert variant of 'each',
called the DISTRIBUTIVITY OPERATOR and notated DIST. The LF of sentence (71a) contains this
covert operator and is thus identical to the LF of sentence (71b).
(71) a. The kids are tall.
b. The kids each are tall.
Fox (2007a) suggests that the parallelism in (68)-(70) should be handled in quite the same way. He
assumes that Natural Language has a phonologically covert variant of 'only', called the EXHAUSTIV-
ITY OPERATOR and notated EXH. And that the strengthened meaning of the sentences (68a)-(70a) is
the plain meaning of the corresponding LFs adorned with this special covert propositional operator
EXH, as stated in (72). Various arguments have been provided in the literature in favor of this as-
sumption (72). One argument is that (72) allows for the exhaustivity operator to appear in embedded
contexts, thus straightforwardly accounting for various patters of embedded implicatures; see Fox
(2007a) and Chierchia et al. (2007). Another argument is that (72) allows for the the exhaustivity
operator to be iterated, as noted in Spector (2006), Spector (2007a) and Fox (2007a).
(72) strengthened meaning of sentence W = [ [EXH W] 1.
Many approaches to the semantics of 'only' or, equivalently, of the exhaustivity operator EXH share
the structure in (73): 3 EXH(o) asserts o and furthermore negates a bunch of alternatives 0, namely
all the alternatives in the set Excl(p) of ALTERNATIVES EXCLUDABLE W.R.T. W. Each conjunct
3Here and throughout the paper, I sloppily use the same symbol W for both an LF and its truth conditions.
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-nV in (73) is called a SCALAR IMPLICATURE of the prejacent o. The set Excl(p) of alternatives
excludable w.r.t. W is a subset of the set Alt(p) of SCALAR ALTERNATIVES of p. Thus, these various
definitions of the exhaustivity operator differ in how they define the two sets Alt(p) and Excl((p).
(73) EXH(p) = o A A -'0.
The standard definition of the set Alt(p) of the scalar alternatives of a sentence V is the one in (74),
whereby scalar alternatives of W are obtained by arbitrarily replacing scalar items in o with their
Horn-mates. I will present my assumptions on Horn-scales one at the time, as I need them.
(74) The set Alt(p) contains all and only those O's that can be obtained from W by replacing one
or more scalar items in V with their Horn-mates.
The classical definition of the set £xcl( o) of alternatives excludable w.r.t. a sentence V is (75),
whereby Excl(p) is the set of all the scalar alternatives ,'s which asymmetrically entail p.
(75) £xcl(p) = { E Alt(p) --+ o, ' 74 }.
In section 2.2, I will pause to consider refinements of the current definition (74) of the set of scalar
alternatives and of the current definition (75) of the set of excludable alternatives, suggested in Fox
(2007a).
2.1.2 Second step: blindness
In this subsection, I discuss the Blindness issue (25)/(27) for Hawkins' original proposal (22). As
noted above, the Gricean or neo-Gricean framework is incompatible with the hypothesis that scalar
implicatures are computed blind to common knowledge: if the computation of implicatures is driven
by general-purpose principles of rationality, then it cannot be encapsulated in such a way as to
ensure blindness to common knowledge. In this section, I try to suggest that the opposite holds true
for the grammatical theory of scalar implicatures, namely that this framework is incompatible with
the hypothesis that scalar implicature are computed taking common knowledge into account. My
discussion follows closely Fox and Hackl (2006, Sect. 5).
The issue The definition of the exhaustivity operator EXH introduced in the preceding subsection
makes use of the notion of entailment. To complete the definition of the exhaustivity operator, I thus
need to spell out the relevant notion of entailment. Let W be the set of all possible worlds. Let Wok
be the subset of those possible worlds where COMMON KNOWLEDGE holds. Common knowledge
can be of two types. It can be true, realistic, well entrenched common knowledge, such as the piece
of knowledge that people have two eyes of the same color or that all Italians come from the same
country. Or it can be an arbitrary piece of knowledge turned into shared knowledge by virtue of some
preceding text. Throughout the paper, I will not distinguish between oddness that arises because of
mismatch against one or the other of these two types of common knowledge, but I will always try
to illustrate each pattern with examples of both kinds.4 Once the two sets of possible worlds W and
Wck are in place, the notion of entailment can be spelled out in two different ways: as LOGICAL
entailment or as entailment GIVEN COMMON KNOWLEDGE Wk. The definitions are provided in
(76). Of course, both notions of entailment amount to set-inclusion. The difference between the
two notions is that set-inclusion is only checked within Wek in the case of (76b). I denote logic
entailment by "-+.," and entailment given common knowledge by "- Wk
(76) For any two propositions V, ¢:
a. 4 LOGICALLY entails W iff V C p.
41n many cases, it looks like mismatch against a realistic, well entrenched piece of common knowledge yields a "stronger"
oddness effect than mismatch against some piece of knowledge introduced by a preceding text. My proposal does not attempt
at modeling this gradience. I implicitly assume that the intensity of the oddness effect is a function of the entrenchment of
the corresponding piece of common knowledge. The degree of the latter is not a matter of linguistics. Thus, the degree of the
oddness effect is not a matter of linguistics either.
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b. 0 entails W GIVEN COMMON KNOWLEDGE Wk iff cv k n w g .
I will come back to the issue of the proper definition of logic entailment in subsection ??. Which one
of these two notions of entailment is the one relevant for the definition of the exhaustivity operator
EXH? This subsection addresses this question.
The idea Assume that scalar implicatures are indeed computed by a grammatical module. This
would have to be a grammatical module sensitive to some notion of entailment. We can thus address
the question just raised by looking at which notion of entailment is used by other entailment-sensitive
grammatical modules. It turns out that there is some evidence that such modules are sensitive to logic
entailment rather than to contextual entailment; let me quickly review two such examples, provided
in Fox (2000, §2.5) and Gajewski (2003). Fox (2000) argues that covert movement is subject to the
constraint SCOPE ECONOMY, which roughly says that a quantifier can undergo covert movement in
English only if the pre-movement LF and the post-movement LF are not equivalent. 5 This statement
of course raises the question of whether the relevant notion of equivalence is logic equivalence or
equivalence relative to common knowledge. Fox provides evidence that Scope Economy must be
stated in terms of logical equivalence, not in terms of equivalence given common knowledge. Thus,
the module which checks Scope Economy is an example of an entailment-sensitive grammatical
module which is blind to common knowledge. Gajewski (2003) provides a second example of an
entailment-sensitive grammatical module blind to common knowledge. He reviews some recent lit-
erature where a CONTRADICTORINESS FILTER is used to account for the deviance of a sentence on
the basis of its contradictoriness; see for instance Chierchia (1988, Sect. II.3.3), Barwise and Cooper
(1991) and von Fintel (1993); and see Ladusaw (1986) for discussion. For instance, von Fintel
(1993) derives the deviance of the 'but'-phrase in (77a) from the fact that the sentence is necessarily
contradictory, given a proper semantics for 'but'-phrases. Yet, Gajewski notes that contradictoriness
in general does not result in deviance, as in the case of the embedded clause in (77b).6 What is the
relevant difference between the two cases (77a) and (77b)? Gajewsky suggests that the Contradic-
toriness Filter is checked at a level of representation where only logical operators are retained, while
non-logical lexical entries are ignored, together with the common knowledge that they carry along.
At this special level of representation, only sentence (77a) yields a contradiction, while the embed-
ded clause of (77b) does not. Thus, the module that checks the Contradictoriness Filter is another
example of an entailment-sensitive grammatical module which is blind to common knowledge.
(77) a. #Some students but Bill passed the exam.
b. Your assumptions entail that [Socrates is mortal and immortal].
I thus conclude that there is some independent evidence that entailment-sensitive grammatical al-
gorithms are blind to common knowledge. Assume now that scalar implicatures are not pragmatic
inferences but rather are computed by a dedicated entailment-sensitive grammatical algorithm, as
suggested by the Grammatical framework for scalar implicatures. Then it makes sense to assume
that the latter algorithm should be blind to common knowledge too, namely that the notion of entail-
ment relevant for the computation of scalar implicatures is that of logic entailment (76a) rather than
that of contextual entailment (76b).
The proposal So far, I have considered the blindness issue from the general perspective of the
grammatical framework to scalar implicatures. Now I want to concentrate on the specific instance of
the grammatical framework reviewed in subsection 2.1.1. According to this specific proposal, scalar
implicatures are derived by appending to the LF a covert exhaustivity operator EXH. This operator
is construed as a covert variant of overt 'only'. It thus makes sense to assume that the two operators
differ from each other only minimally. For the sake of the argument, let me take the analogy perhaps
a step too far, and assume that (73) is also the proper semantics of overt 'only', as stated in (78). It
thus makes some sense to try to address the question of whether the exhaustivity operator is blind to
5See (373) below for a more precise formulation.
6Which is a variant of Gajewski's examples considered in Fox and Hackl (2006).
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common knowledge by addressing the corresponding question for overt 'only', then extending the
solution to the covert exhaustivity operator by analogy.
(78) [only (p) = p A A -0.
kC=Excl(w)
Let's consider again the odd sentence (57b) with overt 'only', repeated below in (79). Let p be the
prejacent of 'only', as in (79a); let 4 be the corresponding alternative with 'some' replaced by 'all',
as in (79b). This sentence mismatches with the piece of common knowledge that all Italians come
from the same country. The most straightforward account for this mismatch is as follows: by (78),
the plain meaning of sentence (79) entails the negation of the alternative 4. Yet, if the computation
of the set £xcl() of excludable alternatives in (78) could take common knowledge into account,
then the prejacent p with 'some' and the alternative 4 with 'every' would be equivalent and thus the
latter alternative 4 would not be excludable. I thus conclude that the proper computation of the set
of excludable alternatives for overt 'only' must be blind to common knowledge.
(79) #Only someF Italians come from a beautiful country.
a. p = Some Italians come from a beautiful country.
b. 4 = All Italian come from a beautiful country.
Yet, this conclusion is threatened by the following alternative account. Assume that the computation
of the set of excludable alternatives for overt 'only' is not at all blind to common knowledge. Thus,
the alternative 4 in (79b) does not belong to the set of excludable alternatives of the prejacent V
in (79a). The oddness of sentence (79) is thus not due to any mismatch with common knowledge.
Rather, the oddness of sentence (79) can be explained as follows. Since 4 in (79b) is not excludable,
then the set of excludable alternatives is empty in the case of (79). Overt 'only' is therefore vacuous.
And sentence (79) is ruled out by the same general constraint that bans the vacuous occurrence of
'only' in sentence (80).
(80) #Only everyF boy arrived.
Yet, I think that this alternative explanation can be counterattacked by considering cases with mul-
tiple alternatives, such as (81). Suppose that the set of excludable alternatives of overt 'only' is
computed taking into account the common knowledge that John has an odd number of children.
In this case, the alternative 4 that John has (at least)7 three children is not excludable, since it is
equivalent to the prejacent p that John has (at least) two children in the context considered. Yet,
the occurrence of 'only' in this sentence (81) is in no way vacuous, because it can still negate the
alternative 4' that John has (at least) four children. Thus, the hypothesis that the semantics of 'only'
is sensitive to common knowledge leads to the incorrect prediction that the sentence 'John has only
two' should be fine in the context considered, and furthermore should mean that John has exactly
three children!
(81) John has an odd number of children...
... #He has only twoF.
a. p = John has at least two.
b. 4 = John has at least three.
c. 4' = John has at least four.
Based on these considerations, I conclude that the set of excludable alternatives for overt 'only' is
computed using logic entailment (76a) and is therefore blind to common knowledge. By virtue of the
analogy between overt 'only' and the covert exhaustivity operator EXH, I thus suggest (82), namely
7I take the fact that 'only' can be construed with a numeral as evidence that numerals do have a week semantics, as shown
by the contrast in (i)
(i) a. John has only twoF children.
b. #John has only exactly twoF children.
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that the computation of the strengthened meaning EXH(W) of a sentence V is blind to common
knowledge. I'll thus dub (82) the BLINDNESS HYPOTHESIS (henceforth: BH).
(82) BLINDNESS HYPOTHESIS. The notion of entailment relevant for the definition of the exhaus-
tivity operator EXH is that of logical entailment rather than that of entailment given common
knowledge Wk"
I started out with the intuition (25) that the BH (82) cannot be true, because the corresponding theory
of implicatures would sound somewhat paradoxical. And I have concluded that the BH (82) cannot
be false, because the corresponding theory of implicatures would paradoxically predict the sentence
'John has (only) two children' to be able to mean in some circumstances that he has exactly three!
2.1.3 Third step: mandatoriness
In this subsection, I discuss the Mandatoriness issue (26)/(28) for Hawkins' original proposal (22).
More precisely, I spell out a rather straightforward account of the context-dependence of scalar im-
plicatures within the version of the grammatical theory of scalar implicatures reviewed in subsection
2.1.1. And I argue that this account for context-dependence is compatible with the surprising manda-
toriness of those special scalar implicatures that happen to mismatch with common knowledge.
The issue Let's say that a scalar implicature is mandatory if it is generated by default without any
triggering effect of context. Granted that implicatures are indeed computed blind to common knowl-
edge according to the BH (82), sentence (57a), repeated in (83a), may trigger the scalar implicature
that the logically stronger alternative (83b) is false, which mismatches with the piece of common
knowledge that all Italians come form the same country.
(83) a. #Some Italians come from a beautiful country.
b. All Italians come from a beautiful country.
But of course, this is not enough: in order to derive the oddness of sentence (83a), I need to assume
that this mismatching implicature must be computed, namely that this mismatching implicature is
mandatory. Yet, this hypothesis is at odds with the very well known fact that implicatures in general
are not mandatory. To illustrate, consider for instance sentence (84c): as an answer to the question
(84a), it triggers the scalar implicature that B doesn't know whether John is available before dinner;
but as an answer to question (84b), it doesn't quite seem to implicate that, but rather that no one else
besides John is available after dinner.
(84) a. A: When is John usually available?
b. A': Who is usually available after dinner?
c. B: John is usually available after dinner.
In conclusion, I need a way to reconcile the alleged mandatoriness of mismatching implicatures with
the fact that standard non-mismatching implicatures are not mandatory at all.s
The idea Here is a possible way to go.9 Scalar alternatives can be relevant or not in a given context.
Of course, if a scalar alternative ?p is not relevant, then it triggers no implicature -V. In the context
8A completely analogous problem arises for Chierchia's (2004) account for the intervention effect with NPI's in terms of
scalar implicatures. Chierchia (2006b) offer a syntactic solution to the problem. As far as I can see, his proposal does not
extend to my case.
9An alternative way to go, suggested to me by Benjamin Spector (p.c.), would be to exploit the distinction between primary
and secondary implicatures, introduced by Sauerland (2004c). PRIMARY scalar implicatures are ignorance inferences of the
form "it is not the case that the speaker believes that..." (in brief: -Bspeaker P). SECONDARY scalar implicatures have
the opposite scope between negation and the belief operator, namely have the form "the speaker believes that it is not the
case that..." (in brief: Bepeaker -"). Sauerland (2004b) notes the contrast in (i): sentence (ib) cancels only the secondary
implicature of sentence (ia), namely that the speaker knows that not all Beethoven's symphonies were played; sentence (ic)
cancels also the primary implicature, namely that it is not the case that the speaker believes that all symphonies were played;
the contrast in acceptability between (ib) and (ic) suggests that secondary implicatures can be canceled by the simple assertion
of the opposite while primary implicatures cannot. This observation seems to suggest that primary implicatures are harder to
36 Oddness by mismatching scalar implicatures
of question (84a), the alternative 'Mary is available after dinner' is not relevant, hence it triggers no
implicature; in the context of question (84b), the alternative 'John is available before dinner' is not
relevant, hence it triggers no implicature. Furthermore, let me assume that also the converse holds:
if a scalar alternative / is relevant, then its corresponding implicature -o is mandatory. From this
perspective, implicature cancellation, as in (85), really amounts to switching from a context where
the alternative 'he read all' is not relevant to a different one, where it is; see van Kuppevelt (1996)
for relevant discussion.
(85) a. Q: Who read some of the books?
b. A: John read some, in fact he read all.
Assume furthermore that, precisely because of its contextual nature, relevance cannot distinguish
between two propositions which are contextually equivalent: they are either both relevant or else
neither of them is. What's special about the mismatching alternative (83b) is that it must be relevant
in the context considered, since it is contextually equivalent to the target utterance (83a), which is
relevant precisely because of the fact that it has been uttered. Since the mismatching alternative
(83b) is necessarily relevant in the context considered, the corresponding implicature is mandatory
and oddness is thus accounted for. In conclusion, scalar implicatures are of course in general not
mandatory, because they might correspond to irrelevant alternatives; but mismatching implicatures
are indeed mandatory, because they correspond to alternatives which are always relevant, because
contextually equivalent to the assertion.
The proposal: first part For the sake of explicitness, let me offer a concrete implementation of the
idea I have just sketched. Within the framework adopted here, scalar implicatures of a sentence <p are
derived by appending to the LF of the sentence a covert variant EXH of overt 'only'. The assumption
of a covert 'only' immediately raises the following question: how does the hearer recover whether
the LF produced by the speaker contains that covert operator or not? For the time being, let's restrict
ourselves to the case of matrix sentences; I will come back to the case of embedded scalar items in
setction 2.3. With this restriction, the simplest possible answer to our question would be (86): it says
that there is no recoverability problem for the exhaustivity operator, since it is mandatorily present. 10
cancel than secondary implicatures, and thus feel more robust.
(i) a. They played many of Beethoven's symphonies, ..
b. ... and possibly all.
c. ... ?and definitely all.
One possible strategy to cope with the mandatoriness issue is thus as follows: secondary implicatures are context dependent,
but primary implicature are not, namely they are mandatory; and the mismatching implicatures needed for Hawkins' proposal
are primary implicatures. I have not substantially explored this alternative account because I fear that it might be incompatible
with the proposal I will make in section 2.2.
t
oHere is one immediate problem for this assumption (86). Consider the contrast in (i): sentence (ia) turns deviant if we
add an overt 'only' associated with the universal determiner 'every' as in (ib). The reason has intuitively to lie with the fact
that 'only' in (ib) does not contribute to meaning, since it is associated with the logically strongest alternative in the focus set.
(i) a. Every boy arrived.
b. ?Only everyF boy arrived.
The contrast in (i) might be problematic for my assumption (86), as follows. By the latter assumption, the fine sentence (ia)
contains a mandatory exhaustivity operator, so that the pair in (i) should really be construed as the pair in (ii). If the semantics
of the covert exhaustivity operator is indeed akin to that of overt 'only', then the contrast in (i) is puzzling.
(ii) a. EXH every boy arrived.
b. ?Only every boy arrived.
There are two possible ways out. One way is to exploit the obvious fact that 'only' is overt while EXH is covert. If we had
some kind of BREVITY PRINCIPLE, then we might try to construe it in such a way that it only applies to overt items and
not to covert items too, thus ruling out (iib) but not (iia). As discussed in subsection 2.5.1, I find such a principle very hard
to formulate. An alternative way to deal with the contrast in (ii) is to exploit possible differences between the semantics of
overt 'only' and that of covert EXH and thus to attribute the deviance of (iib) to some peculiar aspect of the semantics of
'only'. For instance, suppose that the crucial difference between the two operators has to do with the proper division of labor
between assertion and presupposition. Following a long tradition, let me assume that 'only' presupposes its prejacent, thus
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(86) The exhaustivity operator EXH is mandatorily adjoined to every matrix clause.
Once assumption (86) is in place, special care is needed in order to account for the context sensitivity
of scalar implicatures, as illustrated above in (84). Here is a way to go. According to Fox (2007a), the
exhaustivity operator EXH has the shape in (73), repeated in (87a). According to this definition, the
exhaustivity operator EXH takes a proposition W and returns that same proposition conjoined with the
negation of all the alternatives O's which are in the set zxcl(o) of alternatives excludable given p.
Following Fox and Katzir (2009), let me replace this definition (87a) with the slight modification in
(87b). According to this modification, the exhaustivity operator depends on a contextually-supplied
"question under discussion" R of type ((s, t), t): 7. is a property of propositions which holds of a
proposition @ iff 0 is relevant in the given context. According to the definition (87b), the exhaustivity
operator EXHz takes a proposition W and returns that same proposition enriched with the claim that
each excludable alternative 0 is either false or irrelevant. Of course, (87b) is equivalent to (87b').
Thus, I can equivalently restate as follows: the exhaustivity operator EXH takes a proposition o
and returns that same proposition conjoined with the negation of all the alternatives P's which are
in the set Excl( p) of alternatives excludable given V and are furthermore relevant according to 7.
In this section, I use the formuation (87b); in the next section 2.3, I will start from the formulation
(87b') and present a more radical version of this proposal.
(87) a. EXH(o) = WpA A
~'EEXCI(W)
b. EXHR&(s) = W A A v' -v 0)
b'. EXHR(5o) = yp A A -p
Let me now illustrate how this proposal works. Consider sentence (84c), repeated as V in (88a).
Assume that it comes with the two scalar alternatives V1 and 0 2 in (88b) and (88c). According to
(86), the exhaustivity operator is mandatory. According to (87b), the exhaustivity operator yields
the strengthened meaning in (88), dependent on the contextual variable 7. Note that the shape
of the strengthened meaning (88) is the same no matter whether the sentence V is an answer to
question (84a) or to question (84b). Yet, the variable R in the strengthened meaning (88) will be
assigned different values in these two contexts (84a) and (84b). In the context of question (84a), the
alternative V1 is relevant but the alternative b2 is not; hence, the strengthened meaning in (88) boils
down to EXHg (p) = p A -"i1, namely to the proposition that John is available only after dinner. In
the context of question (84b), the alternative V2 is relevant but the alternative 01 is not; hence, the
strengthened meaning in (88) boils down to EXHI(o) = po A -102 , namely to the proposition that
only John is available after dinner.
replacing the initial assumption (78) with the revised assumption (iiia); see for instance Simons (2000) and Ippolito (2006)
for a discussion of assumption (iiia). Let me assume furthermore that EXH is a non-presuppositional variant of 'only', as in
(iiib).
(iii) a. [only] = Ap: . A #.
ObE~xci(Wp)
b. EXH =Aq.9oA A -0-.
0bEExc1((o)
No matter whether sentence (iia) contains or not the exhaustivity operator, its presupposition and assertation will boil down
to (iva). The case of (iib) is different, since its presupposition and assertion are now (ivb).
(iv) a. presupposition of(iia): tautology.
assertion of (iia): every boy arrived.
b. presupposition of (iib): every boy arrived.
assertion of (iib): tautology.
I could now try to account for the contrast in (ii) as follows. Sentence (iib) with overt 'only' is deviant because "unbalanced":
as noted in (ivb), it asserts nothing and only carries a presupposition. Sentence (iia) with covert EXH is fine because "well
balanced": as noted in (iva), all the content is presented as an assertion and not as a presupposition.
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(88) EXH-(~) = p A oh V aR()i A -V2 V ae1(02)
a. p = John is available after dinner.
b. 01 = John is available before and after dinner.
c. 02 = Mary is available after dinner.
The proposal: second part The precise shape of the property 7 is of course determined by the
context. Yet, let me assume that grammar imposes that suitable assignments to 1 satisfy certain
postulates. I submit the two following postulates (89). The postulate (89a) is the Gricean Maxim
of Relevance, that says that an utterance must always be relevant. The postulate (89b) says that
relevance is closed with respect to contextual equivalence, thus capturing the intuition that ? is a
contextual variable and is thus sensitive to contextual information.
(89) a. If D is uttered, then R().
b. If p --Vck 0, then R(p) = R(0).
Before I move on, let me pause to note the parallelism between the theory of the exhaustivity op-
erator sketched here and some versions of the theory of the distributivity operator, such as that of
Schwarzschild (1996). Both the exhaustivity and the distributive operator are covert operators. Both
of them are closely related to corresponding overt operators: 'only' for the case of the exhaustivity
operator; 'each' for the case of the distributive operator. Both the exhaustivity and the distributive
operator are relativized to a proper parameter supplied by the context: a relevance relation 7 for the
exhaustivity operator; a cover C for the distributive operator. In both cases, the contextual parameters
are constrained by grammatical postulates: the relevance property has to be closed under contextual
equivalence; covers have to sum up to the entire domain. Both the exhaustivity and the distributiv-
ity operator can be assumed to be mandatorily present: lack of implicatures does not correspond to
lack of the exhaustivity operator but to a proper choice of 7R (so that the scalar alternatives are not
relevant); analogously, a collective reading does not correspond to lack of the distributivity operator
but to a proper choice of C (a collective cover).
(90) Analogies between the exhaustivity operator EXH and the distributivity operator DIST:
a. both are covert operators...
b. ... with an analogous overt operator;
c. both depend on a context-supplied parameter...
d. . . .whose possible values are constrained by grammatical axioms;
e. both can be assumed to be mandatorily present at LF.
I am now ready to show how the oddness of the sentences (60)-(67) considered at the beginning of
this section is accounted for by means of the assumptions spelled out so far. Let me concentrate
for instance on sentence (64a), repeated below in (91). As noted in chapter 1, Hawkins' account
(45) maintains that sentence (91) sounds odd because it triggers the scalar implicature that not all
Italians come from a beautiful country, which mismatches with the piece of common knowledge that
all Italians come from the same country. Here is how this piece of reasoning is formalized on the
background on the assumptions introduced in this section.
(91) #Some Italians come from a beautiful country.
By assumption (86), sentence (91) admits one and only one LF, namely P in (92), with a matrix
exhaustivity operator whose prejacent I have called W.
(92) [,p EXH [, Some Italians come from a beautiful country ] ]
Let me stick with the classical assumption (93) that ('some', 'all') is a Horn scale. By definition
(74), the set Alt(p) of scalar alternatives of the prejacent p thus contains the alternative 0 obtained
from o by replacing 'some' with 'all'.
(93) Alt('p) = { = All Italians come from a beautiful country}
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Of course, 0 logically entails W. But the opposite doesn't hold, since there is of course a world,
not compatible with common knowledge Wok, where Italians come from different countries and only
some of them happen to come from one that is beautiful. Thus, the alternative 0 asymmetrically
entails the prejacent W if we do not take common knowledge into account. By virtue of the BH
(82), this is enough to conclude that 0 is excludable given W according to the definition (75) of the
set of excludable alternatives, as stated in (94). Note the crucial role played by the BH (82): if the
strengthened meaning were computed using entailment relative to common knowledge, then , could
not have counted as an alternative excludable w.r.t. W, since W and are equivalent given the piece
of common knowledge that all Italians come from the same country.
(94) ,xcl(p) = {}
By the slightly amended definition (87b) of the exhaustivity operator EXH, the proposition denoted
by the odd sentence (91) is (95), dependent on the contextual relevance predicate 7R.
(95) EXHz(W) = W A V
Consider any context where the piece of common knowledge holds that all Italians come from the
same country. In any such context, the prejacent W and its alternative 0 are contextually equivalent.
Thus, they pattern alike with respect to relevance, by assumption (89b). Let me distinguish two
cases. Consider first the case where the prejacent o is not relevant. In this case, V) is not relevant
either. Hence, the strengthened meaning (95) boils down to just W. Since the latter is not relevant
by hypothesis, then it follows that the LF (92) uttered by the speaker is not relevant, contradicting
assumption (89a). Thus, I only need to consider the case where W is relevant. In this case, 0 is
relevant too. Hence, the strengthened meaning (95) boils down to (96).
(96) EXHR(W) = W A -'o
In conclusion, the LF (92) denotes the proposition WoA- , that "some but not all Italians come from a
beautiful country" in any context where the piece of common knowledge holds that all Italians come
from the same country. Of course, this proposition is a contradiction given common knowledge.
The oddness of sentence (91) is thus predicted by the plausible linking condition (97), that I will
call the MISMATCH HYPOTHESIS (henceforth: MH). As far as I can see, the account just presented
straightforwardly extends to the other sentences (60)-(67). In Subection 3.1, I'll suggest that the
oddness of sentence (2b), with the adverb 'sometimes' and the i-predicate 'tall', can be accounted
for in exactly the same way.
(97) MISMATCHING HYPOTHESIS. If a sentence denotes a contradiction given common knowl-
edge, then that sentence sounds odd.
Before I move on, let me comment on assumption (97). If a given sentence admits a unique LF
and if the proposition denoted by that LF is a contradiction given common knowledge, then the
MH (97) says that that sentence sounds odd in the context considered. What if a sentence admits
two LFs and only one of them denotes a contextually contradictory proposition? I assume that, if a
sentence is ambiguous between two LFs and one of them is pragmatically deviant, then that sentence
is not perceived as pragmatically deviant but the ambiguity is lost, namely the pragmatically fine LF
can "cover up" the pragmatically deviant LF to the point that the latter is not accessible anymore.
Thus in particular, if a sentence might correspond to two LFs one of which denotes a contextually
contradictory proposition, then (97) predicts that that sentence sounds fine but that the meaning
corresponding to the guilty LF is not available.
Remark Let me close this section by addressing a recent debate concerning the relationship be-
tween the grammatical nature of scalar implicatures and their mandatoriness. It is sometimes claimed
in the literature that, by virtue of their very nature, grammatical theories of scalar implicatures neces-
sarily predict implicatures to be mandatory, or default, or generated automatically and mechanically
11 This is strictly speaking not true, because of possible worlds where there are no Italians, and thus the restrictor of the
existential and universal operators is empty.
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without any need for contextual triggering. For instance, Geurts (2009, p. 58) writes: "There is
another distinction that I cannot afford to ignore, viz. between DEFAULTIST and NONCIST varieties
of localism.12 If you are a defaultist, you are committed to the view that scalar expressions give rise
to upper-bounding inferences as a matter of course; it is what will happen normally. [... ] Chierchia
and Levinson are both defaultists in this sense of the word. Other authors adopt the position that
scalar inferences are entirely dependent on the context; they are noncists. [...] Methodologically
speaking, noncist versions of localism are disappointingly weak in the sense that they merely predict
that local inferences may or may not occur. Clearly, this type of theory needs to be complemented by
an account of why and when scalar inferences arise. As far as I am aware, there is no such theory on
the market." And Geurts and Pouscoulous (2009a, p. 23), slightly refining Geurts and Pouscoulous
(2009b), write: "Thus far, we have been concerned with what we have dubbed 'mainstream conven-
tionalism'13, a label for a spectrum of theories all of which predict that local strengthening should
be preferred [...]. We presented data showing, arguably, that the predictions of mainstream conven-
tionalism are wrong. What to do? [... ] [One] option is to leave the mainstream without giving up on
conventionalism: stick to your favourite [conventionalist] brand of scalar implicatures, which will
duly generate a batch of interpretations for any sentence that contains scalar expressions, but refuse
to make predictions about which construal is the preferred one. Leave it to pragmatics. To the best
of our knowledge, nobody has come forward to advocate such a minimalist take on conventionalism,
as yet, and we are tempted to say that this is just as well, since this view is too weak to be taken
seriously." In this section, I have argued in favor of the three claims (98), thus defending precisely
this view that Geurts and Pouscoulous think cannot be taken seriously.
(98) a. Grammatical theories of scalar implicatures per se do not make any prediction on the
context sensitivity of scalar implicatures
b. Grammatical theories of scalar implicatures are very well compatible with the context
sensitivity of scalar implicatures
c. Grammatical theories of scalar implicatures do not owe an account of the fine grained
contextual dependence of scalar implicatures
Let me review my arguments for (98). The grammatical theory of scalar implicatures that I have
adopted here from Fox (2007a) really just says that, if an implicature is generated, that must be
signaled in the LF of the sentence, by appending a suitable operator. This proposal per se does not
make any prediction concerning the context sensitivity vs. mandatoriness of scalar implicatures. I
have suggested a way to capture the observed contextual sensitivity of scalar implicatures within
this grammatical theory of implicatures. My proposal is completely straightforward: implicature
cancellation boils down to the very well known mechanism of contextual domain restriction. More
in detail, I have made the following suggestion: the exhaustivity operator is a universal quantifier; its
restrictor is partially contextually determined, just like it is the case for any other universal quantifier;
whether an implicature is derived or not, that depends on whether the corresponding alternative
is relevant (and thus makes it to the restrictor of the exhaustivity operator) or not. A theory of
implicatures does not owe a theory of relevance, just as a theory of distributivity does not owe a
theory of covers. The latter point is made very explicitly in Schwarzschild (1996, p. 92): "On the
view exposed here, the truth conditions for sentences with plural arguments are often determined
in part by the assignment to a free variable over coverings [...] of the domain. We have said
that the source of this assignment is pragmatic. Can we say more? The question of what makes a
partitioning of the domain salient in the discourse bears some resemblance to the question of what
makes the antecedent for a pronoun salient. In many instances there are linguistic clues, [...] but
arriving at a complete answer surely involves other branches of cognitive science. Such is the case
for domain partitioning as well. How we divide up our visual space for example is relevant here and
yet that is a question which is properly a matter yet to be settled by experts on vision."
12My understanding is that what Geurts means by "localism" is what I mean by "grammatical theories" of scalar
implicatures.
13Again, my understanding is that what Geurts means by "conventionalism" is what I mean by "grammatical theories" of
scalar implicatures.
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2.2 Extension to cases with multiple alternatives
In section 2.1, I have considered a first set of odd sentences (60a)-(67a). I have argued that those
sentences sound odd because they come with a logically stronger alternative o that yields a blind
scalar implicature -o that mismatches with the relevant piece of common knowledge. In this section,
I consider some more complicated cases of oddness, where mismatch with common knowledge
comes about not from a single implicature -no but from the conjunction -1 A -"02 A -,1 3 ... of
multiple implicatures -vo1, -102 , -1 3, ... The cases considered in this section will turn out to be
important for my discussion of restrictions on bare plural subjects of i-predicates in chapter 3.
The facts Fronting of the universal quantifier 'every day' in (99a) forces it to take wide scope over
the existential quantifier 'a fireman'. Sentence (99b) has no fronting and thus admits also the reading
with wide scope existential. Since the reading with narrow scope existential admitted by sentence
(99a) is entailed by the reading with wide scope existential admitted by sentence (99b), then we
might have expected sentence (99a) to sound just as fine as sentence (99b) in the context considered.
We are thus faced with the puzzle of accounting for the contrast in (99).14
(99) Context: a competition lasted five days, Monday through Friday; both John and Bill know
that the same guy x won on each of the five days:
M T W T F
winner: x x x x x
John wants to know more about this amazing guy and thus asks Bill for more information;
Bill provides the following information:
a. #On every day, a/some fireman won.
b. A/Some fireman won on every day.
Analogously, the bound pronoun in (100a) forces the universal quantifier 'every friend' to have wide
scope over the indefinite 'an american girl'. Even with this scope configuration, the plain meaning
of sentence (100a) is of course compatible with the boys having all fallen in love with the same girl
they had met at the party, and thus the continuation 'this girl...' should be felicitous, just as in the
case of sentence (100b), which admits the opposite scope configuration, because does not contain
the bound pronoun. Thus, we are faced with the puzzle of accounting for the contrast in (100).
(100) a. Every friend of mine loves an American girl he had met at the party.
#This girl is really beautiful.
b. Every friend of mine loves an American girl.
This girl is really beautiful.
Consider next the following variant (101) of the example (99) considered above. Sentence (101a)
feels odd in the context considered. In sentence (101b), the definite object 'the running competition'
has been replaced by the wide scope universal object 'every competition' and the sentence feels fine
in the context considered. Whatever accounts for the oddness of sentence (101a), must be able to
derive the fact that the sentence turns fine once embedded under a further universal quantifier, as in
(101b).
(101) Context: a competition lasted for five days, Monday to Friday; each day, three challenges are
held: swimming, running and jumping; both John and Bill know that the same guy x won
the swimming competition on all five days, the same guy y won the runnifig competition on
all five days and the same guy z won the jumping competition on all five days:
M T W T F
swimming: x x x x x
running: y y y y y
jumping: z z z z z
14The example in (99) is a slight variant an example from Percus (2001). I discuss Percus' original example in the last
Remark of this section.
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John wants to know more about these amazing guys, and thus asks Bill for more information;
Bill replies as follows:
a. #Every day, a/some fireman won the running competition.
b. Every day, for every competition, a/some fireman won.
Analogously, consider the following variant (102) of the example (100) considered above. It is hard
to accommodate the continuation 'the woman the boys were introduced to by Mary' in the case of
sentence (102a). In sentence (102b), 'Mary' has been replaced by the universal quantifier 'each of
Mary, Ann and Sue' and the continuation 'the woman the boys were introduced to by Mary' feels
more straightforward.
(102) a. Mary introduced every boy to a woman he finds attractive.
#The woman the boys were introduced to by Mary is really beautiful.
b. Mary, Ann and Sue each introduced every boy to a woman he finds attractive.
The woman the boys were introduced to by Mary is really beautiful.
In the rest of this subsection, I concentrate on (99) and (101), the case of (100) and (102) being
formally parallel. I will argue that these puzzles are solved by the conjunction -nVb 1 A -b 2 A ...
of multiple blind implicatures. Let me thus pause on some preliminaries on the computation of
implicatures when the set of excludable alternatives is not a singleton, as it was the case for the
examples considered in section 2.1.
Preliminaries Horn-scales need not really be scales, namely sets linearly ordered w.r.t. entailment,
but rather just partially ordered sets. The main such example is the case of sentences containing
disjunction, such as p in (103a): Sauerland (2004c) suggests that the set of scalar alternatives Alt(p)
is the one in (103b), which contains, besides the corresponding sentence Land with conjunction, also
the left and the right conjuncts OL and OR.
(103) a. p = Kai had peas or broccoli.
p = Kai had peas or broccoli
b. Alt(p) = L = Kai had peas
R = Kai had broccoli
band = Kai had peas and broccoli
A natural generalization of assumption (103) concerns sentences containing an existential quantifier,
such as sentence p in (104a): I assume that its set of scalar alternatives Alt( p) is the one in (104b),
which contains, besides the corresponding sentence /all with the universal quantifier, also the three
alternatives bjohn, OBill and VPTom obtained by replacing the existential quantifier 'some of his
brothers' with the definite description 'his brother such and such', where 'such and such' can be for
instance 'called John/Bill/Tom'.15
15 The obviousformal correspondence between (104) and (103) is spelled out in (i).
(i) a. existential quantifier -+ disjunction;
b. universal quantifier - conjunction;
c. definite descriptions --- two disjuncts.
Sentence (iia) triggers a very strong IGNORANCE INFERENCE that the speaker does not know which one of his two sisters
Mary and Sue does John ate. Sauerland (2004c) suggests that this ignorance inference is evidence for his assumption that the
two disjuncts are scalar alternatives of disjunction. In order to support my parallel assumption for existential quantifiers, let
me point out that sentence (iib) seems to trigger the same ignorance inference.
(ii) a. John hates Mary or Sue.
b. John hates one of his two sisters.
Sauerland derives (103b) from the assumption that disjunction is a Horn-mate of the two operators LEFT = Ap. Aq. q and
RIGHT = Ap. Aq .p. In this way, (103b) fits the definition (74) of the set of scalar alternatives. In any case, (103b) is
compatible with the definition of scalar alternatives of Katzir (2008), as the set of those LFs that can be obtained from the
target LF by deletion or lexical substitution. It is not completely clear to me how to make my variant (104) compatible with
the definition (74) of the set of scalar alternatives or with Katzir's theory of scalar alternatives. One possible way to go might
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(104) a. W = Kai met some of his three brothers.
Ws = Kai met some of his three brothers
J John = Kai met his brother John
b. Alt(p) = Oill = Kai met his brother Bill1 Tom = Kai met his brother Tom
0al = Kai met all of his brothers
Once we allow for sets of scalar alternatives such as (103) and (104), the simple definition (75) of the
set of excludable alternatives runs into a well-known problem; let me illustrate the problem with the
case in (104). Each of the three scalar alternatives €John, /Bill and oTom in (104b) asymmetrically
entails o in (104a). Hence, if the strengthened meaning EXH(W) of o was computed using the
classical definition (75) of the set Excl(o) of excludable alternatives, we would get (105). Yet, this
strengthened meaning is a logical contradiction. Thus, the classical definition (75), coupled with
the assumption (104) on scalar alternatives, fails to derive the intended strengthened meaning of
sentence W, namely that Kai met some but not all of his brothers.
(105) EXH(s) = W A -'John A '2Bill A "vbTom A -Vall
Fox (2007a), building on Sauerland (2004c), solves this problem by replacing the classical definition
(75) of the set of excludable alternatives with the alternative definition (106). The intuition behind
(106) is the following: the strengthened meaning EXH(o) asserts so and excludes as many scalar
alternatives b's as can be excluded in a non-arbitrary way without getting a contradiction.
(106) a. A subset X = { 1, b2,...} of the set Alt(o) is called an CONSISTENTLY EXCLUD-
ABLE subset w.r.t. o iff Wo A --,V A -12 A ... is not a contradiction.
b. A subset X C Alt(o) is called a MAXIMAL consistently excludable subset w.r.t. o iff
there are no consistently excludable supersets of X in Alt(o).
c. The set Excl(o) of EXCLUDABLE alternatives w.r.t. so is the intersection of all maximal
consistently excludable subsets of Alt(W) w.r.t. o.
Here is how this new definition solves our problem: according to clause (106b), there are three maxi-
mal subsets of excludable alternatives: {John, Bill, Oall}, {John, V/Tom, )all} and {JOBill, OTom, )all}
according to clause (106c), Excl(o) is their intersection, namely Excl(o) = {Nau}; hence, we ob-
tain EXH(o) = A -Oall, which is the right result.
First part of the account I want to suggest an account for the oddness of sentence (99a) com-
pletely analogous to that suggested in section 2.1 for the oddness of sentences (60)-(67). The idea
of this account is presented in (107), repeated from (52).
(107) a. On the one hand, an utterance of (99a), with narrow scope indefinite, triggers the scalar
implicature that the logically stronger alternative (99b), with wide scope indefinite, is
false.
b. On the other hand, common knowledge entails that the same guy always won, hence
(99a) cannot be true without (99b) being true too.
c. In conclusion, the oddness of sentence (99a) follows from the mismatch between the
scalar implicature in (107a) and common knowledge in (107b).
The crucial problem here is how to formalize step (107a). The two sentences (99a) and (99b) differ
for the relative scope of the universal and the existential quantifier. Thus, sentence (99b) cannot be
be as follows. Following for instance Westersthal (1984) and von Fintel (1994), let me assume that the LF of 'some NP' is
something like (ii). Here, C is the name of a contextually determined free variable of type (e, t). The constituent [NP C] is
interpreted by predicate modification.
(ii) [ some [ NP C ] ]
I could then try to make (104) compatible with the definition (74) of the set of scalar alternatives and with Katzir's theory of
scalar alternatives by assuming that the variable C is a Horn mate of/ can be replaced by any other variable C' and that one
of these variables C' denotes a property "such and such" whose intersection with NP is a singleton. I leave the issue open.
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derived from sentence (99a) just by replacing scalar items with Horn-mates. The current definition
(74) of the set of scalar alternatives thus straightforwardly predicts (108). Since (99b) is not a scalar
alternative, then of course it cannot trigger any implicature and thus step (107a) fails. One might be
tempted to take this difficulty at face value, and conclude that the current definition (74) of the set
of scalar alternatives is too strict, and that it should be replaced with an alternative definition that
makes the set of scalar alternatives closed with respect to reshuffling of the quantifiers. I will discuss
this option in the last Remark at the end of this section.
(108) Sentence (99b) is not a scalar alternative of sentence (99a).
For the time being, I will stick with the current definition (74) of the set of scalar alternatives and
suggest that the implicature needed for the first step (107a) can be derived in an indirect way, that
circumvents the problem in (108). Here are the details. The LF of the odd sentence (99a) is the one
in (109a). This LF corresponds to the truth conditions V in (109b), namely that "for each day t of
the competition, there was some fireman x such that x won on t." Note that 'each day' (i.e. Vt) has
scope over 'some fireman' (i.e. 3x) in (109b): as anticipated, this will turn out to be the culprit for
the oddness of the sentence.
(109) a. [[each day] [At [[some fireman] [Ax [x won in t]]]]].
b. p = Aw.Vt[[dayJ(t) --4 [3x [[fireman] w(x) A [win] w(x,t)]]].
As already assumed in (104) and stated in (110), let me assume that the existential quantifier 'a/some
fireman' and the definite description 'the fireman such and such' are Horn-mates, for any choices of
'such and such'. Here and henceforth, I'll use 'the fireman P' as a shorthand for 'the fireman such
and such' and I'll use dw as a shorthand for the individual [the fireman P]w.
(110) ('a/some fireman', 'the fireman P') is a Horn-scale.
Consider now the LF (111a), which is obtained from the LF (109a) by replacing 'some fireman' by
'the fireman such and such' (abbreviated as 'the fireman P'). Since these two scalar items are Horn-
mates by assumption (110), then (11 Ia) is a scalar alternative of (109a), according to the standard
definition (74) of the set of scalar alternatives. The truth conditions of the LF (111a) are op in
(111 b), namely that "the fireman such and such won on every day t".
(111) a. [[each day] [At [[the fireman P] [Ax [x won in t]]]].
b. op = Aw .Vt[[day]W(t) -4 Jwin]w"([the fireman PJ]w, t)].
Let o be the truth conditions (112) of the fine sentence (99b), construed with the indefinite over
firemen Ix having wide scope over the universal operator Vt over the days of the competition.
(112) b = Aw. 3x[[fireman]w(x) AVt[[day]w(t) -+ [win]w(x,t)]].
The logical equivalence in (113) holds: 16 the conjunction of the negation of all the alternatives p,
in (111) is equivalent to the negation of the truth condition b of the fine sentence (99b), i.e. to the
statement that "no single fireman won on every day of the competition." The equivalence (113) is
my strategy to circumvent the problem raised in (108).
(113) A--p = -0
P
Let me now argue that the strengthened meaning EXH(W) of o in (109b) is the one in (114), i.e. that
each o, is excludable w.r.t. p. Given the logical equivalence in (113), it is sufficient to show that
so A -n is not a logical contradiction. And of course it is not, since there are possible worlds were
different firemen won on different days, where thus o is true but o is false.
(114) EXH() = p A A-p
P
-Vp,
161n fact, Ap -",0P = -' Vp 'bp, by De Morgan laws; and furthermore Vp 'Pp = O, since {dw I P} = [fireman]w.
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Note nonetheless that EXH(W) = p A -i is a contradiction with respect to the piece of common
knowledge that a single person won on every day. The oddness of (99a) thus follows from the MH
(97). Note again the crucial role played by the BH (82): if the strengthened meaning were computed
taking common knowledge into account, then the entire set of the V,'s would not be excludable
and thus no mismatch would arise. In Section 3, I'll argue that the lack of the existential reading of
bare plural subjects of i-predicates illustrated in (7) can be accounted for in the same way as I have
accounted here for the oddness of sentence (99a), building on the fact that existential bare plurals
are known to always take the narrowest possible scope.
Second part of the account Let me argue that the contrast in (101) follows straightforwardly from
the proposal just presented. The oddness of sentence (101a) can be accounted for in the same way
as that of sentence (99a) was accounted for above. Let me now quickly repeat the reasoning above
for the case of sentence (101b) in order to make sure that it does not predict this sentence to sound
odd. The truth conditions of sentence (101b) are V in (115), where Vt stands for 'every day of the
week t', V, stands for 'every competition y' and B3 stands for 'there is a fireman x'.
(115) p = Aw. Vy[Vt[3x[[win]w(x,y,t)]]].
Consider the alternative Op in (116) obtained by replacing the indefinite 'alsome fireman' with the
definite 'the fireman P', whose denotation is as usual indicated as dw.
(116) , = Aw.V,[Vt[[win] w(d,y,t)]].
Let 0 be as in (117). Note the crucial fact that the existential quantifier over firemen 3x in the
formula 0 has wide scope not only over the universal quantifier over days Vt but also over the
universal quantifier over competitions Vy.
(117) = Aw.xi[Vy[Vt[[win]jw(x,y,t)]]].
The logical equivalence in (118) holds:' 7 the conjunction of the negation of all the alternatives 'p
in (116) is equivalent to the negation of V in (117), namely to the statement that "there is no fireman
who won every competition on every day."
(118) A -p =- -o
P
Thus, the (blind) strengthened meaning EXH(W) of V boils down to (119), which says that "every
day, for every competition, there is a fireman who won and that it is false that there is a fireman who
won every competition on every day." Despite the fact that the strengthened meaning in (119) is
formally analogous to that in (114), the former is not a contradiction given common knowledge. In
fact, since the existential quantifier of V in (117) has wide scope also over the universal quantifier
over competitions and since it does not follow from common knowledge that a single guy won
all three of the competitions, then the negation of b is consistent with W relative to the common
knowledge.
(119) EXH(W) = W A -,0
In Section 3, I'll argue that Fox's surprising effect (8), that a bare plural subject of an i-predicate does
admit the existential reading when it occurs in the scope of a universal quantifier, can be accounted
for in the same way as I have accounted here for the contrast in (101). In the rest of this section, I
qualify the account just presented with a number of remarks.
First remark: the proper definition of the set of scalar alternatives To secure my account for
the contrast in (101), I need to discuss a technical issue concerning the proper definition of the
set of scalar alternatives. Consider Op in (120), for any choice of the property P. This formula
Op is obtained from formula W in (115) by means of two replacements: the universal quantifier
over competitions Vy is replaced by the existential quantifier 3y; and the existential quantifier over
firemen 3, is replaced by the individual d' denoted by the definite description 'the fireman P'.
17The reasoning is identical to that in footnote 16.
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(120) op = Aw . 3v[Vt[[win]'(d',y,t)]].
The logical equivalence in (121) holds: the conjunction of the negation of all the bp's in (120) is
equivalent to the negation of the proposition ¢ that "there exists a fireman x and a competition y
such that x won y on every day". Of course, V A -o is not a logic contradiction. Yet, it is indeed a
contradiction given the piece of common knowledge considered in (101). Thus, if the Op's in (120)
were scalar alternatives of W in (115), then the blind strengthened meaning of W would entail that
W A - and would therefore contradict common knowledge, contrary to the fact that sentence (101b)
is fine in the context considered. Let me show that a solution to this problem follows from a more
careful definition of the set of scalar alternatives, independently needed.
(121) A -p = -no, where 4 = Aw. 3x[y[Vt[[win]'(x, y, t)]]].
P
The new definition (106) of the set Excl(p) of alternatives excludable w.r.t. 9 differs from the stan-
dard definition (75) because it makes use of the notion of contradictoriness instead of the notion of
asymmetric entailment. Precisely for this reason, this new definition (106) leads to a slight prob-
lem when coupled with the standard definition (74) of the set Alt(9) of the scalar alternatives of a
sentence W. The problem is completely general, and arises whenever a non-maximal scalar item is
embedded under another non-maximal scalar item; let me illustrate it with the case of sentence o in
(122a). According to the standard definition (74), the set Alt() of scalar alternatives in the case of
(122a) contains the three alternatives bFA, ONS and ONA in (122b), under the standard assumption
that ('some', 'all') and ('few', 'none') are Horn-scales. 18 These alternatives are ordered with respect
to (asymmetric) entailment as in (122c).
(122) a. 9 = Few boys did any of the readings.
FA = Few boys did all of the readings.
b. Alt(9) = NS = No boys did some of the readings.
bNA = No boys did all of the readings.
c. o
OFA PNS
ONA
According to the standard definition (75) of the set £xcl() of excludable alternatives, only asym-
metrically entailing alternatives are excludable; hence, only bNS is predicted to be excludable in this
case, and the right strengthened meaning is thus derived. Things are very different if we switch to the
new definition (106) of the set £xcl(9) of excludable alternatives. Of course, OFA is not excludable
given 9, since OFA is entailed by s. Thus, the set of excludable alternatives according to (106) is
Excl (W) = {NS, 5NA}, since these two alternatives PNS and ONA can be both negated consistently
with o. In conclusion, the strengthened meaning of sentence 9 is predicted to be (123), namely "few
boys did some of the readings and some boy did some of the readings and some boy did all of the
readings." This result is wrong: an utterance of 9 does not in any way commit to the existence of a
boy who has done all of the readings.
(123) EXH(9) = s A IbNS A _-1NA.
In order to avoid this problem, we need to modify the standard definition (74) of the set Alt(9) of
scalar alternatives in such a way to get ONA out of it. Fox (2007a, footnote 35) suggests to replace
the standard definition with the following alternative definition (124). The intuition behind (124) is
the following: each scalar alternative / of 9 is obtained from 9 by a sequence of steps; at each step,
only one scalar item can be replaced; and a replacement is licit iff it leads to something not weaker.
18Here, I ignore the fact that 'some' is a PPI.
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(124) The set Alt(W) is recursively defined as follows:
a. W E .At(Wo);
b. 0 E Alt(p) iff there is 4 e Alt(p) such that ¢ is not weaker 19 than 0 and furthermore
0 is obtained from q by replacing a single scalar item in q with a Horn-mate.
Given a diagram such as (122c), the scalar alternatives of a sentence W according to (124) can be
described as those nodes O's of the diagram such that it is possible to walk from ' to W on left-
oriented arrows only. Thus, the new definition (124) predicts the offending ONA not to be a scalar
alternative of o, since there is no way to reach the target W starting from ONA by walking on left-
oriented arrows only in the diagram in (122c). The problem posed by (122a) is thus solved by the
new definition (124). 20 And the problem of the offending 0,'s in (120) is solved as well. In fact, it
is not possible to walk from the offending Op to the target W along left-oriented arrows only in the
diagram in (125).
(125) = VvVt3
op = V&Vtdp
OP, = 3uVtdp
For the sake of simplicity, in the body of the paper, I will stick to the simpler, standard definition
(74) of the set of scalar alternatives, and point out in footnotes that my proposal is fully compatible
with the refined definition (124).
Second remark: the issue of relevance The preceding discussion of the oddness of sentence
(99a) has overlooked one crucial issue: why are the alternatives op in (111) relevant? why is the
corresponding implicature mandatory? Let me make the problem explicit. In section 2.1, I have
started out with the simple definition (87a) of the exhaustivity operator. For the simple case of the
odd sentences (60a)-(67a) considered in section 2.1, this definition yields the strengthened meaning
in (126a), that contains the negation of the unique alternative V. For the more complicated case of the
odd sentence (99a) considered in this section, this definition yields the strengthened meaning (114),
repeated in (126b), in terms of the many alternatives op in (111). In both cases, the strengthened
meaning contradicts common knowledge, and thus oddness follows.
(126) a. EXH( p) = Wo A -V.
b. EXH(W) = AA-p.
P
710
Yet, in order to account for the context dependence of implicatures, in section 2.1 I have replaced the
original definition (87a) with the variant (87b), dependent on the relevance predicate 7. Once this
slightly modified definition is in place, the two strengthened meanings in (126) need to be replaced
190f course, given the BH, I take "non weaker" to mean "logically non weaker".
20Note that, while the alternative 'NS asymmetrically entails V, the alternative 'NA does not, since it is logically inde-
pendent of W. Thus, the problem posed by sentence (122a) could have been solved also by other conceivable modifications
of the original definition (74) of the set of scalar alternatives, such as those in (ia) or (ib).
(i) The set Alt( p) contains all and only those O's that can be obtained from V by replacing scalar items in V with
Horn-mates and that furthermore...
a ... asymmetrically entail w.
b ... are not independent of p.
Fox (2007a) argues against both (ia) and (ib) and in favor of (124), by noting that (ia) and (ib) make wrong predictions for
the case of scalar items embedded under non-monotone operators.
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by the slight variants in (127). This replacement turned out to have no consequences for the simple
case (127a) of the odd sentences (60a)-(67a) considered in section 2.1. In fact, the unique alternative
Sis contextually equivalent to the prejacent W; hence, it is necessarily relevant, by assumptions (89);
thus, (127a) turns out to be equivalent to (126a).
(127) a. EXH((p) = W A (- V-().
b. EXH(W) = W AA ( p v -(p)
op
Unfortunately, I see no way to extend this line of reasoning so as to get (127b) to turn out equivalent
to (126b). Assumption (89) on relevance does not in any way help in this case: it just ensures that
0 = Ap P is relevant (since relevance is closed under negation and V) is contextually equivalent
to the prejacent o); but in no way does it ensure that the single alternatives Op are relevant too. Nor
do I see any way to get out of trouble by adding plausible axioms on the relevance predicate R.
What I would really need to get out of trouble would be to derive the strengthened meaning (127b')
instead of the one in (127b). Then, I could reason just as for the case of (127a), namely that 4, or
equivalently -4, must be relevant because contextually equivalent to the prejacent W, so that (127b')
effectively reduces to (126b).
(127) b' EXH(-) = A (A- P) V (A P .
The nature of the problem can be restated as follows. To overcome the problem (108), I have broken
up the proposition 4 in (112) into the many small pieces p in (111) and I have used the universal
quantification built into the exhaustivity operator to put the pieces back together, as in (126b). Truth
conditions do not see the patch work, because they only look at the final result, after the exhaustivity
operator has put the pieces back together. According to (127b), relevance unfortunately does see the
patch work, because it kicks in before the exhaustivity operator has put the pieces back together. In
order to get out of trouble, I would need to find a way to let relevance kicks in only after the pieces
have been put back together, as in (127b').
Third remark: Percus' original sentence Sentence (99a) has the abstract form (128a). It has
a wide scope universal quantifier Vt and a narrow scope existential quantifier 3]. The existential
quantifier takes of course two arguments, namely a restrictor R and a nuclear scope S. The universal
quantifier binds a variable t that sits inside the nuclear scope S of the existential quantifier. It is of
course interesting to consider the variant (128b) of the scheme (128a), that only differs because of
the fact that the universal quantifier binds a variable t that sits inside the restrictive clause R of the
existential operator, rather than inside its nuclear scope.
(128) a. , b.)
I' ~) (Jt 3x R(x, t) (X
Percus (2001) notes that (129a) sounds odd in the context considered. Plausibly, the adverb 'always'
in (129a) must bind the time argument of the predicate 'finished'. The variant in (130) is completely
analogous, only with an indefinite instead of a definite. Thus, these examples make the point that
the case in (128b) behaves analogously to the one in (128a) as far as oddness is concerned.
(129) Context: John and Bill were both present at a series of exams, which took place from Mon-
day through Friday. Both of them saw that the same student finished first each time. John
wants to know about the nationality of this surprising guy. Bill replies as follows:
a. #The student who finished first was always Swedish.
b. The student who always finished first was Swedish.
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(130) Context: as in (129), with the only difference that the same three people finished first each
time, all at the same time.
a. #One of the students who finished first was always Swedish.
b. One of the students who always finished first was Swedish.
Unfortunately, the account that I have proposed here for the case of (128a) does not seem to extend
to the case of (128b): I do not want to say that (129b) is an alternative to (129a) or that (130b) is an
alternative to (130a); but I do not see any indirect way to obtain the desired mismatching implicature
in this case.2 1
Forth remark: can we construct alternatives by reshuffling operators? To account for the
oddness of sentence (99a), schematized as W in (131 a), I want its strengthened meaning to entail the
negation of the corresponding sentence (99b) with the opposite scope configuration, schematized
as 7P in (131b). Since neither the standard definition (74) of the set of scalar alternatives nor the
revised definition (124) considered above allow for reshuffling of the operators, then 0 in (131b)
is predicted not to be a scalar alternative of W in (131a), as stated in (108).22 I have circumvented
21Let me comment on the account for the oddness of sentence (129a) suggested in Percus (2001). He presents the intuitive
idea as follows: "A speaker who utters [(129a)] in a scenario like [the one considered here] [...] is quantifying over more
things than he needs in order to make his point. [...] Specifically, in using the sentence [(129a)] he is stating that all members
of {Monday, ... , Friday} are such that the student who finished first on that day was Swedish. But he knows that we could
have drawn this conclusion if he had informed us that all the times in a smaller set have this character. On our [... ] scenario,
one such smaller set is {Tuesday}." Percus formalizes this intuition by means of the pragmatic principle in (i). Informally,
(i) states a preference for quantifying over the smallest possible domain (at least in the case of universal quantifiers). The
oddness of sentence (129a) would thus follow from the fact that it violates the principle in (i). The account would extend
from the case schematized in (128b) considered by Percus to the case schematized in (128a) that I have considered in this
section.
(i) Do not use the LF o = V,[a(x)][#(x)] if there is an LF b = V,[a'(x)][/3(x)] such that ' C a and furthermore
"it follows from what the parties to a conversation are taking for granted about the actual world that W holds of the
actual world as long as 0 holds of it."
Yet, the principle in (i) is rather ad hoc. Furthermore, its application to (129) is actually doubtful, since the sentence does not
make explicit the restrictor of 'always'. Finally, this principle makes wrong predictions in cases such as (ii), which is a slight
variant of example (62) from Chemla (2006).
(ii) Context: Professor Smith always gives the same grade to all of his students. John wants to know the grade that
professor Smith assigned to each of his students last semester. Bill provides the following information:
a. W = Last semester, all/the students of prof. Smith got an A.
b. 0 = #Last semester, all/the foreign students of prof. Smith got an A.
The principle in (i) would predict that 0 should sound better than W, given that W has quantification over the entire set of
students while the same point could have been made by quantifying on any proper subset; this prediction is not borne out.
22 The reasoning here needs to be more subtle. In principle, one might get 0 in (131b) to be a scalar alternative of W in
(131a) without any reshuffling, by means of the following strategy. Assume that above each node vp there is a position for a
tense operator. That position can be filled or left empty. Assume that when it looks like it is left empty, it is really fillen by a
"null" tense operator Ot, that does just nothing. Thus, the proper LF corresponding to W in (131a) is (i).
(i)
3 t V PI
P(x,t)
Assume furthermore that (0 t, Vt) happens to be a Horn-scale. Thus, I might in principle be allowed to replace the the matrix
tense operator Vt by Ot and the embedded null tense operator 0 t by Vt, thus getting the LF in (ii), that indeed corresponds to
in (131b)
(ii)
0 t
Vt vP
P(xIt)P(X, t)
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this problem by indirectly obtaining the negation of o in the final strengthened meaning EXH(W) as
the conjunction of the negation of a set of alternatives Op obtained by replacing the indefinite with
definite descriptions.
(131) a. W =Vt[3.P(x,t)].
b. 2 = 3x[VtP(x,t)].
This indirect strategy predicts the fine status of the minimal variant (101a) of (99a), schematized as
o in (132a). The abstract reason is as follows. This indirect strategy is really only able to derive
an "alternative" o where the existential quantifier 3x has the widest possible scope. In the case of
(131), there is only one universal quantifier Vt, and thus the net effect is to reverse the scope of 3x
and V.. In the case of (132), there is another universal quantifier V, besides Vt and thus the net effect
is that the existential operator 3x gets wide scope over both universal operators Vt and V., as in 0 in
(132b). Because of the fact that the existential quantifier 3x also has wide scope over the universal
quantifier V. in 0, then the implicature that -io does not contradict common knowledge and (o is not
ruled out.
(132) a. s = Vy[Vt[]xP(x, y,t)]].
b. o = 3x[V [VtP(x,y,t)]].
One might of course have considered a more direct strategy for the case in (131) to start with, as
follows. We modify the definition (74) of the set of scalar alternatives to allow for reshuffleing of
operators. Thus, 0 in (131b) counts as a scalar alternative of o in (131a), contra (108). The account
for the oddness of o in (131a) thus turns out to be identical to the one suggested in the preceding
section 2.1, in terms of the single mismatching scalar implicature -n. This direct approach has two
advantages over the indirect approach that I have defended here: first, that the problem with relevance
discussed above in the Second Remark disappears; second, that the problem with Percus' cases of
the form (128b) discussed above in the Third Remark disappears too. Yet, this direct approach runs
into troubles for the case of (132). In fact, once we have loosen up the definition of the set of scalar
alternatives this way by allowing for reshuffling of operators, then we cannot block 2' in (133b) from
counting as an alternative of o in (132a), repeated in (133a). Contrary to the case of the alternative V
in (132b), in the case of the alternative ' in (133b) the existential quantifier Bx has been reshuffled
only w.r.t. the universal quantifier Vt and not w.r.t. the universal quantifier V,. But then we would get
the scalar implicature --,', namely that "there exists a competition such that there exists no fireman
that won it on every day", which contradicts the common knowledge in (101).
(133) a. o = VVt[3xP(x,y,t)].
b. ' = Vy [3.T[Vt [P(x, y, t)]]].
The contrast in (101) is very important for my application to i-predicates in chapter 3, since I will
argue that Fox's effect (8) is formally analogous to the contrast in (101). For this reason, I dismiss
this latter direct approach and the idea that the definition (74) of the set of scalar alternatives should
be relaxed to allow for reshuffling of operators.
2.3 Extension to downward entailing environments
Let so and 2 be two contextually equivalent scalar alternatives such that logically asymmetrically
entails p. The proposal presented in the previous section 2.1 predicts W to sound odd and 2 to sound
fine. In other words, if you have to choose between two contextually equivalent alternatives, you
I think that this derivation can be ruled out in one of two ways. One way is that, if the two replacements are done one at
the time, then there has got to be an intermediate step at which we are entertaining an alternative such that either its tense
argument is unbounded (if we first replace the matrix tense operator Vt with the null one Ot) or else is bound by two different
operators (if we first replace the embedded null tense operator Ot with Vt); in either case, the derivation of the alternative V
from the prejacent W contradicts, if not the letter, at least the spirit of the new definition (124) of the set of scalar alternatives.
Another way to rule out the derivation just sketched is to deny that there exists any such thing as a Horn-scale of the form
(0t, Vt). One might generalize this hypothesis to the claim that no operator is a Horn-mate of the corresponding null/vacuous
variant, pace Amsili and Beyssade (2006); see also footnote 25.
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should pick the logically stronger one. One would then expect that oddness should flip in downward
entailing (henceforth: DE) contexts, namely one would expect the pattern in (134), where D01 is a
DE operator.
(134) V is a logically stronger but contextually equivalent scalar alternative to p.
a. ODE. ((p) should sound fine;
b. ODE (0) should sound odd.
In this section, I test the prediction (134). I note that the data seem to split into two classes w.r.t.
prediction (134). And I offer a tentative characterization of the two classes of data, based on the way
contextual equivalence is achieved. Throughout this section, I concentrate mainly on the DE context
provided by the restrictor of universal quantifiers, since this is the case of interest for my application
to i-predicates in chapter 3.
First set of examples Following for instance Sauerland (2004a), let me assume that the masculine
gender feature is semantically vacuous. Thus, the universal quantifier in (135a) has a larger restrictor
(namely the entire set of Italians) while the universal quantifier in (135b) has a smaller restrictor
(namely the subset of Italian women). Thus, sentence (135a) is logically stronger than sentence
(135b), despite the fact that they are equivalent given the piece of common knowledge that all Italians
come from the same country. And indeed it is the logically weaker sentence (135b) that sounds odd,
while the logically stronger sentence (135a) sounds fine.
(135) a. Gli italiani vengono da un paese bellissimo.
The Italians-MASC come from a country beautiful
'Italians come from a beautiful country'
b. #Le italiane vengono da un paese bellissimo.
The Italians-FEM come from a country beautiful
'Italian women come from a beautiful country'
The contrast in (136) makes the same point, with a case where the relevant piece of common knowl-
edge is provided by the preceding discourse. The universal quantifier in (136a) has a larger restric-
tor (namely the set of professors who assigned an A to at least some students) and the universal
quantifier in (136b) has a smaller restrictor (namely the set of professors that assigned an A to all
students). Thus, sentence (136a) is logically stronger than sentence (136b), despite the fact that they
are equivalent given the piece of common knowledge that, if some professors got a pay raise, then
all professors did. And indeed it is the logically weaker sentence (136b) that sounds odd, while the
logically stronger sentence (136a) sounds fine.
(136) Every year, the dean has to decide: if the college has made enough profit that year, he gives
a pay raise to every professor who has assigned an A to at least some of his students; if there
is not enough money, then no one gets a pay raise.
a ... This year, every professor who assigned an A to some of his students got a pay raise.
b ... #This year, every professor who assigned an A to all of his students got a pay raise.
In conclusion, these contrasts support the prediction (134): out of two contextually equivalent al-
ternatives that differ for a scalar item embedded in a DE contexts, the logically stronger sentence
sounds fine while the logically weaker sentence sounds odd.
Second set of examples The universal quantifier in (137a) has a larger restrictor (namely the set
of professors who assigned an A to at least some of the students) while the universal quantifier in
(137b) has a smaller restrictor (namely the set of professors who assigned an A to all students). Thus,
sentence (137a) is logically stronger than sentence (137b), despite the fact that they are equivalent
given the piece of common knowledge that every professor assigns the same grade to all of his
students. Surprisingly, in this case it is the logically stronger sentence (137a) that sounds odd, while
the logically weaker sentence (137b) sounds fine.
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(137) Context: In this department, every professor assigns the same grade to all of his students.
a. #This year, every professor of this department who assigned an A to some of his students
got a prize from the dean.
b. This year, every professor of this department who assigned an A to all of his students
got a prize from the dean.
The two cases in (138) and (139) make the same point. Again, the logically stronger sentences
(138a) and (139a) sound odd while the logically weaker sentences (138b) and (139b) sound fine.23
(138) a. #Every father some of whose children have a foreign last name must pay a fine.
b. Every father whose children have a foreign last name must pay a fine.
(139) a. #Every student with a blue eye is German.
b. Every student with blue eyes is German.
In conclusion, these pairs of sentences contradict the prediction (134) that the logically stronger
sentence sounds fine while the logically weaker sentence sounds odd.
A generalization In (135)-(139), I have considered pairs of sentences that can be schematized as
in (140), where Strong is a restrictor of a universal quantifier containing a strong scalar item (e.g.:
'all', feminine morphology, etc.) and Weak is that same restrictor with the strong scalar item replaced
by the corresponding weak one (e.g.: 'some', vacuous masculine morphology, etc.).
(140) a. V = every(Weak)
b. co = every(Strong).
Of course, 0 logically asymmetrically entails p. Furthermore the two sentences W and 7 are con-
textually equivalent in all the examples considered. Why does W sound odd and V sound fine in
the cases (135)-(136) while the opposite happens in the cases (137)-(139)? I want to suggest that
the crucial difference hinges on how contextual equivalence between the two alternatives W and ,b is
ensured. To illustrate the idea, consider the minimal case provided by the two pairs (136) and (137).
In both cases, the weak and strong restrictors of 'every' are as in (141).
(141) a. Weak = set of professors who assigned an A to some students.
b. Strong = set of professors who assigned an A to all students.
In the problematic case (137), context entails that the two restrictors Strong and Weak in (141) are
identical in every world w compatible with common knowledge, from which it follows of course
that the two sentences W and V) are equivalent given common knowledge. In the non-problematic
case (136), context ensures that W and 0 are equivalent without the two restrictors Strong and Weak
in (141) being equivalent too. This observation extends to the other examples considered. In other
words: what's special about the problematic cases (137)-(139) is that contextual equivalence be-
tween the two alternatives W and b is ensured in a "cheap" way, namely through the contextual
equivalence of the two restrictors. I thus suggest the tentative generalization (142).
(142) P "Wck
Strong -+Wck Weak Strong <4 Wck Weak
W = every(Strong) (a) fine (c) odd
= every(Weak) (b) odd (d) fine
In Section 3.2, I'll suggest that the oddness of sentence (5b), with the temporal modifier 'after
dinner' and the i-predicate 'tall', provides further evidence for the generalization in the right column
of (142); and that the life-time effect triggered by sentence (6b), with the i-predicate 'tall' in the past
tense, provides further evidence for the generalization in the left column of (142).
23Example (139) bears on the issue only under the assumption that the restrictor 'x has blue eyes' means "x has two or
more blue eyes" and is thus stronger than 'x has a blue eye'. I am aware that this assumption has been questioned in the
recent literature, for instance by Sauerland (2003a) and Spector (2007a). This example might thus be irrelevant.
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Toward an account: the idea Assume that the generalization (142) is empirically correct. Is there
any way to make sense of it? This is a tough question. Of course, the tough cases are (142a) and
(142b) in the left column, namely the cases that do not fit the expected generalization (134). Let
me make explicit the nature of the challenge. One might have expected case (142a), with Strong
in the restrictor of the universal quantifier, to correspond to the strengthened meaning (143a), that
entails the negation of the corresponding alternative with embedded Weak; but this strengthened
meaning would incorrectly predict case (142a) to sound odd, since this strengthened meaning is a
contradiction w.r.t. any common knowledge that renders the two restrictors Strong and Weak contex-
tually equivalent. Furthermore, one might have expected case (142b), with Weak in the restrictor of
the universal quantifier, to correspond to the strengthened meaning (143b), that has no implicature
and thus coincides with the unstrengthened meaning; but this vacuous strengthened meaning would
incorrectly predict case (142b) to sound fine.
(143) a. Naive strengthened meanings for case (142a):
every(Strong) A -'every(Weak).
b. NaiYve strengthened meanings for case (142b):
every(Weak).
I want to suggest that both these difficulties disappear once we postulate an exhaustivity operator
embedded in the restrictor of the universal operator, besides the matrix one. Let me sketch the idea
informally, before I dive into the details. Consider first the case of (142b), that I want to analyze
as in (144b). Assume that this sentence contains an exhaustivity operator embedded in the restric-
tor of the universal quantifier, besides the matrix exhaustivity operator. Assume furthermore that
this embedded exhaustivity operator triggers a mandatory implicature -iStrong, since the alternative
Strong is contextually equivalent to the embedded prejacent Weak. Then, (142b) is predicted to be
bad because it entails 'every(Weak A -Strong)', that is bad because Weak A -Strong is empty in
every world compatible with common knowledge and thus the existence presupposition of 'every'
cannot be satisfied. Consider next the case of (142a). Assume of course that also this sentence
contains an exhaustivity operator embedded in the restrictor of the universal quantifier, besides the
matrix exhaustivity operator. The embedded exhaustivity operator does nothing in this case, since its
prejacent has no stronger alternatives. Furthermore, the matrix exhaustivity operator does nothing
either. In fact, the only matrix alternative that we need to consider is the one obtained by replacing
Strong by Weak, as in (144a). Of course, this alternative retains the embedded exhaustivity operator
and thus suffers from presupposition failure, just as the case (144b). Thus, this matrix alternative
is in no way contextually equivalent to the matrix prejacent and is therefore not mandatory. Since
both matrix and embedded strengthening are vacuous in this case (142a), then this case is correctly
predicted to be fine.
(144) a. (142a) = [EXl [every [EXH Strong]]]
= [every [ EXH Strong ] ] and not [ every [ EXH Weak ] ]
matrix prejacent matrix alternative
= [every [ Strong ] ] and not [every [ Weak A -Strong ] ]
b. (142b) = [ EXH [ every[ EXH Weak ] ]
= [EXH [every [ Weak A -Strong ] ] ]
presupposition failure
In conclusion, the intuitive idea can be summarized as follows: the case in (142b) sounds odd be-
cause the embedded exhaustivity operator screws up the sentence; the case in (142a) sounds fine
because the embedded exhaustivity operator screws up the potentially dangerous alternative of the
sentence. I am now ready to turn to the details. My proposal hinges on ideas developed in Fox and
Spector (2008).
Toward an account: the details In section 2.1, I have concentrated on the matrix case. I have
assumed that an instance of the exhaustivity operator is mandatorily adjoined to every matrix sen-
tence, as stated in (86) repeated below in (145). In order to make sense of the hypothesis (145) that
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the exhaustivity operator is mandatory in matrix sentences, in section 2.1 I had to partially revise the
initial definition of the exhaustivity operator, by letting it depend on a relevance predicate assigned
by the context, as in (87b)-(87b') repeated in (146). This new definition (146) of the exhaustivity op-
erator soothes the very strong assumption (145) that the exhaustivity operator is mandatory in matrix
clauses: instances of matrix scalar items that trigger no implicature do not contradict the hypothesis
(145) that the exhaustivity operator is present, because lack of implicatures can now be attributed to
the fact that the corresponding alternatives are not relevant.
(145) The exhausitivity operator EXH is mandatory at matrix scope.
(146) EXHRz(p) = o A A '
'00znlExci(cp)
I now want to extend assumption (145) from matrix sentences to any scope site, as stated in (147). To
make sense of the more general assumption (147), I need to further extend the manoeuvre in (146), as
follows. The exhaustivity operator is in essence a universal operator. All (universal) operators come
with a restrictor, that is partially determined by grammar and partially by context. The exhaustivity
operator is no exception. Thus, let me denote by 0 the restrictor of the exhaustivity operator24 and let
me replace the initial definition (73) and the revised definition (146) with the further variant (148). If
an LF contains multiple instances of the exhaustivity operator, each instance will come with its own
restrictor f. For this reason, I will occasionally resort to the more precise notation n(o) that makes
explicit the dependence of the restrictor Q on the prejacent W. Again, this new definition (148) of
the exhaustivity operator soothes the very strong assumption (147), since lack of the exhaustivity
operator is equivalent to an exhaustivity operator with an empty restrictor 9.
(147) The exhausitivity operator EXH is mandatory at every scope site (say, any node that denotes
a proposition).
(148) EXHn(W) = Wo A A -'
Once the two assumptions (147) and (148) are in place, the theory of scalar implicatures can be
construed as the theory of the restrictor 0 of the exhaustivity operator. This theory should consist
of constraints of two types: constraints on what must belong to 0 and constraints on what cannot
belong to f. In section 2.1, I have considered examples of both types of constraints. Constraint
(149a) says that O(W) cannot contain any alternative that does not belong to the formally defined
set £zcl(p) of alternatives excludable w.r.t. p. Constraint (149b) says that 1(W) must contain every
excludable alternative that is relevant. Since in section 2.11 was only concerned with the matrix case,
I did not need any other constraint on the domain 9 of the exhaustivity operator besides the two in
(149). Thus, I could define Q as the set Cxcl(Qp) n R of relevant formally excludable alternatives, so
that (148) reduces indeed to (146). Once I extend the initial assumption (145) that the exhaustivity
operator is present in matrix clauses to the assumption (147) that it is present at every scope site,
various complications arise; let me discuss two of them.
(149) a. n(W) C £xcl(Wo);
b. &xcl(p) n R Z _();
Here is afirst complication. As noted above, I want to posit an exhaustivity operator embedded in
the restrictor of a universal operator. To make this assumption compatible with the current statement
of assumption (147), that characterizes scope sites as constituents that denote propositions, I will
thus resort to a DRT-ish representation, whereby the restrictor of a universal quantifier denotes an
open proposition such as Weak(x) or Strong(x), and the universal operator binds its free variable z.
This move also allows me to stick to the assumption that R is a set of propositions. In section 2.1,
I have elaborated a bit on the constraint (149b): I have stated it more explicitly as in (149b') and I
have suggested that the latter formulation might actually follow from general plausible assumptions
on the relevance property R, such as those listed in (89). Let me now stipulate without further
24Fox and Spector (2008) use the notation C for the restrictor of the exhaustivity operator, instead of f. I cannot use C,
because in chapter 3 I will reserve that symbol for the restrictor of Q-adverbs.
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discussion that (149b') holds also for the case where the prejacent W is an embedded constituent
such as Weak(x) or Strong(x), that denotes a proposition that depends on the assignment of the
value to a free variable x.
(149) b' If the alternative 0 e Excl(p) and the prejacent W are contextually equivalent, then
Here is a second complication. Consider the case of sentence (150a), with a weak scalar item embed-
ded under negation. By assumption (147), this sentence has the LF in (150b), with two exhaustivity
operators, one below and one above negation. If the restrictor S of the embedded exhaustivity oper-
ator were to contain the alternative AND, we would plausibly derive the wrong meaning. Thus, we
need some further constraint on the domain 9l of the embedded exhaustivity operator.
(150) a. John did't talk to Mary or Sue.
b. [EXH[not[EXHnOR]]]
The somewhat obvious idea is that the domain 9 of the embedded exhaustivity operator in (150b)
cannot contain the alternative OR because that instance of the exhaustivity operator occurs in a
DE environment, and thus local strengthening leads to global weakening. Fox and Spector (2008)
formalize this intuition as a constraint on the domain of the exhaustivity operators. I provide a
simplified version of their constraint in (151c), that together with the two constraints repeated in
(15 la) and (15 1b) completes my assumptions on the domain 9 of the exhaustivity operator.
(151) a. 2(p) C Excl(o);
b. If the alternative 0 e Eld(W) and the prejacent W are contextually equivalent, then
0 E 9(w).
c. An LF is ungrammatical if it constaints an instance of the exhaustivity operator EXHn
with a domain Q such that there exists a proper subset 9' of 0 such that the LF obtained
by replacing 11 by Q' is equivalent or stronger.
I now would like to argue that the pattern described in the generalization (142) can be accounted for
by the three assumptions (147), (148) and (151). Let me start with the case (142b), namely with the
fact that the sentence 'every(Weak)' sounds odd in a context that ensures that the two restrictors Weak
and Strong are contextually equivalent. By assumption (147), the LF of this sentence is (152), with
a matrix and an embedded exhaustivity operator. Let's concentrate on the embedded exhaustivity
operator, whose domain is Q. By assumption (151a), Strong can belong to the domain 0, since
Strong belongs to the set of excludable alternatives of the prejacent Weak. By assumption (151b),
Strong must belong to the domain Q, since we are considering the case where common knowledge
renders Strong and Weak contextually equivalent. The oddness of this case (142b) can then be
derived in one of two ways. One way is to attribute it to a contradiction between the two constraints
(151b) and (151c): the former constraint wants Strong to belong to £2 while the latter prevents Strong
from belonging to n. An alternative way is to let constraint (151b) win over constraint (151c), so
that the local implicature is indeed derived and oddness can then be attributed to the fact that the
restrictor of 'every' is empty in every world compatible with common knowledge.
(152)
EXH
VP(s)
everyx
EXH Weak(x)
Let me now turn to the case (142a), whereby the universal quantifier is restricted by Strong. Again by
assumption (147), the LF corresponding to this case is (153a), with both a matrix and an embedded
exhuastivity operator. The set of excludable alternatives of Strong is empty; by (151a), the domain
Q(Strong) of the embedded exhaustivity operator is thus empty too. The embedded exhaustivity
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operator can thus effectively be ignored in computing the truth conditions of the prejacent o, that
therefore turn out to be (153b).
(153) a.
EXHn(W)
VP(X)
every,
EXHn(Strong) Strong(x)
b. p = Vx[Strong(x)][vP(x)]
By assumption (74) that scalar alternatives are obtained by replacing scalar items with Horn-mates,
the prejacent W of the matrix exhaustivity operator in (153a) has only the scalar alternative 0 in
(154a), obtained by replacing Strong with Weak. By assumption (151b), the alternative Strong must
belong to the domain 92(Weak) of the exhaustivity operator embedded in this alternative o, since
Strong is logically excludable and furthermore by hypothesis contextually equivalent to the preja-
cent Weak. The restrictor of 'every' in the alternative V thus ends up being empty in every world
compatible with common knowledge, namely 0 is an instance of presupposition failure or else a
contextual tautology. In either case, b is of course not contextually equivalent to the prejacent o and
thus assumption (151b) is moot with respect to the matrix exhaustivity operator in (153a), that thus
ends up being vacuous. In conclusion, the truth conditions of the LF (153a) coincide with the truth
conditions (153b) of the prejacent W and the case (142a) is thus correctly predicted to sound fine. 25
(154) a.
everyX
EXHn(Weak) Weak(x)
b. ? = Vx (Weak(x) A -Strong(x))
The cases (142c) and (142d) are fully compatible with the proposal just sketched. Again, these
cases will correspond to the two LFs (153a) and (152) respectively. The crucial difference though is
that in these two cases the embedded constituents Weak and Strong are not contextually equivalent.
Assumption (151b) thus has no bite for the embedded instance of the exhaustivity operator. Thus,
I can effectively ignore the embedded exhaustivity operator and consider the simplified LF (155)
for all intents and purposes. The predicted strengthened meaning thus are those in (143) and the
observed judgments follow straightforwardly into place.
(155) EX
0 WeakStrong
Extensions So far, I have concentrated on the DE context provided by the restrictor of a universal
quantifier. I think that the generalization (142) applies to embedding in any DE environment, not
only to embedding in the restrictor of universal quantifiers. For instance, the contrasts (135)-(139)
25 Note that, in order for the account to go through, it is crucial that the alternative 0 in (154) retains the embedded
exhaustivity operator. This can be ensured in one of two ways. One way is to assume that there is no Horn-scale that pairs up
an operator with a vacuous operator, as already suggested in footnote 22. Another way is to construe assumption (147) as a
well-formedness condition that applies to alternatives too. Unfortunately, this assumption that scalar alternatives must retain
the embedded exhaustivity operators of the prejacent is at odds with what proposed in Fox and Spector (2008).
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remain unaffected if 'every' is replaced by 'no'. To illustrate, I give in (156) and (157) the two
cases corresponding to (136) and (137) with 'every' replaced by 'no', and furthermore with 'some'
replaced by disjunction in order to circumvent the problem of the PPInes of 'some'.
(156) Every year, the dean has to decide: if the college has made enough profit that year, he gives
a pay raise to every professor who has taught a graduate or an undergraduate class; if there
is not enough money, then no one gets a pay raise.
a. This year, no professor who taught a graduate or an undergraduate class got a pay raise.
b. #This year, no professor who taught a graduate and an undergraduate class got a pay
raise.
(157) Context: In this department, every professor teaches both a graduate and an undergraduate
class in the same field of linguistics.
a. #This year, no professor who taught graduate or undergraduate Semantics got a pay raise
b. This year, no professor who taught graduate and undergraduate Semantics got a pay
raise.
I thus just rewrite the generalization (142) as in (158), where I have replaced the restrictor of a
universal quantifier with an arbitrary DE operator ODE. Before I move on, let me make a couple of
remarks on the special case where ODE is negation.
(158) o " W ck
Strong -'+Wck Weak Strong 1*Wck Weak
W = ODE(Strong) (a) fine (c) odd
S= ODE (Weak) (b) odd (d) fine
A few authors have observed that odd sentences remain odd when embedded under negation. For
instance Spector (2007a) construes the plurality inference triggered by plural morphology as a scalar
implicature. The oddness of sentence (159a) is thus due to the fact that this implicature mismatches
with the piece of common knowledge that people can marry only one person at the time. Spector
notes that embedding under negation does not affect the oddness of (159a), as shown in (159b).
But the generalization (158) says that negation is not the interesting case to test the behavior of
oddness in DE contexts. In fact, negation has the property that the right column of the table (158)
can never hold, since the hypothesis that the matrix sentences W = -iStrong and 0 = -Weak are
contextually equivalent immediately entails that the corresponding embedded sentences Strong and
Weak are contextually equivalent too.
(159) a. #Last summer, Mario married (some) Italian girls.
b. #Despite his family's pressure, Mario didn't marry Italian girls.
Further support for the generalization (158) comes from the contrast in (160).26 Sentence (160a)
contains the strong scalar item 'all' embedded under negation. This case falls of course under the
left column of table (158), since context ensures the equivalence between the embedded sentence
Strong = 'all professors assigned an A' and the alternative Weak = 'some professors assigned an
A'. Thus, the acceptability of sentence (160a) fits with the generalization (158). Sentence (160b) is
truth-conditionally equivalent to sentence (160a), and yet sounds odd. This is expected if 'not all'
is a single scalar item: in this case, table (158) does not apply, because there is no embedding in
a DE environment here; hence, sentence (160b) is predicted to sound odd, since it is contextually
equivalent to but logically weaker than the alternative with 'not all' replaced by 'no'.
(160) In this department, all professors get together at the end of the semester and decide a grade
to assign to all of their students.
a. It is false that [this year all professors assigned an A].
26This example came up in conversation with E. Chemla.
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b. ?This year, not all professors assigned an A.
So far, I have considered the case of embedding under a DE operator ODE. I think that the gener-
alization (158) can be extended to upward entailing (henceforth: UE) operators too, as stated in the
revised generalization (161).27
(161) ep +Wck
Strong -Wck Weak Strong </Wck Weak
0 is DE 0 is UE
p = O(Strong) (a) fine (c) odd (e) fine
S= O(Weak) (b) odd (d) fine (f) odd
The idea behind this generalization (161) can be informally spelled out as follows. We have to choose
between these two alternatives W and b, obtained by embedding under an operator O either Strong
or Weak. We start from the embedded context and move up. If the two embedded constituents
are indeed contextually equivalent, then the choice is made at the embedded level: we pick the
sentence with the logically stronger embedded constituent Strong, no matter the monotonicity of the
embedding operator O. If the two embedded constituents are not contextually equivalent, then we
cannot make the choice at the embedded level and need instead to look one level up. In this case,
the monotonicity of the embedding operator O does of course matter. In fact, we pick the alternative
that is globally logically stronger. In other words, I assume that also in the case of a UE embedding
operator O, the decision is made at the embedded level whenever the embedded constituents are
contextually equivalent. Of course, in the case where O is a UE operator, it does not make any
difference whether the choice is made locally or globally, because the two options lead to the same
conclusion, since the globally logically stronger alternative is the one with the logically stronger
embedded alternative.
Remark: back to the cases considered in sections 2.1 and 2.2 As noted above, (147)-(148)
reduce to (145)-(146) in the case of matrix sentences. Thus, the modifications suggested in this
section have no effect for the basic matrix case considered in section 2.1. Yet, they do have con-
sequences for the case of the two sentences (101a) and (101b) considered in section 2.2. The case
of sentence (101a) remains unchanged, as shown in detail in (162). By assumption (147), this sen-
tence now receives the LF (162a), with a matrix and an embedded exhaustivity operator.28 Here,
I am using Vt as a shorthand for 'every day', 3. as a shorthand for 'a fireman' and P(x, t) as a
shorthand for 'x won the running competition on day t'. I will stick to my crucial assumption
that ('a fireman', 'the fireman P') (now abbreviated as (3, x)) is a Horn-scale. Of course, also
('a fireman', 'every fireman') is a Horn-scale; but the latter scale is irrelevant to my reasoning, and I
will thus ignore it. The truth conditions of the constituent B(t) are (162b): none of the alternatives
obtained by replacing 3, by x is excludable and the embedded exhaustivity operator is therefore
vacuous. Let B[3/x] (t) be the constituent B(t) with the existential quantifier B3, replaced by x. The
truth conditions of B[3//,] are (162c). 29 The truth conditions of the matrix constituent A can then
be computed as in (162d): in step (i), I have used the fact that the only non-maximal scalar item in
the scope of the matrix exhaustivity operator is the existential quantifier 3, that participates in the
27Thanks to Emmanuel Chemla (p.c.) for discussion on this point.
28Strictly speaking, assumption (147) predicts a third exhaustivity operator in between the existential quantifier 3. and the
atomic formula P(x, t). But this operator would be vacuous (because there would be no scalar items in its scope), and I thus
ignore it.
291 am possibly making an over simplification in (162c). Perhaps, ('the fireman P', 'the fireman P") is a Horn-scale for
any two properties P and P' (here abbreviated (x, xI)). Under this assumption, (162c) and (162d) become (162c') and
(162d') below.
(162) c' Bl3/l(t)= P(x,t) A A -P(x', t) deL ONLYxP(x,t)
X' 6X
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Horn-scale (3B, x); in step (ii), I have used the results in (162b) and (162c). The result obtained at
the end of (162d) is exactly the same one obtained in section 2.2. Thus the embedded exhaustivity
operator required by assumption (147), does not affect my previous proposal.
(162) Every day, a fireman won the running competition.
a. A
EXH
Vt B(t)
EXH
3 P(x,t)
b. B(t) = B3P(x,t)
c. B[3,/lx(t) = P(x,t)
d. A (VtB(t)) A A (VtB[3,I/ (t)
x(i(Vtz]xp(x, t)) AA -, (vtp(x, 0))
= Vt3,P(x, t) A -,3xVtP(x, t)
Let me now turn to the case of sentence (101b), discussed in (163). This case is more complicated be-
cause there are three operators: a universal operator over competitions Vy, a universal operator over
days of the week Vt and an existential quantifier over firemen B3. By assumption (147), the corre-
sponding LF thus has three exhaustivity operators, as in (163a). Again as in the preceding case, the
embedded exhaustivity operator EXH 3 is vacuous, and thus the denotation of the constituent C(y, t)
are (163b). Let C[3=/=] (y, t) be the constituent C(y, t) with the existential quantifier B replaced by
x, whose corresponding truth conditions are (163c). The denotation of the constituent B(t) can then
be computed as in (163d): in step (i), I have used the fact that the only non-maximal scalar item in
the scope of the matrix exhaustivity operator EXH 2 is the existential quantifier 3, that participates
in the Horn-scale (3, x); in step (ii), I have used the results in (163b) and (163c). Let B[3./=1] (t)
be the constituent B(t) with the existential quantifier 3B replaced by x, whose corresponding truth
conditions are (163e). The denotation of the matrix constituent A can then be computed as in (163f)0:
in step (i), I have used the fact that the only non-maximal scalar item in the scope of the matrix ex-
haustivity operator EXH 1 is the existential quantifier 3, that participates in the Horn-scale (3=, x);
in step (ii), I have used the results in (163d) and (163e); in step (iii), I have noted that (*) entails
(**), so that the latter can be dropped.
(163) Every day, for every competition, a fireman won.
a. A
EXH 1
Vt B(t)
EXH 2
V C(y,t)
EXH3
3x P(x, y, t)
d' A = (VtB(t)) AA-(VtB( /,(t))
= (vt3P(x, t)) AA -(VtONLYZP(X, t))
= Vt3,P(x,t) A -,3VtoNLYP(x,t)
I think that this modification does not affect my proposal.
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b. C(y, t) = BxP(x, y, t)
c. C[/x](y,t)= P(x,y,t)
d. B(t) 2 (Vyc(y, t)) AA- (VyC[3/x](y,t))
X
S(Vy3xP(x, y, t)) AA - (VP(x, y, t))
e. Bl.l (t) = VyP(x,y,t)
f. A 2 VtB(t) AA (VtB[Bz/x]())
( Vt [(Vyxp(x, y, t)) A - (3xVyP(x, y, t))] AA (vtvyP(x,y, t))
X
= Vtv xP(x, y, t) A -'3t~xVyP(x, y, t) A -']aVtVyP(x, y, t)
(,) (*,)
(iii VtVyxP(x, y, t) A -'3t~xVyP(x, y, t)
In conclusion, (163f) says that sentence (101b) triggers the scalar implicature -3t3xVyP(x, y, t)
that "it is not the case that there is a day on which a single firemen won all of the competitions."
This implicature is different from the scalar implicature -'xVtVP(x, y, t) that was obtained in
section 2.2 for the LF with a single matrix exhaustivity operator. Yet, the implicature obtained here
is innocuous, since it is indeed compatible with the common knowledge in (101), thus predicting the
felicity of the sentence (101b). Yet, things are different for the variant of the sentence (101b) with
the opposite relative scope of the two universal quantifiers, corresponding to the LF (164a) with
truth conditions (164b). In this case in fact, the implicature -,By3xVtP(x, y, t) that "there exists
no competition that was won by the same fireman on every day" does mismatch with the common
knowledge in (101).
(164) For every competition, every day a fireman won.
a. A
EXH 1
V B(y)
EXH 2
Vt C(y,t)
EXH 3, P(x,y,t)
b. A = VtVBy3xP(x,y,t) A -i3B3xVtP(x,y,t)
I can thus conclude as follows. If sentence (101b) admits both LFs (163) and (164), then it is
correctly predicted to sound fine in the context considered, because it admits at least one LF, namely
(163), which is fine. If instead the surface scope of the two universal quantifiers determines their LF
scope, then my proposal predicts that sentence (163) should be fine in the context considered while
the variant in (164) with the opposite surface scope of the two universal quantifiers should sound
odd.
2.4 Extension to Presuppositions
This section somewhat tentatively explores the hypothesis that anti-presuppositions can be derived
as plain scalar implicatures. This hypothesis is developed through various steps.
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First step As noted in section 1.2, an important class of inferences that have been studied in the
literature is that of ANTI-PRESUPPOSITIONS. These inferences are exemplified in (165)-(166): sen-
tence (165a) triggers the inference that the factivity presupposition of the corresponding sentence
(165b) is not satisfied; analogously, sentence (166a) triggers the inference that the uniqueness pre-
supposition of the corresponding sentence (166b) is not satisfied. There seems to be wide agreement
that the anti-presuppositions triggered by sentences (165a) and (166a) do indeed arise by "competi-
tion" with the corresponding alternatives (165b) and (165b). The crucial issue now is to understand
what is the nature of the "competition" that triggers these anti-presuppositions.
(165) a. John believes that Mary is pregnant.
b. John knows that Mary is pregnant.
(166) a. 9 = A mistress of the victim arrived late.
b. 4 = The mistress of the victim arrived late.
As reviewed in section 1.2, it has been suggested in the literature that anti-presuppositions cannot
be either scalar implicatures or presuppositions. Thus, a new, dedicated principle has been posited
in order to steer the competition that underlies these inferences, such as MP (34). Sauerland (2008)
provides the convincing empirical argument (30) to show that anti-presuppositions are not presup-
positions, based on their different projection behavior under universal quantifiers. On the other
hand, the argument (32) against treating anti-presuppositions as run-of-the-mill scalar implicatures
was contingent on the adoption of a pragmatic theory of scalar implicatures. That argument thus
evaporates once the pragmatic theory is replaced with a grammatical theory of scalar implicatures
such as the one reviwed in section 2.1, whereby scalar implicatures are derived through a covert but
syntactically realized operator akin to overt 'only'. Furthermore, the anti-presuppositions of sen-
tences (165a) and (166a) can be brought out with an overt 'only' as in (167), just as it is the case for
run-of-the-mill scalar implicatures, as noted in (68)-(70) from Fox (2007a).
(167) a. John only believesF that Mary is pregnant.
b. You are only oneF mistress of John.
I thus want to entertain the hypothesis that anti-presuppositions are not a separate, peculiar class of
inferences but rather run-of-the-mill scalar implicatures. Here is an initial way to cash out this idea.
Suppose that a sentence W that contains presuppositional items denotes two propositions, namely its
PRESUPPOSITION pr,. and its ASSERTION a.r. Thus, ['p] = (Pprs, Oasr). How are we going to
interpret the LF (168) obtained by appending the exhaustivity operator EXH to sentence W then?
(168) [[EXH W] = ?
Here is a very minimal way to go, that I illustrate by concentrating on the pair of sentences 'p and 0
in (166). There is wide consensus on what the presupposition 4,, of sentence V) in (166b) should
look like, namely the set of worlds where the victim had one and only one mistress. But what should
the assertion 4, look like? It seems to me that both options (169) are in principle available. Option
(169b) says that the two sentences in (166) have the same assertion, namely V), = pa,. Option
(169a) says that the assertion 0... is a subset of the presupposition 4,. If we were to construe the
denotation of 4 as a partial function, then option (169a) would correspond to defining 0..r as the set
of worlds where the function is both defined and true. I think that the two options (169) do not make
different predictions for projection behavior.
(169) a. Or = the set of worlds where the victim has a unique mistress and she arrived late.
b. Or = the set of worlds where the victim has a mistress who arrived late.
The choice between the two variants in (169) has important consequences for the issue of the proper
derivation of anti-presuppositions. Suppose that the right definition of the assertion ,,ar of sentence
, in (166b) were (169a). And assume that the proper solution to problem (168) is (170). This is
the minimal modification that we can make to the current framework in order to make it compatible
with the assumption that the prejacent ' denotes not one but two propositions. This modification
says that the exhaustivity operator ignores the presupposition component and only works at the level
62 Oddness by mismatching scalar implicatures
of assertion. The anti-presupposition of sentence W in (166a) follows straightforwardly from the
assumption that ('a', 'the') is a Horn-scale.
(170) [[EXH ]] = ((pr., EXH( ar)).
Let me take stock. An anti-presupposition looks suspiciously similar to a scalar implicature, with the
special property that the relevant alternative contains a presuppositional item. Within the pragmatic
framework to scalar implicatures, anti-presuppositions cannot be derived as scalar implicatures, be-
cause of the issue in (32). Thus, basically the same engine needs to be used twice: in the form of
a pragmatic derivation of scalar implicatures; and in the form of a grammatical derivation of anti-
presuppositions. Once we grammaticalize scalar implicatures to start with, there is no reason any
more to treat the two types of inferences separately.
Second step The odd sentences in (60)-(64) containing 'some' remain odd if 'some' is replaced
by 'every'/'all', as shown in (171)-(175). Example (172) is due to Percus (2001); example (173) is
due to Spector (2007b).
(171) Mary is conducting a survay on names and last names of Italian children. She knows that all
children inherit the last name of their father; hence, all children of a given couple share the
same last name. This week, she has interviewed the children of five couples, A through E,
in order to record their names and last names...
a. W = #Every child of couple C has a French last name.
b. b = The children of couple C have a French last name.
(172) Alluding to the Marx Brothers:
a. #Each one's mother was named Minnie.
b. Their mother was named Minnie.
(173) Speaking of the atoms of a molecule which cannot be separated:
a. #Every atom went right.
b. The atoms went right.
(174) #Both eyes of the victim are blue.
(175) a. #Every Italian comes from a beautiful country.
b. Italians come from a beautiful country.
The account proposed in section 2.1 for the oddness of the original sentences with 'some' of course
does not extend to these variants (171a)-(175a), since these latter sentences plausibly express the
strongest meaning among their alternatives and thus (blind) strengthening is vacuous. I want to
suggest that the oddness of sentences (171a)-(175a) is due to the fact that, nonetheless, they do not
carry the strongest presupposition. Let me illustrate the idea, by concentrating for example on the
pair of sentences W and 0 in (171). Let me assume that the plural definite article and universal
quantifiers are Horn-mates, as stated in (176).3o Thus, let me consider the alternative 0 in (171b),
where 'every' is replaced by 'the'.
(176) ('every', 'the') is a Horn-scale
Let me pause to discuss the proper semantics of this alternative b. Distributive predication with
definite subjects, as in the case of 0, requires the predicate to be operated upon by the DISTRIBUTIVE
OPERATOR Dist. Following for instance Link (1983), I take the function Dist([vp]W) to be true of
a plurality x iff the property [vP]"' holds of all the atomic parts y of x (i.e. y <AT x). Thus, W and
301 think this assumption is plausible, for the following reason. Every existing account for the oddness of Hawinks'
sentences (10) needs the assumption that 'a' and the singular definite article are alternatives. Since Sharvy (1980), it has
become standard to assume that there is no difference between singular and plural definites. Thus, we need the assumption
that existential quantifiers and definites are Horn-mates. If Horn-mateness is transitive and if furthermore existential and
universal quantifiers are Horn-mates, then it follows that universal quantifiers and definites are Horn-mates too, as stated in
(176).
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0 end up having the same meaning. Nonetheless, they have different presuppositions. In fact, the
distributivity operator Dist does something more: it also introduces the so called HOMOGENEITY
PRESUPPOSITION, namely the presupposition that the property [VP] w either holds of all the atomic
parts y of x or else it does not hold of any of them; see Fodor (1970), L6bner (1985), von Fintel
(1997) and Gajewski (2005), among others. Thus, the proper semantics of the distributive operator
Dist is that in (177). The homogeneity presupposition can be detected for example by means of
negation: the sentence 'Sue didn't see the boys' conveys that Sue didn't see any of the boys, which
differs from the plain meaning (namely that "Sue didn't see every boy") but does follow from the
plain meaning plus the homogeneity presupposition.
(177) Dist([vP]w) = Ax: YESw(x)VNOW(x) . YES'(x),
a. YES'(x) = 1 iff [VP)w(y) for every y such that y AT x,
b. NOw(x) = 1 iff -[vP] (y) for every y such that y AT x.
By (177), 0 in (171b) bears the homogeneity presupposition bpr, in (178b), according to which
either all the children of couple C have a French last name or else none of them does. No such
presupposition is carried by W in (171a), as stated in (178a), where I am ignoring other potential
presuppositions which are irrelevant to my point.
(178) a. pr,
. 
= W.
b. Oprs = YES U NO,
i. YES = {w I every child of the couple has a long last name w},
ii. NO = {w I no child of the couple has a long last name in w}.
At this point, I would like to suggest that the oddness of sentence W in (171a) arises because of
the anti-homogeneity inference triggered by competition with 0 in (171b). Unfortunately, there
is no way to get this inference by sticking with the simple assumption (170) that strengthening is
only performed at the level of assertion. Let me make the problem explicit. The trick used in the
case of the pair W and 0 in (166) was to effectively define the assertion of the alternative 0 as
the conjunction of the assertion of W with the presupposition of V, as stated in (179). Thus, the
conjunction p, A "~a,r obtained by strengthening the assertion entails - Vpr. But this trick based
on defining the assertion of the alternative 0 as in (179) does not work in the case of the pair p and 4
in (171): the assertion W.,r of o entails the homogeneity presupposition ,,,p of 0; thus, 0.r defined
in (179) boils down to ar; hence, no strengthening of the assertion happens in this case.
(179) asr, = Pprs A Sar
In order to get out of trouble, I would like to suggest that (170) be replaced by (180), namely that
strengthening be performed not just at the level of assertion but also at the level of presupposition. 31
31A similar claim has been made recently in Sharvit and Gajewski (2007) and Gajewski and Sharvit (2009). Building on
Simons (2006), they note the following fact: sentence (i) triggers the implicature in (ia) but not the one in (ib), contrary to
other attitude verbs, such as 'to be certain'. They suggest that this behavior has to do with the fact that 'some' is embedded
in a UE environment if we consider the presupposition but in a DE environment if we consider the assertion. And they claim
that, in order to capture this intuition, it is necessary to assume that strengthening be performed independently at the level of
the presupposition, as in (180) - even though they adopt a very different framework.
(i) W = John is sorry that A or B.
a. - John believes that A or B and not both
b. 74 John is sorry that A or B and not both.
But I think that this fact (i) can be obtained also by strengthening just at the level of the assertion as in (170), and thus do not
really provide an argument in favor of strengthening also at the level of the presupposition as in (180). Here is why. They
assume that the sentence (i) denotes the partial function in (ii), with the standard notation of Heim and Kratzer (1998). Thus,
the assertion ~Wa.r can only be defined as in (iiia) as the set of worlds where the function o is defined and equal to 1. Let ',,
be the assertion of the corresponding alternative obtained by replacing 'or' with 'and', as in (iiib).
(ii) p = Aw : DOX(w) C p. BUL(w) C -np
(iii) a. Wa..r = (DOX(w) C OR) A (BUL(w) g -OR)
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(180) I[EXH pJJ = (EXHprs(pprs)
, EXH.r(W.r)).
The most straightforward way to make (180) explicit would be (181). Let the set of scalar alter-
natives Alt(p) be defined as in (74)32 both for the computation of the strengthened presupposi-
tion and for the computation of the strengthened meaning, namely as the set of LFs obtained from
the prejacent by replacing scalar items with Horn-mates. Let the set £Exclpr.(Wo) of alternatives
presupposition-excludable and the set Excl.,r (o) of alternatives assertion-excludable be defined as
in (75) 33 : £XClpr. () is the set of those alternatives whose presupposition asymmetrically entails the
presupposition of W and £XCl.,,r (o) is the set of those alternatives whose assertion asymmetrically
entails the assertion of o. Finally, let the strengthened presupposition EXHpr. (W) and the strength-
ened assertion EXHa.r (o) be defined as in (73): EXHpr. (o) is the presupposition of o conjoined with
the negation of all the excludable presuppositions and EXHa.r (o) is the assertion of o conjoined with
the negation of all the excludable assertions.
(181) PRESUPPOSITION STRENGTHENED ASSERTION
£xclprs (o) = {1 E Alt(p) I Ppr -- 'op+ } £xclr(Wo) =- {b E Alt(wo) l O.ar - (Pasr}
EXHprs ( = Wpm A A -neprs EXH.sr(So) - asr A A '1Iasr
PEExclpre M) aJExclasr (Mo)
Assume that also strengthening at the level of presupposition is blind to common knowledge, as
stated in (182), which I'll refer to as the BHprs.
(182) The notion of entailment relevant for the computation of the strengthened presupposition
EXHp,,r (o) of a sentence o is that of logical entailment rather than that of entailment relative
to common knowledge.
Once (180)-(182) are in place, the account for the oddness of sentence o in (171a) follows straight-
forwardly. Of course, pr,, in (178b) logically asymmetrically entails opr, in (178a). Hence, the set
of alternatives presupposition-excludable w.r.t. so is £Xclpr,, (o) = {0} and the blind strengthened
presupposition of o thus boils down to (183). 34 This strengthened presupposition contradicts the
piece of common knowledge that all the children of a given couple inherit their father's last name
and thus share the same last name. Note the crucial role played by the BHpr,, (182): if the strength-
ened presupposition were computed using entailment relative to common knowledge, then 0 could
not count as a presupposition-excludable alternative w.r.t. W, since opr, and pr, are equivalent given
the common knowledge that all the children of a given couple share the same last name. This line of
account trivially extends to the other cases (171)-(175). 35 In Section 3, I'll argue that the ban against
b. a.r = (DOX(w) C AND) A (BUL(w) C-AND)
Then, by strengthening only the assertion as in (170), I would derive the strengthened assertion in (iv), where in the last step
I have used the fact that BUL(w) C -,OR entails BUL(w) C -AND.
(iv) EXH((prs) = prs A '")prs
S (DOX(w) OR) A (BUL(w) -,OR) A - (DOX(w) AND) A (BUL(w) -iAND)]
= (DOX(w) C OR A -DOX(w) C AND) A BUL(w) C -OR
By (iv), I get the implicature DOX(w) g AND that is slightly weaker than the implicature DOX(w) C -,AND in
(ia), but could be strengthened to (ia) by virtue of a pragmatic reasoning such as the one sugegsted by Russell (2006). I thus
tentatively conclude that the case in (i) can be handled by strengthening only the assertion as in (170), without any need for
strengthening the presupposition, as in (180).
320r, more properly, as in (124).
33Or, more properly, as in (106)
34Here, I am ingoring once more the issue of relevance, and thus why the mismatching scalar presupposition is mandatory.
35Let me specifically discuss the case of sentence (174). I think it is very plausible to assume that 'both' has the same
semantics as the universal quantifier 'every', only with the extra DUALITY PRESUPPOSITION that its restrictor has cardinality
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a universal adverb such as 'always' in the case of i-predicates, as illustrated in (3b), can be accounted
for in the same way as I have accounted here for the oddness of sentence (171a), by exploiting the
fact that English has a covert Q-adverb GEN which triggers the homogeneity presupposition too. 36
(183) EXHpr (W) = pr A 1'pr. = -'prs'
Third step The account that I have in place right now runs into two problems. One problem con-
cerns fine sentences containing a universal quantifier, such as (184a): the current proposal predicts
this sentence to presuppose the negation of the homogeneity presupposition of (184b) despite the
fact that its assertion entails that presupposition!
(184) a. Every friend of mine is tall.
b. My friends are tall.
Another problem concerns the following observation due to Sauerland (2003b): assume that 'a'
and 'every' are Horn-mates and that 'every' carries an existence presupposition that its restrictor be
not empty; then, sentence (185a) would trigger the strengthened presupposition that the existence
presupposition of (185b) is false; sentence (185a) would thus contradictorily presuppose that there
are no whales and entail that there is one.
(185) a. Mary saw a whale.
b. Mary saw every whale.
two. Assumption (176) that 'every' and 'the' are Horn-mates thus plausibly extends to the assumption that 'both' and 'the'
are Horn mates. The account just suggested for the oddness of the other sentences (171a)-(175a) thus straightforwardly
extends to the case of sentence (174): its strengthened presupposition entails the negation of the homogeneity presupposition
triggered by the corresponding alternative (i) and thus mismatches with the piece of common knowledge that people have
eyes of the same color. So far so good. But as soon as we let 'both' and 'the' be alternatives, we immediately run into
the following problem: why is it that sentence (i) does not sound odd? In fact, if 'both' and 'the' are Horn-mates, then the
strengthened presupposition of sentence (i) should entail the negation of the duality presupposition of 'both' and thus should
mismatch with the common knowledge that people have two eyes.
(i) The eyes of the victim are blue.
Perhaps, one way to get out of trouble might be to assume that 'both' and 'the' are not Horn-mates to start with. Rather
the proper Horn-mate of 'both' is 'the two'. Under this assumption, the oddness of sentence (174) is still accounted for by
repeating the preceding account with the alternative (ii) instead of (i). Furthermore, sentence (i) is now protected by the fact
that it has no relevant presuppositionally stronger alternative; and sentence (ii) is protected by the fact that it has the strongest
possible presupposition, namely both the duality and the homogeneity presupposition.
(ii) The two eyes of the victim are blue.
Yet, this assumption that the single lexical item 'both' is an alternative of the composite expression 'the two' is far from
trivial. For one thing, 'the two' is plausibly not a constituent. Furthermore, this assumption is not compatible with the idea
that scalar alternatives cannot be syntactically "more complex" than the target sentence, as suggested for example by Katzir
(2008). I leave the issue open.
36Let me consider the two variants of Chemla's example (62) in (i) and (ii). In both cases, the (a) sentence with 'some'
sounds odd. The interesting cases are the (b) and the (c) sentences. The proposal developed so far makes the following
prediction: the (b) sentence in (ii) should sound worse than the (b) sentence in (i), since in the case in (ii) the homogeneity
presupposition applies while in the case of (i) it does not apply. The same asymmetry is predicted for the case of the (c)
sentences.
(i) [some/most] Because of an MIT policy against intellectual discrimination, every professor has to give the same grade
A or B or C to most of his students and an F to the few others.
a. #Professor Smith gave a B to some of his students.
b. Professor Smith gave a B to most of his students.
c. Every professor gave a B to most of his students.
(ii) [some/all] Because of an MIT policy against intellectual discrimination, every professor has to give the same grade
to all of his students.
a. #Professor Smith gave a B to some of his students.
b. Professor Smith gave a B to all of his students.
c. Every professor gave a B to all of his students.
I am not sure what the judgments are.
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The two issues (184) and (185) might admit a common solution. The idea of the common solution is
that the strengthened presupposition of the target sentence o is not that common knowledge entails
the negation of the presupposition of the alternative (i.e. CC(l'bpr,)) but rather just that it is not
the case that common knowledge entails the presupposition of the alternative (i.e. -iCCK(pr)). The
formalization of this last step is admittedly not straightforward and I defer a more through discussion
to future work.37
First remark As shown by the examples in (60a)-(64a) and (171a)-(175a), 'some' and 'every'
sound just as odd in the contexts considered. The triplet in (186) summarizes the relevant pattern.
(186) In a society where children inherit their father's last name:
a. #Some children of this couple have a long last name.
b. #Every child of this couple has a long last name.
c. The children of this couple have a long last name.
I have suggested two slightly different accounts for the oddness of the two cases with 'some' and
'every': sentence (186a) with 'some' is ruled out by the fact that its blind strengthened meaning
mismatches with common knowledge; sentence (186b) with 'every' is ruled out by the fact that its
blind strengthened presupposition mismatches with common knowledge. But the symmetry between
sentences with 'some' and sentences with 'every' might seem to call for a unified account and
thus to cast doubts on my split strategy. As a matter of fact, the following unified account seems
readily available, pointed out to me by Danny Fox (p.c) and explored in Spector (2007b). Replace
the BH/BHpro with the single hypothesis in (187), which I'll call the SYMMETRY HYPOTHESIS
(henceforth: SH). Furthermore, replace the assumption (176) that ('the', 'every') is a Horn-scale
with the new assumption (188). The pattern in (186) immediately follows: sentences (186a) and
(186b) sound odd because they "kill each other" through (187) and (188a); sentence (186c) is fine,
because it is spared from (187) by the fact that it has no alternatives according to (188b).
(187) A sentence sounds odd if it is contextually equivalent to one (all?) of its scalar alternatives.
(188) a. ('some', 'every') is a Horn-scale.
b. ('the', 'every') and ('the', 'some') are not Horn-scales.
The account based on the SH crucially differs from the account based on the BH/BHprs as follows:
the former account is symmetric, in the sense that it predicts a sentence to sound odd if it has an
alternative contextually equivalent to it; the latter account is asymmetric, in the sense that it predicts
a sentence to sound odd if it has an alternative logically stronger (but contextually equivalent) to
it. I now provide a couple of arguments that the account based on the BH/BHpr, is superior to the
account based on the SH. My first argument concerns numerals. Example (65), repeated in (189),
shows that when two sentences containing numerals are contextually equivalent, the one which is
logically stronger sounds fine while the one which is logically weaker sounds odd. The symmetric
account based on the SH incorrectly predicts the two sentences in (189) to "kill each other" and thus
to both sound odd. The asymmetric account based on the BH makes the right prediction: the blind
strengthened meaning of the odd sentence (189a) entails the negation of the corresponding sentence
(189b) and thus mismatches with common knowledge; the logically stronger sentence (189b) is fine
because its blind strengthened meaning does not mismatch with common knowledge.38 The same
point applies to the examples (66) and (67) with disjunction.
(189) John has an odd number of children...
a. #He has two.
b. He has three.
37 Sauerland (2003b) advocates a different solution for the problem in (185): he works within the framework of MP (34)
and assumes that only alternatives with the same assertion can compete for the sake of MP.
38This argument based on numerals is admittedly confounded by the fact that numerals are known to be rather special
scalar items; see Horn (2005) and Geurts (2006) a.o.
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Furthermore, consider again the two pairs (99) and (101) studied in the section 2.2. I have shown
how the approach based on the BH-MH can account for both these pairs; let me now show that
the approach based on the SH cannot. The SH trivially accounts for the oddness of sentence (99a),
repeated in (190a): just consider the contextually equivalent alternative (190b), obtained by replacing
'every day' with 'some day'.
(190) a. #Every day, a fireman won. = (99a)
b. Some day, a fireman won.
But the SH is not able to account for the fact that sentence (101b), repeated in (191a), sounds fine,
given that sentence (191a) is contextually equivalent to the alternative (191b), obtained again by
replacing 'every day' with 'some day'.
(191) a. Every day, for every competition, a fireman won. = (101b)
b. Some day, for every competition, a fireman won.
Given the crucial role played by the two pairs (99) and (101) for the developments of chapter 3, I
stick with the asymmetric account based on the BH/BHpr and dismiss the symmetric account based
on the SH.39
Second remark Sentences (171a)-(175a) remain odd if the universal quantifier 'every' is replaced
with the negative quantifier 'no', as shown in (192a)-(196a). The extension of the account just
suggested for the oddness of sentences (171a)-(175a) to the oddness of sentences (192a)-(196a)
would require the assumption that 'the' and 'no' be Horn-mates, despite the fact that they have
different monotonicity.
(192) In the context described in (171):
a. W = #No child(ren) of couple C has a French last name.
b. V = The children of couple C have a French last name.
(193) Alluding to the Marx Brothers:
a. #No one's mother was named Minnie.
b. Their mother was named Minnie.
(194) Speaking of the atoms of a molecule which cannot be separated:
a. #No atom(s) went right.
b. The atoms went right.
(195) #No eyes of the victim are blue.
(196) a. #No Italian comes from a beautiful country.
b. Italians come from a beautiful country.
39There is one more fact that might speak in favor of the asymmetric account based on the BH/BHpr, and against the
symmetric account based on the SH: despite the fact that both sentences with 'some' and 'every' in (186) sound odd in
contexts which entail homogeneity, they do not sound odd to the same degree. The following example from Chemla (2006)
is striking: sentence (ia) with 'all' feels way better than sentence (ib) with 'some' (italics is not meant to signal focus). Also
Singh (2009a) makes the point that oddness in these cases (171a)-(175a) is weaker than in the cases (60a)-(64a).
(i) In this department, every professor assigns the same grade to his students.
a. This year, prof. Smith assigned an A to all of his students.
b. #This year, prof. Smith assigned an A to some of his students.
This gradience seems hard to account for within the symmetric approach based on the SH: the two sentences (ia) and
(ib) should just "kill each other." Gradience might be easier to account for within the asymmetric approach based on the
BH/BHpr.: sentence (ib) would be ruled out because of a blind mismatching strengthened meaning while sentence (ia) would
be ruled out because of a blind mismatching strengthened presupposition, and the latter mismatch might feel "less harmful"
than the former, expecially in cases where the relevant common knowledge is only provided by preceding discourse.
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A possible way to overcome this difficulty might be the following. Sauerland (2000), building on
some existing literature, suggests that the negative quantifier 'no' simply does not exist. Rather, it
should be analyzed as a morphological realization of negation plus an indefinite. If this hypothesis is
on the right track, then I might suggest that scalar alternatives are computed at a level of representa-
tion where 'no' is still split into negation and an indefinite, and the implicature needed to account for
the oddness of sentences (192a)-(196a) is derived by replacing the indefinite with a definite, which
have the same monotonicity. I leave the issue open for the time being.
2.5 Miscellaneous issues
2.5.1 An alternative approach based on Manner and its inadequacy
A Reviewer of Natural Language Semantics has pointed out to me an alternative account for some
of the facts considered in this chapter. The idea of this alternative account has come up also in other
presentations of this material. In this subsection, I sketch this alternative account and explain why I
consider it inadequate.
Sketch of an approach based on Manner This alternative account shares with the account I have
defended in this chapter the rough intuition that a sentence W sounds odd if there is a sentence b such
that W and b are contextually equivalent and yet 0 is "better" than W. The two accounts differ in
how they spell out the condition that the alternative b be "better" than the target sentence o. For my
account, "better" is inspired to the maxim of Quantity: 0 is better than W if 0 is logically stronger
than o. For the alternative account, "better" is inspired to the maxim of Manner: 0 is better than W
if , is "less costly" than W, yielding the generalization in (197). The beginning of a definition of the
relation "less costly" is provided by the conditions in (198), as suggested by the Reviewer.
(197) A sentence W sounds odd if there is a sentence , such that W and 0 are contextually equiva-
lent and furthermore is "less costly" than p.
(198) A sentence 0 is less costly than a sentence W if one of the following conditions holds:
a. W contains some more overt words than 0;
b. W contains a word of a higher type than the corresponding word in 4;
c. fronting has been performed in W but not in 4'.
The alternative account based on (197)-(198) works as follows. Sentence (64a), repeated in (199a),
sounds odd because it is contextually equivalent to the alternative (199b) and this alternative is better
by (198a), because it does not contain the overt word 'sometimes' (rather, it contains a covert generic
operator).
(199) a. #Some Italians come from a beautiful country.
b. Italians come from a beautiful country.
Analogously, sentence (60a), repeated in (200a), sounds odd because it is contextually equivalent to
the alternative (200b) and this alternative is better by (198b), because it contains a definite (which
has a low type e) rather than the quantifier 'some' (which has the higher type ((e, t), t)).
(200) In a society where all the children of a given couple have the same last name, namely that of
their father:
a. #Some children of that couple have a Russian last name.
b. The children of that couple have a Russian last name.
Finally, sentence (99a), repeated in (201a), sounds odd because it is contextually equivalent to the
alternative (201b) and this alternative is better by (198c), because no quantifiers have undergone
fronting.
(201) In the context described in (99):
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a. #On every day, a/some fireman won.
b. A/Some fireman won on every day.
I'll now argue that this alternative account is not empirically adequate, by challenging one by one
the clauses of the definition (198) of "less costly".
Against clause (198a) Clause (198a), together with (197) predicts a sentence 9 to sound odd if
there is another contextually equivalent sentence 0 which contains less words. I think that this
prediction is falsified for instance by (202). Both sentences W and 0 are perfectly fine in the con-
text considered. Yet, (197)-(198a) predict W to sound odd, since it is contextually equivalent to b
(because we know that John's grandmother always bakes three cakes) and contains the extra word
'three'. In other words, assumptions (197)-(198a) do not account for the difference between (202)
and, say, (199). Yet, this difference is straightforwardly accounted for by my proposal. Sentence
(202a) is of corse predicted to be fine, since my proposal compares sentences with respect to logic
entailment rather than brevity and sentence (202a) is not contextually equivalent to any logically
stronger alternative. Sentence (202b) is contextually equivalent to the logically stronger sentence
(202a); yet, numerals and indefinites are plausibly not Horn-mates and thus no mismatching impli-
cature is derived.4 The pair in (203) makes the same point.
(202) John's grandmother loves to bake; whenever she does, she always bakes three identical pies,
one for John, one for John's brother and one for John's sister; she likes to try a different
recipe every time...
a ... W = Yesterday, she baked three apple pies.
b .. 0 = Yesterday, she baked apple pies.
(203) a. Italians are tall.
b. Italians are usually tall.
Against clause (198b) Clause (198b) together with (197) predicts a sentence V to sound odd if
there is another contextually equivalent sentence ' which only differs because it contains a word
of a lower type. To test this prediction, consider the following slight variant (204) of my original
example (200). In the context considered, where it is known that all children of a given couple inherit
the same last name, sentence (204a) sounds to me just as odd as the original sentence (200a). Yet
(197)-(198b) predict the variant in (204a) to be fine, contrary to the case of the original sentence
(200a); here is why. It is usually assumed that, when a definite is conjoined with another quantifier,
its type e is raised to the type ((e, t), t), in order to provide conjunction with two constituents whose
type "ends in t"; see for instance Partee and Rooth (1983). Of course, clauses (197)-(198b) cannot
be checked before type shifting in (204), since the alternative (204b) is uninterpretable before type
shifting and thus contextual equivalence between (204a) and (204b) could not be checked. Thus,
clauses (197)-(198b) must be checked after type shifting has raised the type of the definite 'the
children...' in (204a) from e to ((e, t), t). Hence, clause (198b) cannot do any work in the case of
(204), since the definite 'the children...' in the alternative (204b) has the same type as the indefinite
'some children...' in the target sentence (204a).
(204) In a society where all the children of a given couple have the same last name, namely that of
their father:
a. #A friend of mine and some children of that couple have a Russian last name.
b. A friend of mine and the children of that couple have a Russian last name.
4 I see two reasons why sentence (202a) does not trigger any offensive implicature, and in particular does not trigger the
implicature that the corresponding sentence (202b) is false. One straightforward reason might be that the existential quantifier
associated with the object bare plural in (202a) is not a Horn-mate with numerals, hence (202b) is not a scalar alternative of
(202a). This assumption seems plausible to me. Alternatively, even if (202b) were indeed a scalar alternative of sentence
(202a), it might be the case that (202b) does not end up negated in the strengthened meaning of (202a) because of a "symmetry
problem". This second strategy might require proper stipulations on the semantics of plural morphology.
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Against clause (198c) Clause (198c) together with (197) predicts a sentence W to sound odd if it
differs from a contextually equivalent sentence Vb only because a certain constituent has undergone
fronting in o. To test this prediction, consider again the example (101), repeated in (205). In
the context considered, the two sentences (206a) and (206b) are contextually equivalent to the two
sentences (205a) and (205b), respectively. Note that both sentences (205a) and (205b) differ from
the corresponding variants in (206a) and (206b) because of fronting of the phrase 'every day'. Thus,
(197)-(198c) predict both sentences (205) to sound odd, since both admit a contextually equivalent
sentence with no fronting. This prediction is wrong, since sentence refex: viiib) sounds fine in the
context considered.
(205) In the context described in (101):
a. #Every day, a/some fireman won the running competition.
b. Every day, for every competition, a/some fireman won.
(206) a. Some fireman won the running competition on every day.
b. For every competition, some fireman won it on every day.
I conclude that the current definition (198) of the relation "less costly" is not consistent with the data.
I do not see any way to improve on the current definition (198). I therefore dismiss this alternative
account inspired to the maxim of Manner.
2.5.2 Predecessors
Some of the ideas presented in this chapter have various predecessors in the recent literature, besides
Hawkins' work mentioned in chapter 1. In this subsection, I mention two such predecessors.
Presupposition accomodation The mandatoriness problem discussed in subsection 2.1.3 has an
important precedent in the literature on presupposition accomodation; see for instance Gazdar (1979).
Let me illustrate this important precedent with an example. A sentence such as (207) can be uttered
felicitously out of the blue. This means that the presupposition that John used to drink beer on
Mondays and Tuesdays can be accommodated.
(207) John has stopped drinking beer every Monday and Tuesday night.
Let's now embed this sentence (207) in a piece of text such as (208). This text sounds infelicitous:
accommodation of the presupposition of sentence (208b) is somehow blocked. This is surprising: if
in the case of (207) we are able to accommodate both the fact that John drunk beer on Mondays and
the fact that he drunk beer on Tuesdays, then we should afortiori be able to accommodate the single
fact that John drunk beer on Tuesdays in the case of (208b). What blocks accommodation in the
case of (208)? Various authors have suggested the following answer: sentence (208a) triggers the
implicature that the speaker doesn't know whether John used to drink beer on days of the week that
are not Mondays; but sentence (208b) presupposes that John used to drink beer on both Mondays and
Tuesdays; thus, the oddness of the text (208) follows from the mismatch between the implicature of
(208a) and the requirement on common knowledge imposed by the presupposition of (208b). Note
that this is exactly Hawkins' line of reasoning, as exemplified in (22), (45) and (55). Thus, this line
of account for the oddness of (208) runs right away into the Mandatoriness issue (25)/(27): why is it
that the implicature is kept in place and wins over the presupposition?
(208) a. John used to drink beer every Monday night...
b. ... ?but he has stopped drinking beer every Monday and Tuesday night.
The issue can be sharpened further by embedding the text (208) into the dialogue (209), which
mimics the one in (84). Again, I think that accommodation of the presupposition of (209b) is not
straightforward in this case. Again, we might want to suggest that accomodation of the presup-
position of (209b) is challenged by the implicature triggered by (209a). But in the case of (209),
B is answering a question concerning who had the habit of drinking beer on Mondays. As noted
above for the case in (84), such a question provides a context in which the implicature of (209a) that
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drinking only happened on Mondays should not be relevant and should thus be missing. But if it
is not relevant and thus missing, then this implicature cannot mismatch with the presupposition of
(209b). In conclusion, we have to assume that, although the implicature triggered by (209a) is not in
general relevant when uttered as an answer to A's question, nonetheless it is relevant when it triggers
a mismatch.
(209) A: Which one of your friends used to drink beer every monday night?
B: a. John used to drink beer every monday night...
b. ... ?but he has stopped drinking beer every monday and tuesday night.
The proposal made in section 2.1.3 might extend to the cases (208) and (209). Let me quickly discuss
this issue. Let W be a shorthand for the sentence in (208a) or (209a), as stated in (210a). Assume that
Sin (210b) is a scalar alternative of V in (210a). Thus, the strengthened meaning EXH(p) of p is the
one in (210), that negates that is both true and relevant. In order to accomodate the presupposition
of (208b) or (209b), we need to revise common knowledge Wk in such a way that it entails that John
drank beer on Tuesdays. Given such a common knowledge, the two alternatives W and / in (210) are
contextually equivalent. Since cp is relevant by (89a) and since relevance is closed w.r.t. contextual
equivalence by (89b), then V is relevant too. Thus, the strengthened meaning in (210) entails the
negation of V and thus mismatches with the common knowledge needed in order to accomodate the
presupposition.4 1
(210) EXH(o) = V A (- V -,()
a. V = John drinks on Mondays.
b. 0 = John drinks on Mondays and Tuesdays.
Fox and Hackl (2006) They offer an argument in favor of the BH (82), which I review quickly
here.42 As a starting point, consider the facts in (211): the strengthened meaning of sentence (21 la)
is intuitively equivalent to the plain meaning of sentence (211b), namely to the proposition that John
weights exactly 120 pounds. These facts are very easy to account for, as in (212). Let me denote
by p the sentence (21 la) and the prejacent of 'only' in sentence (211b), as in (212a). Let me make
the assumption that '120' is a Horn-mate of the degree 'd', for any real number de IR. As stated
in (212b), the set of excludable alternatives then consists of all the alternatives oa of the form 'John
weights d pounds' where d is a degree strictly larger than 120. This characterization of the set of
excludable alternatives holds no matter whether it is computed according to logic entailment (76a) or
according to entailment relative to common knowledge (76b), since in this case there is no relevant
piece of common knowledge to take into account. The intuitively correct result in (212c) is thus
straightforwardly derived.
411 see two potential problems with this line of reasoning. Thefirst problem concerns timing of accomodation. In order for
the account just sketched to work, it is crucial that the presupposition of (208b) or (209b) must be accomodated before the
strengthened meaning (210) of (208a) and (209a) is computed, namely that the two sentences in the text must be treated as
piece and parcel. In fact, if instead the strengthened meaning (210) were computed before the presupposition were accommo-
dated, then the alternatives o and i, would not count as contextually equivalent (since it is the accommodated presupposition
that makes them contextually equivalent) and the implicature --,p would thus fail to be mandatory. The second problem
concerns whether 0 in (210b) is the proper alternative or whether it should be replaced by l,' in (1).
(1) a' = John drinks on Tuesdays.
Let me make the issue explicit. On the one hand, it is crucial to use , instead of 0' in the preceding account. In fact, the
piece of common knowledge that John drank on Tuesdays renders V and 0 contextually equivalent but it does not render
W and 0' contextually equivalent. On the other hand, it is not obvious that 0 is a proper alternative of p. Alternatives
such as i, are common in the literature on 'only', to get right the semantics fo sentences such as 'Only John came' on the
background of the standard definition (75) of the set of excludable alternatives in terms of asymmetric entailment. But in
section 2.2, I followed Fox (2007a) and replaced the standard definition (75) with the variant (106) that drops the requirement
of asymmetric entailment. From the perspective of this latter definition, I think the alternative 1,' makes more sense than the
alternative 1. Furthermore, the alternative 0' but not the alternative 1, is compatible with the intuition that alternatives cannot
be syntactically more complex than the target sentence, as spelled out for example in Katzir (2008). This second problem is
analogous to the one discussed in the Second Remark in section 2.2.
42Fox and Hackl extend the ideas summarized here to the case of negative islands. See also Fox (2007b), Spector (2006),
Abrusan (2009) and Abrusan and Spector (2009) for discussion of this extension.
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(211) a. John weighs 120 pounds.
b. John weighs only 120F pounds.
(212) a. W = John weighs 120 pounds.
b. $Xcl(p) = { d d > 120}, where 4n = John weights (at least) n pounds.
c. EXH(V) = [only](o) = John weighs exactly 120 pounds.
Consider next the facts in (213), obtained from (211) by adding 'more'. Sentence (213a) does not
trigger any implicature, namely does not mean that John weighs exactly 121 pounds. Furthermore,
sentence (213b) with overt 'only' sounds deviant. Here is a way to account for these facts (213).
Let me denote by p the sentence (213a) and the prejacent of 'only' in sentence (213b), as in (214a).
As stated in (214b), in this case the set of excludable alternatives is empty. If fact, any alternative
Pd with d < 120 is not innocently excludable given W, according to Fox's definition (106). Fur-
thermore, the set {,d I d > 120} is not innocently excludable either, since W A A{-1d I d > 120}
is a logical contradiction, and thus a fortiori a contradiction given common knowledge. Finally, all
proper subsets of the set {?d I d > 120} are innocently excludable, but their intersection is empty.
The characterization (214b) of the set of excludable alternatives holds no matter whether it is com-
puted according to logic entailment (76a) or according to entailment relative to common knowledge
(76b), since in this case there is no relevant piece of common knowledge to take into account. As
stated in (214c), strengthening is correctly predicted to be vacuous. The deviance of sentence (213b)
with overt 'only' is expected if there is indeed some constraint that rules out vacuous instances of
overt 'only', as advocated above for the case of sentence (80). 43
(213) a. John weighs more than 120 pounds.
b. ?John weighs only more than 12 0 F pounds.
(214) a. W = John weighs more than 120 pounds.
b. Excl(W) = 0
c. EXH(o) = [only](o) = W.
The crucial observation by Fox and Hackl is that (215) is completely analogous to (213): sentence
(215a) does not trigger any implicature; and sentence (215b) with overt 'only' sounds deviant. Fox
and Hackl note that, in order to maintain the parallelism between (215) and (213), it is crucial to
assume that the computation of the set of excludable alternatives in the case of (215) is blind to the
piece of common knowledge that children come in wholes, contrary to pounds.
(215) a. John has more than 3 children.
b. ?John only has more than 3 F children.
Here are the details. If we compute the the set of excludable alternatives using logic entailment
(76a), then there is no difference at all between children and pounds. Thus, we correctly predict
there to be no difference between the two cases (215) and (213), as noted in (216).
(216) Using logic entailment (76a):
a. o = John has more than 3 children.
b. Excl(W) = 0
c. EXH(o) = [only](o) = p.
As noted in (217), things are very different if we use entailment relative to common knowledge
(76b). In this case, o in (217a) and the alternatives a's obtained from o by replacing '3' by 'd', are
contextually equivalent if 3 > d > 4, because to have at least 3.5 children is equivalent to have at
least 4 children, since children come in wholes. Thus, the alternatives 'd's with 3 > d > 4 are not
excludable w.r.t. so with respect to entailment relative to common knowledge and the maximal set
43 This line of reasoning would predict sentence (213b) to improve if 'only' where to associate with something else, besides
the numeral.
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of excludable alternatives contains all the alternatives od with d > 4. As noted in (217c), we thus
incorrectly predict the strengthened meaning of sentence (215a) to say that John has exactly four
kids; furthermore, we predict the overt occurrence of 'only' in sentence (215b) not to be vacuous,
leaving the deviance of sentence (215b) unaccounted for.
(217) Using contextual entailment (76b):
a. W = John has more than 3 children.
b. Excl() = { I d > 4}
c. EXH(W) = [only](W) = John has exactly 4 children.
2.5.3 Miscellaneous problematic cases
This final subsection collects a few miscellaneous problematic cases. They do not seem to have
anything in common, apart from the fact that I do not quite know what to say about them.
First case Singh (2009b) notes the oddness of sentence (218b). This case is not accounted for by
the proposal developed in this chapter. In fact, the constituent 'n or more' does not trigger any scalar
implicature, as shown by the case of sentence (218a); see for instance Chierchia et al. (to appear)
for a discussion of these type of sentences. Since the strengthened meaning of sentence (218b) is
thus identical to its plain meaning, the oddness of sentence (218b) cannot be due to any mismatching
implicature.
(218) a. John has two or more sons.
b. #I have two or more sons.
Given the proposal developed in this section, it might be somewhat natural to suggest the following
line of account. Sentence (218a) does trigger the inference that the speaker does not known whether
John has exactly two sons or whether he has more than that. After Sauerland (2004b), this type
of ingorance inferences are called PRIMARY IMPLICATURES. If sentence (218b) triggers the same
primary implicature, then its oddness might be due to the fact that this primary implicature mis-
matches with the piece of common knowledge that people know how many children they have. Of
course, this line of reasoning would require primary implicatures to be computed blind to common
knowledge and to be mandatory, in order to overcome the two issues (25)/(27) and (26)/(28).
Second case Spector (2007b) notes the oddness of sentence (219b): somehow, the sentence mis-
matches with the piece of common knowledge that people can marry only one person (at the time).
This case is not accounted for by the proposal developed in this section. In fact, even if sentence
(219b) were to trigger the implicature that John did not marry two Italian women, this implicature
would not trigger any mismatch with common knowledge. The variant in (219c) shows that the
problem extends to the case with overt 'only'.
(219) a. Last summer, John married an Italian woman.
b. #Last summer, John married one Italian woman.
c. #Last summer, John only married oneF Italian woman.
Third case In section 2.1, I have considered sentences such as (64a), repeated below in (220a), and
I have accounted for its oddness as follows: its blind strengthened meaning says that "some but not
all Italians come from a beautiful country", which of course mismatches with the piece of common
knowledge that all Italians come from the same country. Unfortunately, this account does not extend
to the variant in (220b), which feels just as odd: the blind strengthened meaning of (220b) would be
"some but not all Italians come from a beautiful country and are blond", which does not contradict
common knowledge, since it would be true in worlds where not all Italians are blond. The pair in
(221) makes the same point.
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(220) a. #Some Italians come from a beautiful country.
b. #Some Italians come from a beautiful country and are blond.
(221) In the context described in (171):
a. #Some children of couple C have a French last name.
b. #Some children of couple C have a French last name and are blond.
To fully appreciate the problem, consider (222), which is obtained from (220b) by replacing 'some'
by 'all' and furthermore 'and' by the operator LEFT of Sauerland (2004c). If (222) were a scalar
alternative of (220b), then the problem would be solved, since the blind strengthened meaning of
(220b) would then entail the negation of (222) and thus mismatch with common knowledge. But
(222) is not a scalar alternative of (220b) according to Fox's new definition (124): the replacement
of 'and' by LEFT leads to a weaker formula, no matter whether it is performed before or after the
replacement of 'some' by 'all'."44
(222) All Italians come from a beautiful country.
Let me also note that the facts are not as sharp as one might expect. The following cases are formally
parallel to those in (220)-(221), and yet the (b) sentences with conjunction sound quite fine to me.
(223) John gave the same grade to all of his students...
a. #He gave an A to some of them.
#To some of them, he gave an A.
b. He gave an A and a prize to some of them.
To some of them, he gave an A and a prize.
(224) John always reads the same newspaper for a month and then switches to another newspaper
the next month. During this month...
a. #John sometimes read the New York Times.
b. John sometimes read the New York Times and drank a cup of coffee.
I leave the issue open for the time being.
SNote that the problem could be overcome by repeating the same account at the level of presupposition; let me illustrate.
Let me use W as a shorthand for sentence (220b), as stated in (ia); let V be sentence in (ib), obtained from W by replacing
'some' by the generic operator GEN and furthermore 'and' by LEFT. As stated in (iia), sentence W in (ia) has vacuous
presuppositions. Following von Fintel (1997), assume that GEN has a homogeneity presupposition (see (435) below for an
explicit definition); thus, the alternative 0 in (ib) has the presupposition in (iib).
(i) a. W = ?Some Italians come from a beautiful country and are blond.
b. ) = GEN Italians come from a beautiful country.
(ii) a. ppr. = W.
b. ipr, = Either all or no Italians come from a beautiful country.
If the replacement of 'and' by LEFT is performed before the replacement of 'some' by GEN, then it leads to an alternative
whose presupposition is not weaker than the presupposition (iia) of W (namely, it is just as vacuous as that of W) and the
replacement is thus licit according to Fox's new definition (124). The strengthened presupposition of W would thus entail
-pr. and therefore mismatch with the common knowledge that all Italians come from the same country.
Chapter 3
Application to individual level
predicates
As reviewed in section 1.1, the s-/i-predicates distinction has many grammatical reflexes. Thus, it
looks like the distinction should be grammatically encoded. Various ways to encode this distinction
into grammar have been suggested in the literature. I have provided a quick sample in (41), repeated
below in (225). In this chapter, I will discuss in some detail these assumptions (225) and various
other similar assumptions.
(225) a. Kratzer (1995): an i-predicate lacks a Davidsonian argument, contrary to s-predicates.
b. Chierchia (1995): an i-predicate bears a feature that forces local agreement with a covert
generic operator that mandatorily binds the Davidsonian argument of the i-predicate.
c. Diesing (1992): an i-predicate is selected by a special inflectional head that requires its
subject to be base generated in [Spec, IP], rather than in [Spec, VP] as it is the case for
s-predicates.
Departing from these and other similar grammatical characterizations of i-predicates, in this chapter
I will assume that there is no relevant grammatical difference between s- and i-predicates: there is no
difference with respect to the position where their subjects are base-generated; there is no difference
with respect to their syntactic features; and there is no difference with respect to their argumental
structure, as stated in (226).
(226) Both the i-predicate 'tall' and the s-predicate 'available' have a Davidsonian argument. For
simplicity, I will naively take that argument to range over times t E T.
What is the relevant difference between s- and i-predicates, then? I assume that all that's special
about an i-predicate such as 'tall' is that it follows from common knowledge Wk that, if an individual
is tall at a given time, then he is tall throughout his entire life span. Let me state this assumption as
in (227), where At. in ' (d, t) stands for the life span of an individual d at a world w.
(227) For every individual d E Ve and for every world w e Wk compatible with common knowl-
edge: if there exists a time t' ET such that [tall]w(d, t'), then [tall]w(d, t) for every time t
such that in (d, t).
As noted in section 1.1, s-predicates can do many more things than i-predicates can do: there are
configurations where s-predicates are fine while i-predicates are not; and there are readings that are
available with s-predicates but not with i-predicates. A theory of i-predicates should thus account
for why i-predicates cannot do the many things that s-predicates can do. In this chapter, I will
argue that, under assumptions (226)-(227), such a theory is a theorem of the more general theory of
oddness sketched in chapter 2, as roughly stated in (228). As a matter of fact, I will argue that, under
assumptions (226)-(227), various properties of i-predicates are formally analogous to various cases
considered in chapter 2, that had nothing to do with i-predicates.
Application to individual level predicates
(228) Those many things that i-predicates cannot do would correspond to a blind strengthened
meaning (or a blind strengthened presupposition) that contradicts the piece of common
knowledge in (227).
Before I move on to argue in favor of (228), let me comment on the core assumptions (226) and
(227) with a few remarks. Assumption (226) is of course an oversimplification, since it construes
the Davidsonian argument in too simple a way, namely just as a time, rather than as a full event or
state or situation. I stick to this simplification only to keep my ontological assumptions on david-
sonian arguments at a minimum. Of course, once assumption (226) is restated using, say, events
or states, then it can be tested using the standard battery of arguments for davidsonian arguments.
For instance, Landman (2000, Ch. 1) notes that sentence (229a) entails the other sentences in (229)
and thus concludes that "in as much as the modifier argument is evidence for an event variable for
s-predicates, it is evidence for a state variable for i-predicates". I will briefly come back to this issue
in section 3.1, where I'll discuss Kratzer's (1995) proposal that i-predicates lack the Davidsonian
argument.
(229) a. I know John well by face from TV.
b. I know John by face from TV.
c. I know John well by face.
d. I know John by face.
Assumption (227) captures the intuition that i-predicates denote permanent properties quite crudely.
Of course, I don't really want to say that, if John is tall at a given time, then he has got to be tall at
literally every time t throughout his life span: tall men might have been short kids. A more careful
restatement of assumption (227) should thus replace John's whole life span (230a) with some proper
subset as in (230b), which might depend on the specific i-predicate considered, be vaguely defined
and context dependent. In what follows, I will ignore this kind of complications and stick to the
simple formulation (227) in terms of (230a). As far as I can see, nothing in my proposal hinges on
this simplification. I will briefly come back to this issue in section 3.2.
(230) a. At . in (j, t)
b. At. Cta(j, t)
An equivalent way of stating assumption (227) is as follows: in every world compatible with the
piece of common knowledge (227), the intersection between the lifespan At. in" (j, t) of John and
the set of times At. [tall]w (j, t) at which he happens to be tall is either empty or else coincides with
the entire life span At. in(j, t). In other words, the predicate At. itall] (j, t) is HOMOGENEOUS w.r.t.
the restrictor At . in(j, t), in the sense of section 1.3: the situation depicted in (231)1, where John
is tall at some times in his life span but not at others, can never arise in worlds compatible with
common knowledge.
(231) At. in(j, t)
Xt. [tal] (j, t)
Another equivalent way of stating assumption (227) is as follows: the two propositions in (232a)
are equivalent given the piece of common knowledge (227), even though p) asymmetrically logically
entails (p. Assumption (227) is stated for the case of the i-predicate 'tall' but it trivially extends to
all i-predicates with a single individual argument. Its extension to the case of transitive i-predicates,
such as 'know', 'love' or 'hate', is more delicate. Again, it should be stated in such a way that the
two propositions in (232b) are contextually equivalent. The issue in this case is how to define the
restrictor C: it seems plausible that it should somehow depend on both the life spans of the subject
'IWith the caveat of footnote 9.
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John and the direct object Mary; but it is not obvious whether they should play a symmetrical role
or not.
(232) a. p = Aw . 3t[inW(john, t)][[tall]w(john, t)].
p = Aw. Vt [inw (john, t)] [[tall] w (john, t)].
b. = Aw. 3t [Cw (john, mary, t)][[love]w (john, mary, t)].
0 = Aw. Vt [Cw (john, mary, t)] [[love] w (john, mary, t)].
Finally, note the crucial difference between the characterization of i-predicates in (227) and those
quoted in (225) from the recent literature. The latter characterizations are grammatical in nature.
My characterization (227) has nothing to do with grammar; rather, it is an assumption on common
knowledge Wk. As far as grammar is concerned, there is no difference between s- and i-predicates:
there are possible worlds where the i-predicate 'tall' denotes a permanent property, in the sense of
(227); and there are other possible worlds where it denotes a non-permanent property, just as is
the case for the s-predicate 'available'. The only difference between the two predicates is that WAk
contains no worlds where the extension of 'tall' is non-permanent but does contain worlds where the
extension of 'available' is non-permanent.
3.1 Existential Q-adverbs
As shown in (233), i-predicates do not tolerate existential Q-adverbs, contrary to s-predicates. As
shown in (234), the contrast disappears once the definite subject 'John' is replaced by an indefinite
or a bare plural. These same facts hold with Q-adverbs of arbitrary quantificational force, such as
'always', 'often' or 'never'. In this section, I concentrate on the case of adverbs with existential
quantificational force, such as 'sometimes'; in section 3.7, I will come back to the case of Q-adverbs
with universal or generic quantificational force.
(233) a. Sometimes, John is available.
b. #Sometimes, John is tall.
(234) a. Sometimes, firemen are available.
b. Sometimes, firemen are tall.
In this section, I argue that the oddness of sentence (233b) can be accounted for in exactly the
same way I have accounted in section 2.1 for the oddness of sentences (60a)-(64a), one of which is
repeated in (235).
(235) #Some Italians come from a beautiful country.
My argument exploits the following parallelism: in the case of sentence (233b), assumption (227)
ensures that it follows from common knowledge Wk that, if John is sometimes tall, then he always
is; analogously, in the case of sentence (235), it follows from the common knowledge that all Italians
come from the same country, that if some Italians come from a beautiful country, then they all do.
In order to stress the analogy between the account for the oddness of sentence (235) and that for the
oddness of sentence (233b), I summarize the main steps of the two accounts one next to the other in
Table 3.2.
3.1.1 Existing accounts
Two main lines of analysis have been suggested in the literature for the facts (233) and (234) - as
well as for the analogous facts with other Q-adverbs. I discuss them in this subsection, trying to
argue that they are not fully satisfactory.
Application to individual level predicates
#Some Italians come from a beautiful country. #John is sometimes tall.
(1) LOGICAL FORM
By assumption (86), the LF contains a mandatory exhaustivity operator
EXHQ EXHn (
VP - , John is tall
some Italians sometimes C
come from...
(2) TRUTH CONDITIONS OF THE PREJACENT
p = E] [[Italians](x)][VP~(x)] = 3t[CW(t) A in(j, t)] [tall] (j, t)]
(3) ASSUMPTION ON HORN SCALES
('some Italians', 'all Italians') ('sometimes', 'always')
(4) SET OF SCALAR ALTERNATIVES
Alt(Wo) = { }, where 4 is the LF with the following shape and truth conditions
P aJnhohn is tall
all Italians
come from...
S= V. [ Italians (x)] [ VP (x)] = Vt [C(t) A inw (j, t)] [tallj (j, t)]
(5) SET OF EXCLUDABLE ALTERNATIVES
Sxcl(W) = {}, since W A -, is true e.g. in the following world:
Aldo Maria Anna C(.) A inW(j, )
beautiful: tall w (j.
not-beautiful: V
(6) DOMAIN Q OF THE EXHAUSTIVITY OPERATOR
Q = {4}, by assumptions (89)
together with the fact that p and 4 are contextually equivalent
(7) CONCLUSION
the sentences denote the proposition EXHQ (P) = Wo A -1 that contradicts common
knowledge; oddness thus follows from the MH (97)
Table 3.2: Parallelism between the account for the oddness of sentence (64a) presented in section 2.1 and the
account for the oddness for sentence (233b) presented in this section.
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Kratzer (1995) and variants thereof Kratzer (1995) dosen't explicitly discuss the case of sen-
tences containing 'sometimes' and an i-predicate; she only discusses the case of 'when'-clauses.
But her account for 'when'-clauses extends straightforwardly to the case of 'sometimes', as follows.
Kratzer's core assumption is (236).
(236) I-predicates lack a Davidsonian argument, contrary to s-predicates.
The deviance of sentence (233b) can then be straightforwardly accounted as follows: by assumption
(236), sentence (233b) ends up with the truth conditions (237a); the adverb 'sometimes' has nothing
to quantify over in the case of these truth conditions; this case is thus ruled out by a constraint against
vacuous quantification; see Potts (2002) for a discussion of this constraint. The case of (234b) is
very different: following a large body of literature, Kratzer assumes that the corresponding truth
conditions are (237b), where the bare plural 'firemen' introduces a variable x that gets quantified
over by the adverb 'sometimes' (see section 3.3 for more details); no vacuous quantification arises
in this case.
(237) a. SOMETIMESt [[tall] (j)]
b. SOMETIMESx[Ifireman](x) A [tallj(x)]
Kratzer's assumption (236) has been criticized by a number of authors, based on the observation that
non-temporal adverbial modification is indeed possible with i-predicates, thus requiring an event
argument also in the case of i-predicates. I repeat in (238) the examples in (229), from Landman
(2000, pp. 15-17).
(238) a. I know John well by face from TV.
b. I know John by face from TV.
c. I know John well by face.
d. I know John by face.
In the face of the data in (238), Kratzer's initial assumption (236) can be rather trivially modified:
instead of assuming that i-predicates lack a Davidsonian argument altogether, we can assume that
they do have a Davidsonian argument too, but that their Davidsonian argument is special in not
being "spatio-temporally located", as suggested for instance in Jiiger (2001). 3 For concreteness,
here is a possible implementation of this idea. Assume that all predicates, both s- and i-predicates,
have an event argument. Assume furthermore that the temporal dimension of an event is recov-
ered trough a function r that maps an event e to its corresponding time interval -r(e). We could
then replace Kratzer's strong assumption (236) with something like the weaker assumption (239).
Since i-predicates do have Davidsonian arguments, the challenge raised by the instances of adverbial
modification in (238) is immediately met, since these adverbs do not modify the time dimension of
events. But since 'sometimes' wants to quantify over the time dimension of events, then Kratzer's
account for the pattern in (233) and (234) remains essentially unaltered.4
2 All i-predicates appear to be statives. Kratzer's assumption (236) has later been extended by some authors from i-
predicates to statives in general; see for instance Katz (2003); I will come back to the relationship between i-predicates and
statives in subsection 3.6.4. It seems to me that authors that have more recently endorsed some version of Kratzer's assumption
(236) have failed to cope with the challenge raised by instances of adverbial modifications such as those in (238). For instance,
Katz (2003) seems to suggest that all adverbial modifiers with statives should be interpreted as "predicate modifiers and not as
event predicates" But the distinction between "predicate modifiers" and "event predicates" seems suspicious to me. No tests
are provided in order to draw the line. Furthermore, once we allow for "predicate modifiers", then the very crucial argument
for events based on adverbial modification evaporates.
3See footnote 26 below for a more detail discussion of Jager's (2001) position on the issue.
4Here is a way of spelling out the details. Consider first the case where 'sometimes' in sentence (233b) is quantifying
over events, as in the truth conditions (ia). In this case, there is no vacuous quantification, and thus something else is needed
in order to rule out these truth conditions. For instance, assume that 'sometimes' carries a presupposition against events that
are not temporally located, as in (iii). Truth conditions (ia) are thus immediately ruled out by (iii) and (239), since they suffer
from presupposition failure.
(i) a. SOMETIMES, [tall] (j,e)]
b. 3SOMETIMEST[[ tall(j, e)]
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(239) The function -is partial and its domain dom(r) does not contain any event in the extension
of an i-predicate.
Yet, I think that this weaker assumption (239) can be questioned too, for instance by means of the
following argument.5 It is well known that i-predicates can be coerced into s-predicates. According
to Kratzer's original assumption (236), this means that the English lexical entry 'tall' is ambiguous
between an i-predicate exponent without the Davidsonian argument and an s-predicate exponent
with the Davidsonian argument. According to the weaker assumption (239), this means that the
English lexical entry 'tall' is ambiguous between an i-predicate exponent with a non-temporally-
located Davidsonian argument and an s-predicate exponent with a temporally located Davidsonian
argument. The crucial point here is that, once we grammaticalize the s- vs. i-predicates distinction
by means of assumptions such as (236) or (239), coercion requires lexical ambiguity. But then, the
contrast in (240) is left unexplained: coercion of an i-predicate into an s-predicate would correspond
to a special kind of lexical ambiguity, that patterns differently from plain cases of lexical ambiguity. 6
(240) a. #John went to the bank to get money, and Bill did too to get some water.
b. John is intelligent. And Mary is too, when she wants to be.
De Swart (1991) Departing from this line of accounts based on (236) or (239), de Swart (1991,
pp. 62-67) makes a rather different proposal, that is very close in spirit to the one I am defending in
this work. She notes that predicates such as 'to die', 'to kill' or 'to build John's house' behave very
similarly to i-predicates with respect to adverbial modification, as illustrated by the pairs in (241)-
(242). What is special about these predicates is that they are not iterable, namely they can hold only
once, so to speak. Thus, de Swart calls them ONCE-ONLY PREDICATES. Because of the parallelism
in (241)-(242), de Swart suggests that all that's special about i-predicates is that they are once-only
s-predicates: "What i-predicates and once-only predicates have in common is that their application
to a particular individual is felicitous only once. [...] The set of spatio-temporal locations that is
associated with an i-predicate or a once-only predicate is a singleton set for all models and each
assignment of individuals to the arguments of the predicate" (p. 65). Chierchia (1995) adopts this
proposal too. 7
(ii) a. SOMETIMESe,z[[fireman](x) A [tall](x, e)]
b. 3~e SOMETIMESx [[fireman] (x) A [tall] (x,e)]
(iii) SOMETIMESe = AX(s,) : X C dom(r) .X # 0
Some care is needed in order to make this strategy compatible with the felicity of sentence (234b): of course, we cannot
posit truth conditions (iia) for this sentence, since these truth conditions suffer from presupposition failure just as those in
(ia). Thus, in this case we would need to assume that 'sometimes' is allowed to quantify only over firemen, while a covert
operator 3e is taking care of the event argument, as in truth conditions (iib). Positing this covert operator over eventualities
of course does not threaten the initial account for the deviance of sentence (233b): positing the null operator for the case of
this sentence leads to truth conditions (ib), where 'sometimes' suffers from vacuous quantification. Note finally that, even
if Kratzer's original account for the patter in (233) and (234) is not substantially affected by the replacement of her strong
assumption (236) with the weak variant (239), other consequences that she derives from her strong assumption (236) do not
seem to me to follow anymore from the weaker variant (239). This seems to me to be the case in particular for her derivation
of Diesing's generalization; see footnote 22.
SThe argument seems rather straightforward to me, but I have not seen it in the literature yet.
61 have to concede that sentence (240b) might be problematic for my account too. To appreciate the problem, consider
first a plain case of coercion such as (i). According to my proposal, coercion in (i) can be treated without lexical ambiguity.
Rather, coercion in (i) might be construed as a process of revision of common knowledge (227), in such a way that it does
not follow anymore from common knowledge that if Mary is intelligent, then she always is.
(i) Mary is intelligent when she wants to be.
Yet, two problems immediately arise, that I will leave open for the time being. One problem is that a proper formalization
of this intuition would require a proper, fine-grained restatement of the MH (97), that is able to discriminate cases where
contextual mismtach leads to coercion from cases where it leads to oddness. Another problem is that this revision of common
knowledge (227) must be construed carefully, so as to only apply to Mary but not to John in the case of sentence (240b).
Perhaps, some thing like the idea that coercion consists of a minimal modification of common knowledge (227) might be
made to work here.
7Chierchia does not spell out in detail how de Swart's proposal can be casted within his framework. He just writes: "[...]
It seems plausible to maintain that [...] variables [...] must in principle be satisfiable by more than one entity. Let's call
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(241) a. #John is always / sometimes / often tall.
b. #John always / sometimes / often kills Mary.
(242) a. A fireman is always / sometimes / often tall.
b. John always / sometimes / often kills a rabbit.
Yet, note that once-only predicates seem to be all either accomplishments or achievements, while
i-predicates are all statives. Furthermore, since i-predicates are all statives, then the hypothesis
that i-predicates are once-only predicates contradicts the characterization of statives in terms of the
subset-property, as suggested for instance by Bennett and Partee (1972) and subsequent literature.
Finally, Cohen and Erteschik-Shir (2002) provide the following argument against the parallelism
between once-only predicates and i-predicates: they note that once-only predicates are fine with
'never', as shown in (243); but i-predicates are not, as shown in (244).8
(243) a. John never built Mary's house.
b. John (has) never killed his pig.
c. Anil will never die.
(244) a. #John has never been Italian.
b. #John has never been from Italy.
c. #John has never known French.
De Swart's proposal is very close in spirit to the one I am actually defending in this work. De Swart
singles out the special class of s-predicates that she calls once-only predicates, and suggests that all
that's special about i-predicates is that they are once-only predicates. Analogously, I have singled
out the class of homogeneous s-predicates, in the sense of (42b), and suggested that all that's special
about i-predicates is that they are homogeneous predicates. In this chapter, I will try to argue that
my characterization of ILPs as homogeneous predicates is better off than de Swart's characterization
as once-only predicates. In particular, recall from the last remark in section 2.4, that homogeneous
predicates correctly pattern with i-predicates in disallowing universal negative quantifiers, such as
never or no'.
A missing generalization I would like to suggest that Kratzer's original account based on (236),
Jiger's alternative account based on (239) and Swart's account based on the analogy with only-once
predicates cannot be on the right track, because they miss a crucial generalization, illustrated by
the pattern in (245). Sentences (245a) and (245b) are variants of sentences (233b) and (234b), with
the i-predicate 'to come from a beautiful country'. According to Kratzer's, Jilger's and de Swart's
accounts, a sentence containing an i-predicate and the adverb 'sometimes' should turn fine as soon as
the adverb is given an argument different from time to quantify over, such as the individual variable
introduced by an indefinite or a bare plural. This line of reasoning incorrectly predicts the case of
sentence (245c) to pattern with (245b) and thus to be fine, while instead it patterns with (245a) and
sounds odd.9
this the NON-VACUITY PRESUPPOSITION. It is the non-vacuity presupposition that appears to be violated in the examples in
[(241b)]. We can relate the deviance of [(241a)] to the deviance of [(241b)] on principled grounds. The tendential stability
of i-predicates triggers a presupposition that there is going to be at most one state of the relevant sort, which clashes with the
non-vacuity presupposition of Q-adverbs." It seems to me non-trivial to spell out this idea on the background of Chierchia's
assumptions. Of course, only-once predicates do not admit the habitual reading, as shown in (i).
(i) a. ? John usually kills Fido cruelly.
b. ? John kills Fido cruelly.
Yet, Chierchia assumes that the i-predicate 'tall' in a plain sentence such as 'John is tall' has a time argument mandatorily
bound by the same covert generic operator involved in the habitual reading of s-predicates.
8 Sentences (244a) and (244b) are distinctively odd; sentence (244c) is better; and the following sentence (i) sounds perfec.
(i) John has never been tall.
I have no proposal to make concerning this effect.
9Example (245c) was pointed out to me by Danny Fox (p.c.).
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(245) a. #John sometimes comes from a beautiful country.
SOMETIMESt [[John comes from... ]
b. Firemen sometimes come from a beautiful country.
SOMETIMESx[[fireman (x) A [comes from... I(x)]
c. #Italians sometimes come from a beautiful country.
SOMETIMESx[[Italiansr(x) A [comes from... ()]
I will suggest in the next subsection that the correct generalization underlying the distribution of
'sometimes' depends on whether it quantifies over a homogeneous argument or not: sentence (245a)
sounds odd because 'sometimes' is quantifying over time and the i-predicate 'to come from a beau-
tiful country' is homogeneous with respect to that argument; sentence (245b) sounds fine because
'sometimes' is quantifying both over time and over firemen and the i-predicate 'to come from a
beautiful country' is not homogeneous with respect to firemen; sentence (245c) sounds odd because
'sometimes' is quantifying both over time and over Italians and the i-predicate 'to come from a
beautiful country' is homogeneous with respect to both arguments.
3.1.2 An account based on blind and mandatory mismatching implicatures
In this subsection, I introduce certain assumptions on Q-adverbs, independently of i-predicates; and
then present my account for the patter in (233)-(234), based on the assumptions (226)-(227) that
i-predicates are homogeneous s-predicates.
Preliminaries Let me present my assumptions on Q-adverbs, by discussing the syntax and the
semantics of the fine sentence (233a), with the s-predicate 'available'. I assume that the LF cor-
responding to this sentence is roughly (246): 'sometimes' has the syntax of a standard determiner,
whose first argument is a predicate over times C assigned by the context.
(246) [ [Sometimest C(t) ] John is available at t ]
In computing the truth-conditions of LFs such as (246), I will avail myself of two assumptions
that have already been defended in the literature. My first assumption is that a predicate such as
'available' or 'tall' (indeed, any predicate but a handful of exceptions, such as 'famous') presupposes
that its argument x is located at every time at which the predicate holds of x; see Musan (1995) for
discussion. I illustrate this assumption in (247) for the case of 'available'. Recall that inw (x, t) is
true iff the individual x is alive at time t w.r.t. the possible world w.
(247) javailable1w(t) - Ax : inw (x, t) . x is available at t in w.
My second assumption is (248): following for instance Berman (1990) and Schubert and Pelletier
(1989), I assume that, in the computation of the truth conditions of an LF of the form [[Adv a] /3]
where 'Adv' is any Q-adverb such as 'sometimes', 'always', etcetera, the presupposition /3 rs of the
nuclear scope /3 gets "added" via conjunction to the restrictive clause a. 10
10Various arguments have been put forward in favor of assumption (248). Here is one more argument. Building on
an example discussed in Larson and Segal (1995, pp. 333-334), Kai von Fintel (MIT lecture notes, Fall 2006) notes that
sentence (ia) is intuitive false in the context considered, while sentence (ib) is intuitively true.
(i) I am in a big room with five doors, all closed. After a while, John starts to go in and out of the room using four of its
doors and leaving each of the four doors he used open.
a. Every door is open.
b. John left every door open.
The fact that sentence (ib) sounds true is puzzling, since its natural truth conditions (iia) are false in the scenario considered.
(ii) a. everyx [door(x)][John left x open]
b. everyx [door(x) A was-open(x)] [John left x open]
Assumption (248) offers a natural way out: assume that the nuclear scope 'John left x open' presupposes that "x was open";
by assumption (248), this presupposition needs to be added by conjunction to the restrictive clause, as in (iib); the fact that
sentence (ib) feels true in the scenario considered is now predicted by the fact that the truth conditions (iib) are indeed true in
that scenario.
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(248) The LF [[Adv a] /3] denotes truth iff Adv-many times t which satisfy both a and the pre-
supposition /3pr,, also satisfy 3.
Once these two assumptions (247) and (248) are in place, the LF (246) straightforwardly yields the
truth conditions in (249). These truth conditions contain an existential operator 3t which ranges
over times; its restrictive clause is the set of times in the life span At. in' (j, t) of John which satisfy
the contextually assigned predicate CW; its nuclear scope is the set of those times at which John is
available.
(249) Aw . B3t[inw(j,t) A Cw(t)][[available]w(j,t)].
Finally, let me turn to sentences with 'sometimes' and an indefinite or a bare plural subject, such as
sentence (250). I assume that this sentence admits three different readings. In the reading (250a),
'sometimes' only binds the individual variable, while the time variable is bound by a covert generic
operator; in the reading (250b), 'sometimes' only binds the time variable, while the individual vari-
able is bound again by a covert generic operator; in the reading (250c), 'sometimes' acts like an
UNSELECTIVE BINDER a la Lewis (1975) and binds both the individual and the time variable.
(250) Firemen sometimes drink beer.
a. = There are some firemen who have the habit of drinking beer.
= Aw. B3 [[fireman](x) A CW (x)] [GENt [CW (t)] [[drink]w (x, t)]].
b. = Firemen in general occasionally drink beer.
= Aw . GENx [[fireman] (x) A Cw (x)][3t[Cw (t)][[drink]fw(x, t)]].
c. = There are some firemen that occasionally drink beer.
= Aw. 3=,t[[fireman](x) A Cw(x) A Cw(t)][[drink]w(x, t)].
I am now ready to turn to the case of sentences (233b) and (234b) with the i-predicate 'tall' and the
existential adverb 'sometimes'.
Account By assumption (86), the odd sentence (233b) comes with a matrix exhaustivity operator,
as in (251). This exhaustivity operator is restricted by the set of alternatives Q.
(251) [ EXHO [, Sometimes John is tall ] ]
Under the assumption that there is no difference between s- and i-predicates, the same LF and truth
conditions as (246) and (249) should be available also for the prejacent W of the exhaustivity operator
in (251), with the i-predicate 'tall'. I have written them down in (252), where C is a contextually
assigned set of times.
(252) a. [, [Sometimest C(t) ] John is tall at t]
b. W = Aw . t[inw(j, t) A Cw(t)][[tall]w(j,t)].
Consider the LF 0b in (253a), which is the same as the LF W in (252a), only with the existential
adverb replaced by a universal adverb. Given the two assumptions (247) and (248), this LF (253a)
gets the truth conditions (253b).
(253) a. [., [always C ] John is tall at t]
b. b - Aw .Vt[inw(j,t) A Cw(t)] [[tall] w(j,t)].
Let me assume that 'sometimes' and 'always' are Horn-mates, as stated in (254). Evidence for this
assumption (254) comes from the fact that a sentence such as 'Sometimes, my daughter cleans up
the table' suggests that she does not always take care of that. Thus, b in (253) is a scalar alternative
of W in (252) according to the standard definition (74) of the set of scalar alternatives Alt(o).
(254) (3t, Vt) is a Horn-scale.
Of course, 0 logically entails ."11 Furthermore, W does not logically entail V: just consider a
world (not compatible with common knowledge Wck) where John is tall sometimes in Cw but not
11Modulo the caveat in footnote 11, of course.
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throughout CW and note that p is true but 4 false in such a world. Thus, 4 logically asymmetrically
entails p and is thus excludable given p according to definition (106), as stated in (255).12
(255) Sxcl(p) = {}.
On the other hand, the alternative and the prejacent ( are contextually equivalent by virtue of the
characterization (226)-(227) of the i-predicateon 'tall', as already noted in (232).
(256) W Wck 0.
The set of alternatives Q of the exhaustivity operator is subject to the two conditions (151a) and
(151b). Since 4' E £xcl(W), then 4 is allowed to belong to 0, by assumption (151a). Furthermore,
since W ++Wck 4, then 4 must belong to Q, by assumption (151b). In conclusion, the odd sentence
(233b) denotes the proposition EXHq (() in (257) that "John is sometimes tall but not always." Of
course, this proposition is a contradiction given common knowledge and the oddness of sentence
(233b) with the Q-adverb 'sometimes' and the i-predicate 'tall' thus follows from the MH (97).13
(257) EXHn(W) = W A -4
Before I move on, let me point out the important role played by the two assumptions (247) and (248)
in the account I have just presented. Suppose that I did not avail myself of these two assumptions.
Then, instead of the truth conditions W and 4 in (252b) and (253b), I would have gotten the truth
conditions W' and 4' in (258), respectively. By reasoning in the same way as above, I would have
derived the strengthened meaning EXHn((f') = W' A -,0'. The problem is that this strengthened
meaning is not a contradiction given common knowledge for every possible choice of the contextu-
ally assigned predicate C: if the restrictive clause C is slightly bigger than the life span of John, then
the strengthened meaning EXHQ(W) is not a contradiction given common knowledge. My proposal
would thus incorrectly predict sentence (233b) to be fine, but picky with respect to the values that
the context can assign to the restrictor of the adverb.
(258) a. p' = Aw.3t[Cw(t)][[tall] w(j,t)].
b. " = Aw. VNt[Cw(t)][[tall w(j,t)].
Let me now make sure that the proposal just presented does not rule out sentence (234b) too, with the
bare plural subject 'firemen'. Of course, also the LF of this sentence contains a matrix exhaustivity
operator. Since there are no differences between i- and s-predicates, the truth conditions of the pre-
jacent W of this exhaustivity operator in this case are completely analogous to one of the three truth
conditions in (250). Here, it is sufficient to pick one of the three and show that everything goes fine.
Let me pick for example the truth conditions o in (259a), corresponding to truth conditions (250c).
The only scalar alternative is the one obtained by replacing 'sometimes' by 'always', whose corre-
sponding truth conditions are 4 in (259). By reasoning as above, I conclude that sentence (234b) has
the strengthened meaning EXH(W) = W A ,0, namely that "some fireman are sometimes tall, but that
it is not true that all firemen are always tall." This strengthened meaning is formally analogous to the
one derived in (257) for the case of the odd sentence (233b). Yet, this strengthened meaning does
not contradict common knowledge (227), since it is true in a world where some fireman are always
tall and some others are never tall, which is of course well compatible with common knowledge. 14
(259) Firemen are sometimes tall.
12 Since 0 logically asymmetrically entails p, then 0 is a scalar alternative of W also with respect to Fox's alternative
definition (124).
130f course, the problem with conjunction pointed out in subsection 2.5.3 with sentences (220) arises also here, for the
case of sentences where the i-predicate is conjoined with an s-predicate, as in (i)
(i) #Sometimes, John is tall and reads the New York Times.
The tentative suggestion put forward in footnote 44 extends to this case. In any event, cases such as (i) seem to me to be
problematic also for other existing accounts, such as Kratzer's.
14Here, I have concentrated on the perilous truth conditions (259a), repeated in (ia), whereby the time argument is exis-
tentially quantified. Later on in section 3.3, I will suggest that the existential quantifier 3 is a scalar alternative of the free
variable x. Suppose that in the case of p in (ia), I could construct an alternative as follows: first, I replace the existential
quantifier 3x, t with the free variable x and then I bound the time argument t with a (properly restricted) universal operator Vt,
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a. p = 3,,t[[fireman](x) A C(x) A C(t)][[tall](x,t)].
b. O = Vx,t[[fireman(x) A C(x) A C(t)][[tall](x,t)].
Finally, let me discuss the case of sentence (245c). This sentence was found above to be problematic
for existing accounts for the distribution of Q-adverbs, since it has the same structure as sentence
(234b), and yet the former sounds odd while the latter sounds fine. On the contrary, my account is
able to account for this difference. The truth conditions corresponding to sentence (245c) are W in
(260a), that are of course completely analogous to those in (259a) for the case of sentence (234b).
The truth conditions of the corresponding alternative with 'sometimes' replaced by 'always' are
in (260b). By reasoning as above, I conclude once more that sentence (245c) has the strengthened
meaning EXH(so) = o A -,,. The crucial point is that this strengthened meaning does indeed
contradict common knowledge. In fact, consider a world w compatible with common knowledge
where the prejacent is true. This means that there exists an Italian and a time such that that Italian
comes from a beautiful country at that time. By virtue of the pieces of common knowledge that
Italians come from the same country and that to come from a given country satisfies the homogeneity
assumption (227), it follows that every Italian satisfies the predicate at every time t in his life span
in this world w, namely that the alternative b is true too.
(260) Italians sometimes come from a beautiful country.
a. o = 3.,t[[italians] (x) A C(x) A C(t) A in(x, t)] [[come from a beautiful country] (x, t)]
b. V = Vx,t[[italians] (x) A C(x) A C(t) A in(x, t)][[come from a beautiful country] (x, t)]
In conclusion, the right generalization about the distribution of 'sometimes' seems to be that it is
only fine when it quantifies over some non-homogeneous argument. My proposal is well suited to
account for this generalization. In the rest of this section, I qualify my proposal with a few remarks.
First remark: interval statives A rather interesting case is that of predicates such as 'sit', 'stand'
and 'flow', which Dowty (1979, pp. 173-174) calls interval statives. Note the following contrast: 15
(261) a. Sometimes, John sits on that couch.
b. #Sometimes, New Orleans sits on the Mississipi river.
(262) a. Your glass sometimes sits near the edge of the table.
b. #John's house sometimes sits at the top of the hill.
(263) a. The long box sometimes stands next to the door.
b. #The new building sometimes stands at the corner of first Avenue and Main Street.
thus getting the alternative o' in (ib). Then, truth conditions (ia) would correspond to the strengthened meaning A A, -I'
that is indeed a contradiction given common knowledge. Here, I am assuming that Vz in (ib) is not a scalar alternative of V
in (ia), namely that the existential quantifier 3.,t denoted by unselective 'sometimes' can only be replaced by the universal
quantifier Vx,t denoted by unselective 'always'.
(i) a. w = 3x,t [[fireman] (x) A C(x) A C(t)][[tall](x,t)].
b. 1 = Vt[[tall](x, t)].
In any event, in order to account for the felicity of sentence (234b), it is enough to exhibit one LF which is fine. Thus,
consider the LF where the prejacent W of the matrix exhaustivity operator of sentence (234b) gets the truth conditions p in
(ii), analogous to the truth conditions in (250a).
(ii) p = Aw. 3 [[fireman](x) A Cw(x)] [GENt[in'(t)][[tall]w(x,t)]].
These truth conditions contain a wide scope existential quantifier and their strengthened meaning is therefore vacuous; cf. the
First Remark in section 3.3. Thus, I could have also accounted for the felicity of sentence (234b) by using these alternative
truth conditions.
15Dowty makes the same point with the contrast in (i), concerning the progressive.
(i) a. The socks are lying under the bed.
b. #New Orleans is lying at the mouth of the Mississipi river.
In this work, I do not consider the case of the progressive; thus, I have rephrased Dowty's observation for the case of existential
Q-adverbs.
Application to individual level predicates
(264) a. One leg of the piano sometimes rests on the carpet.
b. #That argument sometimes rests on an invalid assumption.
As Fernald (2000, p. 7) puts it, these predicates "are taken to be i-predicates just in case the subject
denotes the sort of thing that cannot ordinarily change its physical position from the one described
by the predicate (New Orleans always lies at the mouth of the Mississipi river)." I think that the
contrasts in (261)-(264) highlight the general fact that the i- vs. s-level distinction does not really
apply at the level of predicates but rather at the level of (atomic) sentences, since it depends also
on the arguments of the predicate. Thus, theories which encode the distinction by positing special
grammatical properties for i-predicates, such as Kratzer's assumption (236), are ill-suited to account
for cases such as (261)-(264). My assumption (227) is potentially better suited, given that it is not
really an assumption on the predicate [tall] but rather an assumption on the proposition [tall] (John).
In other words, it is very well compatible with the refinement that At. [vPJ (New Orleans, t) is a
homogeneous set of times for some predicates VP, while At. [vP] (John, t) is not.
Second remark: truth conditions of a plain sentence with an i-predicate Consider a plain
sentence containing an i-predicate, such as (265a). According to assumption (226), the i-predicate
'tall' has a time argument, just as s-predicates. This argument needs to be bound at LF, in order for
the sentence to denote a truth value.
(265) a. John is tall.
b. [ GENt [ C(t) [ John tall(t) ] ] ].
c. Aw. GENt[Cw(t) A inW(j,t)][[talll(j,t)].
I assume that Natural Language has two covert tense operators: an existential quantifier 3t, whose
meaning is akin to that of overt 'sometimes'; and a universal quantifier GENt called the GENERIC
OPERATOR, whose semantics is akin to that of overt 'usually' or 'always'. In the case of s-predicates,
the time argument can be bound by either operator, yielding the episodic and the habitual reading,
respectively. Since there are no grammatical differences between s- and i-predicates, then both
options are in principle available also for i-predicates. Yet, we just saw in this section that existential
quantification over the time argument of an i-predicate is ruled out by the MH, since it triggers the
blind mismatching implicature that the corresponding sentence with universal quantification is false.
Hence, the time argument of the i-predicate in (265a) can only be bound by the generic operator,
namely the sentence only admits the LF in (265b). The restrictive clause of the generic operator is
an arbitrary predicate of times C w provided by context. Furthermore, by assumptions (247)-(248),
the presupposition inw (j, t) that John is alive gets added to this restrictive clause, thus effectively
yielding the truth conditions (265c). In the next section, I will argue that the only available choice
for this predicate C is the one whereby Cw (t) A inw (j, t) = in (j, t).
3.2 Temporal modification
As shown in (266a), temporal modification is banned with i-predicates. Furthermore, Kratzer (1995)
notes that temporal modification through past-tense morphology in (266b) yields the inference that
John has got to be dead. Musan (1997) calls this inference the LIFE-TIME EFFECT.
(266) a. #John is tall after dinner.
b. John was tall. - John is dead
In this section, I argue that the two facts in (266) correspond to the two columns of the generalization
(142) discussed in section 2.3.
3.2.1 Existing accounts
According to Kratzer's (1995) assumption (236), sentence (266a) is ruled out by the fact that the
i-predicate 'tall' introduces no time argument for 'after dinner' to modify, as in (267a). Further-
more, Kratzer assumes that past morphology denotes the property of 'belonging to the past' and
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that this property applies to both times and individuals. She thus posits the truth conditions (267b)
for sentence (266b), whereby the lifetime effect follows as an entailment. As far as I can see, this
same line of analysis can be repeated once Kratzer's original strong assumption (236) is replaced by
the weaker version (239). I have no specific arguments against this line of account for the facts in
(266), but dismiss it based on my discussion of the two crucial assumptions (236) and (239) in the
preceding subsection 3.1.1.16
(267) a. At. [after-dinner](t) A [tall](j)
b. PAST(j) A [tall](j).
Maienborn (2004) suggests a pragmatic account for the oddness of sentences like (266a);17 and
Musan (1997) suggests a pragmatic account for the life-time effect displayed by sentences such as
(266b). Their accounts are very close in spirit to the account that I will suggest in this section.
Let me thus review their specific formalization as a way of motivating my own formalization. I
will concentrate on Musan's proposal; Maienborn's proposal is less explicit, but it seems to me
substantially analogous to Musan's proposal. Musan (1997, (22)) accounts for the life-time effect
triggered by i-predicates in the past tense by means of the piece of reasoning in (268).
(268) a. "The speaker has expressed the proposition [(269b)]."
b. "Thus, the speaker is maximally informed about Gregory's being from America - in
particular about the duration of Gregory's being from America."
c. "If the speaker thought that Gregory's being from America is not over, he would have
expressed the proposition (269a), since that would have been a more informative alter-
native utterance about the duration of Gregory's being from America."
d. "Thus, the speaker couldn't have been maximally informative about Gregory's being
from America unless he though that Gregory's being from America is over."
e. "Thus, the speaker has implicated that Gregory's being from America is over."
f. "Since being from America is a property that, if it holds of an individual at all, holds
of that individual over its entire lifespan, and since the speaker has implicated that Gre-
gory's being from America is over, the speaker has implicated furthermore that Gregory
is dead:'
(269) a. Gregory is from America.
b. Gregory was from America.
The crucial step of this reasoning is (268c), which says that (269a) is "more informative" than
(269b). But I do not understand the way Musan argues for this claim.1 8 She assumes the semantics
in (270) for the two sentences (269), where t is a time interval. Crucially, these truth conditions
have existential quantification over time. I do not understand why truth-conditions (270a) are more
informative than truth conditions (270b).
(270) a. [Gregory is American](Now) = 1 4= 3t[NOW E t A AMERICAN(g, t)]
b. [Gregory was American] (Now) = 1 4= > t[t < NOW A AMERICAN(g, t)]
16Musan's (1997) arguments against Kratzer's analysis only target her further assumption that past morhology can only
apply to the external argument, either the Davidsonian argument (for s-predicates) or the subject (for i-predicates).
17She considers sentences containing locatives rather than tense modifiers, such as 'Mary is blond in her car', but her
proposal seems to me to straightforwardly extend to tense modifiers too.
18Musan explains this claim in the following passage, that I do not understand: "Suppose (269a) is true. In this case,
we know the following: if (269b) is also true, then the situation time of 'be from America' obviously reaches into the past
(because of the truth of (269a)), i.e., the implication from the present tense clause to the past tense clause is guaranteed. But
how about the case where (269a) is false? For practical purposes in a concrete discourse, this possibility can be disregarded
because conversation takes place under the assumption that utterances are truthful. Hence, when [(269a)] is uttered, for
practical purposes - which only care about cases where the past tense clause is true - the present tense clause is justified
to count as more informative than the past tense clause. It seems that this relationship justifies treating past tense clauses and
present tense clauses as ordered with regard to informativeness" (pp. 280-281).
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The problem here is that there is no subset relationship between the two sets [PAST] = At . t < NOW
and [PRES] = At. NOW E t, and thus no way to compare the informativeness of the two propositions
(269). In order to get a subset relationship, I will follow below Sauerland (2002) and assume that
the present tense is vacuous, namely that it does not impose any restriction. This way, we do get
a subset relationship [PAST] _ 1PRES]. Yet, if we stick with Musan's assumption (270) that time
is existentially quantified, then we make (269b) stronger and thus more informative than (269a),
contrary to what we want. To get out of trouble, I will suggest that time in these two sentences is
not quantified by an existential operator but rather by a universal operator and that tense morphemes
end up in the restrictor of that universal operator, which is a DE environment.
3.2.2 An account based on blind and mandatory mismatching implicatures
In this subsection, I present what I take to be a streamlined version of Musan's and Maienborn's
accounts for the facts in (266).
Preliminaries Let me start with a naive way of restating Musan's and Maienborn's proposals, in
order to see where it fails. Building on the last Remark in subsection 3.1.2, I assume that the truth
conditions of sentence (266a) are plausibly pI in (271a), where the temporal modifier 'after dinner'
further restricts the restrictive clause of the generic operator. Furthermore, I assume that the truth
conditions of sentence (266b) are 02 in (27 1b), namely that past-tense morphology acts as a tense
modifier, analogously to 'after dinner'.
(271) a. W1 = Aw . GENt [inw(j, t) A [after-dinner]w(t)][[tall] (j, t)].
b. 2 = Aw . GENt[inflw(j,t) A [PAST w(t)][[tall w(j,t)].
Assume that modifiers in the restrictor of a universal operator can be dropped without falling out of
the set of scalar alternatives. Support for this assumption comes from the fact that the sentence 'Ev-
ery blond woman is beautiful' triggers the implicature that not every woman is beautiful. Hence, ?
in (272) is a scalar alternative of Pl in (27 la). Assume furthermore that present- and past-tense mor-
phology are Horn-mates and that present-tense morphology is semantically vacuous, as suggested
for instance in Sauerland (2002); hence, b in (272) is a scalar alternative of P2 in (271b) too.
(272) 4 = Aw . GENt[inw(j,t)][[tall]w(j,t)].
Of course, 0 in (272) logically asymmetrically entails both W1 and W2 in (271), since the latter two
formulas have some extra stuff in their restrictors. Hence, the blind strengthened meaning of both
Vl and O2 in (271) is predicted to be the one in (273).
(273) EXH(Pi) = Wi A -V4, for i = 1, 2.
In the case of sentence (266a) with truth conditions P, this blind strengthened meaning says that
"John is always tall after dinner but there are non-after-dinner times at which he is not tall"; of
course, this blind strengthened meaning contradicts the piece of common knowledge (227) that
tallness is a permanent property; in conclusion, sentence (266a) is correctly predicted to sound odd.
The problem is that exactly the same prediction is made for the case of sentence (266b) with truth
conditions P2: its blind strengthened meaning says that "John was always tall in the past but there
are times not in the past where John is not tall"; again, this blind strengthened meaning contradicts
the common knowledge that tallness is a permanent property; thus, sentence (266b) is incorrectly
predicted to sound odd too and furthermore no life-time effect is derived. What is the relevant
difference between the two sentences (266)? I would like to argue that the discussion presented in
Subsection 2.3 sheds some light on this puzzle.
Account The relevant scalar items in the case of the two sentences (266) are the tense modifier
'after dinner' and the past-tense morphology 'PAST'. According to the truth conditions (271), these
scalar items are embedded in a DE environment, namely the restrictor of a universal quantifier. Thus,
the generalization in table (142) applies; let's see what it predicts. Let's start with the case of sentence
(266a), with the truth conditions P1 in (271a) and the alternative ?p in (272). They correspond to the
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target sentence V = every(Strong) and the alternative 0 = every(Weak) in table (142) with the two
restrictors Strong and Weak defined as in (274). Note that this is a case where the two restrictors
cannot be equivalent given common knowledge: in fact, the equivalence Strong W ck Weak would
mean that it follows from common knowledge Wk that John is only alive at after dinner times, which
obviously cannot be. Hence, the right column of table (142) applies in this case: sentence (266a)
with truth conditions p with the stronger restrictor is correctly predicted to sound odd; sentence b
with the weaker restrictor Weak is predicted to sound fine.
(274) a. Strong = At. inW (j, t) A [after-dinner]w(t).
b. Weakw = At. inw (j, t).
Let's now turn to the case of sentence (266b), with the truth conditions '2 in (271b) and the al-
ternative 0 in (272). Again, they correspond to the target sentence p = every(Stmrong) and the
alternative b = every(Weak) in table (142) with the two restrictors Strong and Weak defined as in
(275). Two cases need to be consider. One case is that it follows from common knowledge that John
is already dead. Equivalently, that two restrictors Strong and Weak in (275) are equivalent given
common knowledge. In this case, the left column of table (142) applies: sentence (266b) with truth
conditions W2 with the past tense predicate is predicted to sound fine and the alternative ' without
the past tense predicate is predicted to sound odd. The other case that needs to be considered is that
it does not follow from common knowledge that John is already dead. Equivalently, that the two
restrictors Strong and Weak in (275) are not equivalent given common knowledge. In this case, the
right column of table (142) applies: sentence (266b) with truth conditions V2 with the past tense
predicate is predicted to sound odd and the alternative ' without the past tense predicate is predicted
to sound fine. The life-time effect is thus derived. 19
(275) a. Strong' = At . inW(j,t) A [PASTIW(t).
b. Weakw = At. inw (j, t).
In conclusion, the two tense modifiers 'after dinner' and PAST in sentences (266) lead to two different
effects, namely oddness and the life-time effect, respectively; these two effects correspond to the two
columns of table (142). The proposal made in section 2.3 to account for the generalization (142) thus
extends to the case of the two sentences (266). For the sake of explicitness, let me quickly recall the
basic idea of that account. The LFs of both sentences (266) contain an instance of the exhaustivity
operator embedded in the restrictor of the generic operator. In the case of sentence (266a), the two
restrictors Strong and Weak in (274) are not contextually equivalent, hence the embedded implicature
is not mandatory and thus the embedded exhaustivity operator ends up being vacuous. In the case of
sentence (266b) where common knowledge entails that John is dead, the two restrictors Strong and
Weak in (275) are contextually equivalent, thus the embedded implicature is mandatory and it leads
to a mismatch.
First remark: more on the truth conditions of a plain sentence with an i-predicate Consider
a plain sentence containing an i-predicate, such as (276a). As discussed in the Second Remark in
subsection 3.1.2, the time argument of the i-predicate 'tall' in sentence (276a) can only be bound by
the generic operator, yielding the truth conditions (265c), repeated in (276b), whereby the generic
operator is restricted by the predicate of times At. Cw (t) A in ' (j, t), where C is contextually sup-
plied. Yet, as seen in this section, any choice of the predicate C such that there are worlds compatible
with common knowledge where Cw(t) A inW (j, t) / inw(j, t) is ruled out by the fact that it leads
to a blind mismatching inplicature. In conclusion, the only truth conditions predicted for sentence
19Consider sentence (i), with the present tense morphology. What I have derived is not that the felicity of sentence (i)
requires common knowledge to entail that John is alive but rather something weaker, namely that common knowledge does
not entail that he is dead.
(i) John is tall.
(ii) A: Do you know John? do you know if he still alive?
B: That I don't know. I know he is tall and has blue eyes.
I think that this prediction might not be wrong, since the dialogue in (ii) might be fine.
Application to individual level predicates
(276a) are those in (276c), at least if we restrict ourselves to possible worlds compatible with com-
mon knowledge.
(276) a. John is tall.
b. Aw. GENt[inW(j,t) A Cw(t)][[tall (j,t)].
c. Aw. GENt[inw(j,t)][[tallI(j,t)].
Truth conditions (276c) are precisely those posited by Chierchia (1995). Thus, I have derived Chier-
chia's assumption that (276c) are the only possible truth conditions for sentence (276a) without any
ad hoc assumptions. 20
Second remark: licit tense modifiers I-predicates do not always ban temporal modification: al-
though sentence (277a) with the temporal modifier 'after dinner' sounds odd, sentence (277b), with
the temporal modifier 'since he was fifteen', sounds fine. This contrast is difficult to derive within a
framework such as Kratzer's. Assume that the oddness of sentence (277a) is due to the fact that 'to
know Latin' lacks a Davidsonian argument by (236) and thus 'after dinner' has nothing to modify. In
order to reconcile this account with the felicity of (277b), we would have to say that the i-predicate
has been coerced into an s-predicate in this case. But then we are unable to account for the oddness
of (277c): we would have expected that also in the case of (277c), just as in the case of (277b),
the i-predicate can be coerced into an s-predicate in order to provide an argument for 'since he was
fifteen' to modify, offering a free ride to the further modifier 'after dinner'. Clearly, something else
needs to be said about this latter case (277c). Whatever we say about (277c) will plausibly apply
also to (277a), so that the assumption (236) that i-predicates lack a Davidsonian argument that we
started with ends up being redundant.
(277) a. #John knows Latin after dinner.
b. John knows Latin since he was fifteen
c. #John knows latin after dinner since he was fifteen.
Here is how my proposal might cope with the contrast between (277a) and (277b). My current
characterization (227) of i-predicates says that in every world w e Wk compatible with common
knowledge, if an individual x satisfies an i-predicate PW at a time t', then x satisfies the predicate PW
at every time t at which x is alive, namely at every time t such that inW (x, t). This characterization is
supposed to capture the intuition that what's special about i-predicates is that it follows from common
knowledge that they are permanent, that they tend to last. As already noted at the beginning of the
chapter, this current formulation (227) cashes out this intuition in a rather rough way. One might
want to be more careful, and replace it with the following more fine grained variant (278).
(278) In every world in w E Wk compatible with common knowledge, if an individual x satisfies
an i-predicate PW at a time t, then x satisfies the predicate at least at every time t such that
CX (X1 t).
Let me call Cp the ASSUMED MINIMAL DURATION of the i-predicate P. According to assumption
(227), the assumed minimal duration Cp(., .) is in(., .) for every i-predicate P. Assumption (278)
improves on assumption (227) in allowing different i-predicates to have different assumed minimal
durations. For instance, it is plausible that the assumed minimal duration CFrench of the predicate
'to be French' is indeed in, since if John is French then plausibly he is French throughout his entire
life. But in the case of the predicate 'to know Latin', this doesn't seem plausible and we may want
instead its assumed minimal duration Cknow to be much shorter. Nothing changes (I think) in the
account presented in this section if assumption (227) is replaced by assumption (278). And the patter
of judgments in (277) immediately follows.
20Chierchia uses instead two specific assumptions. In order to force generic quantification rather than existential quantifi-
cation over the time argument of the predicate, Chierchia assumes that i-predicates come with a special feature that forces
local agreement with the generic operator. Furthermore, Chierchia (footnote 22) resorts to a special presupposition in order
to rule out other restrictors besides in.
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Third remark: generic numerical indefinites The plural indefinite 'two firemen' of sentence
(279a) admits both the generic reading ("every two prototypical firemen love each other") and the
existential reading ("there are two firemen who love each other"). If we replace the collective i-
predicate 'to love each other' with the inherently distributive i-predicate 'tall', we get a very differ-
ent effect: the plural indefinite 'two firemen' of sentence (279b) only admits the existential reading
("there are two firemen who are tall") but lacks the generic reading ("every two prototypical firemen
are tall", which would then boil down to "every prototypical fireman is tall", because of the distribu-
tivity of the predicate 'tall'). The contrast between (279a) and (279b) can be sharpened by adding an
overt 'usually' with matrix scope (which blocks the existential reading of the indefinite) and noting
that sentence (279a) remains fine while sentence (279b) turns distinctively odd.
(279) a. Two firemen love each other. [the 'two'-indefinite admits the generic reading]
b. Two firemen are tall. [the 'two'-indefinite does not admit the generic reading]
In order to account for the generic reading of the plural indefinite of sentence (279a), let me assume
that 'two firemen' introduces a variable that ranges over plural individuals x-y that are the sum of two
(different) firemen x and y; and furthermore that this variable can get bound by the generic operator,
thus yielding the truth conditions (280a). Based on the preceding First Remark, I have assumed here
that the restrictive clause of the generic operator is as large as possible, namely the intersection of
the two life spans of the two firemen x and y that the generic operator is quantifying over. We then
expect sentence (279b) to admit the truth conditions (280b), analogous to the truth conditions (280a)
of sentence (279a). Here, I have assumed that the inherently distributive predicate 'tall' has been
operated upon by a distributive operator in order to be able to apply to pairs of individuals. What is
wrong with sentence (279b)?
(280) a. GENx, y, t [x y A [fireman](x) A [fireman] (y) Ain(x, t) Ain(y, t)] [[love] (x+y, t)].
b. GENx, y, t [z 5 yA [fireman](x)A[fireman] (y)Ain(x, t)Ain(y, t)] [[tall] (x, t) A [tall] (y, t)].
Here is the sketch of a possible way to go. So far, I have construed the Davidsonian argument
just as time. This is of course an oversimplification. So assume for instance that the Davidsonian
argument is a situation, after Kratzer (2007). And let me rewrite the truth conditions (280b) as o in
(281a). Consider the scalar alternative of sentence (279b) obtained by replacing 'two' with 'a'. The
corresponding truth conditions are b (28 1b). Consider the proposition so A -iob that "any two firemen
are tall when they are together but it is not the case that any fireman is tall at any situation where he
is located". Plausibly, this proposition is not a logical contradiction: just consider a possible world
where there are only two firemen, who happen to be tall in those situations where they are together,
so that o is true; but that are not tall in those situations where they are not together, so that --,V is true
too. Let me thus assume that the strengthened meaning of the target sentence o is indeed o A 'V. 21
2 1Let me discuss this latter claim more carefully. In section 2.3, I have suggested that the exhaustivity operator is mandatory
at every scope site, as stated in (147); and furthermore that the restrictor of universal quantifiers should be construed as an
open formula, so that it requires an embedded exhaustivity operator. Thus, the LF of sentence (279b) has two instances of the
exhaustivity operator, as in (i): a matrix one and another one embedded in the restrictive clause of the generic operator that
bounds the indefinite and the time argument.
(i)
EXH
tall
GEN
EXH two firemen
The only interesting alternative of the prejacent 'two firemen' of the embedded exhaustivity operator is the alternative obtained
by replacing 'two' by 'a'. The denotation of these two restrictors is given in (ii), construed as an open proposition.
(ii) a. [two firemen] = Aw. [two firemen]lw(x) A [two firemenlw(y) A inw(x, t) A inw(y,t).
b. [a fireman] = Aw. [firemanlw(x) A inw(x, t).
Now we need to ask whether condition (151b) applies or not in this case, namely whether the two restrictors (ii) count as
contextually equivalent or not and thus whether the embedded implicature is mandatory or not. I think the answer depends
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(281) a. W = GENz,, [x 54 y A [fireman](x)A [fireman](y)Ain(x, s)Ain(y, s)] [[tall](x, s) A [tall](y, s)]
b. = GENz, [[fireman](x)Ain(x, s)][[tall](x, s)].
Let me assume that common knowledge entails that there are no lonely firemen, as stated in (282).
Then, the proposition WAoA-V is a contradiction given common knowledge and the lack of the generic
reading of sentence (279b) is accounted for.
(282) For every world w E Wk compatible with common knowledge and for every fireman x,
there is at least a situation s and a firemen y (different from x) such that x and y are together
in s.
I close this discussion with a very puzzling complication. Dobrovie-Sorin (2003) discusses plural
French 'des'-indefinites in subject position with generic meaning. She notes the following contrast:
generic 'des'-indefinites are fine with collective i-predicates, as in (283); but bad with distributive
ones, as in (284).
(283) a. Des droites convergentes ont un point en comun.
'Des convergent lines have a point in common'.
b. Des pays limitrophes ont souvent des rapports difficiles.
'Des neighboring countries have frequently have difficult relations'.
c. Des vrais jumeaux se ressemblent dans les plus petits d6tails.
'Des true twins look alike down to the smallest details'.
(284) a. #Des carres ont quatre c6ts.
Des squares have four sides.
b. #Des chats sont intelligents.
Des cats are intelligent.
This pattern with French 'des'-indefinites can be replicated with Italian pseudopartitive 'deildegli
NP'; I provide an example in (285). The pattern in the case of French 'des'-indefinites and Italian
pseudo-partitives looks very similar to that in (279): as Dobrovie-Sorin observes, the pattern in
(284)-(283) stays exactly the same if 'des' is replaced by a numeral, say 'two'.
(285) a. #Dei quadrati hanno quattro lati.
of-the squares have four sides.
b. Delle rette convergenti si incontrano in un punto.
of-the lines convergent themselves meet in a point.
Despite this resemblance, there seems to me to be no way to extend the account sketched above for
the oddness of (279b) to the case of French 'des'-indefinites or Italian pseudo-partitives. Let me
make the problem explicit. In order to extend my proposal from the former case to the latter case,
I would have to assume that the property provided by 'des'-indefinites and pseudo-partitives for the
generic operator to quantify over only contains plural individuals, just as in the case of 'two firemen'.
It would then be plausible to assume that the same holds when 'des'-indefinites and pseudo-partitives
are used as existential quantifiers. Yet, this assumption would mismatch with the well known fact
on the fine grained details of the formulation of assumption (151b). If it turns out that the two restrictors (ii) do not count as
contextually equivalent, then condition (15 1b) does not apply and the embedded exhaustivity operator can thus be effectively
ignored. In other words, we can assume for all intent and purposes that the LF of sentence (279b) is (iii), with only the matrix
exhaustivity operator.
(iii)
EXH
GEN two firemen
In this case, the reasoning suggested in the text goes through.
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that the plurality inference of 'des'-indefinites and pseudo-partitives (as well as any other plural
existential quantifier) disappears under negation, contrary to the case of 'two'-indeinites. This fact
is illustrated in (refex: Mario nono ha comprato dei libri) for the case of Italian pseudo-partitives:
sentence (286a) with the 'two'-indefinite is true in a scenario where Mario bought only one book;
sentence (286b) with the pseudo-partitive is not.
(286) a. Mario non ha comprato due libri.
Mario not did buy two books
'Mario didn't buy two books'
b. Mario non ha comprato dei libri.
Mario not did buy of-the books.
'Mario didn't buy books'
In other words, I am faced with the following conundrum: on the one hand, in order to get the
contrast in (286), I need to assume that 'des'-indefinites and pseudo-partitives are analogous to
English bare plurals and different from 'two'-indefinites, namely that 'des'-indefinites and pseudo-
partitives existentially quantify over both singular and plural individuals; on the other hand, in order
to account for the analogy between (279) and (283)-(285), I need to assume that 'des'-indefinites and
pseudo-partitives are analogous to 'two'-indefinites and different from English bare plurals, namely
that 'des'-indefinites and pseudo-partitives provide a restrictor to the generic operator that does not
contain singular individuals. The mystery will get even thicker when German negative bare plurals
will enter the picture in section 3.4.
3.3 Bare plural subjects
The bare plural subject (henceforth: BPS) 'firemen' of the s-predicate 'available' in (287a) admits
both the generic reading ("Firemen are available people") and the existential reading ("There are
firemen who are available"); the BPS of the i-predicate 'tall' in (287b) instead lacks the existential
reading and only allows the generic one.
(287) a. Firemen are available. B-BPS, GEN-BPS
b. Firemen are tall. #B-BPS, GEN-BPS
In this section, I argue that the existential reading of the BPS of sentence (287b) is unattested because
the blind strengthened meaning that would correspond to its LF is a contradiction given the common
knowledge (227) that 'tall' is a permanent property. More precisely, I argue that the existential
reading of the BPS of sentence (287b) can be ruled out in exactly the same way I have accounted in
section 2.2 for the oddness of sentence (99a), repeated in (288a).
(288) Context: a competition lasted five days, Monday through Friday; both John and Bill know
that the same guy x won on each of the five days:
M T W T F
winner: x x x x x
John wants to know more about this amazing guy and thus asks Bill for more information;
Bill provides the following information:
a. #On every day, a/some fireman won.
b. A/Some fireman won on every day.
My argument exploits the following parallelism. In the case of sentence (288a), it is crucial that the
indefinite 'a/some firman' has scope below the universal quantifier 'on every day', since sentence
(288b) where the scope is reversed is acceptable. Analogously, Carlson (1977) points out that exis-
tential BPs always take the narrowest possible scope with respect to other scope bearing elements in
the sentence. Furthermore, the context described in (288) entails that, if a fireman won on one day,
then he won on every day; analogously, the common knowledge Wk described in (227) entails that,
if a fireman is tall at a given time, then he always is. To stress the analogy between the account for
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the oddness of sentence (288a) suggested in section 2.2 and the account for the lack of the existential
reading of the BPS of sentence (287b) suggested in this section, Table 3.4 summarizes the main steps
of the two accounts, one next to the other.
3.3.1 Existing accounts
Two recent approaches to the lack of the existential reading of BPSs of i-predicates have been de-
veloped in the literature. One approach is based on syntactic assumptions, and has been developed
mainly by Kratzer (1995), Diesing (1992) and Chierchia (1995). Another approach is based on in-
formation structure assumptions, and has been developed mainly by Jager (2001) and Cohen and
Erteschik-Shir (2002). In this subsection, I review both approaches in turn and try to argue that they
are not fully satisfactory, thus making room for my own proposal. An older approach due to Carlson
(1977) will not be reviewed here; see for instance Wilkinson (1991) for discussion.
The syntactic approach: overall idea Diesing's and Chierchia's proposals differ substantially
with respect to both their syntactic assumptions (e.g. the position at LF of subjects of i- and s-
predicates; the characterization of the restrictive clause and the nuclear scope of Q-adverbs; etcetera)
and their semantic assumptions (e.g. the semantics of bare plurals and indefinites; the semantics of
LFs containing Q-adverbs; etcetera). Yet, the two accounts share a common logic, that is worth
sketching at the beginning, before turning to the details. Both authors assume that the generic
reading of BPSs comes about through a covert Q-adverb with generic force, called the GENERIC
OPERATOR and notated GEN. Like any other Q-adverb, this generic operator has a restrictor and a
nuclear scope. If a BP ends up in the restrictor of the generic operator, then the BP gets bound by
the generic operator and receives the generic reading. If instead the BP ends up in the nuclear scope
of the generic operator, then the generic operator cannot bind the BP, and the BP gets closed off
existentially. Thus, the first step of Diesing's and Chierchia's accounts is (289): whether a BPS is in-
terpreted existentially or generically depends on whether it sits at LF within or outside of the nuclear
scope INS . .. ] of the generic operator. Diesing calls this assumption (289) a MAPPING HYPOTHESIS,
since it constraints the mapping between LFs and truth conditions.
(289) First step:
a. The BPS in the LF [... [NS ... BPS ...]] has only the existential reading;
b. The BPS in the LF ... BPS ... [Ns .. .]] has only the generic reading.
The second step of Diesing's and Chierchia's account is (290), namely a constraint on the LF position
of the subject of an i-predicate such as 'tall' with respect to the nuclear scope [Ns . .. ] of the generic
operator.
(290) Second step:
a. [... SUBJ ... [NS ... tall ...]];
b. *[...[Ns... SUBJ ... tall ... ]].
The lack of the existential reading of the BPS 'firemen' of the i-predicate 'tall' of sentence (287b)
follows straightforwardly from these two assumptions (289) and (290): by (290), the BPS must sit
outside of the nuclear scope [Ns...] of the generic operator; by (289), a BPS in that LF position
cannot have the existential reading. The availability of the existential reading of the BPS 'firemen'
of the s-predicate 'available' of sentence (287a) follows just as straightforwardly, since constraint
(290) does not apply to subjects of s-predicates so that the BPS is allowed to sit within the nuclear
scope INS...] of the generic operator in the case of 'available'. In conclusion, the two steps (289)
and (290) yield an account for the contrast in (287). As it is clear even from this cursory initial
description, this account is syntactic in nature, since it crucially relies on the assumption that the LF
(290b) is ungrammatical. Diesing is particularly explicit about the syntactic nature of her account:
"I show that this contrast [(287)] between the two types of predicates is actually syntactic in nature,
but because of the working of the Mapping Hypothesis [(289)], it is reflected also in the available
semantic interpretations of a BPS" (p. 11). Let me now discuss Diesing's implementation of these
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#Each day, a/some fireman won. #Firemen are tall. (with 3-BPS reading)
(1) LOGICAL FORM
EXH p EXH 'p
eaGEN c
each day GE[some fireman]. won firemen, tall
(2) TRUTH CONDITIONS OF THE PREJACENT
= Aw . Vt [[daylw(t)] [, [[win]p(x,t)]] p = Aw . GENt [C (t)] [3e, [tall]w(x, t)]]
(3) ASSUMPTION ON HORN SCALES
('some fireman', 'the fireman such and such') ('firemen', 'the fireman such and such')
Notation: 'the fireman P' stands for 'the fireman such and such' and d' stands for its denotation
(4) SET OF SCALAR ALTERNATIVES
Alt(p) = P E ,,t) , where ip is the LF with the following shape and truth conditions
each day [the fireman P] won GEN C [the fireman P] tall
= Aw. Vt[[day]'(t)][Lwin]j'(d',t)] op = Aw .GENt[C' (t) A in'(d', t)][[tall]'(d, t)]
(5) A USEFUL RESTATEMENT OF THE NEGATION OF ALL THE ALTERNATIVES
A -p = -v, where 0 are the following truth conditions
P
Aw. 3B Vt [[day"(t)] [[win]J(x, t)j]] - Aw . 3z[GENt[CW(t) A inw(x, t)][[tall]w"(, t)]]
(6) SET OF EXCLUDABLE ALTERNATIVES
Excl() = {ipI P E Dw }, since 'p A - is true e.g. in the following world:
__ (t)
M T W John:
John: Bill:
Bill: Tom:
Tom: V
(7) CONCLUSION
the sentences denote the proposition EXH('p) = p AAP, --,Op = p A -,,o that contradicts
common knowledge; oddness thus follows from the MH (97)
Table 3.4: Parallelism between the account for the oddness of sentence (288a) presented in section 2.2 and the
account for the oddness for sentence (233b) presented in this section.
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two steps (289) and (290); similar considerations apply to Chierchia's implementation, that I will
not discuss in detail here.
Diesing's version of the syntactic approach Building on Heim (1988) and Kamp (1981), Diesing
posits the three assumptions in (291). According to these assumptions, the nuclear scope of the
generic operator is VP; BPSs within VP are existentially closed off by the DEO; BPSs outside of
VP are bound by the generic operator. The first step (289) of the syntactic approach, concerning the
correlation between LF position of a BPS and the availability of its existential or generic construal,
thus immediately follows from these assumptions (291).
(291) a. A BP [DP 0 N] has no quantificational force on its own: it simply introduces a free
variable x which ranges over [NI.
b. There is a covert default existential operator (henceforth: DEO) that binds every free
variable in its scope; its scope is defined to be VP.
c. A Q-adverb ('always', 'sometimes, GEN, etcetera) binds every free variable outside of
its nuclear scope; its nuclear scope is defined to be VP.
On the background of these assumptions (291), the second step (290) reduces to the assumption
that subjects of i-predicates must be outside of VP at LF. Two different implementations of this
assumption have been suggested in the literature: the one in (292) is due to Kratzer (1995); the one
in (293) is due to Diesing (1992). The advantage of Kratzer's version (292) is that it can be linked
to her assumption (236) that i-predicates lack a Davidsonian argument, as follows. The "external
argument" of a predicate is the argument that is base generated outside of the maximal projection
of the predicate. Each predicate comes with one and only one external argument. S-predicates
have a Davidsonian argument that counts as their external argument; hence, their subjects must be
VP internal. I-predicates lack the Davidsonian argument by assumption (236) and thus it is their
subjects that count as their external argument. 22 Diesing replaces (292) with (293) based on the
observation that floated quantifiers are fine with i-predicates and plausibly require the [Spec, VP]
position to be filled.23
(292) a. Subjects of s-predicates are base generated in [Spec, VP] and can thus be reconstructed
into vP at LF;
b. subjects of i-predicates are based generated in [Spec, IP] while [Spec, VP] is left empty,
hence they cannot be reconstructed into VP at LF.
(293) "The difference between the two types of predicates [i-/s-predicates] arises from differences
in the properties of the Infl associated with them" (p. 24):
a. "s-predicates have an unaccusative (in the sense of having an internal subject) Infl: the
subject is base-generated internal to VP in [Spec, VP] and Infl does not assign a 0-role to
[Spec, IP]" (p. 24).
b. "i-predicates should be analyzed as analogues to control predicates. On this account,
[...] i-predicates differ from s-predicates in that they have an Infl that assigns a 0-role
to [Spec, IP]. This role has roughly the meaning 'has the property z', where x is the
property expressed by the predicate. The lexical NP in [Spec, IP] controls a PRO subject
in [Spec, VP], which is assigned a 0-role by the verb" (pp. 25-26).
I am now ready to illustrate Diesing's account for the contrast in (287). By assumption (293), the
BPS 'Italians' of the s-predicate 'available' can either remain at LF in its surface position [Spec, IP]
22 In subsection 3.1.1, I have suggested that Kratzer's strong assumption (236), that i-predicates lack a Davidsonian ar-
gument, could be replaced by the weaker assumption (239), that i-predicates have a Davidsonian argument too but that it is
not temporally located. I think that the derivation of (292) from (236) just presented does not hold anymore once (236) is
replaced by (239).
23 Another possible argument in favor of Diesing's assumption (293) against Kratzer's assumption (292) has to do with the
details of the compositional interpretation. Diesing assumes a semantics whereby the nuclear scope of Q-adverbs and the
scope of the DEO are of type t. If these two scopes are both defined to be vp, then VP must be of type t. And in order for
VPs to be of type t when their subject is generated outside of VP, we need a place holder in [Spec, VP].
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or else be reconstructed into VP; hence, sentence (287a) with the s-predicate 'available' admits both
LFs (294a) and (294a').24 Both LFs contain a matrix covert generic operator GEN, whose nuclear
scope vP I have boldfaced. Again by assumption (293), the BPS 'Italians' of the i-predicate 'italian'
cannot be reconstructed into VP, because it is base generated in [Spec, IP] from where it controls a
null PRO in [Spec, VP]; hence, sentence (287b) with the i-predicate 'tall' only admits the LF (294b).
(294) a. IP a'. IP
GEN IP GEN IP
firemen I' 0 I'
I VP I VP
ti V firemen V
are available are available
b. IP
GEN IP
firemen I'
I VP
PRO V'
are tall
By assumption (291), the three LFs (294) yield the corresponding truth conditions (295). The BPS
'firemen' of the analogous LFs (294a) and (294b) sits in the restrictive clause of the generic operator
and thus gets bound by it, yielding the truth conditions (295a) and (295b). The BPS 'firemen' of
the LF (294b') sits in the nuclear scope of the generic operator and thus gets bound by the DEO,
yielding the truth conditions (295a').
(295) a. GENx, tt [fireman](x)] [[available](x, t)].
a' GENt [Bx[[fireman] (x) A [available] (x, t)]].
b. GENx [[fireman] (x)] [ftall] (x)].
The truth-conditions (295b) correspond to the generic reading of the BPS of sentence (287b); since
these are the only truth-conditions that we can derive for sentence (287b), then Diesing correctly
predicts the BPS of this sentence to only admit the generic reading. The truth-conditions (295a) and
(295a') correspond respectively to the generic and the existential readings of the BPS of sentence
(287a); hence, Diesing correctly predicts that the BPS of sentence (287a) admits both readings. The
contrast in (287) is thus derived.
First argument against Diesing's version of the syntactic approach By assumption (293), s-
and i-predicates are selected by a different inflectional head. For the sake of explicitness, let me
denote by Infl, the "raising" inflectional head that selects s-predicates and by Infli the "control"
inflectional head that selects i-predicates. Various authors have noted that this assumption (293)
raises a problem for vp-coordination; see for instance Burton and Grimshaw (1992, p. 311). The
core idea of the argument is as follows: assumption (293) combined with a plausible formulation of
the coordinate structure constraint (henceforth: CSC) predicts the ungrammaticality of a coordinate
24I assume that when the subject is reconstructed into [Spec, VP], it does not leave any trace in [Spec, IP], at least as far as
semantics is concerned.
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structure like (296), where a VP projected by an s-predicate V, is conjoined with a VP projected by
an i-predicate vi; yet, this coordinate structures are perfectly grammatical.
(296) IP
DPi I'
I VP
VP and VP
ti V' PROi V
I I
Vs Vi
Here is a way to spell out the details of the argument. Take for instance the formulation of the CSC in
Fox (2000, p. 50). It says that a necessary condition in order for the coordinate structure (296) to be
grammatical is that its two components (297a) and (297b) both satisfy all grammatical constraints.
Of course, the head Infl should be the same in both components (297a) and (297b), either Infli or
Infl,. If it is infl, then the component (297b) is ungrammatical, because infl does not assign any 0-
role and therefore the DPi in [Spec, IP] of (297b) receives no 0-role. If it is Infli, then the component
(297a) is ungrammatical, because the chain (DPi, ti), receives two 0-roles, one assigned to ti by V,
and a second one assigned to DPi by Infli.
(297) a. IP b. IP
DPi I' DPi I'
I VP I VP
ti V PROi V'
I IV8  Vi
To conclude the argument, we only need to exhibit examples of coordinate structures of the form
(296) that sound fine. Some care is needed in constructing these examples, since we need to make
sure that they involve VP-coordination rather than IP-coordination. One such example is (298), from
Chierchia (1995, p. 221), building on van Valin (1986): the elided phrase is clearly the coordinated
phrase in the antecedent sentence; since the tense is realized on 'did', it is implausible that the elided
phrase could be a coordination of IPs; thus, plausibly the antecedent involves VP-coordination. The
felicity of sentence (298) thus raises a problem for Diesing's assumption (293).
(298) Which of your colleagues came from America and moved to Russia?
Sue did 0.
An alternative way of probing for VP-coordination comes from gapping. The subject quantifier 'ev-
ery girl' of the first conjunct of sentence (299a) can bind the pronoun 'her' in the second conjunct,
while this is not possible in sentence (299b). Furthermore, sentence (300a) allows the reading where
negation has scope over disjunction, while sentence (300b) only admits the reading where negation
has scope below negation. The facts about sentences (299b) and (300b) are straightforwardly ac-
counted for by the assumption that these two sentences involve TP-coordination. In fact, the subject
quantifier 'every girl' in [Spec, TP] of the first conjunct of sentence (299b) does not c-command
the pronoun 'her' in [Spec, TP] of the second conjunct. Furthermore, negation heads a phrase NegP
which immediately dominates VP so that TP-disjunction in sentence (300b) c-commands the negation
of both conjuncts. Johnson (1996, 2000) and Lin (2000, 2001) suggest that the different behaviour
of sentences (299a) and (300a) follows straightforwardly from the assumption that these sentences
involve only one node T which selects as a complement a VP-coordination. In fact, assume that in
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the case of sentence (299a) the verb 'ate' has moved ATB from both conjoined VPs to T and that
the subject quantifier 'every girl' has moved from its base position inside the first conjoined VP to
[Spec, TP], in order to satisfy EPP of T25 . This structure correctly predicts that the subject quantifier
in [Spec, TP] c-commands the pronoun inside the second VP. Furthermore, assume that in the case of
sentence (300a) negation is generated as the head of a phrase NegP which immediately c-commands
the coordinated vPs. This structure correctly predicts that negation c-commands disjunction, yield-
ing the attested reading of sentence (300a).
(299) a. Not every girls ate a green banana, and heri mother a ripe one.
b. *Not every girli ate a green banana, and heri mother ate a ripe one.
(300) a. Kim didn't play bingo or Sandy sit at home all night.
= -play](kim) A -[sit] (sandy)
b. Kim didn't play bingo or Sandy didn't sit at home all night.
= - [play](k) V -i[sit](s)
This analysis of the minimal pairs (299) and (300) implies that the subjects 'her mother' and 'Sandy'
sit in [Spec, TP] in the case of sentences (299b) and (300b) but sit in [Spec, VP] in the case of
sentences (299a) and (300a). Therefore, Diesing's assumption (293) predicts that the s-predicates
'eat' and 'sit' could be replaced with i-predicates in sentences (299b) and (300b) but not in sentences
(299a) and (300a). This prediction is not borne out, since sentences (301a) and (302a) are fine.
(301) a. Not every girli loves an old man, and heri mother a young man.
b. *Not every girli loves an old man, and heri mother loves a young man.
(302) a. Kim doesn't love Mary or Sandy love John.
b. Kim doesn't love Mary or Sandy doesn't love John.
Second argument against Diesing's version of the syntactic approach So far, I have tried to
argue against Diesing's crucial assumption (293) by looking at the case of coordination. As noted
above, the intended effect of this assumption is that of blocking reconstruction of the subject of an
i-predicate into VP. Thus, a somewhat more direct way to argue against Diesing's proposal is to look
for diagnostics for reconstruction and show that the diagnostics do not differentiate between subjects
of s- and i-predicates. Here is a way to pursue this strategy. Various arguments have been provided to
show that subjects can be lowered down to a position underneath negation; see for instance Johnson
and Tamioka (1997) for one such argument. As stated in (303), these arguments do not distinguish
between s- and i-predicates.
(303) Subjects of both i- and s-predicates can be QLed at LF to a position lower than NegP.
This is not enough yet to threaten Diesing's proposal: it could be the case that the position to which
the subject may be QLed, although lower than NegP, is still high enough to be outside of the nuclear
scope of the generic operator. To complete the argument, consider a sentence such as (304), with
negation and a Q-adverb. This sentence does admit the reading that almost for every student it is the
case that he does not come from Asia.
(304) MIT students usually do not come from Asia.
In order to derive the intended reading of sentence (304), we need to assume that the nuclear scope
of 'usually' contains NegP. Plausibly, this is a general property of Q-adverbs, as stated in (305).
By (303), subjects of i-predicates may be lowered to a position inside NegP; by (305), NegP can sit
within the nuclear scope of Q-adverbs; in conclusion, subjects of i-predicates may be lowered inside
the nuclear scope of Q-adverb, contrary to what predicted by Diesing's assumption (293).
(305) NegP may sit inside the nuclear scope of a Q-adverb.
25See Lin (2001) for an argument that this extraction of the subject from the first conjunct of a coordinate structure is
compatible with Fox's (2000; p. 50) formulation of the CSC.
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In conclusion, it does not seem to me possible to account for the lack of the existential reading of
BPSs of i-predicates by assuming that these subjects must always sit outside of the nuclear scope of
the generic operator at LF. In other words, constraints on subject reconstruction are orthogonal to
the distribution of the existential reading of BPSs.
The information structure approach Jiger (2001) and Cohen and Erteschik-Shir (2002) develop
an alternative account for the distribution of the existential reading of BPSs, that makes use of
constraints on information structure rather than on syntactic assumptions on reconstruction. The
two accounts seem to me almost identical; thus I will not distinguish between the two, and rather
collectively refer to them as the JCS's account. The crucial notion of information structure used
in the JCS account is that of TOPIC. The main assumptions on topics needed by this account are
summarized in (306).26
(306) a. Every atomic clause must have a topic.
b. In the case of s-predicates, the Davidsonian argument can serve as a topic; this option is
not available for the case of i-predicates.
c. Q-adverbs unselectively bind all topics in their scope.
The availability of the existential reading of the BPS 'firemen' of the s-predicate 'available' of sen-
tence (287a) can be accounted for as follows: since 'availbale' is an s-predicate, its Davidsonian
argument can serve as the topic of the sentence, by assumption (306b); thus, the constraint (306a)
that each sentence has a topic is satisfied without any need for the BPS to be marked as topic; since
the BPS is not topical, it can get a non-specfic existential reading. The lack of the existential reading
of the BPS 'firemen' of the i-predicate 'tall' of sentence (287b) can be accounted for as follows:
since 'tall' is an i-predicate, there is no Davidsonian argument around that can serve as the topic of
the sentence, by assumption (306b); thus, the constraint in (306a) that each sentence has a topic must
be satisfied by marking the BPS as topic; being topical, the BPS can only get the generic reading, by
assumption (306c). The JCS's account just sketched seems to me to face major empirical problems.
In the rest of this subsection, I discuss these problems by concentrating on JAiger (2001); the same
issues seem to me to hold against Cohen and Erteschik-Shir (2002).
26 Jager (2001) and Cohen and Erteschik-Shir (2002) spell out the crucial assumption (306b) in two different ways. Cohen
and Erteschik-Shir adopt Kratzer's assumption (236) that i-predicates lack a Davidsonian argument, from which (306b)
follows straightforwardly. Jager's take on the issue is more elaborate. His starting point is the observation that also BPSs of
s-level statives often lack the existential reading, an issue I will come back to in subsection 3.6.4. In order to capture this fact,
he formulates assumption (306b) without distinguishing between i- and s-level statives with respect to the topicality of their
Davidsonian argument, as in (i).
(i) "Events [namely the Davidsonian arguments of eventives] but not states [namely the Davidsonian arguments of sta-
tives] can function as a topic" (p. 122).
But why should (i) hold? Jager assumes that "all predicates [both eventives and statives] have a Davidsonian argument" (p.
102) and that in principle all Davidsonian arguments (both states and events) could be topics. He then derives his assumption
(i) by means of the piece of reasoning in (ii).
(ii) a. Davidsonian arguments can be topic only if they can be bridged: "Davidsonian arguments are always novel, thus
to be topics, they have to be linked to the preceding discourse via bridging" (p. 122).
b. Davidsonian arguments of (both i- and s-level) statives are "of a different sort than events proper", namely "are
not localized in space" (p. 122), while events are.
c. "events [being localized in space] easily undergo bridging via the relation of local nearness, while states [being
not spatially localized] cannot be bridged in this way" (p. 122).
d. In conclusion, since only events can be bridged while states cannot be bridged, then "in effect events but not
states can function as a topic", as stated in (i).
Yet, the reasoning in (ii) crucially relies on the implicit assumption that bridging can only hold "via the relation of local
nearness". Why is this so? Why can't bridging also happen, say, via the relation of temporal nearness? If the latter were
indeed the case, then Davidsonian arguments of non-permanent statives, being temporally located, should be able to undergo
bridging and thus to function as topic. Thus, it seems to me that Jager's account for the parallelism between i-level and s-level
statives comes at the price of the bare stipulation that bridging can only happen through spatial nearness and not through
temporal nearness.
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First argument against the information structure approach So far, I have only considered sen-
tences with an intransitive predicate, and thus a single argument, namely the subject. As Jdger
himself notes, his proposal predicts that things should be very different as soon as we add another
argument besides the subject:
(307) "Non-subject arguments (even implicit ones) can serve as topic and thus save a weak reading
of the subject of a stative predicate" (p. 122).
Jiger suggests that this prediction is borne out for instance by the contrast in (308): the BPS of
sentence (308a) lacks the existential reading while the BPS of sentence (308b) readily admit it. He
suggests that we can make sense of this fact in terms of (307): assume that the object 'that house',
being specific, can be topic; thus, the subject in (308b) is relieved from the duty of serving as topic;
hence, this subject can be construed existentially. With JAger's own words: "we predict that the
possibility of a weak construal of some subjects does not depend solely on the main predicate but on
the other arguments as well. If the object is a topic, the discourse linking principle [namely (306a)]
is fulfilled and the sentence [with an existential construal of the subject] is felicitous" (p. 120).
(308) a. Tycoons own banks. *3-BPS
b. Tycoons own that house. V-BPS
Yet, JAger's prediction (307) seems to me quite wrong, as can be seen in a number of ways. Consider
the minimal pair in (309): since sentence (309b) contains the specific object 'Pavarotti' which can
act as a topic, JiRger predicts that the BPS 'Italians' in (309b) should admit the existential reading,
contrary to the BPS in (309a). This prediction seems to me wrong: there is no difference between
the BPS of (309a) and that of (309b). The same point can be trivially repeated with all classical
examples of transitive i-predicates.
(309) a. Italians love good singers.
b. Italians love Pavarotti.
Consider the minimal pair in (310): since sentence (310 b) contains the argument 'Michael Jordan'
which can act as a topic, Jiger predicts that the BPS 'firemen' in (310 b) should admit the existential
reading, contrary to the BPS in (310a). This prediction seems to me wrong: there is no difference
between the BPS of (310a) and that of (310b). The same point can be made with all adjectival
i-predicates.
(310) a. Firemen are tall.
b. Firemen are taller than Michael Jordan.
My conclusion is that JRger's prediction (307) is not quite right: by and large, the availability of the
existential reading of the subject does not in any way depend on whether there are other arguments
around that can serve as topic. And the few cases where the prediction (307) seems to hold, such as
(308), are better analyzed as special cases, for which something ad hoc needs to be said.27
Second argument against the information structure approach 8 Diesing and Chierchia account
for the lack of the existential reading of BPSs of i-predicates by means of assumptions on subject
reconstruction. I have argued against their approach by suggesting that it is incompatible with other
27"Jlger gives two more exmaples that he considers parallel to (308), which I repeat below, together with Jager's judgments.
(i) a. Monkeys live in trees. (Generic only)
b. Monkeys live in that tree. (Existential possible)
(ii) a. Presidents are similar to senators. (Generic only)
b. Presidents are similar to these senators. (Existential possible)
The example in (i) seem to me not bear on the issue, since 'live' is not an i-predicate nor a stative. The example in (ii)
is dubious at best: my informants consider the existential reading of the BPS of sentence (iib) not available (Ezra Keshet
and Jennifer Michaels (p.c.)). This latter point shows that the availability of existential BPSs of transitive i-predicates with
specific objects is really very tightly constrained, contrary to the prediction (307).
2SThe material in this paragraph was prompted by a discussion with Angelika Kratzer.
102
existing applications of the theory of reconstruction. Jiger and Cohen and Erteschik-Shir account
for the lack of the existential reading of BPSs of i-predicates by means of assumptions on informa-
tion structure. Let me now argue against their approach by suggesting that it is incompatible with
other existing applications of the theory of information structure, such as that described in Heycock
(1994). Heycock provides an account for a very interesting contrast between the interpretation of
Japanese 'ga'-marked subjects in matrix and embedded clauses in terms of information structure.
The matrix sentence (31 la), with the s-predicate 'kita' ('come'), admits two readings: "on the NEU-
TRAL DESCRIPTION READING [henceforth: NDR], this sentence is a straightforward announcement
of the event of John's arrival; on the EXHAUSTIVE LISTING READING [henceforth: ELR], it means
something like 'of all the people salient at this point in the discourse, it was John who came' ". The
matrix sentence (31 lb), with the i-predicate 'kasikoi' ('smart'), is not ambiguous: "if the predicate
is i-level [... ] a subject marked with 'ga' can only receive the ELR. [(311b)] is such an example:
it is interpreted roughly as 'of all the people salient at this point in the discourse, it is John who is
smart'. The NDR is not available for this sentence." This restriction on the NDR of 'ga'-marked
subjects of i-predicates disappears in embedded clauses: no matter whether the embedded clause
contains an i- or an s-predicate, both the NDR and the ELR are available for the 'ga'-marked subject
of the embedded clause, as in the case of (312).
(311) Matrix sentences:
a. John-ga kita.
John-GA came.
'John/JOHN came' [both NDR and ELR]
b. John-ga kasikoi.
John-GA smart
'JOHN is smart' [only ELR, no NDR]
(312) Embedded sentences:
a. Mary-wa [John-ga kita koto-o] wasurete-ita.
Mary-WA [John-GA came fact-ACC] forgot.
'Mary forgot that John/JOHN came' [both NDR and ELR]
b. Mary-wa [John-ga kasikoi koto-o] wasurete-ita.
Mary-WA [John-GA smart fact-ACC] forgot.
'Mary forgot that John/JOHN is smart' [both NDR and ELR]
In conclusion, the interpretations available for 'ga'-marked subjects of matrix i-predicates are re-
stricted compared to matrix s-predicates: only the ELR but not the NDR is available; the restriction
disappears in embedded contexts. Heycock's account for the facts in (311)-(312) is cast within the
theory of information structure. More precisely, Heycock's core assumptions are (313a)-(313c).
(313) a. i. A matrix sentence must have a topic29 and a focus.
ii. An embedded sentence need not have both a topic and a focus.
b. "In sentences with s-predicates, the Davidsonian event argument referring to the slice of
time and space at which the event takes place is always available as a topic. [...] If the
predicate is an i-predicate, however, there is no such event argument".
c. i. 'ga' is a nominative marker, with no information structure import;
ii. an argument is a topic iff it is marked with 'wa';
iii. a predicate can be topic without being marked with 'wa'.
Here is how Heycock uses these assumptions (313a)-(313c) to account for the facts in (311)-(312).
Consider first the case of the matrix sentence (311a) with the s-predicate 'kita' ('come'). By as-
sumption (313b), the Davidsonian argument of the s-predicate can count as a topic. Thus, the entire
29Heycock uses the term "link" instead of "topic", but makes it explicit that "the link corresponds to a large extent to what
in some frameworks is called the topic"; I stick to the term 'topic' here, and always replace 'link' with 'topic' in all my quotes
from Heycock.
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sentence can be marked as focus, as in the Information Structure in (314a) which corresponds to the
NDR. Suppose instead we decide not to mark as topic the Davidsonian argument of the s-predicate.
By assumption (313ai), we have to mark as topic some other constituent. By assumption (313cii),
the subject cannot be marked as topic, because it has been marked with 'ga' rather than 'wa'. By as-
sumption (313ciii), the predicate can be marked as topic, and is thus the only option. By assumption
(313ai), we also have to mark as focus some constituent in the sentence and the only option is to mark
as focus the subject. Thus, we derive the Information Structure in (314b), which corresponds to the
ELR. Consider next the case of the matrix sentence (311 b) with the i-predicate 'kasikoi' ('smart').
By assumption (313b) that i-predicates lack a Davidsonian argument, the requirement (313ai) that
matrix sentences have a topic cannot be satisfied by the Information Structure in (314a) in the case
of i-predicates. Hence, the only Information Structure available for the matrix sentence (31 lb) with
the i-predicate 'kasikoi' ('smart') is the one in (314b), thus accounting for the fact that this sentence
only admits the ELR. Of course, this contrast between i- and s-predicates disappears in embedded
clauses: by assumption (313aii), there is no requirement for the embedded clauses in (312) to con-
tain a topic, and thus the option in (314a) of focus marking the entire embedded clause is available
both in the case of s- and i-predicates.
(314) a. [F Subj vP]. = NDR
with the Davidsonian argument marked as topic.
b. [[F Subj] [T VP]]. = ELR
with the Davidsonian argument unmarked.
Heycock's account for restrictions on the NDR/ELR ambiguity for 'ga'-marked subjects of matrix
predicates looks attractively similar to JCS's account for restrictions on the existential/generic am-
biguity for BPSs reviewed above. As a matter of fact, Heycock's assumptions (313a) and (313b)
correspond to assumptions (306a) and (306b) respectively, and the two parallel pairs of assumptions
do indeed play a very similar role in the two accounts. Thus, these two accounts seem to outline a
unified approach to i-predicates based on a few core assumptions on information structure. Yet, I
want to argue that the convergence between the two proposals is only apparent. More precisely, I
will argue for claim (315). To the extent that Heycock's proposal that the NDR/ELR ambiguity is
governed by information structure constraints is correct, it follows that JCS are wrong in claiming
that the existential/generic ambiguity is governed by those same constraints too.
(315) The NDRIELR ambiguity for 'ga'-marked subjects and the existential/generic ambiguity
for BPSs have different empirical properties, and thus cannot be subsumed under a unified
theoretical framework.
Heycock notes that the NDR/ELR ambiguity is affected by the difference between matrix and em-
bedded clauses. But the existential/generic ambiguity for BPSs is not affected by that difference:
the BPS 'firemen' cannot be construed as existential neither in the matrix clauses (316a) nor in the
embedded clauses (316b). This difference with respect to the matrix/embedded distinction provides
an argument in favor of claim (315) that the restrictions on the NDR/ELR ambiguity and the re-
strictions on the existential/generic ambiguity have different empirical properties. This means that
it is not possible to account for both phenomena in terms of constraints on information structure. In
fact, assume that Heycock is on the right track in claiming that the NDR/ELR should be accounted
for in terms of information structure. This means that embedded clauses must be relieved from the
requirement of having a topic, as stated in (313aii). But once we import this assumption (313aii)
within JCS's account, we make the incorrect prediction that BPSs of i-predicates should admit the
existential reading in embedded clauses: if embedded clauses can do without a topic, nothing forces
their BPSs to be topics and thus nothing prevents them from having an existential reading.
(316) a. Firemen are tall / intelligent / altruistic / Italian...
b. John thinks that firemen are tall / intelligent / altruistic / Italian...
Heycock notes that "there is the possibility that some topic can be recovered from the context,
even in the case of an i-predicate. In this case we predict that the interpretation need not be one
of narrow focus on the subject [as in the Information Structure (314b), which corresponds to the
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ELR], since the entire sentence could constitute the focus [as in the Information Structure (314a),
which corresponds to the NDR]. This prediction is borne out. Consider for example the exchange
in [(317)]. The sentences in [(317B)] do not have to be interpreted with narrow focus on the subject
[as in the ELR]. Rather the question provides 'problems with B's new job' as the topic, leaving open
the possibility that all the material in the response will be new information to be filed under this
address."
(317) A: Atarasii sigoto-no mondai-wa nan desu ka?
new work-GEN problem-WA what be QU
'What's the problem with your new job?'
B: Ofisu-ga tiisaisi, kyuuryoo-ga yasuisi, uwayaku-ga hidoi desu.
office-GA small-and, pay-GA low-and, boss-GA terrible be
'The office is small, the pay is low, and the boss is terrible'
But the existential/generic ambiguity for BPSs is not affected by the presence of other topics pro-
vided by the discourse: as shown in (318), the BPSs 'Italians' of the i-predicate 'lazy' of sentence
(318B) does not in any way admit the existential reading, despite the fact that, by parity of reason-
ing with Heycock's example (317), one might conceive the preceding question (318A) as providing
'problems with Italy' as the topic, thus reliving the BPS from the duty of serving as topic. This
difference with respect to sensitivity to discourse topics provides another argument in favor of claim
(315) that the restrictions on the NDR/ELR ambiguity and the restrictions on the existential/generic
ambiguity of BPSs have different empirical properties. Once more, this means that it is not possible
to account for both phenomena in terms of constraints on information structure. In fact, assume
that Heycock is on the right track in claiming that a topic can be provided by discourse. Once we
import this assumption within JCS's account, we make the incorrect prediction that existential BPSs
of i-predicates should be available as soon as the context provides an implicit topic.
(318) A: What's the problem with Italy?
B: The economy is going down and Italians are lazy.
The example in (319) sharpens this point. Heycock notes that "the exchange in [(319)] is felici-
tous because the question supplies 'the best thing about New Haven' as the topic. The predicate in
[(319B)] is clearly individual-level; furthermore, there is no any reason to suppose that any 'coer-
cion' into a stage-level reading is taking place. In [(319B)] the 'ga'-marked subjects are clearly part
of the focus". Thus, JCS's account would predict the BPS 'buildings' of the corresponding English
paraphrase to allow the existential reading, which is wrong.
(319) A: Sorejaa, New Haven-de ichiban ii mono-wa nani?
so, New Haven-in most good thing-WA what
'So what's the best thing about New Haven?'
B: Tatemono -ga kirei da.
building-GA beautiful be
'Buildings are beautiful'
A digression on Heycock's pattern (311)-(312) Before I leave this discussion, I would like to
quickly address Haycock's pattern (311)-(312) from the perspective of the theory of i-predicates that
I am defending in this work. I am not in a position to offer a detailed account, but would like at least
to point out a possible way to go. I have repeated in (320a) and (320b) the relevant data concerning
matrix sentences: matrix 'ga'-marked subjects of s-predicates admit both the NDR and the ELR;
matrix 'ga'-marked subjects of i-predicates only admit the ELR. Let me consider next the case of
matrix 'ga'-marked subjects of habitual s-predicates: my Japanese informants (Junri Shimada and
Yasutada Sudo (p.c.)) report that the 'ga'-marked subject of the matrix habitual s-predicate in (320c)
behaves exactly as the 'ga'-marked subject of the matrix i-predicate in (320b), namely it only allows
the ELR.
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(320) a. John-ga kita.
John-GA came.
'John/JOHN came' [both NDR and ELR]
b. John-ga kasikoi.
John-GA smart
'JOHN is smart' [only ELR, no NDR]
c. John-ga mainichi sake-o nomu.
John-GA every day sake-ACC drink-NON-PAST
'JOHN usually drinks sake' [only ELR, no NDR]
The core tenet of my proposal is that i-predicates have Davidsonian arguments and that their David-
sonian arguments do not have any special ontological properties. What's special about a sentence
containing an i-predicate is that, in order for the sentence not to trigger a mismatching implicature,
the Davidsonian argument of the i-predicate must be bound by the generic operator. Thus, the proper
truth conditions of sentence (321a) = (320b) are those in (321b), as in Chierchia (1995). Note that
the truth conditions in (321b) are formally analogous to the standard truth conditions (322b) for
sentence (322a)=(320c) with the habitual s-predicate 'drinks sake'.
(321) a. John is smart.
b. GENt[C(t)][smart](j, t)].
(322) a. John drinks sake.
b. GENt[C(t)] [[drink-sake](j, t)].
Given the strict analogy between (321) and (322), whatever accounts for the lack of the NDR in the
case of the 'ga'-marked subject of the habitual s-predicate in (320c) will plausibly account also for
the lack of the NDR in the case of the 'ga'-marked subject of the i-predicate in (320b).
3.3.2 An account based on blind and mandatory mismatching implicatures
In this subsection, I introduce some standard assumptions on existential BPSs, independently of i-
predicates. On the background of these assumptions, I then present my account for the contrast in
(287). Finally, I discuss its extension to plain indefinites and 'there'-construction.
Preliminaries Let me start by presenting my assumptions on existential BPs. Carlson (1977)
points out that existential BPs always take the narrowest possible scope with respect to other scope
bearing elements in the sentence. Some of the examples he uses to make this point are quoted in
(323)-(325). He comments on these examples as follows: "In the (a) versions, with the singular,
the existential quantifier is interpreted as being outside the scope of the time adverbial, and thus it
is the same object that is spoken of at all relevant points of time. In the (b) versions, however, the
existential quantifier is interpreted as being within the scope of the adverbial, so the objects referred
to may be different from time to time."
(323) a. A dog hung around my house all last week.
b. Dogs hung around my house all last week.
(324) a. A cat has been here since the Vikings landed.
b. Cats have been here since the Vikings landed.
(325) a. A tyrant ruled Wallachia for 250 years.
b. Tyrants ruled Wallachia for 250 years.
One way of accounting for the generalization that existential BPs have narrow scope is through
assumptions (326), from Diesing (1992) building on Heim (1988) and Kamp (1981). By (326a), the
BPS 'dogs' of sentence (323b) introduces a free variable that ranges over dogs. This variable needs
to be bound at LF and the DEO in (326b) is the only available binder. Since by (326c) the DEO has
the smallest possible scope, the time adverbial 'all last week' must scope above it. In conclusion,
the existential BPS 'dogs' can only have narrow scope w.r.t. the time adverbial 'all last week'.
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(326) a. A BP [DP 0 N] has no quantificational force on its own: it simply introduces a free
variable x that ranges over [N].
b. There is a default existential operator (henceforth: DEO) that binds every free variable
in its scope.
c. The DEO has the narrowest possible scope: let's say it has VP scope, where VP is the
smallest scope site (the smallest constituent of type t).
Another way of accounting for the generalization that existential BPs have narrow scope is thorough
assumptions (327), from Chierchia (1998). By assumption (327a), a type (or sort) mismatch arises
when the BPS 'dogs' is applied to the predicate 'hung around' in sentence (323b), since the former
denotes a kind while the latter denotes a property of regular individuals. By assumption (327b), this
type mismatch is resolved through the type shifter DKP, that raises the type (or sort) of the predicate
from regular individuals to kinds. By assumption (327c), DKP is a last resource option, and is thus
triggered only in the most embedded position. In conclusion, the existential BPS 'dogs' can only
have narrow scope w.r.t. the time adverbial 'all last week'.
(327) a. Bare plurals denote kinds, after Carlson (1977).
b. The DERIVED KIND PREDICATION operator (.)DKP shifts a predicate P of common
individuals into a predicate of kinds in the following way:
(P)DKP - AXk . 3y[y Xk A P(y)]
where Xk is a variable over kinds and the relation d < k between a common individual
d and a kind k holds iff d is an instance of the kind k.
c. DKP is a type shifter and thus is only applied as a last resource.
I can develop my account on the background of either of these frameworks; for concreteness, I'll
adopt the Heim-Diesing's framework (326). With this bit of preliminaries in place, let's now turn to
the case of sentence (287a), with the BPS 'firemen' and the s-predicate 'available'. According to the
Heim-Diesing framework (326), the existential reading of the BPS of this sentence corresponds to the
LF in (328). The generic or existential operator binds the time argument of the predicate, yielding
the habitual or the episodic reading, respectively. A contextually supplied predicate over time C
restricts the tense operator GENt or Bt. The BPS has been reconstructed into its base position within
VP, whereby the free variable x it introduces can get bound by the DEO, yielding the existential
reading of the BPS.
(328) [{ GENt C(t) ] [vP firemen(x) available(t) ]]
The truth conditions which correspond to the LF (328) are those in (329). These truth-conditions
say that "for some/every time t which satisfies the restrictor C, there is a fireman x who is available
at t." Note that the tense operator GENt/3t in (329) has wide scope over the existential quantifier
over firemen 3. That this is the only possible scope configuration follows straightforwardly: since
the existential BP only arises through the DEO, since the DEO has VP-scope and since VP is the
smallest scope site, then GENt/3t must scope above 3.,
(329) Aw. {GENt [((t)] [3x [[firemen]w(x) A [available] w(x, t)]].(329  3t
As a final point, note that the LF (328) contains the restrictor C while the truth conditions (329)
contain a different restrictor C. Here is why. By assumption (247), the formula [availablelw(x, t)
presupposes that x is alive at t. Let 7r be the presupposition that we get by letting this presupposition
pass through the existential quantifier 1. By assumption (248), this presupposition 7r must be added
via conjunction to the restrictive clause C of the tense operator. Thus, I am assuming that C is the
conjunction of C with this presupposition 7r. Since I am considering an arbitrary C to start with, it
does not really matter what this presupposition 7r looks like.
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The account In order for a BPS to get an existential reading, the variable it introduces must be
bound by the DEO; in order for this binding to hold, the variable must fall within the DEO's scope,
namely VP; in order for this configuration to hold, the BPS must be reconstructed within VP. Diesing
straightforwardly accounts for the lack of the existential reading of BPSs of i-predicates by assuming
that subjects of i-predicates cannot be reconstructed into vP. This option is of course not available
to me, given my tenet that there are no grammatical differences between s- and i-predicates. Thus,
let me assume that the same LFs (328) and the same truth conditions (329) just derived for sentence
(287a) with the s-predicate 'available' are available also for sentence (287b) with the i-predicate
'tall'. I have written them down in (330) and (331), for the two cases where the time argument of
the i-predicate is bound by the generic or by the existential operator. Thus, the goal of accounting
for the lack of the existential reading of the BPS 'firemen' of the i-predicate 'tall' of sentence (287b)
boils down to the goal of ruling out both truth conditions o and W' in (330b) and (33 1b).
(330) a. [[ GENt C(t) ] [V, firemen(x) tall(t) ]]
b. o = Aw. GENt[(t)][3x [[firemen] (x) A [tall] w(x, t)]].
(331) a. [ [ 3t C(t) ] [vP firemen(x) tall(t) ]]
b. 'p' = Aw. 3t[4w(t)][3x [[firemen]w(x) A [tall](x, t)fl]].
Let me start with the case of W in (330b). Consider the LF in (332a), which is identical to the one in
(330a) but with the BPS 'firemen' replaced by the definite description 'the fireman such and such'
(here abbreviated as 'the fireman P'). On the background of the two assumptions (247) and (248),
the LF (332a) yields the truth conditions bp in (332b), where I have used the shorthand dw for the
individual [the fireman P]w. These truth conditions say that "at each time t in Cw at which the
fireman such that P is alive, he is tall at t."
(332) a. [ [ GENt C(t) ] [w, the fireman P tall(t) ] ]
b. ", AW . GENt[Cw(t) A inw(dw,t)] [[talllw(dw,t)].
As noted above, the LF (332a) is obtained from the LF (330a) by replacing 'firemen' with 'the fire-
man such and such'. Let me consider the slight variant of assumption (110) stated in (333), namely
that the definite description 'the fireman such and such' is a Horn-mate of both the indefinite 'a/some
fireman' and the bare plural 'firemen'. Since the LF (332a) is obtained from the LF (330a) by re-
placing the scalar item 'firemen' with its Horn-mate 'the fireman P', then P, is a scalar alternative
of W, according to the definition of scalar alternatives (74).30
(333) ('firemen', 'the fireman such and such') is a Horn-scale.
Let P be as in (334), which says that "there is a fireman x who is always tall throughout the portion
of his lifespan which is in C". Thus, 0 is as W in (330b) but with the opposite scope 3x > GENt.
(334) P = Aw. 3x [[fireman]w (x) A GENt[Cw(t) A inw(x,t)][[talllw(x,t)]].
30Furthermore, since p, in (332b) is not weaker than W in (330b), then , is a scalar alternative of W also according to
Fox's alternative definition (124) of the set of scalar alternatives. The two assumptions (247) and (248) clearly play a crucial
role in deriving the truth conditions obp in (332); let me discuss an alternative way to derive these same truth conditions
without using the two assumptions (247) and (248) and explain why I don't go that way. Consider the following LF (i). This
LF differs from the LF (330a) of our sentence in two respects: first, the BPS 'firemen' has been replaced by the definite 'the
fireman such and such'; second, the restrictive clause C(t) has been replaced by a different one, namely C(t) A in(dp, t).
Of course, this LF (i) yields the truth conditions p in (332b) straightforwardly, without any need for the two assumptions
(247) and (248).
(i) [ [ GENt [C(t) A in(dp, t)] ] [the fireman P tall(t) ] ]
The reason why I do not follow this way, is that the LF (i) is not a scalar alternative of the LF (330a) of our sentence, according
to the alternative definition (124) of scalar alternatives that I am adopting here, from Fox (2007a, ft. 35). In fact, no matter
whether the replacement of the restrictive clause C(t) with C(t) A in(dp, t) is performed before or after the replacement
of the BPS with the definite, it leads to a weaker formula and thus is not licit according to definition (124). Thus, I need the
restriction in(dp, t) to slip into the restrictive clause in some other way. The two assumptions (247) and (248) do the trick.
This trick was suggested to me by Irene Heim (p.c.).
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The logical equivalence in (335) holds: 31 the negation of all the alternatives 2, 's in (332) is equiv-
alent to the negation of V in (334), which says that "there is no fireman who is tall throughout the
entire portion of his life span which is in C."
(335) A =
P
Let me now argue that the blind strengthened meaning of W in (330) is the one in (336), namely that
all the obp's in (332) are excludable w.r.t. V. Given the logical equivalence in (335), it suffices to
exhibit a world where o A-b is true.
(336) EXH(p) = (pA A .
Consider the possible world w represented in (337). Suppose that there are three firemen in w,
namely dl, d2 and d3 . Their life span is represented with a thin segment. The thickened portion of
each segment represents the portion of each life span throughout which the individual is tall in w.
The long thin line at the top of the picture is the time axis T; its thickened portion is the restrictive
clause of formula W, i.e. Cw (t). Note that so is true in this world w, because for each time t in the
set Cw, either d, or d2 or d3 is tall at t. Note furthermore that b is false in w, since no one of the
three firemen dl, d2 , d3 is tall throughout the entire portion of his life span which is in Ct. Thus,
EXH(cp) = cp A -v is not a logical contradiction.
(337) w(t)
dl:
d2:
d3:
As stated in (338), the blind strengthened meaning EXH(p) = o A -bp just computed is a contradic-
tion given the common knowledge Wk in (227) that 'tall' is a permanent property, precisely because
no world such as the one in (337), in which firemen are tall only throughout a portion of their life
span, can ever belong to YIk. In fact, suppose that o is true in a world w E W4 k. Hence, there must
exist at least one fireman in w who is tall at at least one instant in w, say John. Since w is compatible
with the common knowledge 1V4k in (227), John is tall throughout his entire life span in w and has
got to be true too in w.
(338) EXH() A Vk =p A -, AWk 0
Let me conclude. The existential reading of the BPS 'firemen' of the i-predicate 'tall' of sentence
(287b) could in principle correspond to one of the two truth conditions o or p' in (330b) and (331b),
depending on whether the time argument of the i-predicate is bound by the generic or by the exis-
tential operator. The first option W in (330b) leads to the blind strengthened meaning (336), which
contradicts the common knowledge in (227) and is thus ruled out by the MH (227). The second op-
tion p' in (331b) can easily be shown to lead to a strengthened meaning which contradicts common
knowledge too and is thus likewise ruled out by the MH. 32 In conclusion, the lack of the existential
reading of the BPS 'firemen' of the i-predicate 'tall' of sentence (287b) follows from the fact that
every LF which would correspond to such a reading is ruled out by the MH.
31The reasoning is identical to that in footnote 16.
32Here is a sketch of the reasoning. From the assumption (254) that 3t and Vt are Horn-mates together with the assumption
(333) that 'firemen' and 'the fireman such and such' are Horn-mates too, it follows that the set of scalar alternatives Alt(o')
of ' in (331b) contains all the alternatives listed in (i):
(i) a. the alternative 4 obtained by replacing 3t with Vt;
b. all the alternatives p's obtained by replacing the BPS 'firemen' with the definite 'the fireman such and such';
c. all the alternatives V4p's in (332) obtained by replacing both 3 t with Vt and the BPS with the definite.
It is easy to check that the set of excludable alternatives w.r.t. p' according to Fox's (2007) definition (106) is £xcl(p') ={4, ip, I P}. Hence truth conditions W' in (331 b) are ruled out in exactly the same way I have ruled out above truth conditions
W in (330b).
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First remark: indefinites Let me consider again sentence (287b) repeated below in (339a), to-
gether with the variant (339b), with the indefinite 'some fireman' instead of the BP 'firemen'. Sen-
tence (339b) does of course admit the existential reading which sentence (339a) lacks, namely "there
is a firemen who is tall." Let me thus make sure that my proposal for why the BPS of sentence (339a)
lacks the existential reading does not rule out sentence (339b) too.
(339) a. Firemen are tall. *3-reading
b. Some fireman is tall. 3-reading
The idea is that the contrast in (339) is analogous to the contrast in (99), repeated once more in (340).
The crucial difference between the two sentences (340) is the following: the indefinite of the odd
sentence (340a) has narrow scope with respect to the universal quantifier over days; by contrast, the
indefinite of the fine sentence (340b) has wide scope.
(340) It is known that the same guy won on every day:
a. #On every day, a/some fireman won.
b. A/Some fireman won on every day.
Analogously, the crucial difference between the two sentences (339) is the following: as noted
above, the existential BPS of sentence (339a) can only have narrow scope with respect to the generic
operator that binds the time argument of the i-predicate 'tall'; this is not the case for the indefinite of
sentence (339b): its LF (341a) yields truth conditions (341b), namely b in (334), where existential
quantification over firemen has scope over the generic operator.
(341) a. [[Some fireman] [Ax [GEN [x is tall]]]].
b. b = Aw. 3x [[fireman]w(x) A GENt[in'(x,t)][[tall]w(x, t)]].
Let me now show that the blind strengthened meaning of 0 in (341b) is not a contradiction given
common knowledge. By the assumption (110) that 'some fireman' and 'the fireman such and such'
are Horn-mates, each , , in (332) is a scalar alternative of / in (341b). Note that in the case of 0 in
(341), contrary to the case of <p in (330), it is not possible to exclude all such VP,'s, since A -, is
logically equivalent to P, as noted in (335). As a matter of fact, by repeating the reasoning illustrated
immediately below (106) for the case of sentence (104a), it turns out that none of these alternatives
1 P's in (332) is excludable given b in (341). Thus, the blind strengthened meaning of 0 cannot
be a contradiction given common knowledge, and the attested existential reading of the indefinite in
(339b) is thus sheltered from the MH (97).
Second remark: 'there'-construction After Milsark (1977), it is well known that i-predicates
cannot appear in the coda of the 'there'-construction contrary to s-predicates, as illustrated by the
contrast between (342) and (343).
(342) a. There are many children sick.
b. There were people sick.
c. There were people drunk.
d. There were doors open.
e. There were instect that I couldn't identify on the windowsill.
f. There were three cars rolling down the hill.
g. There was a woman running along the beach.
(343) a. ?There are firemen tall.
b. ?There were people intelligent.
c. ?There were doors wooden.
d. ?There were people doctors.
e. ?There was a surgeon a happy woman.
f. ?There was a tycoon that Lynne met on an expedition owning this company.
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g. ?There was a student who ordinarily sits in the front row knowing the answer.
My take on this contrast is that the 'there'-construction forces the indefinite or the bare plural to
have narrow scope with respect to the operator that binds the time argument of the i-predicate, either
the existential or the generic operator. In other words, sentence (343a) can only have one of the two
truth conditions in (344).
(344) Aw . GENt [Cw(t)][3x[[firemen] w(x) A [tall]"(x, t)]].
These truth conditions are precisely the same truth conditions already considered in (331) and (330),
and are therefore ruled out by the MH (97).
3.4 Word order and extraction in German
Sentences (345), from Diesing (1992), contain the BPS 'Feuerwehrmiinner' ('firemen') at the right of
the particles 'ja doch' ('indeed'). Sentence (345a) contains the s-predicate 'verfigbar' ('available'),
and is fine. Sentence (345b) contains the i-predicate 'intelligent', and is bad. The deviance of
sentence (345b) is due precisely to the mutual position of 'ja doch' and the BPS: once the order is
reversed, sentence (345b) turns fully acceptable.
(345) a. ... weil ja doch Feuerwehrminner verfigbar sind.
... since PARTs firemen available are
b. # ... weil ja doch FeuerwehrmAnner intelligent sind.
... since PARTS firemen intelligent are
More examples of the fact that BPSs of i-predicates cannot sit at the right of the particles 'ja doch' or
of the adverb 'angeblich' ('allegedly') are provided in (346), from Diesing (1992) and Jdiger (2001).
Thus, the difference between s- and i-predicates has consequences for German word order: subjects
of i-predicates of German subordinate clauses cannot occur to the right of certain particles (such as
'ja doch') or certain adverbs (such as 'angeblich'), contrary to the case of subjects of s-predicates.
(346) a. # ... weil ja doch Professoren intelligent sind.
... since PARTs professors intelligent are
b. # ... weil ja doch Skorpione giftig sind.
... since PARTS scorpions poisonous are.
c. # ... weil ja doch Wolfshunde Deutsch k6nnen.
... since PARTS German shepherds German know.
d. # ... weil angeblich Feuerwehrmiinner selbstlos sind.
... since allegedly firemen altruistic are
Sentence (347a) illustrates the so-called German SPLIT-TOPIC construction: a subject of the form
'viele NP' ('many NP') is split by moving the NP to some topic position at the left edge of the
clause while stranding 'viele'. Diesing (1992) notes that split-topic is not available for subjects of
i-predicates, as shown by (347b).
(347) a. Feuerwehrminner sind viele verffigbar.
Firemen are many available
'As for firemen, many are available'.
b. # Feuerwehrminner sind viele intelligent.
Firemen are many intelligent
'As for firemen, many are intelligent'.
More examples of the fact that split-topic is not possible with subjects of i-predicates are provided in
(348), again from Diesing (1992). Thus, the difference between s- and i-predicates has consequences
for extraction in German.
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(348) a. # Wildschweine sind viele intelligent.
wild boars are many intelligent
'As for wild boars, many are intelligent'
b. # Schuhe sind viele wasserdicht.
shoes are many waterproof
'As for shoes, many are waterproof'.
c. # Linguisten wissen das viele.
linguists know this many
'As for linguists, many know this'.
In this section, I argue that these contrasts follow from the same piece of reasoning presented in
section 3.3 to account for the lack of the existential reading of BPSs of i-predicates. The logic of my
proposal is analogous to that of Chierchia (1994).
3.4.1 Existing accounts
Diesing argues that both the contrast w.r.t. word order illustrated in (345) and the contrast w.r.t. split-
topic illustrated in (347) follow from her assumption (293) - a simplified formulation of which is
repeated in (349) - together with plausible specific assumptions on the grammatical phenomena
considered. Let me spell out the details of Diesing's account.
(349) a. Subjects of s-predicates are based generated within VP, in [Spec, VP];
b. Subjects of i-predicates are based generated outside of VP, in [Spec, Ip].
Assume that the generalization (350) holds. This assumption (350) entails that subjects at the right of
'ja doch' or 'angeblich' sit inside VP (plausibly, in [Spec, VP]) while subjects at the left of 'ja doch'
or 'angeblich' sit outside of VP (plausibly, in [Spec, IP]). The contrast w.r.t. word order lllustrated
in (345) thus immediately follows from Diesing's crucial assumption (349): "if, as I have claimed,
the distinction between s- and i-predicates is a syntactic distinction that restricts the position of the
subject in i-predicates but not in s-predicates, then the facts in [(345)] are not unexpected. The
[sentence (345b)] is expected to be less good, since the subject of an i-predicate is base generated in
[Spec, IP], the outer position, and has no option of lowering into vP."
(350) Certain particles (such as 'ja doch') and certain adverbs (such as 'angeblich') mark the left
edge of VP in German.
Assume that split-topic constructions are derived accordingly to assumption (351), from Riemsdijk
(1989). As Diesing points out, this assumption (351) states that the "split-topic construction [is]
sensitive to the position of a subject from which extraction occurs. If the subject is vp-internal,
extraction is possible. If the subject is vp-external, extraction is not allowed." The contrast w.r.t.
split-topic illustrated in (347) thus immediately follows from Diesing's crucial assumption (349): "it
is predicted that extraction should be possible from the subjects of s-predicates, since these subjects
have the option of appearing in the vp-internal position. On the other hand, i-predicates should
disallow extraction from the subject, since they do not permit the option of having the subject in
[Spec, VP]."
(351) The split-topic construction is derived as follows: the subject is base generated as 'viele NP'
in [Spec, VP]; the surface form is derived by movement (or "extraction") of NP into some
"topic" position at the left edge of the sentence, while the determiner 'viele' is stranded
behind in situ.
Jiger (2001) provides the following very interesting argument against Diesing's account for the word
order contrast in (345). Diesing's account rests on the crucial syntactic assumption (349), that draws
a distinction between subjects of s- and i-predicates. This assumption does not distinguish between
subjects with different quantificational force. Thus, Diesing's account for the word order contrast
in (345) predicts that the contrast should arise not only with BPs but also with any other type of
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subject. As Jiger points out, this prediction is not borne out. He notes for instance that universally
quantified subjects behave differently than BPSs: as we just saw, BPSs of i-predicates prefer to sit
at the left of 'ja doch'; by contrast, "quantifiers headed by 'alle' ('all') or 'jeder' ('every') generally
occur preferably to the right of the particle [...], no matter what sort of predicate we take." For
instance, sentence (352) is perfectly fine, despite the fact that the subject 'alle Studenten' ('every
student') of the i-predicate 'knnnen' ('to know') occurs at the right of the particle 'ja'.33
(352) ... weil ja alle Studenten Englisch k6nnen
... because PART all students English know.
3.4.2 An account based on blind and mandatory mismatching implicatures
In this subsection, I present an account for the two contrasts (345) and (347) that retains Diesing's
two specific assumptions (350) and (351) but dispenses with her problematic assumption (349).
Preliminaries Let me start with sentence (345a) repeated below in (353), with the s-predicate
'verfigbar' ('available') and the BPS at the right of the particles 'ja doch'. As Diesing points out,
the BPS 'Professoren' ('professors') of sentence (353) only admits the existential reading, which is
compatible with the predicate being construed either as episodic as in (353a), or as habitual as in
(353b). The generic reading of the BPS as in (353c) is unattested, and only available for sentence
(354) with the inverted word order, namely the BPS at the left of the particles 'ja doch'.
(353) ... weil ja doch Professoren verftigbar sind.
... since indeed professors available are
a. = There are professors available.
b. = Usually, there are professors available.
c. $ Professors are (in general) available.
(354) ... weil Professoren ja doch verfiigbar sind.
... since professors indeed available are
a. 5 There are professors available.
b. # Usually, there are professors available.
c. = Professors are (in general) available.
Thus, sentence (353) only admits the two LFs (355a) and (356a), which yield the two truth conditions
(355b) and (356b) respectively, which correctly capture the two attested readings (353a) and (353b).
Note crucially that the the existential BPS has narrow scope with respect to the operator that binds
the time argument of the predicate. No other LF is available for sentence (353), since it is has no any
other reading, in particular it does not admit the generic reading for its BPS. 34
33Jiger furthermore notes that sentence (352) with the subject 'alle Studenten' ('all students') at the left of 'ja' is less than
perfect for a few speakers. I have nothing to say about this fact.
34 For the sake of explicitness, let me digress to ask the following question: why do we have the pattern of readings in
(353) and (354)? Or, more explicitly: why is it that the BPS of an s-predicate at the right of 'ja doch' can only be interpreted
existentially, as in (353)? and furthermore why is it that the BPS of an s-predicate at the left of 'ja doch' can only be
interpreted generically, as in (354)? As Diesing herself suggests, the solution must hinge on the fact that scope relationships
in German are fixed at S-structure, as stated in (i).
(i) In German, a scope bearing element ci can have scope over a scope bearing element P at LF iff a c-commands P at
S-structure.
Assumption (i) can be illustrated by means of the following example (ii), from Jiger (2001): contrary to its English translation,
the German sentence (ii) can have only the reading (iia), which corresponds to the surface scope configuration 'sometimes' >
'all'; but it cannot have the reading (iib), which corresponds to the opposite scope configuration 'all' > 'sometimes'.
(ii) ... weil manchmal alle Studenten die Antwort wissen.
... since sometimes all students the answer know.
a. = Sometimes, all the students know the answer.
b. 54 Every student knows sometimes the answer.
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(355) LF and truth-conditions for the reading (353a):
a. [ja doch [ GENt [vp firemen(x) available(t) ] ] ].
b. Aw . GENt [CW(t)] [3x[[firemen]1w(x) A [available]w(x, t)]].
(356) LF and truth-conditions for the reading (353b):
a. [ ja doch [ Bt [v, firemen(x) available(t) ] ] ].
b. Aw. 3t [Cw(t)] [3x [[firemen]w(x) A [available]w(x, t)]].
Account for the word order contrast in (345) Under the assumption that there is no relevant
grammatical difference between s- and i-predicates, exactly the same LFs which are available for
sentence (345a) with the s-predicate 'verffigbar' ('available') should also be available for sentence
(345b) with the i-predicate 'intelligent'. Thus, this latter sentence (345b) should have the two LFs
in (357a) and (358a), and no others. The corresponding truth conditions are V and W' in (357b) and
(358b). These truth conditions o and W' in (357b) and (358b) are identical to the truth conditions
o and V' in (330b) and (331b) considered in section 3.3 for the unattested existential reading of the
BPS 'firemen' of the basic sentence 'Firemen are tall'. Hence, the blind strengthened meaning of the
truth conditions W and p' in (357b) and (358b) contradicts the piece of common knowledge (227).
In conclusion, all the LFs corresponding to sentence (345b) lead to truth conditions ruled out by the
by MH (97) and the deviance of sentence (345b) is thus predicted.
(357) a. [ja doch [ GENt [v, firemen(x) intelligent(t) ] ].
b. 9 -GENt [Cw(t)] [3x [[firemen]w(x) A [intelligent] w(x, t)]].
(358) a. [ja doch [ 3t [vp firemen(x) intelligent(t) ] ] ].
b. ' -- 3t [Cw(t)] [3x[[firemen]w(x) A [intelligent] w(x, t)]].
My account for the contrast in (345) rests on specific assumptions on BPSs, namely that a BPS such
as 'firemen' contributes an existential quantifier to the truth conditions and furthermore is a Horn-
mate of the definite description 'the fireman such and such', by assumption (333). Thus my account
leaves open the possibility that other types of subjects of i-predicates might differ from BPSs in
being perfectly fine at the right of 'ja doch'. In particular, since universal quantifiers are maximal
in their Horn-scale, then blind strengthening is vacuous and thus cannot trigger any mismatch with
common knowledge. Thus, nothing in my proposal rules out a universally quantified subject at the
right of 'ja doch'. In conclusion, my account is well compatible with Jilger's observation (352),
repeated in (359), that universally quantified subjects are fine at the right of the particles 'ja doch'.35
(359) ... weil ja alle Studenten Englisch kinnen
... because PART all students English know.
Account for the split-topic contrast in (347) By assumption (351), split-topic is obtained as
follows: the subject 'viele NP' is base generated within [Spec, VP] and then NP is extracted to some
topic position. The LF scope of the subject could in principle be either its base position within vP or
its landing position outside VP. It turns out that the attested LF scope is the former. Here is a way to
see that. In the case of sentence (360), the Q-adverb 'gewohnlich' ('usually') intervenes between the
base position and the landing position of the NP 'Freunde' ('friends'). If the LF scope of the subject
The patterns in (353) and (354) follow straightforwardly from assumption (ii). The BPS of sentence (353) is at the right
of 'ja doch'; by assumption (350), the BPS is thus inside VP at S-structure; by assumption (ii), it must remain there at LF;
since Diesing assumes that variables introduced by material in the VP can only be bound by default existential closure, it then
follows that this BPS can only receive the existential reading. The BPS of sentence (354) is insetad at the left of 'ja doch'; by
assumption (350), it is thus outside of VP at S-structure; by assumption (ii), it must remain there at LF; since Diesing assumes
that variables introduced by material outside of vP cannot be bound by default existential closure and must instead be bound
by a generic operator, it thus follows that this BPS can only receive the generic reading.
351 am being sloppy here. My proposal predicts that sentence (359) should have something like the truth conditions in (i),
where V, is a short hand for 'for all students'.
(i) GENt[C(t)][V [[know-English](x, t)]]
The problem is that I do not quite know what should the restrictor C of the generic operator look like.
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'viele Freunde' ('many friends') were the landing position of extraction, then we would expect the
reading in (360b) to be attested, which is not, as pointed out to me by Patrick Grosz (p.c.). The only
attested reading is (360a), that corresponds to the subject 'viele Freunde' having LF scope in the
base position within VP.
(360) dass Freunde ihn gew6hnlich viele fibers Ohr hauen.
that friends him usually many over.the ear beat.
a. = it is usually the case that many friends rip him off.
b. there are many friends who usually rip him off.
Thus, sentence (347b) must correspond to one of the two truth conditions in (361). These truth con-
ditions are identical to those in (357b) or (358b), only with 3] replaced by MANYX. If assumption
(333), that 'firemen' and 'the fireman such and such' are Horn-mates, is extended to the assumption
that 'many firemen' and 'the fireman such and such' are Horn-mates too, then these truth condi-
tions (361) are ruled out again by the fact that they yield a contextually contradictory strengthened
meaning, just as the truth conditions (357b) and (358b). 36
(361) a. O- GENt [CW (t)] [MANYx[firemen]w(x) A [intelligent]w(x, t)]].
b. ' - 3t [CW(t)] [MANYx[[firemen]w(x) A iintelligent]w(x, t)]].
First remark: definites Jiger also reports that definite subjects behave as BPSs, namely that both
types of subjects cannot occur at the right of 'ja'. For instance, sentence (362b) is deviant, precisely
because of the definite subject 'der PrIsident' ('the president') of the i-predicate 'intelligent' at the
right of 'ja'.
(362) a. ... weil der Prasident ja intelligent ist.
... since the president PART intelligent is.
b. *... weil ja der Prisident intelligent ist.
... since PART the president intelligent is.
The deviance of sentence (362b) is problematic for my proposal; here is why. The LF of sentence
(362b) is (363a) and the corresponding truth conditions are W in (363b). If the restrictor C (t) is
set by context to be the life span inw ([the president]w, t) of the president, then there is no way that
strengthening o can lead to a contradiction given common knowledge.
(363) a. [ja [v,, [der Prisident] [intelligent ist]]].
b. W = GENt [Cw(t)] [[intelligent]w([the president]w, t)].
The problem can be restated as follows: since the definite subject is scopally inert, its position has no
truth conditional consequences and thus my semantically-based approach predicts that it shouldn't
matter where the definite sits, contrary to what shown by the contrast in (362). I have to leave the
issue open for the time being.
36Diesing (1992) notes that the s-li-predicates distinction also has consequences for the German 'was flir'-split construc-
tion. The German DP 'was far N' means something like 'what kind of N'. As shown in (ib), it is possible to move the
wh-element 'was' to some higher position (plausibly [Spec, CP]) stranding behind the rest of the DP. This construction is
called 'WAS-FOR' SPLIT. Diesing notes that 'was-fir' split of a subject DP depends on the predicate: as shown in (ib), it is
possible in the case of the subject of the s-predicate 'verfligbar' ('available'); as shown in (ia), it is impossible in the case of
the subject of the i-predicate 'intelligent'.
(i) a. * Was sind fr Leguane intelligent?
what are for iguanas intelligent
'What kind of iguanas are intelligent?'
b. Was sind fr Leguane verf'igbar?
what are for iguanas available
'What kind of iguanas are available?'
I have no proposal to make concerning the contrast in (i).
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Second remark: German negative BPSs Kratzer (1995, p. 144-145) notes that s- and i-predicates
in German behave differently with respect to plural negative subjects of the form 'keine NPp,', as
illustrated by the following contrast: the sentences in (364) have s-predicates, and they are fine; the
sentences in (365) have i-predicates, and they are bad.
(364) a. ... weil uns keine Freunde helfen.
... since us no friends help.
'... since no friends are helping us'.
b. ... weil hier keine FliederbAume wachsen.
... since here no lilacs grow.
'... since no lilacs are growing here'.
(365) a. * ... weil keine Arzte altruistisch sind.
... since no physicians altruistic are.
'... since no physicians are altruistic'.
b. * ... weil das keine Kandidaten wissen.
... since this no candidates know.
'... since no candidates know this'.
Kratzer argues that the contrast between (364) and (365) follows from assumption (349), concerning
the different base positions of subjects of i- and s-predicates, together with the auxiliary assumption
(366). A sentence such as (364a) is fine because it admits the following derivation: according
to assumption (349), the BPS 'Freunde' ('friends') is base generated in [Spec, VP]; according to
assumption (366b), 'night' is base generated next to it, say adjoined to VP; according to assumption
(366a), 'nicht' and the existential operator merge as 'keine'. No such derivation is possible for a
sentence such as (365a): according to assumption (366a), the phrase 'keine Arzte' ('no doctors')
can only be generated as a result of the adverb 'nicht' ('no') and the (existential closure operator
associated with the) BP 'Arzte' ('doctor') being base generated next to each other; but this can never
happen, given that 'nicht' is base generated at the edge of VP by assumption (366b) while the BP is
base generated outside of VP by assumption (349).37
(366) a. At D-structure and at LF, a quantifier phrases such as 'keine NP' ('no NP') consists "of
the negation adverb 'nicht' ('not') and the bare plural NP. The bare plural has to receive
existential force through existential closure. 'Keine NP', then, involves two operators:
negation and the existential closure operator." There is a phonological rule which manda-
torily realizes 'nicht' and an adjacent (plural) existential closure operator as 'kein-'.
b. "Just like its English counterpart 'not', 'nicht' is base generated somewhere between the
subject and the VP, that is, in the usual position for sentence adverbs".
Thus, it looks like Diesing's assumption (349) on the base position of subjects of s- and i-predicates
offers a straightforward account of the contrast between (364) and (365). And I see no way of
recasting this account within the purely semantic framework I have defended so far. Yet, Sauerland
37Evidence for assumption (366a) is provided by sentence (i). If 'keine Beispiele' were a normal quantifier, we would
expect sentence (i) to have either the reading in (ia) or that in (ib), depending on the relative scope of this quantifier with
the modal. However, sentence (i) has neither of these readings, but rather the one in (ic). This last reading is predicted by
assumption (366a): if 'keine' is split into 'nicht' and an existential operator at LF, then a third operator can intervene between
the two, as in (37c).
(i) ... weil keine Beispiele bekannt sein milssen.
... since no examples known be must.
a. 9 NOx [[example](x)] [Oknown](x)].
b. O L]NO [[example](x)] [[known](x)].
c. = NOT 3 , [[example] (x)] [[known] (x)].
See also Sauerland (2000) and Penka and Zeijlstra (2005) for further discussion of this split-scope reading (also, note that
Penka and Zeijlstra report slightly different judgments).
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(2007) has very recently pointed out some new interesting facts concerning the distribution of 'keine
NPpl', that cast doubts on Kratzer's account. He considers predicates such as 'to be related by
blood' and 'to be genetically identical'. These predicates behave as standard i-predicates: their
BPSs only admit the generic reading, as shown in (367a); and they resist 'there'-construction and
'when'-clauses, as shown in (367b) and (367c).
(367) a. Royals are related by blood.
b. #There are royals related by blood.
c. #When John is related by blood to Mary, he is her brother.
Yet, contrary to the i-predicates in sentences (365), these i-predicates can occur with plural negative
indefinites, as illustrated by the fact that sentences (368) are fine, both with and without 'zwei'
('two'). Sauerland points out that the felicity of (368) poses a problem for Kratzer's account of
the distribution of german plural negative quantifiers. In fact, in order to account for the lack of the
existential reading of the BPS 'royals' of sentence (367a), Diesing and Kratzer would have to assume
that subjects of the predicate 'miteinander blutsverwandt sein' ('to be related by blood one with the
other') are base generated directly in [Spec, IP]. But assumptions (366) would then incorrectly
predict that sentence (368a) cannot be generated.
(368) a. ... weil keine ('zwei') Linguisten miteinander blutsverwandt sein.
... since no (two) linguists with-one-another blood-related are.
'Since no linguists are related by blood'.
b. ... weil keine (zwei) Zebrafische genetisch identisch sind.
... since no (two) zebra-fish genetically identical are.
'Since no (two) zebra fish are genetically identical'.
The crucial difference between the i-predicates in (365) and those in (368) is that the former are in-
herently distributive while the latter are inherently collective. The distribution of German plural neg-
ative quantifiers just described thus looks similar to the distribution of French plural 'des'-indefinites
with generic meaning, as illustrated in (284)-(283) from Dobrovie-Sorin (2003).
3.5 BPSs embedded under a universal operator
Fox (1995) observes that the existential reading of the BPS of an i-predicate becomes available
when the BPS is in the scope of a universal operator, such as a universal object. As expected,
the BPS 'Jewish women' of the i-predicate 'to be related to Chomsky' of sentence (369a) does
not admit the existential reading. In sentence (369b), the definite 'Chomsky' has been replaced by
the universal object 'every Jewish man' and surprisingly the BPS 'Jewish women' does admit the
existential reading, as soon as the universal object is given wide scope, i.e. the sentence can mean
that "for every Jewish man there are Jewish women who are related to him."38
(369) a. Jewish women are related to Chomsky. #3-BPS
b. Jewish women are related to every Jewish man. 3-BPS
(370) a. MIT students know Chinese. #3-BPS
b. MIT students know almost every foreign language. ]-BPS
381 wonder whether the contrast just pointed out holds also for the i-predicates 'love' and 'hate'.
(i) a. MIT professors love Chomsky.
b. MIT professors love every Jewish linguist.
(ii) a. MIT professors hate Chomsky.
b. MIT professors hate every Jewish linguist.
It is not completely clear to me whether there is a contrast between the (a) and (b) sentences in (i) and (ii).
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As Fox points out, the existential interpretation of the BPSs in (369b) and (370b) is only possible
when the subject has narrow scope with respect to the universal object, as shown by the fact that the
existential reading disappears in the variants in (371), where the subject binds a pronoun within the
object and is therefore forced to have wide scope.
(371) a. Jewish women are related to every Jewish man they know.
b. MIT students know almost every foreign language they've heard of.
In this section, I'll argue that the contrast illustrated in (369)-(370) follows from the proposal de-
veloped so far: the reasoning developed in section 3.3 to rule out the existential reading of BPSs
of i-predicates fails when BPSs are embedded under a universal quantifier (over individuals). This
should be no surprise, for the following reason. My account for the lack of the existential reading
of BPSs of i-predicates is identical to the account proposed in section 2.2 for why sentence (99a),
repeated in (372a), sounds odd. But sentence (99a) turns acceptable when it is embedded under a
further universal operator, as shown by sentence (101b), repeated in (372b).
(372) Context: a competition lasted for five days, Monday through Friday; each day, three chal-
lenges are held: swimming, running and jumping; both John and Bill know that the same
guy x won the swimming competition on all five days, the same guy y won the running
competition on all five days and the same guy z won the jumping competition on all five
days:
M T W T F
swimming: x x x x x
running: y y y y y
jumping: z z z z z
John wants to know more about these amazing guys, and thus asks Bill for more information;
Bill replies as follows:
a. ?Every day, a/some fireman won the running competition.
b. Every day, for every competition, a/some fireman won.
Thus, my account for Fox's effect, that embedding under a universal operator rescues the existen-
tial reading of BPSs of i-predicates, is identical to the account suggested in section 2.2 for why
embedding under a universal operator rescues sentence (372b). To stress the analogy between the
two accounts for the contrasts in (372) and (369), Table 3.6 summarizes the main steps of the two
accounts, one next to the other.
3.5.1 Existing accounts
Fox (1995) suggests an account for the contrast in (369) based on three ingredients: the first ingre-
dient is Diesing's assumption (326) that existential BPSs come about through the DEO and that the
DEO has VP scope; the second ingredient is Kratzer's assumption (236) that i-predicates lack a time
argument; the third assumption is Fox's SCOPE ECONOMY (373), that roughly bans LF-movement
which does not have truth conditional consequences. Let me present the details of his account.
(373) LF-movement of a quantifier Q, which does not cross at least one quantifier Q2 such that
Q1 and Q2 do not commute is ungrammatical.
The case of BPSs of s-predicates is illustrated in (374). The subject is base generated in [Spec, VP]
and moved to [Spec, IP]. The time argument of the s-predicate is bound by a tense operator Ot
which sits between the surface position [Spec, 1P] of the BPS and its base position [Spec, VP]. By
Diesing's assumption (326), the BPS needs to be reconstructed into VP in order to get bound by the
DEO and thus be interpreted existentially. Since the BPS and the tense operator don't commute,
reconstruction of the BPS is allowed by Scope Economy (373). The existential reading of BPSs of
s-predicates is thus accounted for.
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Every day for every competition, Jewish women are related
a fireman won. to every Jewish man.
1) LF AND TRUTH CONDITION S
[every competition] [every man]
every days womenx related
a fireman. won
S= Aw . V, [Vt [3 [Iwon] (x, y, t)]]] = Aw . Vy [GENt [3x[[related] (x, y, t)]]]
(2) SET OF SCALAR ALTERNATIVES
Alt(W) = {pPIp V t) }, where Op is the LF with the following shape and truth conditions
[every competition], [every man]
every days GENt
the fireman P won the woman P related
p = Aw . V [Vt [[won]w(dy, t)]] = Aw . Vy[GENt[[related]w(dw, y, t)]]
(3) A USEFUL RESTATEMENT OF THE NEGATION OF ALL THE ALTERNATIVES
A -p = -", where V are the following truth conditions
P
)- Aw. 1 [Vy[Vt[[win]w(x,y,t)]]] - Aw . [Vy[GENt[[related]w(x,y,t)]]]
(4) SET OF EXCLUDABLE ALTERNATIVES
£xcl(W) = {p I P ED t) }, since W A -V is true e.g. in the following world:
M T W T F ti t 2  t3  t 4  t5
swimming: x x x x x John: Sue Sue Sue Sue
running: y y y y y Bill: Ann Ann Ann Ann
jumping: z z z z z Tom: Mary Mary Mary
(5) CONCLUSION
The sentences denote the proposition EXH(p) = ep A -i, which is not a contradiction
w.r.t. common knowledge, since the possible world considered in step (4) is in Wk.
Table 3.6: Parallelism between the account for the contrast in (372) presented in section 2.2 and the account
for the contrast in (369) presented in this section.
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3.5 BPSs embedded under a universal operator
(374) IP
Firemeni
Ot VP
ti available(t)
The case of BPSs of i-predicates is illustrated in (375). Again, the subject is base generated in
[Spec, VP] and moved to [Spec, IP], because that is always the case, both for s- and i-predicates.
By Kratzer's assumption (236), i-predicates lack a time argument and thus there is no tense operator
above VP. Again by Diesing's assumption (326), the BPS would need to be reconstructed into VP in
order to get bound by the DEO and thus be interpreted existentially. But in this case lowering of the
BPS into vp is blocked by Scope Economy (373), because there is no operator to cross. The lack of
the existential reading of BPSs of i-predicates is thus accounted for.
(375) IP
FiremenV
0 VP
ti available
Finally, the case of BPSs of i-predicates with wide scope universal objects is illustrated in (376).
The universal object has been QRed at the left edge of VP, to resolve a type mismatch. Again, the
subject is base generated in [Spec, VP] and moved to [Spec, IP]. Again, the i-predicate lacks a time
argument and thus there is no tense operator above VP. Again, the BPS needs to be reconstructed
into VP in order to get bound by the DEO and thus be interpreted existentially. In this case, lowering
of the BPS into VP is not blocked by Scope Economy (373), because movement of the BPS crosses
the object adjoined to [Spec, VP] which does not commute with the BPS.
(376) IP
Womeni
every man, VP
ti related-to tj
In conclusion, Fox offers an account for the restriction (287) on the existential reading of BPSs of
i-prdicates that does without Diesing's problematic assumption (293), concerning the different base
positions of subjects of s- and i-predicates. Furthermore, Fox's account predicts the effect in (369)-
(370) of embedding underneath a universal object. To evaluate Fox's account, let me step back and
look at the overall picture on BPSs of i-predicates. In sections 3.3 and 3.4, I have considered two
restrictions on BPSs of i-predicates, recalled in (377a) and (377b), respectively. Both Diesing's and
mine accounts for the restriction (377a) on the interpretation of BPSs of i-predicates straightfor-
wardly extends to the restriction (377b) on German word order, through the auxiliary assumption
(350). This is not true for Fox's proposal: since his account for the restriction (377a) on the interpre-
tation of BPSs is based on an economy constraint on Quantifier Lowering, it does not extend to the
word order restriction in (377b), where movement does not seem to play any role. The restriction
(377b) is thus left unexplained by Fox's proposal.
(377) a. BPSs of i-predicates lack the existential reading;
b. BPSs of i-predicates cannot sit at the right of the particles 'ja doch' in German.
The desiderability of a unified analysis for the two restrictions (377a) and (377b) is underscored by
their common sensitivity to embedding underneath a universal object. Fox's examples (369)-(370)
show the sensitivity of the interpretational restriction (377a) to embedding underneath a universal
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object. Let me now show the sensitivity of the word order restriction (377b) to embedding under-
neath a universal object by means of the contrast in (378). Sentence (378a), with the i-predicate
'verwandt' ('related to') and the BPS 'jiidische Frauen' ('Jewish women') at the right of 'ja doch'
is deviant, as expected given the contrast in (3.4) considered in section 345. Yet, sentence (378b),
where the definite object 'Chomsky' has been replaced by the universal quantifier 'jedem jiidischen
Mann' ('every Jewish man'), sounds fine. The contrast in (378) is thus a replication of Fox's contrast
for the interpretational restriction (377a) to the case of the word order restriction (377b).
(378) a. #Mit Chomsky sindja doch jiidische Frauen verwandt.
with Chomsky are PARTS Jewish women related
b. Mit jedem Jiidischen Mann sindja doch jiidische Frauen verwandt.
with every Jewish man are PARTs Jewish women related
Let me finally note that the contrast in (378) is also problematic for Diesing's account for the word
order restriction (377b) reviewed in subsection 3.4.1, since her proposal is not sensitive to properties
of the embedding environment.
3.5.2 An account based on blind and mandatory mismatching implicatures
In this subsection, I present my account for Fox's effect of embedding under a universal operator
over individuals, and then turn to the case of embedding under a modal.
Account Of course, the existential reading of the BPS of sentence (369a), repeated in (379a), is
ruled out in the same way as the existential reading of the BPS of the basic sentence (287b), repeated
in (379b), since the reasoning illustrated in section 3.3 can be repeated for the i-predicate 'related to
Chomsky' in place of 'tall'.
(379) a. Jewish women are related to Chomsky.
b. Firemen are tall.
Let's now see what happens when this same line of reasoning is applied to (369b), with the wide
scope universal object 'every Jewish man'. The LF which corresponds to the existential reading of
the BPS of this sentence (369b) is the one in (380): the BPS 'Jewish women' has been reconstructed
into [Spec, VP]; the universal object 'every Jewish man' has been QRed out of VP; the time argument
of the i-predicate 'related' is bound by the generic operator; the restrictor of the generic operator is
a predicate C assigned by the context.
(380) [ every many [ [ GENt C ] [vp women(x) related-to(y, t) ] ] ].
This LF (380) yields the truth-conditions p in (381): the DEO binds the variable x introduced by
the BPS 'Jewish women'; the presupposition of the nuclear scope of the generic operator (whatever
it is) is added to its restriction C, yielding the predicate C;39 the notation V, is a shorthand for the
denotation of 'for every Jewish man'. Thus, I need to run the resoning in section 3.3 for the case of
these truth conditions o and make sure that they are not ruled out.
(381) W = Aw. Vy[GENt[C((y, t)] [3x [[women]' (x) A [related]"(x, y, t)]]].
By replacing 'Jewish women' in (380) with the definite description 'the Jewish woman such and
such', we get the LF (382a), where I am using 'the woman P' as a short hand for 'the Jewish woman
such and such'. This LF yields the truth conditions in (382b), where I am using dw as a shorthand
for [the woman P]w.
39Note that I assuming in (381) that the restrictor t depends on the specific Jewish man y. This assumption is needed
independently from the issue of i-predicates, for instance in order to to get the truth conditions (ib) for sentence (ia) with a
universal subject and an habitual s-predicate.
(i) a. Every friend of mine smokes.
b. Aw. Vy[Ifriend]W(y) -- GENt[Cw (y, t)][[smoke]t(y, t)]].
Note that the dependence of the restrictive clause of the generic operator on the individual y might be due to the addition to
the restrictive clause of the presupposition of the nuclear scope; I leave the issue open.
Application to individual level predicates
(382) a. [ every many [ [ GENt C ] [ the woman P related-to(y, t) ] ] ]
b. op = Aw . V[GENt [C(y,t) A in'(dw, t)][[related]w(dw, y,t)]].
Let 0 be as in (383), where 3., is a shorthand for the existential quantifier over Jewish women and
V1, is a shorthand for the universal quantifier over Jewish men. This formula says that "there is a
Jewish woman who is related to every Jewish man at all times in the restrictive clause". Note that 
only differs from W in (381) because of the fact that the existential quantifier over Jewish women 3,
has widest scope. Note furthermore the following crucial difference between (383) and (334): in the
case of 0 in (383), the existential quantifier over Jewish women B3 has wide scope not only over the
generic operator GENt but also over the universal quantifier over Jewish men Vy.
(383) = Aw . 3x[V.[GENt[Cw(y,t)A inw(x,t)][[related]w(x,y,t)]]].
The logical equivalence in (384) holds;4 in words: the negation of all the alternatives ,p's in (382)
is equivalent to the negation of 0 in (383), namely to the statement that "there is no Jewish woman
who is related to every Jewish man throughout the entire restrictive clause."
(384) A - p = -10
P
Let me now argue that the blind strengthened meaning EXH(o) of our sentence o in (381) is the
one in (385), i.e. that all the alternatives Vp's in (382b) are excludable w.r.t. W in (381). Given the
equivalence in (384), it suffices to show that p A -b is not a logical contradiction.
(385) EXH(p) = W A -A p.
To this end, consider the possible world w described in (386): there are only two Jewish men a, and
a 2; there are only two Jewish women b, and b2; the woman b, is related only to the man a, and
the woman b2 is related only to the man a2. Note that p is true in such a world w (with a judicious
choice of the restrictive clause C), since for every Jewish man there is a Jewish woman related to
him. Note furthermore that 0 is false in such a world w, since there is no Jewish woman related
to every Jewish man. Thus, po A --, is true in such a world w and EXH(W) = W A -,o is not a
logical contradiction. Furthermore, the world w in (386) could very well be compatible with the
common knowledge WVck in (227). Hence, the strengthened meaning EXH(p) of W in (381b) is not
a contradiction given common knowledge and the existential reading for the BPS of (369b) is not
ruled out by the MH.4 1
(386) a. [Jewish man]w = {al, a2 }.
b. [Jewish woman]w = {b, b2}.
c. [related-toJ w = {(al, bi), (a 2 , b2)}
In this section, I have noted that the account for the lack of the existential reading of BPSs of
i-predicates suggested in section 3.3 predicts the existential reading to be rescued by embedding
under a universal object. Fox's contrast (369) showed that this prediction is borne out. In section
3.4, I have suggested that the restriction on German word order illustrated in (345) follows from the
same account suggested in section 3.3 for the lack of the existential reading of BPSs of i-predicates.
By parity of reasoning, my account for German word order thus predicts that embedding under a
universal object should rescue the ordering of the BPS at the right of 'ja doch'. This prediction is
borne out by the contrast in (378).
4The reasoning is identical to that in footnote 16.
41 Of course the problem highlighted in the First remark in section 2.2 holds also in this case. Let me recall the problem.
Consider the LFs obtained from the LF in (380) by replacing both 'Jewish women' by 'the Jewish woman such and such'
and 'every Jewish man' by 'some Jewish man'. If these LFs were scalar alternatives of (380), then the blind strengthened
meaning of the existential reading of the BPS of sentence (369b) would mismatch with common knowledge, and the attested
existential reading would be incorrectly ruled out. Crucially, these LFs are not scalar alternatives of (381) according to Fox's
alternative definition (124) of the set of scalar alternatives.
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Remark: embedding under universal modals Fox's contrast shows that the existential reading
of a BPS of an i-predicate is rescued by embedding under a universal operator. Crucially, not any
universal operator does the trick: universal operators over individuals do; but for instance universal
modals don't. Despite the fact that the BPS 'firemen' of the i-predicate 'tall' is embedded under a
universal modal in (387a), it lacks the existential reading, as in the plain case (387b).
(387) a. It must be the case that firemen are tall. *3-BPS
b. Firemen are tall. *3-BPS
Let me thus make sure that my proposal captures this difference between universal quantifiers over
individuals and universal modals. The idea is that what's special about modals is that they quantify
over worlds and that the scalar item [the fireman P] has world-dependence built into it, since P is a
function from worlds into sets of individuals. In order to make this point explicit, I will now quickly
repeat for the case of sentence (387a) the piece of reasoning presented in section 3.3 for the case of
sentence (387b) and argue that it works just as well in both cases. Consider the LF (388a) for our
sentence (387a), which yields the truth conditions V in (388b), which correspond to the unattested
existential reading of the BPS 'firemen' that I want to rule out. Of course, (388) is the same as (330)
considered above for (387b), only with a modal on top.
(388) a. [ must [ [ GENt C(t) ] [ firemen(x) tall(t) ] ] ]
b. = Aw . IWEMB(w)GENt [Cw'(t)] [3 [[fireman]Jw'(x) A ltall]w(x, t)]].
Consider next the LF (389a), obtained by replacing the BPS 'firemen' of LF (388a) with the definite
description 'the fireman such and such', abbreviated as usual as 'the fireman P'. The corresponding
truth conditions are V, in (389b), where I am using the usual shorthand dw' for the individual
[the fireman p]'. Since the BPS 'firemen' and the definite description 'the fireman such and such'
are Horn-mates by assumption (333), then I can conclude that (389) is a scalar alternative of (388),
according to the standard definition (74) of the set of scalar alternatives.4 2
(389) a. [ must [ [ GENt C(t) ] [ the fireman P tall(t) ] ] ]
b. 'p, = Aw. -Iw,EMB(w)GENt [CW'(t) A inW'(d', t) ] [[tall ] w'(d', t)].
Consider b as in (390), where B3, is a shorthand for the existential quantifier over firemen. Note
that ?p only differs from p in (388b) because of the fact that the existential quantifier over firemen
3, has wide scope over the generic operator GENt. Note the crucial difference between 0 in (390),
that we get for the case of embedding under a universal modal, and b in (383), that we got above
for Fox's case of embedding under a universal operator over individuals: in the latter case (383), the
existential quantifier B3 had wide scope over the universal quantifier V. (as well as over the generic
operator); but in the former case (390), the existential quantifier 3, does not have wide scope over
the universal modal (but only over the generic operator).
(390) V) = Aw. O[WEM(W) [3 [GENt [C"'(t) A inw (x, t)] [[tall]w'(x, t)]]].
The logical equivalence in (391) holds;43 in words: the negation of all the alternatives ,bp's in (389)
is equivalent to the negation of b in (390), namely to the statement that "it is possible that there is
no fireman who is tall throughout his entire life-span."
42Furthermore, since obp is not logically weaker than (but actually logically independent of) p, then I can conclude that
(389) is a scalar alternative of (388) also according to Fox's allternative definition (124) of the set of scalar alternatives.
43First, let me show that if -o is true in a world w, then AP -0p is true too in w. In fact, suppose by contradiction
that the claim is false, namely that AP -Op is false in w; this means that there is at least one property P such that p is
true in w; this means in turn that, in every world w' e MB(w), the fireman such that (namely the individual d 'T) is tall
throughout his entire life span in w'; thus, i is obviously true too in w, contradicting the initial hypothesis. Vice versa, let me
show that if AP -'0p is true in a world w, then -,? is true too in w. In fact, suppose by contradiction that the claim is false,
namely that a/ is true in w; this means that for each world w' E MB(w), there is a fireman d = dw' (possibly, a different one
in different worlds) such that dw' is tall throughout his entire life-span; consider the property such that, for every world
w' E MB(w), 'the fireman such that ' denotes this special fireman dw ' (namely dv' = dw'); note that the truth of ?p in
w thus entails the truth of the the corresponding 2bp in w and thus the falsity of Ap -*bp in w, which contradicts the initial
hypothesis.
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(391) A-b = -
Let me now argue that the blind strengthened meaning EXH( o) of p in (388) is the one in (392),
i.e. that all the alternatives Ob,'s in (389) are excludable w.r.t. p. Given the equivalence in (391), it
suffices to show that po A -V is not a logical contradiction. And of course it is not, since it would be
true for instance in a world w such that all the worlds w' accessible from w are as depicted in (337).
(392) EXH((p) = W A A - 1P,.
"P
Let me now state the technical assumption (393), namely that only worlds compatible with common
knowledge are accessible from a world compatible with common knowledge.
(393) If w E Wk, andw' E MB(w), then w' Ec Wk.
Under assumption (393), the strengthened meaning EXH(p) = p A -0 that I just computed is a
contradiction given common knowledge (227), as stated in (394); let me explain why. Consider a
world w E Wk where V is true. Hence, for each world w' accessible from w, there is at least a
fireman who is tall at at least one instant in w'. Since w is compatible with common knowledge,
then each such world w' is compatible with common knowledge too, by assumption (393). Thus, in
each world w' accessible from w there is a fireman who is tall throughout his entire life span, i.e.
is true in w.
(394) EXH() A Vk = A -'b AWk = 0
In conclusion, the lack of the existential reading of the BPS of the modalized sentence (387a) is
predicted in exactly the same way as the lack of the existential reading of the BPS of the plain
sentence (387b).
3.6 More facts on the distribution of existential BPSs
At the beginning of this chapter, I have characterized the distinction between s- and i-predicates in
terms of homogeneity with respect to the time argument. And in section 3.3, I have derived the
generalization (395) from this characterization of the s-/i-predicates distinction. Let me refer to
(395) as the STANDARD BPS-GENERALIZATION.
(395) a. BPSs of i-predicates admit the generic reading but not the existential one;
b. BPSs of s-predicates admit both the existential and the generic reading.
Yet, both claims of the standard BPS-generalization (395) have been challenged by various scholars.
If these scholars are right, then I have an account for the wrong empirical generalization. In this sec-
tion, I'll review various counterexamples to (395) and try to evaluate them. To anticipate, I will try to
establish the following conclusions: that most of the counterexamples against claim (395a) reported
in the literature do not really make the point they are intended to make; that there is a subset of these
counterexamples that do make the point yet, and that I hope share the common property of being
(physical or abstract) locatives in the sense of Gruber (1965); that most counterexamples to claim
(395b) do make the point; that, nonetheless, these counterexamples to (395b) do not really argue
against the BPS-generalization being stated in terms of homogeneity but rather against homogeneity
being defined only in terms of the temporal argument.
3.6.1 First set of facts: existential BPSs that are non-kind denoting
Glasbey (1997, p. 169-170) considers the minimal pairs (396)-(398) and reports the intuition that the
existential reading for the BPS is "very difficult, if not impossible" for the (a) sentences but "readily
available" for the (b) sentences. Glasbey further notes that "the phenomenon [whereby the BPSs of
the i-predicates in the (b) sentences admit the existential reading] is not a result of the predicates in
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question not being truly permanent or i-level. She thus concludes that the (b) sentences provide a
counterexample to the generalization (395a) that BPSs of i-predicates cannot receive the existential
readings.
(396) a. Students own sports cars.
b. Students own sports cars in this department.
(397) a. Drinkers were under-age.
b. I was shocked to discover in the Red Lion last night that drinkers were under-age.
(398) a. Ministers are gay.
b. In this church, ministers are gay.
Some more examples of BPSs with alleged existential reading that have been offered in the literature
as counterexamples to claim (395a) are reported in (399), from Cohen and Erteschik-Shir (2002) and
Kiss (1998).
(399) a. Chapters of this book are interesting.
b. Family members are proud of John.
c. In this area, hot springs exist.
d. Fish abound in this lake.
e. Men are bald as a result of using this hair restorer.
Finally, Fernald (2000, p. 98) notes that the BPSs in the (a) sentences in in (400)-(402) can only be
construed generically while the one in the (b) sentences can be construed existentially: "there are a
number of cases in which definite nominals seem to cause what we would otherwise interpret as an i-
predicate to act like an s-predicate. [Consider for instance the pair in (400):] 'own banks' has all the
characteristics of an i-predicate. On the other hand 'own that house' looks like an s-predicate. We
must conclude that the nominal object of 'own' plays a crucial role in determining possible readings
for indefinite subjects." The (b) sentences thus provide a counterexample to the generalization (395a)
that BPSs of i-predicates cannot receive the existential readings.
(400) a. Tycoons own banks.
b. Tycoons own that house.
(401) a. Presidents are similar to senators.
b. Presidents are similar to these senators.
(402) a. Monkeys live in trees.
b. Monkeys live in that tree.
Let me discuss these counterexamples to the standard BPS-generalization (395a) in some detail. I
think that the examples in (399) are not interesting. The first two examples (399a) and (399b) are
actually judged as deviant by my informants (Ezra Keshet and Tamina Stephenson (p.c.)). Kimball
(1973, p. 268) notes that "for Frege, existence was a predicate, but of a special sort. It was a second
order predicate, a predicate of predicates, not a predicate of objects. To say 'Tame tigers exist' for
Frege was to say of the concept 'tame tigers' that something fell under it. Thus, the logical subject of
such an utterance was not any tame tiger, but the concept itself." After Carlson (1977), this passage
can be reinterpreted saying that 'exists' is a kind-level predicate. McNally (1998b) shows how to
implement this idea in an explicit semantics for 'there'-sentences. If indeed 'exist' is a kind-level
predicate, then example (399c) can be put aside. I would like to suggest that also the predicate
'abound' in sentence (399d) is a kind-level predicate, as shown by Carlson's (1977; pp. 47-48) test
that it resists having quantified NP's as subjects.
(403) a. #All / most / three / some / many / ... fish abound in the lake.
Finally, I would like to suggest that the availability of the existential reading for the BPS in (399e)
is due to the fact that the sentence contains a hidden 'became' as is (404a). Under this analysis,
(399e) contains the s-predicate 'to become bald' and can thus be put aside. Indeed, Asaf Bachrach
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(p.c.) points out that the existential reading of the BPS 'men' in (399e) disappears if 'as a result of'
is replaced by 'despite', as in (404b).
(404) a. Men became bald as a result of using this brand of hair restorers.
b. Men are bald despite using this brand of hair restorers.
Let me now turn to Fernald's contrasts (400)-(402). The last example (402) seems to me dubious,
since it is not clear to me why 'to live' should be considered an i-predicate. In any event, note that
the contrast does not seem to me to extend to other i-predicates, as shown by the lack of contrast
in the interpretation of the BPS in the analogous minimal pairs (405)-(407). I thus conclude that
Fernald's observation only holds for a small special class of i-predicates. This is of course the same
conclusion reached in subsection 3.3.1 in the discussion of the JCS's proposal. I have no account to
offer as to what makes these i-predicates special in this respect."44
(405) a. Italians know good wine.
b. Italians know this good wine.
(406) a. Italians love good food.
b. Italians love Barilla.
(407) a. Firemen are taller than policemen
b. Firemen are taller than Michel Jordan.
Let me finally turn to the minimal pairs in (396)-(398), and argue that the availability of the ex-
istential reading for the BPSs of the (b) sentences is actually compatible with the proposal I have
presented so far.45 Carlson (1977, § 5.4) points out the very interesting fact that not all (English) BPs
44As pointed out to me by Kai von Fintel (p.c.), there seem to be an interesting parallelism between Fernald's contrast
(400) and the following contrast, noted in von Fintel (2003, p. 287): given the piece of common knowledge that French is a
republic, sentence (ia) sounds like an instance of presupposition failure; but sentence (ib) does not, rather it sounds as a fine
false sentence. As von Fintel notes, "the predicate here is an i-predicate in both cases. The difference lies in whether there is
a specific object that the king of France is claimed to own"
(i) a. The king of France owns a pen. (presupposition failure)
b. The king of France owns this pen. (false, and no presupposition failure)
von Fintel only discusses the i-predicate 'own'. It is not clear to me whether his contrast extends to other transitive i-
predicates.
45 In the discussion of these examples (396)-(398), I will assume that Glasbey and Cohen and Erteschik-Shir are on the
right track in claiming that the BPSs in the (b) sentences have an existential reading. Yet, I am not completely sure that this
claim is really correct. Cohen and Erteschik-Shir themselves note that what they call an existential reading doesn't quite
feel as a plain existential reading: "One may argue that [these] sentences imply stronger than simple existential claims, e.g.
[(399c)] implies that more than a handful of family members are proud of John. We do, in fact, agree with this intuition,
but in our opinion this is an implicature, rather than part of the meaning of the sentences [...]. Hence, this fact is not in
contradiction with the claim that the BPs in these sentences are read existentially." They refer to Cohen (2000) for discussion
of this implicature; Cohen (2005) might be a later version of that proposal, but I actually don't quite see how it might help
in deriving the desired implicature. As a matter of fact, I think that what these authors really have in mind for many of these
examples is something like the syllogism in (i).
(i) a. These BPSs do not have the generic reading;
b. a BPS can have either the generic or the existential reading;
c. hence, these BPSs have the existential reading.
This syllogism is sometimes made explicit, as in the following passage from Cohen and Erteschik-Shir (2002, p.129-130):
"What is the interpretation of the BPSs in these sentences? It is clearly not generic [...]. The reading of the[se] BPSs is,
therefore, the existential reading." I accept hypothesis (ia), that the BPSs in the (b) sentences in (396)-(398) do not have a
true generic reading, as in 'Firemen are tall'. But I deny hypothesis (ib), and thus the conclusion (ic) altogether. As a matter
of fact, it has been pointed out by Condoravdi (1997) that, besides the generic and the existential reading, BPSs (of both
i- and s-predicates) admit also a third reading, that she dubs the FUNCTIONAL READING. Condoravdi illustrates this third
reading by means of examples such as (ii). She points out that, "intuitively, [(ii)] appears synonymous with [(iia)]". Thus,
its BPS has neither the existential nor the generic reading, i.e. sentence (ii) cannot be paraphrased neither with (iib) nor with
(iic). Infact, "unlike [(iib)], [(ii)] does not make an existential assertion but, like [(iia)], it is an assertion about the totality
of the contextually relevant students, whose existence in the actual world seems to be presupposed by both [(ii)] and [(iia)]."
Furthermore, sentence (ii) crucially differs from (iic): "although the bare plural receives a universal reading, [(iia)] is not
generic in any obvious way; it does not express a non-accidental generalization about students in general, nor a regularity
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are alike. He writes: "we have so far been concentrating our attention on NP's that make reference
to kinds of things. However, there appears to be a rather enigmatic class of bare plural NP's which
do not seem to denote kinds as we have imagined them. This class of bare plural NP's, so far as I
know, always is modified by a relative clause or a PP." A few examples are given in (408).
(408) a. parts of that machine.
b. people in the next room.
c. books that John lost yesterday.
d. bears that are eating now.
Carlson points out that non-kind-denoting BPs can be easily pulled apart from kind-denoting BPs
by means of the following two tests. First, kind-level predicates cannot be predicated of non-kind-
denoting BPs, as illustrated in (409a). Second, the two types of BPs differ with respect to their scope
possibilities. As recalled in section 3.3, kind BPs always take the narrowest possible scope; but
non-kind BPs can take wide scope. The classical contrasts (410)-(411) illustrate this difference: the
existential BP in (410a) can only take narrow scope w.r.t. the modal, while sentence (410b) admits
both an opaque and a transparent reading; analogously, the existential BP in (411a) can only have
narrow scope w.r.t. negation, while sentence (41 lb) displays scope ambiguity.
(409) a. ?People in the next room are common.
b. ?People in the next room are numerous.
c. ?People in the next room are indigenous to Asia.
d. ?People in the next room are widespread.
(410) a. John is looking for machines. *3 > looking, looking > 3
b. John is looking for parts of that machine. I > looking, looking > 1
(411) a. John didn't see machines. *3 > , > 3
b. John didn't see parts of that machine. 3 > , > I
I would like to suggest that the BPSs in (396a), (397a) and (398a) are kind BPs while those in (396b),
(397b) and (398b) are non-kind BPs. As a matter of fact, the difference between Glasbey's (a) and
(b) sentences is just that a PP has been added, which can plausibly be construed as modifying the
BPS (e.g. 'students in this department', 'drinkers in the Red Lion', etc.). Thus construed, these BPSs
about the occurrence of awareness in other situations in which a ghost was haunting the campus."
(ii) In 1985 there was a ghost haunting the campus. Students were aware of this fact / the danger.
a. The students were aware of this fact / the danger.
b. There were students who were aware of this fact / the danger.
c. Students are usually aware of this fact / the danger.
Let me thus assume that the following test can be used to single out whether a BPS has the functional reading: replacement
of the BPS with the corresponding definite description should not in any way affect the meaning of the sentence. It seems to
me that the following (a) sentences, repeated from above, can be faithfully paraphrased by the (b) or (c) sentences, with the
corresponding definite description.
(iii) a. In this church, ministers are gay.
b. The ministers of this church are gay.
c. In this church, the ministers are gay.
(iv) a. Students own sports cars in this department.
b. The students of this department own sport cars.
c. The students own sports cars in this department.
(v) a. Family members are proud of John.
b. His family members are proud of him.
I conclude that the BPSs of these (a) sentences do not have the existential reading but rather Condoravdi's functional read-
ing. Thus, these (a) sentences are not counterexamples to claim (395a) of the standard BPS-generalization, that BPSs of
i-predicates lack the existential reading. I leave it open for the time being whether Condoravdi's functional reading of BPSs
is problematic for the proposal I am defending in this work.
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cannot take kind-level predicates, as shown in (412); furthermore, they display scope freedom w.r.t.
negation, as shown in (413).
(412) ?Students of this department are common/widespread.
(413) a. John didn't see students. *3 > >, 3
b. John didn't see students of this department. 3 > , > 3
The account for the lack of the existential reading of BPSs of i-predicates that I have presented
in section 3.3 crucially relied on the fact that BPSs can only take narrow scope w.r.t. the generic
operator which binds the time argument of the i-predicate. Thus, my proposal only applies to kind
BPSs but does not apply to non-kind BPSs, because of their free scope possibilities. In conclusion,
my proposal predicts the contrasts in (396)-(398), given that the BPSs in the (b) sentences are non-
kind BPs and thus nothing rules out their existential reading.
3.6.2 Second set of facts: BPSs associated with 'only'
von Fintel (1997) notes that the BPS of an i-predicate does get the existential reading when the
BPS is associated with 'only': "it is obvious that speakers who utter these sentences [(414)] do
not have to presuppose that professors in general are confident, [... ], that all intelligent people are
physicists [... ]. So, if what we feel these sentences as signaling about the speaker's presupposition is
a straightforward clue as to what the prejacent proposition is, we have to conclude that we are dealing
with existentially quantified prejacents. And that would be so even though the putative prejacents
uttered on their own are not readily understood existentially." Kiss (1998, p. 148) makes the same
point: she considers sentence (415) and notes that it "can also be true about a village in which only
a minority of women, but none of the men, have blue eyes." Thus, association with 'only' seems to
be a suitable device to build counterexamples to claim (395a) of the standard BPS-generalization.4
(414) a. Only professorsF are confident.
b. Only [intelligent people]F are physicists.
(415) In this village, only womenF have blue eyes.
Let me argue that these cases are fully compatible with my proposal. As recalled above, (kind) BPs
always take the narrowest possible scope. But Fox et al. (2001) note that BPs associated with 'only'
do take wide scope. They support this claim with the example (416): sentence (416a) sounds odd
because the existential BP 'books' can only take narrow scope w.r.t. negation, and thus the sentence
ends up saying that the censor has banned every book; in (416b) the same BP is associated with
'only' and the sentence feels fine, showing that the existential BP can scope above negation in this
case. I have no proposal to make as to why BPs behave in this special way when they associate with
'only'.
(416) We live in a regimented society where reading material is censored. The way this is done is
that once a week this guy comes over and provides us with a list of books and articles that
we are not allowed to read. The list is never the entire set of books or articles. In fact, there
is always plenty of reading material in accord with the values of the society. One week there
are no articles on the list.
a. ?He said that we shouldn't read books.
b. He only said that we shouldn't read BOOKS.
The proposal presented in section 3.3 only rules out the existential reading of (kind) BPSs of i-
predicates which are condemned to narrow scope w.r.t. the generic operator which binds the time
argument of the i-predicate. If the BPSs in (414) can have wide scope because of association with
46Kiss' example (415) might partially be confounded by the locative 'in this village', which might make the BP non-
kind denoting, as discussed in the preceding subsection (or else could make it receive Condoravdi's functional reading, as
discussed in footnote 45).
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'only' (for whatever reason), then the availability of their existential reading is fully compatible with
my proposal. 47
3.6.3 Third set of facts: generalized locatives?
Kiss (1998) and McNally (1998a) provide the examples in (417) with locatives; see also Dowty
(1979; p. 191, fn. 15) and Carlson (1977; par. 7.4). McNally comments that in these examples "the
locative property is temporally persistent and yet the BPs are construable as weak existentials". In
other words, BPSs of locative i-predicates admit the existential reading.
(417) a. Volcanoes line both sides of the river.
b. Large forests were on either side of the canyon.
c. Cities lie along that river.
d. Ruins were at the foot of the mountain.
Kratzer (1995) notes that the existential reading is available for the BPSs in (418). Kratzer concludes
from (418) that BPSs of passive and unaccusative i-predicates admit the existential reading.
(418) a. Counterexamples to this claim are known to me.
b. Ponds belong to this property.
Yet, the BPSs of other passive i-predicates, such as those in (419a), do not admit the existential
reading, contrary to (418a). Furthermore, there might just be something very special going on with
the predicate 'belong' in (418b), independently of it being unaccusative: 'belong' is related to the
i-predicate 'own', whose BPS surprisingly admits the existential reading, as in Fernald's example
(400), repeated in (419b).
(419) a. Italians are loved/hated by John.
b. Italians own this restaurant.
As pointed out by Diesing (1992, p. 46), it is exciting to note that the recalcitrant cases of locatives
in (417), 'know' in (418a) 'belong' in (418b) and 'own' in (419b) are exactly the cases which
exemplify the generalized notion of locatives explored in Gruber (1965), as can be seen from the
following quote from Jackendoff (1972): "with verbs of location, the Theme is defined as the NP
whose location is being asserted. In (420a)-(420c), we are dealing with physical location, and 'the
rock', 'John' and 'the book' are Themes. (420d)-(420f) involve possessional location, and 'the book'
is theme in each case. (420g) is an abstract analogue of possession, so 'the answer' is Theme."
(420) a. The rock stood in the corner.
b. John clung to the window sill.
c. Herman kept the book on the shelf.
d. Herman kept the book.
e. The book belongs to Herman.
f. Max owns the book.
g. Max knows the answer.
I thus tentatively suggest that these examples show that there is something very special going on in
the case of BPSs of locative and extended locative i-predicates. I have no concrete proposal to make
at this regard.48
47Kiss (1998) furthermore considers examples like (i) and observes that the BPS 'girls' can be construed existentially, i.e.
the sentence feels true if no boy knows math and only some girls do.
(i) GIRLS know mathematics the best in my school.
He thus concludes that contrastive focus, more generally, licenses existential BPSs of i-predicates. To get this parallelism
between association with 'only' and plain focus, it would be nice if the contrast in (416) still hold also when 'only' is replaced
by contrastive focus. I am not clear about the judgments.
48The case of locatives might indeed be very special. For instance, locatives provide a sharp exception to at least an-
other well known generalization concerning the i- vs s-predicates distinction. Portuguese has two copulas, 'ser' and 'estar'.
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3.6.4 Fourth set of facts: statives
Also the second half (395b) of the Standard BPS-Generalization has been criticized in the litera-
ture. Evidence against claim (395b) of the standard BPS-generalization comes from the fact that
i-predicates coerced into an s-level meaning still do not allow their BPSs to have an existential read-
ing. This point has been made for instance in Condoravdi (1992), McNally (1998a) and JiAger (2001).
For instance, McNally considers the examples (421) and (422) and comments as follows: in the con-
text described in (a), "the (b) examples below can have a reading that corresponds to quantification
over eventualities, a reading that only s-predicates are generally assumed to license [...]. In such
cases, Kratzer (1995) and others have suggested that i-predicates are COERCED into behaving as
stage level counterparts. Nonetheless, the bare plural in the (c) sentences cannot easily be construed
as weakly existential, as one might expect under coercion. For example, it is not sufficient for the
truth of (422c) that only two or three of the daffodils in the context are suddenly tall; instead, the
subordinate clause most naturally expresses a generalization about the contextually relevant set of
daffodils at some spatiotemporal index. [... ] The failure of coercion to affect the interpretation of
the bare plurals in the (c) examples indicates that the temporal properties of a state or the way in
which it is individuated in time do not affect the interpretation of the bare plural".
(421) a. In this town, firemen dye their hair every other day.
b. (When) blond, they have more fun.
c. Today, firemen are blond. *3-BPS
(422) a. The characters in "Alice in Wonderland" are constantly changing size at will by eating
and drinking various things.
b. (When) tall, Alice can't get through that tiny wooden door.
c. Alice knew that her animal friends could change size, but she was surprised to learn that
daffodils were suddenly very tall. *3-BPS
The main piece of evidence against claim (395b) of the standard BPS-generalization has to do with
adjectival predicates. For example, Kiss (1998) writes: "There are s-predicates that do not allow
[...] existentially interpreted BPSs. Such are almost all adjectival predicates. [...] Even though
these predicates express temporary, stage-level properties, their subjects cannot be interpreted ex-
istentially." Analogously, Higginbotham and Ramchand (1997) write that "generic interpretation is
the norm for predication of bare plurals in the simple present, rather than a feature that attaches to
i-predicates" since "if we survey examples over than the well known [...], we find that [BPSs of]
predicates of a generally transient nature resist existential interpretation." Some of these examples
are quoted in (423) and (424), from Higginbotham and Ramchand (1997), Cohen and Erteschik-Shir
(2002), Kiss (1998) and McNally (1998a). McNally comments on the examples in (424) as fol-
lows: despite the fact that the predicates in these examples "express transient states", "it is difficult
even with the facilitating context to interpret the bare plurals in these sentences as weak existentials.
Rather these sentences [... ] express generalizations over the denotations of their subjects in some
temporally constrained domain (if indeed they sound felicitous at all)."
(423) a. Children are fat / skinny / sick / joyful / sad.
Roughly, 'estar' patters with s-predicates (it cannot be used with true i-predicates, such as 'has blue eyes'; furthermore, it
yields a temporary reading of neutral predicates, such as 'happy'); 'es' patterns with i-predicates (it cannot be used with true
s-predicates, such as 'is pregnant'; furthermore, it yields a permanent reading for neutral predicates). As Schmitt (2005)
points out, locatives provide a blatant counterexample to this generalization: sentences (i) express permanent properties, and
nonetheless 'estar' is perfectly acceptable.
(i) a. A casa estA no fim da rua.
The house ESTAR in-the end of-the street.
'The house is in the end of the street'
b. As Montanhas Rochosas estio no Colorado.
The Rocky Mountains ESTAR in-the Colorado
'The Rocky Mountains are in Colorado.
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b. Stars are old / young.
c. People are rich.
d. Shoes are shiny.
e. Boys are brave.
f. People are on holiday.
g. People are at work.
h. People are on coffee break.
i. Girls are good at learning foreign languages.
(424) a. Committee members were bored until the Dean suddenly showed up.
b. Today, people in the office were in a good mood.
c. During the class, farmers were hungry / tired / cheerful.
d. Yesterday butter was old / fresh.
e. The diners complained because plates were dirty / greasy.
f. Turn on the dryer again because shirts are still damp.
Kiss (1998) adds the following contrast: contrary to the adjectival predicate 'to be noisy' in (425a),
"the verbal predicate corresponding to 'noisy' allows the existential reading of its BPS", as shown
in (425b). Overall, these examples show that lack of the existential reading of BPSs has nothing to
do with the temporal properties of the predicate, contrary to what asserted by claim (395b) of the
standard BPS-generalization. 49
(425) a. Children are noisy. *]-BPS
b. Children are making noise. B-BPS
In light of the examples (423) and (424), the examples in (421) and (422) don't really say much:
coercion transforms the i-predicates 'blond' and 'tall' into stative adjectives which behave just as
those in (423) and (424) with respect to the readings of their BPSs. The crucial counterexamples
against claim (395b) of the standard BPS-generalization are thus those in (423) and (424): non
persistent stative adjectives whose BPSs lack the existential reading. What's going on here? Here
is a very tentative suggestion. Following Chierchia (1995), I have suggested that i-predicates are
inherently generic, namely that they have a davidsonian argument which always ends up bound by a
generic operator, as in the truth conditions (276b) repeated in (426), analogous to those of habitual
s-predicates. To the extent that statives in general pattern like i-predicates, I thus have to maintain
that statives too are inherently generic, namely that their davidsonian argument is always bound by a
generic operator. I am not in a position to really defend this hypothesis on statives here. Yet, I would
like to suggest that it might not be implausible.
(426) a. John is tall.
49 There are two interesting contrasts discussed in Higginbotham and Ramchand (1997), that I have nothing to say about.
One contrast is (i): the BPS of the matrix clause (ia) can be construed existentially but the BPS of the embedded clause (ib)
does not seem to admit an existential construal.
(i) a. Firemen are available / on strike.
b. I consider firemen available / on strike.
Another contrast is (ii): that the BPS of sentence (iia) admits the existential reading but the one of sentence (iib) does not.
(ii) a. (Guess whether) firemen are nearby / at hand.
b. (Guess whether) firemen are far away / a mile up the road.
Higginbotham and Ramchand (1997) seem to make a big point out of the latter contrast (ii). Indeed, they write: "many of
these predicates [which allow for an existential BPS] involve the spatio-temporal proximity of the subject to the speaker. Thus
contrast (iia) with (iib). It seems that an insight into the issues here must take account of some notion involving the local
scene" (p. 66); and also: "although it would take us too far afield to consider all of the data here, the predicates that naturally
allow existential readings seem to us generally to involve, not merely spatio-temporal location, but spatio temporal proximity
to the speaker. This special class does not appear to be structurally distinguished in any way" (p. 56).
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b. GENt[in(j, t)] [[tall](j, t)]
Indeed, this hypothesis on statives is very close in spirit to the old characterization of statives in terms
of the SUBINTERVAL PROPERTY suggested by Bennett and Partee (1972). This characterization
says that, whenever a stative holds of an individual at a given interval, it holds of that individual
at any subinterval. As a matter of fact, this characterization of statives sounds very similar to my
characterization (227) of an i-predicate such as 'tall', according to which, if it holds of an individual
at a given time, it always holds of that individual. Another way to make sense of the hypothesis that
statives are inherently generics is to consider their behavior w.r.t. modification. I-predicates such
as 'tall' do not allow temporal modification, as shown in (427a). The stative adjectives in (423) of
course do, as shown in (427b). Yet, these stative adjectives do not allow locative modification, as
shown in (427c); see Maienborn (2001) for arguments in favor of this latter claim.
(427) a. ?Yesterday, John was tall.
b. Yesterday, John was sleepy.
c. ?John was sleepy in his car.
In Subsection 3.2, I have interpreted the oddness triggered by the tense modification in (427a) as
evidence for assumption (227) that 'tall' is persistent w.r.t. time. Since (427b) is fine, then these
stative adjectives are not persistent w.r.t. time. Throughout this paper, I have construed Davidsonian
arguments in the simplest possible way, namely as times. With this choice, there is no way to get
the analogy between the ban against temporal modification in (427a) and locative modification in
(427c). Yet, this assumption on davidsonian arguments is of course an oversimplification. Thus,
assume that davidsonian arguments have a richer ontological nature, say they are spatio-temporal
situations. Now, I could get the analogy between (427a) and (427c) by assuming that these stative
adjectives which do not allow locative modification are persistent too, only not w.r.t. time but rather,
say, w.r.t. the space coordinate of their davidsonian argument. By analogy with (426), I could then
posit something like (428). See for instance Deal (2008) for analogies between time and spatial
locations.
(428) a. John is sleepy.
b. GEN [in(j, £)] [[sleepy](j, £)]
I could thus repeat for the BPSs of the adjectives in (423) the account presented in section 3.3 for the
BPSs of i-predicates, replacing the time argument with situations or locations. This line of reasoning
of course predicts that, if a stative does allow for local modification, then its BPS is not prevented
from getting the existential reading. And the data in (429) indeed show that those statives that do
admit locative modification also allow their BPS to be construe existentially.
(429) a. Firemen are available on Cambridge street.
b. Stars are visible on the north portion of the sky.
c. Students were present at the meeting.
Furthermore, this line of reasoning would predict a Fox's effect analogous to (369) also for the BPSs
of the adjectives in (423): embedding under a universal operator should rescue the existential reading
of the BPS of these statives. As a matter of fact, the existential reading of the BPS 'children' seems
more readily available in (430b) than in (430a).
(430) a. Children are sick.
b. Every day, children are sick.
I thus tentatively conclude that the examples in (423) do not really argue against correlating the lack
of existential BPSs with persistence of the predicate but rather against persistence being construed
only in terms of time. But I leave it open for the time being how exactly this intuition should be
spelled out.
3.7 Overt universal Q-adverbs
As shown in (431), i-predicates cannot occur with an overt universal Q-adverb such as 'always' or
'often', contrary to s-predicates.
(431) a. #John is always tall.
b. John is always available.
The oddness of sentence (431 a) is particularly puzzling for my proposal. In fact, consider sentence
(431a), repeated below in (432a), next to the fine sentence (432b) without overt 'always'. The
obvious LF of the odd sentence (432a) is o in (433a). At the end of section 3.2, I have suggested
that the LF of the fine sentence (432b) is 0 in (433b), with the generic operator GEN. Under the
assumption that the quantificational force of 'always' and the generic operator GEN are the same, the
contrast in (432) is surprising.
(432) a. #John is always tall.
b. John is tall.
(433) a. o = [ alwayst [ John tall(t) ] ].
b. 1P = [ GENt [ John tall(t) ] ].
In this section, I argue that the contrast in (432) can be accounted for in the same way in section 2.4
I have accounted for the contrasts in (171)-(175), one of which is repeated in (434).
(434) In a context where all children inherit the last name of their father:
a. ?Every child of couple C has a French last name.
b. The children of couple C have a French last name.
My argument exploits the following parallelism: sentence (434a) competes with sentence (434b),
where the universal quantifier is replaced by a definite; and this latter sentence (434) triggers a ho-
mogeneity presupposition; in the same way, sentence (432a) competes with sentence (432b), where
'always' is replaced by the covert generic operator GEN; and this latter sentence (432b) triggers a
homogeneity presupposition too. For a discussion of the parallelism between the definite article and
the generic operator, see for instance Ferreira (2005). To stress the analogy between the two accounts
for the contrasts in (432) and (434), Table 3.8 summarizes the main steps of the two accounts, one
next to the other.
Account Of course, the two LFs b and so in (433) have the same meaning; nonetheless, they
crucially have different presuppositions. As argued for example in von Fintel (1997), the covert
generic operator GEN carries the homogeneity presupposition in (435), namely that the nuclear scope
of GEN holds of each item in its restrictive clause or else is false for each such item. The homogeneity
presupposition can be detected by means of negation: the sentence 'It's false that John smokes'
conveys that he never smokes, which is different from the plain meaning (namely that "it is false that
John always smokes") but does follow from the plain meaning plus the homogeneity presupposition.
No such presupposition is carried by overt 'always'.
(435) [GENx,...,vn[(l,.,[n)][(Vl,...,vn)]]= Aw: YES" VNOw. YES"
a. YESw = iff P(v, . .., vn) for all v, ..., vn s.t. a(vi, ..., Vn);
b. NO" = 1 iff -,'(v,..., Vn) for all vi,..., v, s.t. aw(vl,..., Vn).
In the case of 1 in (433b), the generic operator binds a single variable, namely time; thus, the
homogeneity presupposition of b according to (435) boils down to (436b), namely that "either John
is tall at every time he is alive or he is never tall." No such presupposition is carried by o in (433a),
as stated in (436a), where I am ignoring other potential presuppositions irrelevant to my point. Let
me assume that 'always' and GEN are Horn-mates. Of course, Op,,. asymmetrically entails pP,.
Thus, the blind strengthened presupposition of s boils down to EXHpr (so) = Wpms A pr = -- 0pr 
This strengthened presupposition is a contradiction given common knowledge Wk in (227), since
Wek entails pr, namely that John is either always tall or else he never is. The oddness of sentence
(431a) is thus predicted.
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?Every the children of that couple
have a foreign last name.
?John is always tall.
(1) LF AND PRESUPPOSITIONS
Jolwhn is tall
VP always C
every children
has a last name...
Dprs =W (pr =
(2) ASSUMPTION ON HORN SCALES
('every child', 'the children') ('always', GEN)
(3) SET OF SCALAR ALTERNATIVES
Alt(pr,,) = pr}, where p,,,r is the presupposition of b defined as follows
pGEN C John 
is tall
the children
have a last name...
Both the definite and the generic operator bear the homogeneity presupposition;
see Fodor (1970), Ltbner (1985), von Fintel (1997), Gajewski (2005), Ferreira (2005)
Opro. = Aw. [Vx[[VP]W(x)]]I V [x[VP W(X)]
bprs = Aw. [GENt[[tall]W (j, t)]] V [GENt[-[tallw (j, t)]]
(4) SET OF EXCLUDABLE ALTERNATIVES
Xcld(Ppr,) = {1P, }, since pr,, A -nbPr, is true e.g. in the following world
John Bill Tom C'(-) A in'(j, 
-)
foreign: / / [tall]w (j..)
not-foreign: V
(5) CONCLUSION
The blind strengthened presupposition is EXH(CprB) = prs A Abprs = -bproI
which contradicts common knowledge
Table 3.8: Parallelism between the account for the oddness of sentence (434a) presented in section 2.4 and the
account for the oddness for sentence (431 a) presented in this section.
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(436) a. Opr,
. 
=W.
b. prs, = YES U NO,
i. YES = {wI [tall]j(j, t), for every t such that in (j, t)},
ii. NO = {w I -,[tall](j, t), for every t such that inw(j, t)}.
As already noted in section 3.1, Kratzer (1995) points out that sentence (431a), repeated once more
in (437a), turns fine if the definite 'John' is replaced by either a BP or an indefinite, as in o in (437b).
(437) a. ?John is always tall.
b. W = Firemen / a fireman are / is always tall.
Let me show how the contrast in (437) follows from my proposal. Consider the alternative 0 in
(438), where the overt Q-adverb 'always' has been replaced by the covert generic operator GEN.
(438) b = Firemen / a fireman are / is GEN tall.
In the case of o and 0 in (437b) and (438), the Q-adverbs GEN and 'always' are quantifying both
over times and over firemen; see Lewis (1975), Heim (1988) and Diesing (1992) among others for
a discussion of unselective binding. Thus, the homogeneity presupposition for b in (438) becomes
(439b) in this case. Again, V)o
, 
asymmetrically entails V and the strengthened presupposition of o
boils down to EXHprs () = sOprs A 'Ipprs = --'pr.. But this time, -0pr, is not a contradiction given
the common knowledge Wk in (227), since there are of course worlds compatible with common
knowledge where 2bpr, is false because some firemen are tall while others are not. The felicity of
sentences (437b) is thus predicted.
(439) a. Opr, = W.
b. p, = YES U NO,
i. YES wI [tall](x, t), for every z, t s.t.[firemen] w (x) and in'(x, t) f'
. NO= [ -tall ] (x,t), forevery zx, t s.t.
ii. NO = w [firemen] w(x) and inW(x,t) 5
This account furthermore predicts that sentences of the type of (437b) - with a BPS, an i-predicate
and 'always' - should sound odd in cases where common knowledge entails that the individuals
denoted by the BPS are homogeneous with respect to the property denoted by the i-predicate. This
prediction seems to be borne out by the contrast in (440), pointed out to me by Danny Fox (p.c.): sen-
tence (440a) with overt 'always' sounds odd despite the presence of the BPS (if 'a difficult language'
is given wide scope and taken to refer to Hebrew).
(440) a. W = ?Hebrew speakers always know a very difficult language.
b. 0 = Hebrew speakers know a very difficult language.
The presuppositions of W and V) in (440) are as in (441). Again, the strengthened presupposition of p
in (440a) entails --,,bp, in (441b), which in this case does mismatch with common knowledge, since
common knowledge entails that all Hebrew speakers speak the same language, which is either hard
(hence YES is true) or easy (hence NO is true).
(441) a. prs,, = W.
b. Opr = YES U NO,
i. YES = w [know ... 
](x, t ) , for e ve ry z, t 
s
.t.
S[Hebrew speaker] (x) and in (x, t) '
i. NO - w -i[know ... ](x, t), for every x, t s.t.
. -= [Hebrew speaker]w (x) and inw(xt) f.
The case of sentence (440) just considered is of course analogous to the case of sentence (245c)
considered in section 3.1.
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Part II
Constraint promotion and
the OT on-line model for the
acquisition of phonology

3. vr nvra -deb 3
Abstract of Part H - The second half of this dissertation develops a theory of update rules for
the OT on-line algorithm that perform constraint promotion too, besides demotion: it motivates the
need for such rules; it develops techniques to prove their finite time convergence; and it starts the
investigation of their properties. Chapter 4 explains why we need constraint promotion. More in
detail, this chapter introduces the OT on-line model for the acquisition of phonology; it systematizes
within a unified framework various existing results on update rules for the OT on-line model, un-
derscoring the fact that no convergent update rules that perform promotion too have been proposed
so far in the literature; finally, it motivates the need for update rules that perform promotion too by
arguing that demotion-only update rules are unsuited to model the early stage of the acquisition of
phonology prior to morphological awareness, when the learner can only posit fully faithful underly-
ing forms. Chapter 5 shows how to get constraint promotion. More in detail, this chapter presents
two different techniques to prove finite time convergence for a variety of update rules that perform
promotion too. One technique shares the combinatoric flavor of Tesar and Smolensky's analysis of
demotion-only update rules. The other technique is very different, and consists of a strategy to adapt
to OT results from the theory of on-line algorithms for linear classification. The latter technique
has various consequences interesting on their own, explored in Chapter 8. In particular, it entails
that linear OT has no computational advantage over standard OT, contrary to what has been recently
suggested by various scholars. Chapter 6 starts the investigation of the properties of update rules
that perform promotion too, concentrating on the characterization of the final vector. More in detail,
this chapter presents an invariant on the (dual) vector entertained by the OT on-line algorithm with
a promotion-demotion update rule; it shows how to use this invariant in order to characterize the
final vector entertained by the algorithm, by discussing a few examples; finally, it puts forward the
conjecture that the strong internal symmetry of phonotactics comparative tableaux might enable the
OT on-line model run with a promotion-demotion update rule to learn much of the phonotactics of
the target language. Chapter 7 carries further the investigation of promotion-demotion update rules,
concentrating on the number of updates. More in detail, this chapter shows that the number of up-
dates required by update rules that perform promotion too may be large and it attempts at making
sense of this fact by showing that the problem of the acquisition of phonology, construed as the OT
Subset problem, is NP-complete.
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Chapter 4
Why we need constraint promotion
A number of computational models for the acquisition of phonology within OT have been put for-
ward in the recent literature. In the second part of my dissertation, I concentrate on the OT ON-LINE
MODEL, see for instance Tesar and Smolensky (1998, 2000), Boersma and Levelt (2000) and Curtin
and Zuraw (2002). This is the simplest and most primitive among existing models. And it is also
the most widely used (or, at least, assumed) model in the non-computational acquisitional literature.
It therefore deserves a close investigation. In a nutshell, the idea of the model is as follows: the
learner holds at every time a current ranking; gets a piece of data; consequently updates its current
ranking by promoting and/or demoting certain constraints. Section 4.2 describes the general shape
of the model. The crucial ingredient of the model is the update rule used to move from one ranking
to the next. There has been an intense discussion on update rules for the on-line model in the recent
computational OT literature. One of the hot issues of this literature is whether constraint re-ranking
should happen by demotion only or by promotion only or by both promotion and demotion. Various
successful demotion-only update rules have been presented in the literature, while the search for up-
date rules that perform promotion too has failed so far. Sections 4.2.2-4.2.6 offer a detailed review
of the state of the art on update rules for the OT on-line model. There has been less discussion of
the issue of constraint promotion versus demotion in the empirical acquisitional literature. Fikkert
and De Hoop (2009) raise the question: "Does the (re)ranking of constraints involve the demotion
of markedness constraints, the promotion of faithfulness constraints, or can it be achieved by both
the demotion and the promotion of constraints?" (p. 311). But they leave the issue open and seem
to suggest that the issue only has theoretical significance: "Although in practice the two approaches
[constraint promotion and constraint demotion] are highly similar, conceptually they are different"
(p. 319). Gnanadesikan (2004) explicitly considers the hypothesis of constraint promotion: "The
process of acquisition is one of promoting the faithfulness constraints to approximate more and
more closely the adult grammar, and produce more and more marked forms. The path of acquisition
will vary from child to child, as different children promote the various faithfulness constraints in
different orders" (p. 73). But she does not provide arguments in favor of her hypothesis that learning
happens through constraint promotion, nor does she make explicit the details of the promotion up-
date rule she is positing. Bernhardt and Stemberger (1998) and Stemberger and Bernhardt (1999) too
explicitly defend constraint promotion: "We are unsure as to how constraints are generally re-ranked.
They may always be re-ranked higher. [...] We suggest that the typical way that children learn the
ranking of constraints is to re-rank faithfulness constraints so that faithfulness increases" (1999).
They defend their claim in favor of constraint promotion by discussing a few specific cases; see also
Stemberger et al. (1999) and Stemberger and Bernhardt (2001). In section 4.3.4, I take up this issue
and provide a very general and straightforward argument in favor of update rules that perform both
promotion and demotion. The argument in a nutshell is that demotion-only is not suitable in order
to model the early stage of the acquisition of phonology as described in Hayes (2004), namely the
stage prior to morphological awareness, when the learner cannot take advantage of alternations and
thus can plausibly only posit fully faithful underlying forms. In conclusion, this chapter opens the
research project of devising and investigating update rules for the OT on-line model that perform
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promotion too. The rest of this dissertation will lay out the beginning of this research project: chap-
ter 5 will show how to get constraint promotion and chapters 6 and 7 will show how to study the
corresponding OT on-line algorithm.
4.1 OT preliminaries
This section provides background definitions and results on the framework of standard OT, as defined
in Prince and Smolensky (2004). Subsection 4.1.1 quickly reviews the basic framework, in order to
establish the notation. Subsection 4.1.2 introduces a better representation for OT data in terms of
comparative rows, after Prince (2002) and Tesar (1995). Finally, subsection 4.1.3 introduces a better
representation for OT hypotheses in terms of ranking vectors, after Boersma (1997).
4.1.1 OT basics
I will denote by X the set of UNDERLYING FORMS and by Y the set of SURFACE FORMS. I will
denote by Gen : x E X - Gen(x) C Y the GENERATING FUNCTION. Finally, I will denote
by C the CONSTRAINT SET. I will always assume that there is a finite1 number n of constraints
C1,... , Cn : (x, y) E X x Gen(x) F- N. These four ingredients (X, Y, Gen, C) are called the
UNIVERSAL SPECIFICATIONS of a typology. An example of universal specifications is provided in
(1): the set of underlying forms X and the set of surface forms Y coincide; the generating function
Gen is only allowed to modify voicing, but does not perform either deletion or epenthesis; the
constraint set C contains a markedness constraint against voiced obstruents and two variants of the
faithfulness constraint for voicing, a general and a positional one.
(1) a. X = /ta, Ida/, /rat/, /rad/}
b. Y = [ta], [da], [rat], [rad] }
c. Gen(Ita/) = Gen(/da/) = {[ta], [da]}
Gen(/rat/) = Gen(Irad/) = {[rat], [rad]}
SFpos = IDENT[VOICE]/ONSET,
d. C= Fen = IDENT[VOICE],
M = *[+VOICE, -SONORANT] J
Given an underlying form x E X, let Gen(x) be the corresponding set of CANDIDATES. Consider
two candidates y*, y E Gen(x) and let's call y* a WINNER candidate and y a LOSER candidate. The
basic data units in OT are UNDERLYING/WINNER/LOSER FORM TRIPLETS (x, y*, y) as in (2a): the
first item of the triplet is the underlying form x, the second item is the intended winner candidate y*,
and the third item is a loser candidate y. A concrete example of such a triplet is provided in (2b) for
the case of the typology in (1).
(2) a. winner b. winnerI I
( X, y*, y ) (Irad/, [rat], [rad])I I
loser loser
An hypothesis in OT is a RANKING, namely a linear order > on the constraint set C. An example
of ranking over the constraint set in (ld) is provided in (3): this ranking sandwiches the markedness
constraint in between the two faithfulness constraints, with the positional faithfulness constraint
ranked at the top. Given an arbitrary ranking >>, I can assume without loss of generality that it is
I It turns out that this hypothesis that the constraint set be finite is in no way necessary. The theory developed in this work
extends straightforwardly to a framework with an infinite number of constraints C1, 2,..., as long as any pair (x, y) of
an underlying form x E X' and a corresponding candidate y E Gen(x) can violate only afinite number n of constraints,
namely Ck (x, V) = 0 for all constraints Ck but at most a finite number of them.
Why we need constraint promotion
C1 >> 2 >> ... >> Cn, since the numerical labels assigned to the constraints are arbitrary to start
with.
(3) Fpos0 >> M > Fgen
The definition of OT-COMPATIBILITY in (4a) links together a data unit, namely an underlying/winner/loser
form triplet, with an hypothesis, namely a ranking. For instance, the ranking in (3) is OT-compatible
with the triplet in (2b) according to the definition (4a).2
(4) a. A ranking >> is called OT-COMPATIBLE with an underlying/winner/loser form triplet
(x, y*, y) iff the highest >>-ranked constraint that distinguishes between the two pairs
(x, y*) and (x, y) assigns fewer violations to the pair (x, y*) than to the pair (x, y).
b. A ranking >> is called OT-COMPATIBLE with a set of underlying/winner/loser form
triplets iff it is OT-compatible with each of them according to (4a).
c. A set set of underlying/winner/loser form triplets is called OT-COMPATIBLE iff it is OT-
compatible with at least one ranking according to (4b).
The notion of OT-compatibility in (4) has the following important property: given a ranking > and
the set of candidates Gen(x) corresponding to an underlying form x, there exists one and only one
candidate y* E Gen(x) such that > is OT-compatible with the underlying/winner/loser form triplet
(x, y*, y) for every candidate y E Gen(x) different from this designated candidate y*. Thus, the OT-
GRAMMAR OT> : x E X 'F-+ Gen(x) corresponding to a ranking >> can be defined as in (5) for any
underlying form x. Note that all OT-grammars corresponding to the same universal specifications
are assumed to have the same domain X, according to the RICHNESS OF THE BASE assumption.
(5) OT> (x) = y* iff > is OT-compatible with the underlying/winner/loser form triplet (x, y*, y)
for every candidate y E Gen(x) different from y*.
For instance, the OT-grammar corresponding to the ranking in (3) is described in (6). Since Fpos is
>>-ranked above M, it lets /da/ surface faithfully. Since M is ranked above Fgen, it neutralizes the
final voicing of/rad/.
(6) OT> (/ta/) = [ta] OT> (Ida/) = [da]
OT> (/rat/) = [rat] OT> (/rad/) = [rat]
The LANGUAGE 1Z(OT>) generated by the ranking >> is the range of the function OT>, namely
the set of those surface forms y E Y that are attainable through >>, namely such that there exists at
least one underlying form x G X such that the OT-grammar OT> maps that underlying form x into
that surface form y. The language corresponding to the ranking >> in (3) is the one in (7).
(7) { [da], [ta], [rat] }
Before I conclude, let me note that there are of course alternative, more direct ways of defining
an OT grammar OT>>, besides (5). For instance, one might define OT>> (x) as the maximum over
Gen(x) w.r.t. a properly defined total order induced by the ranking >>. Here, I have chosen a more
indirect way, whereby the notion of OT-compatibility (4) takes the foreground, and the notion of OT
grammar is derived from that, as in (5). As it will become clear as we proceed, this way is best suited
to the perspective adopted in this work.
2The notion of OT compatibility (4a) can also be restated as follows. Given an underlying/winner/loser form triplet
(x, y*, y), consider the corresponding vector W = (-d, . . ., k, ... , Zn) of Rn whose generic kth component dk is defined
as the difference between the number of violations Ck (x, y) assigned by constraint Ck to the loser pair (x, y) and the number
of violations Ck (x, y*) assigned by that same constraint to the winner pair (x, y*), namely Zk = k(X, Y) - Ck(x, y*).
Then, a triplet (x, y*, y) and a ranking > are OT-compatible iff the vector K, obtained by reshuffling the components of
according to the linear order >, is lexicographically positive. From this perspective, I think that the OT framework was very
popular in the operation research literature in the seventies; see for instance Fishburn (1974) for a review.
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4.1.2 OT with comparative rows
Given an underlying/winner/loser form triplet (x, y*, y), we can classify a given constraint Ck as in
(8). In words, WINNER-PREFERRING constraints are those that assign less violations to the winner
pair (x, y*) than to the loser pair (x, y); vice versa, LOSER-PREFERRING constraints are those that
assign more violations to the winner pair (x, y*) than to the loser pair (x, y). Of course, a constraint
can be neither winner- nor loser-preferring if it assigns the same number of violations to the two
pairs, in which case it is called EVEN. Winner- and loser-preferring constraints together are also
called ACTIVE.
(8) a. Constraint Ck is called WINNER-PREFERRER iff Ck(X, y*) < Ck(X, y);
b. constraint Ck is called LOSER-PREFERRER iff Ck(X, y*) > Ck(X, y);
c. constraint Ck is called EVEN iff Ck(X, y*) = Ck(X, y).
Consider again the underlying/winner/loser form triplet (2b). We usually represent the relevant
information concerning this triplet in the form of the OT-tableau (9). Crucially, this representation
(9) encodes the actual number of constraint violations, as the number of stars in a given cell.
(9) winner
/rad/l o Fge I M
[rad] 11. 1 1
(/rad/, [rat], [rad])
loser
Yet, the definition (4) of OT-compatibility does not really care about the actual number of constraint
violations. It only cares about whether a given constraint is winner-preferring or loser-preferring or
neither. Thus, let's replace the overabundant representation (9) with the sharper representation (10).
(10) winner
I Fpo0  Fgen M
(/rad/, [rat], [rad]) == [ INACTIVE LOSER-PREFERRER WINNER-PREFERRER ]I
loser
Let me abbreviate (10) as in (11) by means of the three symbols w, L and E that stand for winner-
preferring, loser-preferring and even or inactive, respectively. Thus, all the information we really
need concerning the underlying/winner/loser form triplet (2b) is just this row with entries equal to
either L, or E, or W, one for every constraint.
(11) winner
I Fpos Fgen M
(/rad/, [rat], [rad]) =4- [ E L W ]
I
loser
These considerations lead to the following developments. After Tesar (1995) and Prince (2002), let
me say that a COMPARATIVE TABLEAU is a table of the form (12), with n columns (one for every
constraint) and an arbitrary number (say m) of rows, whose elements are w's, L's and E's. I will say
that the kth column of the tableau CORRESPONDS to the kth constraint Ck. I will denote an arbitrary
comparative tableau by A. I will also write A E {L, E, W}mxn to make explicit the number m of
rows and the number n of columns. I will call an arbitrary row of Aa COMPARATIVE ROW 3 ; I
will denote it by a; and I will denote by (ai,.. . , ak,. .. ,an) the n entries ak E {L, E, W} of the
comparative row a. I will often omit E's for the sake of readability.
3 Various alternative names for comparative rows have been used in the literature: Prince (2002) calls them ELEMENTARY
RANKING CONDITIONS; Tesar and Smolensky call them MARK DATA PAIRS.
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(12) C1 ... Ck ... Cn
W L W L E
A = L W W E E m rows
E W W L L
n columns
Let me introduce next the new notion of OT-COMPATIBILITY in (13), as a purely combinatoric
relation that holds between a ranking and a comparative row or tableau.
(13) a. A ranking > is called OT-COMPATIBLE with a comparative row a iff the highest >-
ranked active constraint is a winner-preferring constraint.
b. A ranking > is called OT-COMPATIBLE with a comparative row A iff it is OT-compatible
with each of its rows according to (13a).
c. A comparative tableau A is called OT-COMPATIBLE iff A is OT-compatible with at least
one ranking according to (13b).
A ranking > is OT-compatible with an underlying/winner/loser form triplet according to the old no-
tion of OT-compatibility (4a) iff > is OT-compatible according to the new notion of OT-compatibility
(13a) with the comparative row corresponding to that triplet according to (14). Furthermore, a
ranking > is OT-compatible with a set of underlying/winner/loser form triplets according to the
old notion of OT-compatibility (4b) iff > is OT-compatible according to the new notion of OT-
compatibility (13b) with the comparative tableau obtained by organizing one underneath the other
(in any order) the comparative rows corresponding to those triplets according to (14).
(14) winner
1(X7*, y) a [a ... ak ... an
Sw if Ck is winner-preferring
loser where ak L if Ck is loser-preferring
E if Ck is inactive
Throughout this work, I will assume that the OT on-line algorithm is given as input an OT-compatible
comparative tableau. It is therefore useful to have good characterizations of comparative tableaux
that are OT-compatible according to (13c). To start, note that OT-compatibility can obviously be
made pictorially explicit as follows: a ranking > is OT-compatible with a comparative tableau A iff,
once the n columns of A are reordered from left to right in decreasing order according to >, then the
leftmost non-E entry of every row of the reordered tableau is a w. To illustrate again with the typol-
ogy in (1), consider the set of underlying/winner/loser form triplets { (Ida/, [da], [ta]), (/rad/, [rat], [rad])}.
The corresponding comparative tableau is (15a). There is only one ranking OT-compatible with this
set of triplets according to definition (4b), namely the ranking Fpos > M > Fgen in (3). If the
columns of the tableau in (15a) are reordered according to this ranking from left to right in decreas-
ing order, we get the tableau (15b), which is the one in (15a) with the last two columns switched.
The tableau (15b) thus obtained has the property that the leftmost non-E symbol of every row is a W.
No other ordering of the columns of the tableau in (15a) has this property.
(15) a. winners
FpoS Fgen M
(/da/, [da], [ta]) W W L
(/rad/, [rat], [rad]) E L WI
losers
b. Fpos M Fgen
E W L
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The following claim 1 slightly sharpens the characterization of OT-compatibility just discussed; a
very different characterization will be offered by claim 41 in chapter 8. I adopt here the following
piece of notation. Consider a comparative row a = (a,,..., an) and a ranking >>. Let dec> (a)
be the >>-DECISIVE constraint for the comparative row a, namely the >>-highest ranked active con-
straint, as defined in (16a). Definition (13a) thus says that > is OT-compatible with the comparative
row a iff the >>-decisive constraint dec> (a) for that row a is a winner-preferring constraint. Con-
sider a comparative tableau A and a ranking >>. For every constraint k = 1, . . ., n, let dec> (k) be
the set of those rows of the tableau A whose >>-decisive constraint is Ck, as defined in (16b).
(16) a. dec> (a) max Ok ak E}
b. dec (Ck) = {a dec> (a) = Ck
If > is OT-compatible with A, then (16b) can be made more explicit as in (17a). As noted above, I
can assume without loss of generality that this OT-compatible ranking >> is C >> C2 > ... > Cn,
since the labeling of the constraints is arbitrary to start with. Under this assumption, (17a) becomes
(17b). I this case, I will simplify the notation by dropping the subscript >>, thus writing just dec(k).
(17) a. dec> (Ck)= a=(a, ... a n) a=
b.a = E for every Ch > k
b. dec(Ck)= a = (a1,...,an) a=W...a 1 E
Ia, = ... = ak-1 = E
Claim 1 A comparative tableau A is OT-compatible iff there exists an integer d < n such that
A can be brought into the form (18) by reordering its rows and its columns and by relabeling the
constraints.
C 1  C 2  ... Cd Cd+1 ... Cn
W
dec(C1) I ... ... ... ... .. .
W
dec(C2)
(18)
E W
I I
E W
E E
I I
E E
E E W
dec(Cd) I E ... I ... ... ...
E E W
d columns n-d columns
In words: the rows in the first block start with a w, followed by arbitrary entries; the rows in the
second block start with an E and a w, followed by arbitrary entries; and so on, until the rows in the
last block that start with d - 1 E's and a w, followed by arbitrary entries.
Proof Let > be a ranking OT-compatible with A. Partition the rows of A into the sets dec> (Ck) for
every constraint k = 1, ... , n. Some of these sets dec> (Ck) might of course be empty. Let d < n
be the total number of constraints Ck such that dec> (Ck) is non-empty. Relabel the constraints so
that these d constraints are C1,..., Ca and that C1 is the >>-highest ranked among {Ci,..., Ca},
C2 is the next >>-highest ranked among {C,..., Ca}, ... Od is the >>-bottom ranked among
{C1, . . ., Cad}. Reorder the columns of A as follows: let the leftmost column be the one correspond-
ing to Cl; let the second left-most column be the one corresponding to 02 ; ... let the dth left-most
column be the one corresponding to Ca; let the remaining columns be the ones corresponding to the
remaining constraints, in any order. Furthermore, reorder the rows of A as follows: let the top rows
be the ones in dec> (C01); let the next top rows be the ones in dec> (02 ); and so on. The comparative
tableau A thus reordered has the form (18). U
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To conclude this discussion of OT-compatible comparative tableaux, let me introduce and briefly
comment on the equivalence relation over comparative tableaux in (19).
(19) Two comparative tableaux A e {L,E,W}mxn and A' E {L,E,W}m ' xn (with the same
number n of columns but possibly different numbers m and m' of rows) are called OT-
EQUIVALENT iff any ranking is OT-compatible with A iff it is OT-compatible with A'.
There are a number of operations that transform a comparative tableau A into a new comparative
tableau A' OT-equivalent to it; see Prince (2002) for more discussion. Here, I only discuss two
such operations, that will often be useful in what follows. Here is a first operation that obviously
preserves OT-compatibility: if a row of a comparative tableau A contains no entries equal to L, then
A is OT-equivalent to the tableau A' obtained from A by suppressing that row. Here is another
operation that preserves OT-compatibility: if a row of a comparative tableau A contains £ entries
equal to L, then A is equivalent to the tableau A' obtained from A by replacing that row with £ rows
identical to it but for the fact that each of them retains only one of the original £ entries equal to L
while the others are replaced by E's. The latter operation is illustrated in (20) w.r.t. the last row of
the comparative tableau A.
W L WW L W
(20) A= w L W = A' W= L W
W W L
W W L L L W W L
These simple considerations prove claim 2. This claim entails in particular that I can restrict myself
without loss of generality to comparative tableaux that have the property that each one of their rows
contains one and only one entry equal to L.
Claim 2 For every comparative tableau A there is another comparative tableau A' such that A is
OT-equivalent to A, has exactly one entry equal to L per row and has a number of rows polynomial
in the number of rows and columns of A.
4.1.3 OT with ranking vectors
So far, I have represented rankings as total orders on the constraint set. As noted in Boersma (1997,
2008), a ranking over n constraints can equivalently be represented as an n-tuple of numbers, exploit-
ing the natural ordering between numbers. To introduce the idea, consider again the three constraints
in (ld), repeated in (21).
(21) C1 = Fpos = IDENT[ONSET][VOICE],
C 2  = Fgen = IDENT[VOICE],
Ca = M = *[+VOICE, -SONORANT].
Let's pair up each one of these three constraints C1, C 2 and C 3 with an arbitrary number, for instance
with the three numbers 01, 02 and 03 in (22).
(22) C1 Fp0os C2 Fgen C3 = MII I
01 = 100 02 = 2 03 = 50
As noted in (23), this triplet 0 = (01, 02, 03) intuitively univocally represents the ranking in (3):
the positional faithfulness constraint C1 = Fpo. is top ranked, because it corresponds to the largest
number 01 = 100; the general faithfulness constraint C2 = Fgen is bottom ranked, because it cor-
responds to the smallest number 02 = 2; the markedness constraint C 3 = M is ranked in between,
because its corresponding number 03 = 50 lies in between the two numbers corresponding to the
two faithfulness constraints.
Fpos Fgen M
(23) 0 = (100 2 50) Fpos > M > Fgen
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It is crucial for the correspondence in (23) to hold that the three numbers 01, 92 and 03 are all distinct.
What if among these three numbers there are, say, two that are identical? Well, we might think of
the corresponding triplet 0 = (01, 02, 03) as representing two different rankings "at the same time".
An example is provided in (24): the numbers assigned to the markedness constraint M and to the
general faithfulness constraint Fgen tie; thus, this triplet 0 can be interpreted as representing two
different rankings at the same time, depending on how the tie between the markedness constraint M
and the general faithfulness constraint Fgen is resolved. We can think of these two rankings as two
different ways of "refining" the tie in the triplet 0.
Fpo. Fien M > Fos M > Pgen
(24) 0= (100 50 50) Fpos > Fgen
Fpos > Fgen > M
These considerations can be generalized as follows. After Boersma (1997), let me say that a RANK-
ING VECTOR is an n-tuple 0 of numbers 0, ... , On (one for every constraint), as in (25). The kth
component Ok of 0 is called the RANKING VALUE of the corresponding constraint Ck.
C1  ... Ck ... Cn(25) o= ( O, ... Ok, ... On ).
Given a comparative row a = (a 1, ... , an), let me denote by W(a) and by L(a) the corresponding
sets of winner- and loser-preferring constraints, as in (26). These two sets capture all the relevant
information concerning the comparative row a. The constraints in W(a) U L(a) are the active ones.
(26) W(a) = k E {1,... ,n} ak = W = set of winner-preferring constraints
L(a) = k E {1,... In} ak = L = set of loser-preferring constraints
Let me now introduce the new notion of OT-compatibility in (27), as a combinatoric relation that
holds between a comparative row or tableau and a ranking vector.
(27) a. A ranking vector 0 = (01,..., On) is called OT-COMPATIBLE with a comparative row a
iff the condition max Ok > max Oh holds.k W(a) h6L(a)
b. A ranking vector 0 = (01, . .. , On) is called OT-COMPATIBLE with a comparative tableau
A iff it is compatible with every row of A according to (27b).
c. A comparative tableau A is called OT-COMPATIBLE iff A is OT-compatible with at least
one ranking vector according to (27b).
Let me illustrate the relationship between the old notion of OT-compatibility in (13) and the new
notion in (27). Let me say that a ranking > is a REFINEMENT of a ranking vector 0 = (01, ... , On)
iff condition (28) holds for every h, k = 1, . . ., n. The idea is as follows: if two or more components
of 0 tie, different refinements of 0 can break the tie in different ways; otherwise, any refinement
satisfies the ordering implicitly encoded into the natural ordering of the components of 0. The
boxed condition in (27a) says that there exists a winner-preferring constraint whose ranking value
is larger than the ranking value of any loser-preferring constraint. Thus, a ranking vector 0 is OT-
compatible with a comparative row a according to the new definition (27a) iff every refinement
of 0 is a ranking OT-compatible with a according to the old definition (13a) of OT-compatibility.
Furthermore, a comparative tableau A is OT-compatible according to the new definition (27c) iff A
is OT-compatible according to the old definition (13c). 4
4 Note that the notion of OT-compatibility (27) for ranking vectors with two or more identical components has nothing
to do with the alternative notion of OT-compatibility introduced by Tesar and Smolensky (2000), that allows for multiple
constraints to be assigned to the same stratum with the corresponding tie resolved additively. Without getting into the details
of this alternative definition of OT-compatibility, let me illustrate the difference with an example. Consider the comparative
row in (ia) together with the ranking vector in (ib), with the two identical components 01 = 02.
C1 C2  C 3
(i) a. a= [ w L W
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(28) Oh > Ok == Ch > Ck.
I will denote by 0 the null ranking vector, namely the ranking vector whose components are all equal
to zero. Given two ranking vectors 0 = (01, . . , On) and 0' = (0,... , 0,'), I will denote by 0 > 0'
the condition that each component of 0 is larger than or equal to the corresponding component of 0',
namely Oh _ 0h for every component h = 1,..., n. I will denote by 0 = 0'+ 0" the COMPONENT-
WISE SUM of the two ranking vectors 0' = (0, ..., 0n) and 0" = (0',..., 0"), namely the vector
0 = (01, .. ., On) defined by Oh = 0' + O for every component h = 1, . . ., n. I will denote by
0 = max{0', 0"} the COMPONENT-WISE MAXIMUM of the two ranking vectors 0' = (0,..., 0')
and 0" = (0',..., 0"n), namely the vector 0 = (01,... ,On) defined by Oh = max{0I', 0e} for
every component h = 1, . . ., n. An important issue for what follows is that of operations on ranking
vectors that preserve OT-compatibility, namely operations that take two ranking vectors 0' and 0"
both OT-compatible with a given comparative row and yield a new ranking vector 0 OT-compatible
with that row too. It is easy to check that the operation of point-wise sum between two ranking
vectors does not preserve OT-compatibility. Tesar and Smolensky implicitly note that the operation
of component-wise maximum does preserve OT-compatibility, as stated in claim 3.
Claim 3 If two ranking vectors 0' and 0" are OT-compatible with a comparative row a, then their
component-wise maximum 0 = max{0', 0"} is OT-compatible with a too.
Proof The proof consists of the chain of inequalities in (29). Here, I have reasoned as follows:
in step (a), I have used the definition of the ranking vector 0 as the component-wise maximum of
the two ranking vectors 0' and 0"; in step (b), I have commuted the two maximum operators; in
step (c), I have used the hypothesis that both ranking vectors O' and 0" are OT-compatible with the
comparative row a, namely satisfy the boxed condition in (27a); in step (d), I have commuted again
the two maximum operators; in step (e), I have used again the definition of the ranking vector 0 as
the component-wise maximum of the two ranking vectors O' and 0".
(29) max Oh max max f 0', O'h}
hEW(a) hEW(a)
Oh
(b max max 0, max 0'
hEW(a) hEW(a) J
> max max max
kEL(a) kEL(a)
()max 0max{, O }kEL(a)
Ok(e)
max OkkEL(a)
The chain of inequalities (29) shows that the vector 0 satisfies the boxed condition in (27a), namely
is OT-compatible with the comparative row a. U
Let me summarize this section as in (30). Subsection 4.1.1 reviewed the three main ingredients of
the OT framework: the basic unit of data, namely underlying/winner/loser form triplets; the basic
format of the hypotheses, namely rankings; and the connection between the two, namely the notion
C1 C2 C 3
b.O= (2 2 1)
According to the alternative definition of OT-compatibility introduced by Tesar and Smolensky (2000), the ranking vector (ib)
is indeed OT-compatible with the comparative row (ia), since the two equally highest ranked constraints C1 and C 2 "cancel
out". Instead, the ranking vector (ib) is not OT-compatible with the comparative row (ia) according to the definition (27),
since the ranking vector (ib) admits the refinement C2 > C 1 > Ca that is not OT-compatible with the comparative row (ia)
according to the definition (13a). In the rest of the paper, I will stick to the notion of OT-compatibility in (27) and ignore the
alternative notion of OT-compatibility introduced by Tesar and Smolensky, that I have just alluded to. The entire discussion
is thus framed squarely within standard OT. Contrary to what suggested by Tesar and Smolensky, there is no need to step
outside of the standard framework for algorithmic purposes.
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of OT-compatibility in (4). Subsection 4.1.2 reviewed an alternative representation of the data in
terms of comparative rows and tableaux, and thus restated the notion of OT-compatibility as in (13).
Finally, subsection 4.1.3 reviewed an alternative representation of the hypotheses in terms of ranking
vectors, and thus restated the notion of OT-compatibility as in (27).
(30) data unit hypothesis
a. tplet(xy*,y) notion of OT-compatibility (4) rankinga. triplet (X, y* Y) 4 .. ranking >
r notion of OT-compatibility (13)
b. comparative row a -ranking >
c. comparat ive row a *notion of OT-compatibility (27) ranking vector 0c. comparative row a ... rnngvco0
In this subsection, the restatement of OT from rankings to ranking vectors has been presented only
as a formal trick, that allows the original roundabout definition of OT-compatibility (13) to be alge-
braized as the elegant and coincise boxed condition in (27). Question (31) now naturally arises.
(31) Which one of the two paramneterizations considered so far, rankings or ranking vectors, is
the one actually used indeed by the learner? In other words, does the learner assume that
languages are parameterized by combinatoric objects such as rankings or by continuous
objects such as ranking vectors?
Various cognitive faculties seem to involve continuous parameterizations, such as vision or motor
control. If the answer to question (31) turned out to be that natural language learners assume lan-
guages to be parameterized by continuous ranking vectors, rather than by combinatoric rankings,
then the language faculty would pattern with other cognitive faculties. And the combinatoric nature
of linguistics would turn out to be just an illusion. Question (31) is thus an interesting question. Yet,
it is a hard question, since the two parameterization are indistinguishable from many points of view.
As discussed below in section 4.3, the technical developments of the OT on-line algorithm seem
to point toward the conclusion that OT-grammars should indeed be parameterized by continuous
ranking vectors rather than by combinatoric rankings.
4.2 The OT on-line algorithm: a computational perspective
The rest of this chapter describes the simplest possible model for the acquisition of phonology,
namely the OT on-line algorithm. It is useful to split up the presentation into its computational and
its modeling halves. This section presents the OT on-line algorithm from a purely computational
point of view. The next section 4.3 will address various issues that arise in using the algorithm as a
model of the acquisition of phonology.
4.2.1 Outline of the algorithm
The general shape of the OT ON-LINE ALGORITHM is described in (32). The algorithm maintains
a CURRENT RANKING >. This current ranking is initialized to an INITIAL RANKING >init. At
each time, the algorithm is given a surface form y* that belongs to the target language. The al-
gorithm figures out a corresponding underlying form x and selects some other candidate surface
form y for x different from y*. If the current ranking vector > is OT-compatible with the under-
lying/winner/loser form triplet (x, y*, y) according to (4a), then nothing happens and the algorithm
loops back. Otherwise, the algorithm takes action by updating its current ranking in response to its
failure in accounting for this underlying/winner/loser form triplet (x, y*, y).
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not OT-compatible
(32) 1
Step 1: Step 2: Step 3:
get a surface form y*; check whether the current > is update the current > in
guess an underlying form x; OT-compatible with the underlying/ response to the underlying/
pick a loser candidate y winner/loser form triplet (x, y*, y) winner/loser form triplet (x, y*, y)
OT-compatible
For future developments, it is useful to restate the model (32) in terms of ranking vectors rather than
in terms of rankings, as in (33). The algorithm (33) entertains a CURRENT RANKING VECTOR 0,
initialized to a given INITIAL RANKING VECTOR Oin it and updated whenever it is not OT-compatible
with the comparative row corresponding to the current underlying/winner/loser form triplet.
not OT-compatible
(33) 1--
Step 1: Step 2: Step 3:
get a surface form y*; check whether the current 0 is update the current 0 in
guess an underlying form x; OT-compatible with the comparative response to the comparative
pick a loser candidate y row corresponding to (x, y*, y) row corresponding to (x, y*, y)
OT-compatible
Given a surface form y*, step 1 of algorithm (32) asks for a corresponding underlying form x. To
determine this underlying form is not at all a trivial task. Here is a possible way to go. Assume that
the set of underlying forms X and the set of surface forms Y coincide. This assumption makes sense
for many realistic cases, although admittedly not for cases such as syllabification, stress assignment,
and so on, where the set of output forms is richer than the set of input forms. Under this assumption,
a possible solution is (34), namely to assume that the underlying form x corresponding to the given
surface form y* is completely faithful.
(34) In step 1 of algorithm (32), let the underlying form x be defined by x = y*.
Assumption (34) is computationally sound; here is why. Consider a 4-tuple of universal specifica-
tions (X, Y, Gen, C) with the crucial property that X = Y. Following Tesar (2008), let's say that
an OT-grammar OT> in the corresponding typology corresponding to some ranking > is OUTPUT
DRIVEN iff it satisfies condition (35) for every candidate surface form y e Y. This condition says
that the surface form y belongs to the language 1(OT>) corresponding to the ranking > iff the
corresponding OT-grammar OT> maps that form y (construed as un underlying form) into itself
(construed as a surface form). Tesar proves that a generic OT-grammar satisfies condition (35) under
mild assumptions on the constraint set. Condition (35) ensures that assumption (34) is sound, in the
sense that it cannot possibly lead to a mistake.
(35) y E R(OT>) 4== OT>(y) = y
Having received a surface form y* and having determined a corresponding underlying form x, say
according to (34), step 1 of algorithm (32) asks for a corresponding loser candidate y. A sensible
strategy to perform this task is (36). The rationale is that, if the algorithm keeps picking candidates
that trigger an update in step 3, then the algorithm will proceed faster toward success.
(36) In step 1 of algorithm (32), pick a loser candidate y E Gen(x) such that the current ranking
> is not OT-compatible with the underlying/winnerfloser form triplet (x, y*, y), if any such
candidate y exists.
Of course, there exists a candidate y E Gen(x) such that the current ranking > is not OT-compatible
with the underlying/winner/loser form triplet (x, y*, y) iff the corresponding grammar OT> maps
the underlying form x to a surface form y = OT> (x) different from y*. This suggests that a possible
implementation of (36) is (37). Whether this is an efficient implementation or not, it depends on a
variety of factors. One of these factors is how long it takes to actually compute y = OT>> (x).
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(37) In step 1 of algorithm (32), let the candidate y be defined by y = OT> (x), where > is the
current ranking.
The restatement (33) of the OT on-line model in terms of ranking vectors raises a small problem
for assumption (37); let me illustrate. Assume that the current ranking vector 0 at a given iteration
of algorithm (33) happens to have pairwise distinct components. We can then consider the OT-
grammar OT> corresponding to the unique ranking > represented by 0. And we can compute the
corresponding predicted winner y -' OT> (x). Assumption (37) can thus be restated as in (38).
(38) In step 1 of algorithm (33), let the candidate y be defined by y - OT> (x), where > is the
ranking univocally represented by the current ranking vector 0.
Of course, in the general case the current ranking vector 0 might happen to have some identical
components and thus does not identify a unique OT grammar. We can of course still run the strategy
in (38), by considering the OT-grammar corresponding to an arbitrary refinement of 0, as stated in
the variant (39).
(39) In step 1 of algorithm (33), let the candidate y be defined by y - OT>> (x), where > is an
arbitrary refinement of the current ranking vector 0.
Boersma (1997) suggests a drastic way to implement (39), namely (40). The idea is to add to the cur-
rent ranking vector 0 = (01, . . . , On) a noise vector e = (e , .. , en,) whose components are sampled
independently according to some continuous distribution (say, the uniform distribution U([-a, a])
on some small interval [-a, a] or the normal distribution Af(0, a) with zero mean and variance
a). Indeed, if the components El,..., en are sampled independently accordingly to a continuous
distribution, then the probability that 0 + E has two identical components is null.
(40) In step 1 of algorithm (33), let the candidate y be defined by y - OT> (x), where > is the
unique refinement of the vector 0 + c, where E = (E,..., en) i.i.d. according to a proper
continuous distribution.
The choice between these various alternatives might have modeling consequences. But it does not
have theoretical computational consequences. In fact, all these choices do not affect the worst-case
number of updates in step 3, which is the measure of theoretical significance. 5 Thus, I can abstract
away from the issue of the proper definition of step 1, namely from the issue of the proper choice of
the underlying form x and of the loser form y. Throughout this section, I thus assume that they are
given too. In other words, I simplify the algorithm (33) as in (41). According to (41), the algorithm
is given a comparative row a at each iteration; it checks whether the current ranking vector 0 is
OT-compatible with that comparative row a; if it is, nothing happens and the algorithm gets another
comparative row; if it is not, then the algorithm takes action by updating its current ranking vector
in response to its failure in accounting for the current comparative row a. I assume that the rows fed
to the algorithm in step 1 are sampled from a fixed, given OT-compatible comparative tableau A,
called the INPUT to the algorithm.
not OT-compatible
(41)
Step 1: Step 2: Step 3:
get a row a from some check whether the current update the current
comparative tableau A 0 is OT-compatible with a 0 in response to a
OT-compatible
To complete the description of the OT on-line model, we need to discuss update rules to be used in
step 3. An UPDATE RULE for step 3 of algorithm (41) is a function of the form (42), that takes a
comparative row a together with the current ranking vector 0 ld and returns a new updated ranking
vector onew.
5Boersma (1997) and Boersma and Hayes (2001) actually suggest that this variant (40) does turn out to be useful to handle
certain cases of variation.
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(42) update rule: (0 old a) i 0new
Most of the update rules considered in the literature as well as in this work satisfy the two condi-
tions in (43). Assumption (43a) says that there is no vacuous update: when update is performed,
something has got to change in the current ranking vector. Assumption (43b) entails in particular
that update rules are not sensitive to the actual size of the components of the current ranking vector
0old. This last assumption will be violated only in subsections 4.2.4, 5.5.2 and 5.5.3.
(43) a. The updated ranking vector Onew is different from the current ranking vector 0 o ld when-
ever the current vector 0old is not OT-compatible with the current comparative row a.
b. The dependence of the update rule on the current ranking vector 0Old is rather limited,
in the sense that the update rule does not see the difference between two current ranking
vectors that admit the same refinements, namely that represent the same rankings.
Let me say that the on-line algorithm (41), with a specific update rule (42) used in step 3, CON-
VERGES iff condition (44) holds. This condition ensures that, if every row of the input comparative
tableau is supplied to the algorithm a sufficient number of times, then the algorithm will eventually
entertain a current ranking vector OT-compatible with that comparative tableau. No further update
will therefore happen. Let me call such vector the FINAL ranking vector in the run considered, and
denote it by Oin.
(44) If the comparative rows in step 1 are sampled from an OT-compatible input tableau, then the
algorithm can perform only a finite number of updates in step 3 (no matter the choice of the
initial ranking vector and the order that the comparative rows are fed with).
To develop a theory of an update rule (42) for the OT on-line algorithm (41) means at least to
answer the three questions listed in (45).6 This section systematizes within the unifying framework
of ranking vectors various results of the form (45) for a number of update rules that have been
developed in the literature within slightly different frameworks (standard OT with total hierarchies,
OT with non-total hierarchies, stochastic OT, etcetera).
(45) a. Does the on-line algorithm (41) corresponding to a given update rule (42) converge in
finite time, namely does it satisfy condition (44)?
b. If it does, what is the worst case number of updates in step 3 for an arbitrary input
comparative tableau A with n columns and an arbitrary initial vector Oinit.9
c. And how can the final vector Ofi n be characterized in terms of the input comparative
tableau A and the initial ranking vector Oinit?
Let me close this introduction with a synopsis of the main results reviewed from the literature in the
rest of this section. Given a comparative row a, recall the definition (26) of the sets W(a) and L(a)
of winner- and loser-preferring constraints. The various update rules considered in the literature
fit into the general scheme (46a), described in words in (46b). Let me unpack the notation. The
ranking vector 0 new = (Onew, onew), obtained by updating the current ranking vector 0 old
(o0ld, ... , ld) according to (46) in response to a comparative row a, is the component-wise sum of
the current ranking vector 0old and a numerical vector R = ( U, .. ., k) E Rn. This vector d has the
following shape: if Ck is a winner-preferring constraint, then -k is null or positive, so that update
increases the ranking value of Ck (or leaves it unchanged); if Ck is a loser-preferring constraint,
then ik is null or negative, so that update decreases the ranking value of Ck (or leaves it unchanged);
if Ck is not active, then ak is null, so that update leaves the ranking value of Ck unchanged. This
vector - is called the UPDATE VECTOR corresponding to 0 old and a. The positive components of the
update vector are called PROMOTION AMOUNTS; the (absolute value of the) negative components of
the update vector are called DEMOTION AMOUNTS. To define a specific update rule of the form (46)
means to define the update vector W, as a function of the current ranking vector 0old and the current
comparative row a. The notation E is not optimal, because it hides the dependence of the update
6A fourth interesting question concerns robustness to noise, namely the performance of the OT on-line algorithm (41)
when the input comparative tableau is not OT-compatible. But I ignore this issue here, and always assume that the input
tableau is indeed OT-compatible.
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vector on the current ranking vector 0old. Yet, assumption (46b), that an update rule is only sensitive
to the rankings represented by the current ranking vector 0old and not to the current ranking vector
itself, entails in particular that the dependence of the update vector on the current ranking vector
is limited, while the crucial dependence is the one on the current comparative row. In particular,
it means that fixed the comparative row a, there is only a finite number of corresponding update
vectors. All update rules considered in this work will have the additive form in (46), but for the one
considered in subsection 5.5.3.
S0 new - Oold - 1
> f 0 if k G W(a)
(46) a. O ew  = old + k where~k = <0 if k E L(a)
* 0 otherwise
Onew 0 new L n
b. If the constraint Ck is winner-preferring (loser-preferring), add to its current ranking
value a corresponding null or positive (null or negative) constant .k
The various update rules considered in the literature differ along three dimensions, that can be
preliminarily sketched as follows. The first dimension is whether the rule is demotion-only or
promotion-demotion, depending on whether the promotion amounts are always null or not. The
second dimension is whether the rule is minimal or non-minimal, depending on whether it only de-
motes the loser-preferring constraints that "need' to be demoted or all of them. The third dimension
is whether the rule is gradual or non-gradual, depending on whether a given comparative row can
trigger two consecutive updates or not. I classify in (47) the main update rules considered so far in
the literature according to these three dimensions. I also provide the current name of the correspond-
ing OT on-line algorithm (41) together with known results for the two properties (45a) and (45b)
concerning convergence and speed.
~LAdem.
minimal GL-- Am -n
g u converges, and is fast
gradualdemotion- GLAdem:
-only non-minimal -==
-only converges, but is slow
non-gradual CD:
(47) update non-gradual converges, and is super-fast
rules minimal GLAmin:
does not converge
demotion- gradual GLA:
-promotion non-minimal does not converge
I I does not converge
non-gradual ??
Tesar (1995), Tesar (1998), Tesar and Smolensky (1998) and Tesar and Smolensky (2000, Ch. 7)
(henceforth: Tesar and Smolensky) offer a complete theory (45) for minimal demotion-only update
rules. Subsections 4.2.2-4.2.4 illustrate how the most natural framework to set this theory is that
of ranking vectors.7 Subsection 4.2.5 shows that non-minimal update rules are inferior to minimal
update rules, and should thus be avoided. Some promotion-demotion update rules were tried out
by Boersma (1997). Yet, they were shown not to converge by a recent counterexample due to Pa-
ter (2008). Thus, the problem of devising convergent promotion-demotion update rules is currently
open in the literature. Section 4.2.6 provides a detailed explanation of Pater's counterexample. This
explanation previews the use of dual variables in the analysis of the on-line algorithm (41). Dual
variables will become crucial in chapter 5, where I will take on the task of devising provably con-
vergent promotion-demotion update rules.
7The idea of representing rankings in terms of numerical ranking vectors is actually implicitly already present in Tesar
and Smolensky's notion of the OFFSET of a constraint w.r.t. a ranking, defined as the number of strata above that constraint
in that ranking. I think indeed that the most natural framework to develop their theory is the one adopted here, in terms of
ranking vectors, whereby most of their reasoning can be straightforwardly algebraized.
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4.2.2 Generalities on demotion-only update rules
The best studied class of update rules for step 3 of the on-line algorithm (41) is that of DEMOTION-
ONLY update rules. These are update rules of the form (46) whose promotion-amounts are always
null. More explicitly, these are rules that update the current ranking vector 0 old = (ld,..., 0old)
to the new ranking vector 0 new = (Oew, ... , Onew ) in response to a comparative row a according to
the scheme in (48a), described in words in (48b).
(48) If the current ranking vector 0old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a:
- onew " old - a 1
•~~ " 0 if k EL(a)
a. Onew = oold + k where k = 0 ifk e L(a){ k 0 otherwise
SOnew Onew 9en
b. Only the ranking values of loser-preferring constraints are modified; whenever a ranking
value is modified, it is decreased.
Tesar and Smolensky's claim 4 ensures that the convergence condition (44) holds for any demotion-
only update rule. The core idea of the proof is that demotion-only update rules yield a very simple
dynamics over time of the components of the current ranking vector. Simple in the sense that a
single component can be straightforwardly analyzed independently of the other components, as long
as the components are analyzed "in the right order", namely in the order provided by a ranking
OT-compatible with the input comparative tableau.
Claim 4 The on-line algorithm (41) run with any demotion-only update rule (48), starting from
any initial vector, and with comparative rows sampled from an an OT-compatible input comparative
tableau can perform only a finite number of updates in step 3.
Pmroof Let me prove the claim by induction on the number n of columns of the input comparative
tableaij A. The claim trivially holds for n = 1. Assume that the claim holds for n - 1. Let me prove
that the claim holds for n. Consider an OT-compatible input comparative tableau A with n columns.
By claim 1, I can assume without loss of generality that this tableau A has the shape in (49), for
some comparative sub-tableau A' with n - 1 columns.
CI C 2  ... Cn
W ...
dec(C1)
w
(49) EE
A'
E
The ranking value 01 of constraint C1 will stay put at its initial value, because its column does not
contain a single L and thus its ranking value never gets modified by a demotion-only update rule.
Each row in the upper block can only trigger a finite number of updates, i.e. at most as many updates
as needed to bring underneath C1 every constraint that is loser-preferrer for some row in the top
block.8 Thus, there is a finite time after which the algorithm will only respond to rows in the bottom
block of the tableau. Thus, from that time on, the algorithm behaves as if it was given as input the
comparative tableau A'. Since the tableau A' has only n - 1 columns, the claim follows by the
inductive hypothesis. U
8This claim is not true in the general case. For instance, it would not be true if the demotion amounts were allowed
to become arbitrarily small over time. But this possibility is ruled out by the assumption (43b) that the update vector only
depends on the current comparative row and on the rankings represented by the current ranking vector. Thus in particular,
each comparative row is paired up only with a finite number of update vectors, so that the demotion amounts cannot become
arbitrarily small.
Claim 4 guarantees a positive answer to question (45a) for any demotion-only update rule. By
(48), different demotion-only update rules differ along two dimensions: by which loser-preferring
constraints get demoted and by how much they get demoted. In the next three subsections, I consider
various specific instances of demotion-only update rules that differ along these two dimensions. For
some of these specific demotion-only update rules, we will be able to tackle questions (45b) and
(45c) as well.
4.2.3 First example of demotion-only update rule: minimal and gradual
Given a ranking vector 0 = (01,..., 0,), let L(a, 0) be the subset (50) of those loser-preferring
constraints Ck E L(a) that are ranked above the top ranked winner-preferring constraint, namely
the set of those loser-preferring constraints Ck whose ranking value Ok is not smaller than the largest
ranking value maxhEw(a) Oh of winner-preferring constraints. Tesar and Smolensky call any such
loser-preferring constraint UNDOMINATED w.r.t. 0. An update rule is called MINIMAL if it only
demotes currently undominated loser-preferring constraints, namely 0Old > knew entails that k E
L(a, oold)
(50) L(a, 0)-- k E {1,...,n} ak=L, Ok hEW(a)x Oh
I hEW(a)
Consider the rule that updates the current ranking vector 0old = (oold, old) to the new ranking
vector Onew = (Onew "- new) in response to a comparative row a as in (51a), described in words
in (51b). This update rule is demotion-only and minimal: it demotes currently undominated loser-
preferring constraints by a small fixed amount. According to (51a), the fixed small amount by
which the currently undominated loser-preferring constraints get demoted is 1. This amount 1 can
of course be replaced by any positive constant 77 > 0. This constant is called either the STEP-
SIZE or the PLASTICITY of the update rule. The on-line algorithm (41) with this minimal, gradual,
demotion-only update rule is Boersma's (1997) MINIMAL DEMOTION-ONLY GRADUAL LEARNING
ALGORITHM (henceforth: GLA nm ).
(51) If the current ranking vector 0old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a:
w 0old - 1 if k E L(a, old)
a. kf = oa. 0ew= old otherwise
b. Demote by 1 the currently undominated loser-preferring constraints.
The behavior of the on-line algorithm (41) with the update rule (51) run on the input comparative
tableau (15) starting from the null initial vector is described by the diagram (52). At the first iteration,
the algorithm can receive either the first or the second row of the comparative tableau. Suppose that
it receives the first row. Since the current ranking vector Oinit is not OT-compatible with that row,
then the algorithm updates Oinit to 01 by demoting by 1 the ranking value of constraint C3 , which is
the only constraint that has an L in the first comparative row. At the next iteration, the algorithm can
again receive either the first or the second row of the comparative tableau. Since the current ranking
vector 01 is OT-compatible with the first row, nothing happens if the algorithm receives the first row.
Since the current ranking vector 01 is not OT-compatible with the second row, once the algorithm
receives the second row, it updates its current ranking vector 01 to 02 by demoting by 1 the ranking
value of C2 , which is the only constraint that has an L in the second comparative row. And so on. No
matter the order that the comparative rows are fed to the algorithm, after three updates the algorithm
entertains the ranking vector 03 = (0, -2, -1), that represents the ranking C1 > Ca > C2 . Since
this ranking vector is OT-compatible with the input tableau, no further update will be triggered. This
ranking vector is thus the final vector entertained by the algorithm.
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0 init 01 0
2  0 3
(52) 0
0
row 1 row 2
C1 C2 C3[w
E L W - 0.
row 2 row 1
-1
0
Boersma (1998, p. 323-327) notes that the analysis of Tesar and Smolensky (originally developed
for the update rule presented in the next subsection) trivially extends to the case of the update rule
(51). In the rest of this subsection, I present Tesar and Smolensky's analysis in full detail.
4.2.3.1 Bound on the worst-case number of updates
The input comparative tableau in (52) is only OT-compatible with the ranking that assigns C1 to the
first stratum, C3 to the second stratum and C 2 to the third stratum. The diagram in (52) shows that
the ranking value of C1 never goes below 0 throughout the entire learning path, the ranking value of
C3 never goes below 1 and the ranking value of C2 never goes below 2. In other words, the ranking
value of a constraint assigned to the kth stratum (with the 1st stratum being the top stratum) never
goes below k - 1. Tesar and Smolensky note that this property holds in general, as stated in claim
5. In words, this claim says that the components of the current ranking vector cannot become too
small. The proof is basically identical to the proof of the preceding general claim 4.
Claim 5 Without loss of generality, assume that the ranking OT-compatible with the input compar-
ative tableau A is C1 > C2 > ... > Cn. Then, the ranking vector 0 = (01,..., 0,) entertained
at a generic time by the on-line algorithm (41) run on the input tableau A with the update rule (51)
starting from the null initial vector satisfies condition (53) for every k = 1, . . ., n.
(53) Ok > -(k - 1)
Proof By claim 1, I can assume that the input tableau has the shape in (18), repeated in (54).
C 1  0 2  ... Cd Cd-1 ... C.
W
dec(CI) I ... ... ... ... ... ..
W
E W
dec(C2) I... ... ... ... ...
E W
(54) E E
I I
E E
E E W
dec(Cd) E ... ... ... ...
E E W
d columns n-d columns
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Here is why (53) holds for the case k = 1. The column of A corresponding to Ci does not contain
a single L. Thus, the demotion-only update rule (51) never modifies the initial ranking 0oin it = 0 of
constraint C1. Here is why (53) holds for the case k = 2. The only rows that can trigger demotion
of C2 are the rows in dec(C1) that have an L corresponding to C2 that is currently ranked higher
than the w corresponding to C1. But once 02 reaches -1, these rows cannot trigger any further
update of the ranking value of C2. In fact, 01 = 0 and thus C2 is no longer undominated, since the
winner-preferring constraint C1 is ranked above it. In conclusion, the ranking value of C2 can never
get below 02 = -1. The cases k > 2 are dealt with analogously. U
I will note in subsection 4.2.5 that claim 5 does not hold for non-minimal update rules. I will note
in chapter 5 that a slight generalization of claim 5 actually holds for any minimal update rule of the
form (46), no matter whether it is demotion-only or not. As shown by the proof of the following
claim 6, the invariant (53) immediately yields a bound on the worst case number of updates, thus
answering question (45b) for the case of the minimal demotion-only update rule (51).
Claim 6 The on-line algorithm (41) with the update rule (51) run on an arbitrary comparative
tableau A with n columns starting from the null initial vector can perform at most n(n - 1)
updates in step 3.
Proof By claim 4, we know that the algorithm does indeed converge to a ranking vector 0fi n
(0 ...n , n ) OT-compatible with the input tableau A after a finite number T of updates. Without
loss of generality, assume that the input tableau A is OT-compatible with the ranking C1 > 02 >
.>. > Cn. The proof of the claim consists of the chain of inequalities in (55).
(a) n(55) T _ -o
k=1
(b) n< E(k -1)
k=1
1
= -n(n- 1)
2
Here, I have reasoned as follows: in step (a), I have noted that each time update is performed, one or
more components of the current ranking vector get decreased by one; since all components start out
null, then the total number of updates T must be smaller than or equal to the sum of the components
of the final ranking vector O n , multiplied by -1; in step (b), I have used the invariant (53), that
holds for every ranking vector entertained by the algorithm and thus in particular also for the final
one. U
The bound n(n - 1) on the worst-case number of updates provided by claim 6 is tight. In fact,
consider comparative tableaux of the form (56), that Riggle (2007) calls DIAGONAL. If the rows are
fed in the fixed order an-1 --> an- 2 -a ... , a1, then exactly ln(n - 1) updates are required.
C1 C2 C3 C4 ... Cn- 1 Cn
al W L
a2 W L
W L
(56)
an-2 " L
an-1 W L
To see this, consider for instance the case n = 4. As shown by the learning path (57b) described by
the algorithm when the rows of the diagonal tableau (57a) are fed in the fixed order a, -+ a2 - a3 ,
it takes 6 = 14(4 - 1) updates to reach the unique ranking vector OT-compatible with the input
comparative tableau.
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a[ W L
(57) a. a2 W L
a3 W L
.0 0  0 0 0 0 0
0 at -1 a2 -1 _!S -1 &2 -1 &3 -1 a3 -1
b. 0 0 -1 4 -1 -2 -2 -2
0. 0 . -1. -1. -2. _-3.
Claim 6 provides the worst case number of updates over all possible input comparative tableaux
with n columns and all possible ways of feeding the rows of that tableau to the algorithm. We might
also be interested in the worst case number of updates for a fixed input comparative tableaux over
all possible ways of feeding the rows of that tableau to the algorithm. This worst case number of
updates measures the complexity of a given comparative tableau A. I will come back to this issue at
the end of the next paragraph 4.2.3.2.
4.2.3.2 Characterization of the final vector
The invariant stated in claim 5 can be slightly strengthened as in claim 7, by considering not just the
set of all possible rankings OT-compatible with the input tableau but rather the set of all possible (in-
teger and non-positive) ranking vectors compatible with it.9 The proof of this claim 7 is conceptually
identical to the proof of the preceding claim 5.
Claim 7 Let 0 be the ranking vector entertained at a generic time by the on-line algorithm (41)
run on an input OT-compatible comparative tableau A with the update rule (51) starting from the
null initial vector. The inequality (58) holds for every ranking vector v E {0, -1, -2,...}n with
nonpositive integer components OT-compatible with the input tableau.
(58) 0 > v
Proof Consider an arbitrary ranking vector v = (vi,..., Vn) E {0, -1, -2,...}n OT-compatible
with the input tableau A and let me prove that (59) holds for every k = 1,..., n. Let > be a
refinement of v. Without loss of generality, assume that > is C1 > C2 > ... > Cn. Let me prove
(59) by induction on k.
(59) Ok > Vk
The ineqality (59) holds for k = 1. In fact, since the input comparative tableau A is OT-compatible
with a ranking that assigns C1 to the top stratum, then the column of A corresponding to C1 cannot
contain a single L and thus the demotion-only update rule (51) will never modify the initial ranking
01 = 0 of constraint C1 . Let me now prove that (59) holds for a generic k, using the inductive
hypothesis that it holds for each h such that h < k. In other words, let me prove that, if the kth
component of the current ranking vector Oold = (0,1d , kald,... , 01d) is Oold = vk, then that
component will never be further updated. In other words, let me prove that k t L(a, Oold) for
every row a = (a, ... , ah,... , ak, ... , an) of the input comparative tableau. If ak L, then the
constraint Ck is not even a loser-preferring constraint and thus a fortiori k V L(a, 6 old). If ak = L,
then the chain of implications in (60) shows that the loser-preferring constraint Ck is not currently
undominated and thus k V L(a, 0old).
9 Consider for instance the comparative tableau A in (ia) and the ranking vector 0 in (ib).
C1 C 2  C3
(i) a. A= [w L ]
I W L
b. 0= (1,1,3)
Since 0 satisfies the invariant (53) but does not satisfy the invariant (58), then claim 7 does indeed strengthen claim 5.
157
(60) A is OT compatible with v ==
(= there exists Ch E W(a) such that Vh > vk
( there exists C E W(a) suchthatv > vk andhe {1,...,k- 1}
(C there exists Ch E W(a) such that vh > 0 kd and h E {1,..., k - 1}
there exists Ch E W(a) such that 0old > 0kld
k L(a, old
In (60), I have reasoned as follows: in step (a), I have noted that, since a is OT-compatible with the
ranking vector v and since ak = L, then there has got to exist Ch e W(a) with Vh > vk; in step
(b), I have noted that, since C1 > C2 > ... > Cn is a refinement of v and since Vh > Vk, then
it must be h < k; in step (c), I have used the hypothesis that 0Old = vk; in step (d), I have used the
inductive hypothesis that 0d > Vh for every h = 1,..., k - 1; in step (e), I have used definition
(50) of L(a, Oold).
As shown by the proof of the following claim 8, the strengthened invariant (58) immediately yields
a complete characterization of the final vector entertained by the algorithm in terms of the input
comparative tableau, thus answering question (45c) for the case of the minimal demotion-only up-
date rule (51). Note that the identity (61) makes sense by virtue of claim 3, that ensures that the
component-wise maximum of OT-compatible vectors is OT-compatible too.l0
Claim 8 The final ranking vector Ofn returned by the on-line algorithm (41) run with the update
rule (51) on an input OT-compatible comparative tableau A starting from the null initial vector is
uniquely characterized by (61), namely as the component-wise maximum over ranking vectors OT-
compatible with A with non-positive integer components.
(61) Ofin = max v E {0, -1, -2,...}n v is OT-compatible with A
()
Proof The final vector Ofi n returned by the algorithm is OT-compatible with the input comparative
tableau and has integer non-positive components. Thus, Ofi n belongs to the set (*) in (61). Thus, to
prove (61) it is sufficient to prove that 0 n > v holds for every ranking vector v in the set (*) in
(61). This fact is guaranteed by the invariant (58). U
The ranking vector Ofi n = (Ofin, ., n) defined in (61) only depends on the input comparative
tableau A. The worst case number of updates over all possible ways of feeding the rows of that
input tableau A is thus bounded by - h O hn . The bound is tight in the case of comparative
tableaux that contain a unique entry equal to L per row; the bound is not tight for comparative rows
that contain multiple entries equal to L in some rows.
4.2.3.3 Extension to an arbitrary initial vector
So far, I have only considered the case where the initial ranking vector Oinit is the null vector. The
analysis trivially extends to the case of any CONSTANT initial vector, namely the case of an initial
l0 Strictly speaking, claim 3 does not apply to the case in (61), since the set (*) in (61) is not finite. But this is only a small
technicality, that can be immediately overcome as follows. Consider an arbitrary ranking vector V in the set (*) in (61). Thus,
the identity (i) holds: the component-wise maximum over the set (*) is identical to the component-wise maximum over the
set (**) in (i).
(i) max {v E {0, -1,.. .}n v OT-comp. withA} = max {ve {0, -1,...} v OT-comp. with A, v > V}
Since the set (**) is finite, then claim 3 does apply, and thus ensures that its component-wise maximum is OT-compatible
with the tableau A.
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vector that has identical (although possibly nonnull) components. Furthermore, the analysis also
easily extends to the case of a general initial vector Oinit, yielding claim 9. The proof of this claim
is a straightforward variant of the preceding analyses; I provide it here explicitly because the claim
has not so far appeared in the literature.
Claim 9 The final ranking vector Ofi returned by the on-line algorithm (41) run with the update
rule (51) on an input OT-compatible comparative tableau A starting from an arbitrary integral initial
vector Oinit = (0'nit,... , 0it) is uniquely characterized by (62), namely as the component-wise
maximum over ranking vectors OT-compatible with A obtained from the initial vector Oinit by
component-wise sum with a non-positive integral vector v.
(62) Ofin = max {0 = Oinit + v v E {O, -1, -2, .. .}n, O OT-compatible with A
(*)
Furthermore, the algorithm can perform at most A(Oinit) + rn(n - 1) updates in step 3, where
A(Oinit) is the quantity defined as follows:
(63) A(Oinit) = ( 0init - min it)
hh=h=1 h=
and thus measures the "scatteredness" of the initial vector Oini t .
Prof The proof of the identity (62) is identical to the proof of the identity (61). Let me prove that
the number of updates is upper bounded by A(Oinit) + ln(n- 1). Without loss of generality, assume
that the input tableau A is OT-compatible with the ranking C > C2 > ... > Cn. Consider the
ranking vector 0 = (01,..., On) defined as in (64) for every k = 1,..., n. Note that Ok > 0k+1 for
every k = 1, . . ., n - 1, and thus 0 is OT-compatible with the tableau A. Furthermore, the number
vk defined in (64) is integral and nonpositive. Thus, 0 belongs to the set (*) in (62).
(64) Ok = 0 nit + min init - nit-(k 1)k (h=1,...,n h k
VIk
The number T of updates performed by the algorithm in a given run can then be upper bounded by
means of the chain of inequalities in (65).
(a)(65) T init - Ofn
(65) T < jJIOk k)
k=1
(b) init
< it - Ok
k=1 k=1
n n
(C) oZnit - o nit + mn 0nit  o n it - (k - 1)
k=1 k=1
n (ant_ ii
E 0 i min 0 it+ (k - 1)
k=1 k=11
SA(o init) + n(n - 1)
In step (a), I have reasoned as follows: the kth component of the current ranking vector starts out
at it, gets demoted by 1 each time it is updated and ends up at Ofn; thus, the kth component is
updated a number of times that is equal to 0 nit - Ofn; the total number of times T that update is
performed cannot be larger than the total number of times that the first component of the current
ranking vector is updated plus the total number of times that the second component is updated and
so on (it can be smaller, because more than one component can be updated in a single update). In
step (b), I have used the identity (62) together with the fact that the evctor 0 defined in (64) belongs
to the set (*) in (62). In step (c), I have used the definition (64) of the vector 0. M
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The bound on the worst-case number of updates provided by claim 9 is tight, as shown by the same
example in (57a) with the rows fed in the same fix order a, -+ a2 - a3 and with an initial ranking
vector such as 0init = (4, 3, 2, 1).
4.2.4 Second example of demotion-only update rule: minimal and non-gradual
An update rule is called NON-GRADUAL iff the following condition holds: if 0old is updated to
onew in response to the comparative row a, then one w is immediately OT-compatible with that row
a. Equivalently, iff no comparative row can trigger two consecutive updates. Otherwise, an update
rule is called GRADUAL. The update rule (51) just considered is gradual: in the top path of diagram
(52), the second row of the input comparative tableau triggers two consecutive updates. As an
example of non-gradual update rules, consider the rule that updates the current ranking vector 0old =
(Oldo..., 0ld) to the new ranking vector Onew = (Onew... , ne w ) in response to a comparative
row a as in (66a), described in words in (66b). The on-line algorithm (41) with this update rule is
Tesar and Smolensky's CONSTRAINT DEMOTION (henceforth: CD).
(66) If the current ranking vector 0old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a:
max 0 ld - 1 if k e L(a, 0o ld )
a. okew 
- -  hEW(a)Okl d  
otherwise
b. Demote the currently undominated loser-preferring constraints all the way immediately
below the currently highest ranked winner-preferring constraint.
This update rule is again demotion-only, namely it fits into the scheme (48): in fact, it can be rewrit-
ten as in (67), where the demotion amount Ak is nonnegative because k E L(a, 0old) and thus 0Old
is larger than the ranking value maxhEw(a) 0 ld of the top ranked winner-preferring constraint. Fur-
thermore, this update rule is trivially non-gradual, since all currently undominated loser-preferring
constraints are immediately brought to a safe position below the highest ranked winner-preferring
constraint.
(67) Onew = 0 old- (old - ma oold + 1)
k hEW(a) /
X k
The behavior of the on-line algorithm (41) with the update rule (66) run on the input comparative
tableau (15) starting from the null initial vector is described in (68). Note that no row triggers two
consecutive updates (even though the same row can trigger multiple updates in the same path, as is
the case of the second row in the bottom path).
Oin it 01 o2 03
(68) 0
0[Al row 2
row 1
Fo. Egen M 
0[W W L - 0 -2E L W
\\N row 2
row 2 [-1 [2-11
L row -1
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The two diagrams in (52) and (68) only differ because of the fact that the two consecutive updates
by the second row in the top path in (52) are replaced by a single "jump" in the case of (68). In other
words, the update rule (51) is just a slightly slowed down version of the update rule (66): a single
update by the latter corresponds to a series of updates by the former. This trivial idea is used in the
following proof of the claim 10 that the preceding analysis of the gradual update rule (51) carries
over to the non-gradual update rule (66).11
Claim 10 Claims 6 and 8 also hold for the on-line algorithm (41) with the update rule (66).
Proof The proof rests on two very simple ideas. Here is the first idea. Consider a comparative
row a not OT-compatible with the current ranking vector Oold . Let £ be the number of currently
undominated loser-preferring constraints in a, namely the cardinality of the set L(a, 0 old). Consider
the £ comparative rows al,..., a t identical to a but for the fact that each of them retains only one of
these undominated £ entries equal to L, while the others get replaced by an E. Then, the update (69a)
of 0 old triggered by a according to the update rule (66) is equivalent to the sequence of £ updates in
(69b) triggered by the £ rows al, . . ., at according to that same update rule (66).
(69) a Onewa. o° ld
a and 0 o
ld
not OT-comp.I
update
w.r.t. (66)
b. 0old
I
al and Oold
not OT-comp.I
update
w.r.t. (66)
a 2 a2
I
a
2 
and 02
not OT-comp.
update
w.r.t. (66)
a
3
01 0new
I
at and 0t
not OT-comp.
update
w.r.t. (66)
Here is the second idea. Consider a comparative row a not OT-compatible with the current ranking
vector Oold and assume that a has a unique undominated entry equal to L, corresponding to some
constraint Ck. Let A be the difference between the current ranking value of Ck and the ranking value
of the currently highest ranked winner-preferring constraint, namely A = Ok - maxhEW(a) 0hld 12
Then, the update (70a) of 0, ld triggered by a according to the non-gradual update rule (66) is equiv-
alent to the sequence of A + 1 updates in (70b) triggered by that same row according to the gradual
update rule (51).
(70) a. 0 old enew
a and 0 old
not OT-comp.I
update
w.r.t. (66)
" Alternatively, I could have repeated verbatim for the case of the non-gradual update rule (66) the proofs presented in
subsection 4.2.3 for the case of the gradual update rule (51).
12Note that A is positive, because 0,ld is not OT-compatible with a, namely Okld > maxh W(a) 0h*
'
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b. 0old a 01 a 2 ... 0A a 0new
I I I
a and 0old a and 01 a and 0A
not OT-comp. not OT-comp. not OT-comp.I I I
update update update
w.r.t. (51) w.r.t. (51) w.r.t. (51)
The claim thus follows from the fact that any update w.r.t. the non-gradual update rule (66) can be
mimicked by a series of updates w.r.t. the gradual update rule (51), by combining (69) and (70). U
The example in (57) shows that the bound n(n - 1) on the worst case number of updates is tight
also for the case of the non-gradual update rule (66). The only difference between the gradual update
rule (51) and the non-gradual version (66) shows up in the case of an arbitrary initial vector. As seen
in claim 9, the worst case number of updates required by the gradual update rule (51) starting from
the initial vector Oinit depends on the "scatteredness" of 0 init through the quantity A(0init) defined
in (63). As noted by Tesar and Smolensky, the worst case number of updates required by the non-
gradual update rule (66) is instead n(n - 1), and thus does not depend on the initial vector. The
latter bound is tight, as shown again by the same example in (57), with an initial ranking vector such
as Oin it = (4, 3, 2, 1).
4.2.5 Third example of demotion-only update rule: non-minimal and gradual
Consider the rule that updates the current ranking vector 0old = (Oold , l, d) to the new ranking
vector 0 new = (Onew, ,new) in response to a comparative row a as in (71a), described in words
in (7 1b). This update rule is of course again demotion-only, as the two preceding rules (51) and (66);
and it is of course again gradual, as the preceding update rule (51). Contrary to the two preceding
rules (51) and (66), this new update rule (71) is non-minimal, because it demotes all loser-preferring
constraints rather than just the currently undominated ones, namely because the set L(a, 0old) has
been replaced by L(a). The on-line algorithm (41) with this maximal, gradual, demotion-only up-
date rule is Boersma's (1997) DEMOTION-ONLY GRADUAL LEARNING ALGORITHM. (henceforth:
GLAdem).
(71) If the current ranking vector 0old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a:
n 9 0 ld - 1 if k G L(a)
a. Onew +_a. k  - ld otherwise
b. Demote by 1 all loser-preferring constraints.
The invariant (53), that holds for the two minimal update rules (51) and (66), does not hold for
the non-minimal update rule (71). The intuitive reason is that a given L can be demoted for "un-
substantial" reasons. This is illustrated by the run in (72): the ranking value of the constraint C2
drops down to -3, even though the input comparative tableau is OT-compatible with the ranking
C1 > C2 > C3 > C4, where 02 is assigned to the second stratum.
0 init 01 0
2  
o
3
C1 C2 C3 C4
r 001 0
L row 1 row 2 row 3(72) W [L L0 -1 -2 -3 L L ==
W L L L 0 0 -1 -2
0O 0 JL0 J -1J
I want to suggest that non-minimal update rules are "wrong", in the sense that they ignore the intrin-
sic logic of OT. Here is a way to make this point. As noted in claim 2, a given comparative tableau A
is OT-equivalent to the comparative tableau A' obtained from A as follows: a row of A that contains
f entries equal to L is replaced in A' with f rows identical to it but for the fact that each of them
retains only one of the original £ entries equal to L while the others are replaced by E's. The latter
operation is illustrated in (73) w.r.t. the comparative tableau in (72).
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(73) A=
L
-- A' =
L
L
L
L
L
L
The crucial difference between minimal and non-minimal update rules can now be spelled out as
follows. Minimal update rules match the intrinsic logic of OT, by ensuring that the behavior of the
corresponding on-line algorithm (41) does not "see" the difference between a given input compar-
ative tableau A and the corresponding OT-equivalent tableau A' obtained by splitting rows with
multiple entries equal to L. This point was made explicit above in the proof of claim 10. Non-
minimal update rules instead do not match the intrinsic logic of OT, since the corresponding on-line
algorithm (41) might behave differently, say, in the case of the two comparative tableaux A and A' in
(73), despite the fact that they are OT-equivalent. One side effect of the fact that non-minimal update
rules are "wrong" is that they might require a number of updates much larger than minimal updates
rule. Claim 11 makes this point dramatically explicit. The proof consists of a simple generalization
of the case in (72).
Claim 11 The on-line algorithm (41) with the non-minimal update rule (71) has worst case running
time super-polynomial in the number n of columns of the input comparative tableau.
Proof For every h = 1, . . ., n - 1 and for every k = 1,..., n - h, consider the comparative row ak
defined as in (74): it has a w as its hth entry, followed by k L's, while all other entries are E's.
.. Ch Ch+1 ... Ch+k ...
(74) a= [** W L - L ...
To illustrate, I give in (75) the comparative tableau obtained by assembling
n = 6.
a1
a2
a3
a5
2a1
a2a2(75) 3~
2
a4
3a1
a3a2
3
a3
4
a1
4
aL2
a5a1
C3 C4 C5 06
all such rows in the case
Suppose that we feed these rows to the algorithm as follows. We consider these rows one at the
time, in the order described in (76), namely first all the rows ak with h = 1 ordered from k = 1 to
k = n - 1; then all the rows ah with h = 2 ordered from k = 1 to k = n - 2; and so on. We keep
feeding each row until the current ranking vector is OT-compatible with it, and then we move to
the next row. Note that, once the current ranking vector is OT-compatible with a given row a , any
subsequent ranking vector entertained by the algorithm will remain OT-compatible with that row.
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(76) al = aI  = ... = an 2  = n 11 2 2
= a = a2  = ... = a 2 =
an-2 n-2
= a1  = a2
San-1
=>al
It can easily be seen that the number of updates required by the algorithm to converge to the unique
ranking vector OT-compatible with the input comparative tableau is superpolynomial in n when the
rows are fed in the order described. U
4.2.6 Promotion-demotion update rules
Another class of update rules to be used in step 3 of the on-line algorithm (41) that have been
studied in the literature is that of PROMOTION-DEMOTION update rules. These are update rules of
the form (46) whose promotion amounts are nonnull. More explicitly, these are rules that update the
current ranking vector 0 old n (old, Gold) to the new ranking vector 1new (Qew, new)
in response to a comparative row a according to the scheme (77a), described in words in (77b).
(77) If the current ranking vector 0old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a:
0 Qnew - - 0 old - a 1
*< 0 if k E L(a)
a. new d alk where ak is > 0 if k c W(a)
S. . = 0 otherwise
-new 0°ld an
. n . . n
b. The ranking value of loser-preferring constraints is decreased or left unchanged; the
ranking value of winner-preferring constraints is increased.
As an example, consider the rule that updates the current ranking vector 0 old (ld,..., 0 ld) to
the new ranking vector 0 new = (onew ... , onew ) in response to a comparative row a as in (78a),
described in words in (78b). This promotion-demotion update rule is non-minimal, because it targets
all loser-preferring constraints. And it is gradual, because the current ranking values are modified
only by a small amount, namely 1. The on-line algorithm (41) with this update rule is Boersma's
(1997) (deterministic) GRADUAL LEARNING ALGORITHM (henceforth: GLA).
(78) If the current ranking vector 0old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a:{ 0old - 1 ifk c L(a)
a.onew 0 ld + 1 if k e W(a)
0old otherwise
b. Decrease by 1 the ranking values of all loser-preferring constraints; increase by 1 the
ranking values of all winner-preferring constraints.
As discussed in subsection 4.2.5, non-minimal update rules do not look like a good option, since
a given constraint might get dragged down for irrelevant reasons and thus the resulting algorithm
might need many more updates before it converges to a ranking vector OT-compatible with the input
tableau. From this perspective, it is thus natural to consider the variant of (78) stated in (79). The
promotion-demotion update rule (79) is minimal, since it only demotes the currently undominated
loser-preferring constraints. The on-line algorithm (41) with this update rule is Boersma's (1997)
MINIMAL GRADUAL LEARNING ALGORITHM (henceforth: GLAmin).
(79) If the current ranking vector 0 old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a:
0 ld - 1 if k C L(a, 0old)
a. 0new 0 old + 1 if k e W(a)
0old otherwise
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b. Decrease by 1 the ranking value of undominated loser-preferring constraints; increase
by 1 the ranking values of all winner-preferring constraints.
The behavior of the on-line algorithm (41) with either of these two update rules (78) or (79) on the
input tableau (15) starting from the null vector is described in the diagram (80).
(80) Oinit 01 o2 o3 04 05
row 
1 1
w 2
C1 C2 C3 0, [21 2
CW 02 0L0 row 2 [i row 1 row 2 ]
row 2 row 1
[- 1]
Boersma's promotion-demotion update rules (78) and (79) are symmetric, in the sense that the de-
motion amount is equal to the promotion amount (in this case they are both equal to 1, although
the actual amount of course does not matter). In the rest of this section, we will see that symmetric
promotion-demotion update rules do not work in the general case. In chapter 5, I will thus turn to
the investigation of asymmetric promotion-demotion update rules, namely update rules where the
promotion amount and the demotion amount are different.
4.2.6.1 A detailed explanation of Pater's counterexample
As noted by Tesar and Smolensky (1998, pp. 244-245) in the celebrated passage quoted in (81),
promotion-demotion update rules are much harder to analyze than demotion-only update rules.
(81) "[The update rules considered in the preceding sections 4.2.2-4.2.5 are] defined entirely
in terms of demotion; all movement of constraints is downward in the hierarchy. One
could reasonably ask if this is an arbitrary choice; couldn't the learner just as easily pro-
mote constraints toward the correct hierarchy? The answer is no, and understanding why
reveals the logic behind [demotion-only update rules]. [In order for OT-compatibility to
hold], at least one [winner-preferring constraint] must dominate all [loser-preferring con-
straints]. Demotion moves the [loser-preferring constraints]. [...] Once the highest-ranked
[winner-preferring constraint] is identified, all of the [loser-preferring constraints] need to
be dominated by it, so all [loser-preferring constraints] are demoted if not already so dom-
inated. A hypothetical promotion operation would move the constraints corresponding to
the [winner-preferring constraints] up in the hierarchy. But [...] it isn't clear which of the
[winner-preferring constraints] should be promoted - perhaps all of them, or perhaps just
one. Other data might require one of the [winner-preferring constraints] to be dominated by
one of the [loser-preferring constraints]. [The current comparative row] gives no basis for
choosing."
As a matter of fact, the issue of the convergence of the GLA or of the GLAmin has remained open
in the literature for various years, until recently Pater (2008) has exhibited a counterexample. He
reports that the GLA run on the input comparative tableau (82) starting from the null initial vector
and the rows sampled in random order keeps increasing the components of its current ranking vector,
without ever converging to an OT-compatible vector.'13 Since every row of the comparative tableau
13 A small caveau is in order here. Pater (2008) tests the GLA on his counterexample (82) using the Praat implementation
of the GLA (with standard settings: uniform sampling of the rows of the tableau; constraints initially equally ranked with
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(82) contains a unique L, then the GLA and the GLAmin behave in the same way on this tableau;
hence, (82) also provides a counterexample against the GLAmin.
C1 C2 C3 04 C5W L W
(82) A= W WW L W
W L
Pater (2008) does not attempt to explain why is it that the GLA fails on this particular example (82).
Here is my explanation. To get started, consider the beginning (83) of a possible run of the GLA on
Pater's counterexample (82) starting from the null initial vector. Suppose that at the first iteration, the
GLA gets the first row of Pater's tableau. Since the null vector is not OT-compatible with that row,
update is performed. As prescribed by (78), the ranking values of the winner-preferring constraints
O1 and C3 are promoted by 1 and the ranking value of the loser-preferring constraint C2 is demoted
by 1. Equivalently, the current ranking vector is updated by component-wise sum with the update
vector corresponding to the first comparative row, namely the vector that has a 1 in correspondence of
the two winner-preferring constraints C, and C3, has a -1 in correspondence of the loser-preferring
constraint C2 and has O's elsewhere. Suppose that at the second iteration the GLA gets the second
row of Pater's tableau. Since the current ranking vector is not OT-compatible with that row, update
is performed. As prescribed by (78), the ranking values of the winner-preferring constraints 02 and
C4 are promoted by 1 and the ranking value of the loser-preferring constraint C3 is demoted by 1.
Equivalently, the current ranking vector is updated by component-wise sum with the update vectors
corresponding to the second comparative row, namely the vector that has a 1 in correspondence of
the two winner-preferring constraints 02 and 04, has a -1 in correspondence of the loser-preferring
constraint C3 and has O's elsewhere. And so on.
0 init =... = 
nit 
= 100; default setting of the parameters, namely o = 2.0 and r7 = 0.1); see Boersma (1999). The
version of the GLA implemented in Praat differs from the one I am describing here under two respects. The first difference
is that the GLA implemented in Praat uses condition (40), whereby the current ranking vector at each iteration is perturbed
with a small additive noise. Boersma suggests that this additive noise might be useful in order to model the acquisition
of languages with variation; but here I am ignoring the issue of variation, and I have thus gotten rid of the additive noise.
The second difference is that the GLA implemented in Praat uses a slightly different notion of OT-compatibility in order to
decide in step 2 of the on-line algorithm (41) whether to update or not its current ranking vector. More precisely, it uses the
notion of OT-compatibility from Tesar and Smolensky (2000), that allows for multiple constraints to be assigned to the same
stratum with the corresponding tie resolved additively. As noted in footnote 4, this notion of OT-compatibility is different
from the notion of OT-compatibility in (27) used in this work. Despite these two differences between the version of the GLA
implemented in Praat and the version considered here, we can still use the Praat implementation to test the behavior of the
variant of the GLA considered here. We just have to run the Praat implementation with the specifications in (i). The idea is
that, since the components of the initial ranking vector are all distinct and fractional and since plasticity is integer, then the
components of the current ranking vector will stay all distinct throughout learning; thus the notion of OT-compatibility built
into the Praat implementation of the GLA coincides with the notion of OT-compatibility (27) used in this paper.
(i) How to simulate the update rule (78) in Praat:
a. integral plasticity (e.g. q = 1);
b. no noise (i.e. or = 0);
c. an initial vector with components 0 init,..., Oinit distinct and fractional.
By using the specifications in (i), we can thus in particular test the behavior of the variant of the GLA considered in this paper
on Pater's tableau (82). I have indeed run the GLA on Praat with the specifications (ia) and (ib) and the initial ranking vector
(iia), that satisfies the conditions in (ic). I have got back the ranking vector (iib), that corresponds to the wrong hierarchy
C3 > C4 > C1 >> 02 > 05. Indeed, the components of the current ranking vector just keep increasing without ever
converging, just as in Pater's simulations.
(ii) a. Oinit = (100.08, 100.06, 100.04, 100.02, 100.00).
b. 0 = (5837.684, 5837.126, 5838.516, 5838.234, 5836.696).
This observation also shows that the failure of the GLA on Pater's comparative tableau (82) has nothing to do with the internal
randomization of the version of the algorithm defined by Boersma and tested by Pater.
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C I C2  C 3 4 C5 0w0 +1
(83) W L W row 1
row(2 -+ ]+H
W L W == 
-
+1w + Hi]10 +1
W L
0 -
+1 0 0
- 1 +1 0
row 3
+1 + -1 + + [
The paper-and-pencil simulation in (83) shows that the ranking vector 6 entertained by the GLA
at a generic iteration must have the shape in (84), for some nonnegative coefficients a 1, a2, as, a4.
Namely, 6 must be obtained by adding together the four column vectors that appear in (84), each
multiplied by a nonnegative constant a2. The ith column vector in (84) corresponds to the ith row
of Pater's comparative tableau (82), in the sense that it is obtained by replacing w's, L's and E's in
that row with 1 's, -l's and 0's respectively. And the corresponding coefficient a2 in (84) represents
the number of times that, up to that iteration, the GLA has updated its current ranking vector 6 in
response to a failure in accounting for the ith row of Pater's comparative tableau.
(84) # of updates in response to the . # of updates in response to the01 0 +11st row of the tableau (82) 4th row of the tableau (82)
+1 0 0[1 "-[1 [ [ ] ±+ ++1 + 1
=0 +1 -1L_ 0 L 0 J L+1.j L .
I I
update vector that ... update vector that
corresponds to the 1st ... corresponds to the 4th
row of the tableau (82) row of the tableau (82)
Adding up the corresponding components in (84), we conclude that the search space of the GLA runon Pater's counterexample (82) starting from the null initial vector is a subset of the set of ranking
vectors of the form (85), for nonnegative coefficients a1, a2, a3, a4.(85) 6 c i03 t 2a 4b 3  2 , 1, 2 , a 3 , 1 a4 0
04 02 4 1 1Sotor that . update vector that(84) of pdatscinrespons to the I .t .. # o r ae nrespondse to the4t1row of the tableau (82)4t row of the tableau (82)01 1a00,2 a2- 10
(85) =0 03 a, +1 a3-2 aC 3 , a4 >0
04 a2 + -1 -1e
_ 05 J 1. a3-14
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There is only one ranking OT-compatible with Pater's tableau (82), namely CI > C 2 > C 3 >
C 4 > Cs. Thus, a ranking vector vector 0 = (01,, 02, 3, 04, 0s) is OT-compatible with Pater's com-
parative tableau iff it univocally represents this ranking, namely it satisfies the four strict inequalities
01 > 02 > 03 > 04 > 0s. By virtue of the characterization (85) of the ranking vectors entertained
by the GLA, these four strict inequalities can be rewritten as the four strict inequalities (86), in terms
of the coefficients al, a 2 , 3, a4.
(86) 01 > 02 >a2 - a,
02 > 03 a - a, > a, + 3 - 0a2
03 > 04 = il 3 - 0 2 > 2 a4 - a 3
04 > 05 a2 + a4 - a3 > a3 - a 4.
Crucially, the four strict inequalities in (86) are not feasible, namely there exist no coefficients
a,, a2, a3, a4 that satisfy all four of them. Here is a way to see that. If the fourth inequality in
(86) is subtracted from the second one, we get (87a); if the third and the fourth inequalities in (86)
are summed together, we get (87b); if the first and the fourth inequalities in (86) are summed together
and then the result divided by 2, we get (87c); if the two inequalities (87b) and (87c) are summed
together, we get (87d). Since (87d) contradicts (87a), then the four strict inequalities in (86) are
unfeasible.
(87) a. -2a1+a 2 +a 3 -2a 4 >0
b. a,-a2+a4 >0
c. ai -a 3+a4 > 0
d. -2a, +a2 +a3 -- 2a4 < 0.
In conclusion, the reason why the GLA fails on Pater's comparative tableau (82) is as follows: the
search space of the GLA is limited to ranking vectors of the form (85); but no such ranking vector
is OT-compatible with Pater's comparative tableau, namely satisfies the inequalities (86). In other
words, the GLA fails because it struggles to reach a ranking vector that lies behind its reach. 14 , 15
14The preceding discussion explains why the GLA fails on Pater's counterexample (82), but it does not explain why in the
case of this counterexample the components of the current ranking vector entertained by the GLA just keep increasing. An
explanation of this fact follows from two general properties of promotion-demotion update rules studied in chapter 5. First,
the components of the current ranking vector cannot decrease below a certain value, namely they are lower bounded; see
claim 12. Second, the algorithm cannot entertain the same ranking vector twice within the same run; see claim 14.
15As noted in footnote 4, Tesar and Smolensky (2000) introduce a notion of OT-compatibility alternative to the standard
notion of OT-compatibility (27) considered in this work. According to their alternative notion of OT-compatibility, ties among
equally ranked constraints are resolved additively. Let GLA' be the variant of the GLA obtained by using this alternative
notion of OT-compatibility in step 2 of the on-line algorithm (41). As noted in footnote 13, Praat actually implements the
GLA', not the GLA. Contrary to the GLA, the GLA' works fine on Pater's counterexample (82): as shown by the diagram in
(i), the GLA' converges after at most 5 updates, no matter the order in which the rows of Pater's comparative tableau (82) are
fed to the algorithm.
einit 91 02 93 94 05[01 row 4 0 1 row 3 0 row 4 0(i) -~ - o o 0 - o
0 0 +1 +10+1 0 +10 -1 - 0 -1I
row \2
0+1 ++1 row 4 00 +1+1 +1
row 3
r 01
+1 row 4 +1
+1 - M +1
0 +1
+1 0
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4.2.6.2 On the analysis of promotion-demotion update rules
It is useful to restate this discussion of Pater's counterexample in a slightly more abstract way,
that paves the way to the developments of chapter 5. A run of the on-line algorithm (41) with
any update rule on an input comparative tableau A E {L, E, W}mxn describes a path of ranking
vectors as in (88a), where 0init is the initial ranking vector, 0on is the final ranking vector of that
run (assuming that the algorithm converges in that run) and Ot = (0t,..., 0 ) is the current ranking
vector entertained by the algorithm at a generic time t. There are two ways of keeping track of
"time", and thus of interpreting this superscript t. One way is to interpret time as counting all the
loops (41), also those where the comparative row fed to the algorithm is OT-compatible with the
current ranking vector and thus no update is performed. Another way is to interpret time as counting
only those loops (41) that trigger an update. Let me adopt the latter strategy. Thus, Ot is the ranking
vector entertained by the algorithm after t updates; and the identity 0 T = 0 fin means that it took
T updates in that run for the algorithm to reach a final ranking vector Oa n OT-compatible with the
input tableau. Let a be the number of updates out of the first t updates that where triggered by a
failure in accounting for the ith row of the input comparative tableau A, for every i = 1, . . ., m. Let
me collect the m numbers at,..., at into an m-tuple a t = (at,..., at). I will call at the DUAL
VECTOR at time t and I will call its ith component a the ith DUAL VARIABLE at time t. I will thus
also call Ot = (0,..., 0t) the PRIMAL VECTOR at time t and I will call its hth component 0 the
hth PRIMAL VARIABLE at time t. A run of the on-line algorithm (41) thus describes, besides the
PRIMAL PATH (88a), also the DUAL PATH (88b). 16
The success of the GLA' on Pater's comparative tableau fits well with the account given above for the failure of the GLA on
that same tableau. In fact, the moment we allow the algorithm to exploit ties by switching from the standard notion of OT-
compatibility to the alternative notion of OT-compatibility considered in Tesar and Smolensky (2000), we effectively enlarge
the set of rankings that account for Pater's tableau to also include non-total rankings like the ones in (ii). The succes of the
GLA' thus just says that these three rankings can indeed be represented by ranking vectors that belong to the search space
(85) of the algorithm.
(ii) a. {C3, C4} > {C1, C2} > {C5 }.
b. {C 1, C3, C4 } > {C2 , C5}.
c. {c 2, C3, C4 } > {CI, Cs}.
Thus, Pater's comparative tableau (82) provides a counterexample against the GLA (with the standard notion of OT-
compatibility) but does not provide a counterexample against the GLA' (with the alternative notion of OT-compatibility
considered by Tesar and Smolensky). Yet, consider the comparative tableau in (iiia). Suppose that the rows of this compara-
tive tableau are fed to the GLA' in the fixed order row 3 -- row 2 -* row 1. The first two passes through the data are given
in (iiib). Note that at the end of the second pass, the GLA' is entertaining a ranking vector that represents the same non-total
ranking represented by the initial null vector. Thus, the GLA' doesn't converge.
(iii) a. w L W
W L
0 0 0 +1 +1 +1 +1I row 3 0 row 2 +1 row 1 0 row3 0 row2 +1 row 1
0 -: +1 0 +1 0 +1 +1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 row I 0 row 2 0 row3 0 row 1 0 row 2 +1 row 3 +1C. 0 0 0 +11 +1 0 +1
0 0 -0 . -1 -1 0 -1
It is interesting to note that the GLA' does converge if the rows of the comparative tableau (iiia) are fed in a different order.
For instance, the GLA' does converge after two passes through the data in the rows of the comparative tableau (iiia) are fed
to the algorithm in the fixed order row 1 - row 2 --1 row 3, as shown in (iiic).
16The terminology PRIMAL and DUAL comes from the connection between on-line algorithms for linear classification and
duality theory for linear programming.
(88) a. Oinit 01 02 .'. 0 -- .* - Ofin
b. 0 a 1  a 2  *at .... aT
To illustrate, I provide in (89) the dual paths corresponding to the primal paths in (80). The dual
vectors have two components, since the input comparative tableau (15) has m = 2 rows. The initial
dual vector is of course the null vector, since at the beginning no row has triggered a single update.
The dual variables at any time are of course non-negative integers. And the dynamics over time of
the dual variables is very simple, since each of them can only increase over time.
init 1 O2 3 a4 5
(89)
row 01 [2row 2
[2row2 [] row1 [2] row 2]
ro 1223
row 2 row 1
If a given update rule yields a simple dynamics of the primal vectors Ot, then the behavior of the
corresponding on-line algorithm (41) is best characterized in terms of its primal paths. This is indeed
the case for demotion-only update rules. These rules yield a very simple monotonic dynamics of the
primal variables, since they can only decrease over time. For this reason, the corresponding on-line
algorithm can be studied in terms of primal paths, as done indeed throughout sections 4.2.2-4.2.5.
The situation with promotion-demotion update rules is very different. The corresponding dynamics
of the primal vectors is much more complicated because it is non-monotonic: as illustrated for
example in (80), a given primal variable can oscillate up and down over time. The behavior of the on-
line algorithm (41) corresponding to promotion-demotion update rules is thus better characterized in
terms of its dual paths. In fact, the dual dynamics is always monotonic, since dual variables can only
increase over time. Furthermore, the dual dynamics completely determines the primal dynamics. In
the rest of this subsection, I comment on the latter fact in some detail.
(90) a. Demotion-only update rules: analysis at the primal level (88a);
b. promotion-demotion update rules: analysis at the dual level (88b).
To start, note that the identity (91) trivially holds: the number of updates t is of course given by the
sum of the number of updates at triggered by the first row plus the number of updates at triggered
by the second row and so on. This identity entails in particular that the total number of updates T in
a given run can be described as the sum of the components of the final dual vector a corresponding
to that run.
m
(91) t=Z at
i= 1
Furthermore, the dual vector at at time t fully determines the primal vector Ot at time t. Let me
illustrate this point in detail, starting from the specific case of Boersma's update rule (78) and slowly
moving toward the general case. This update rule fits into the general scheme Onew = 0old +
in (46), with the update vector - = (al,..., an) corresponding to a comparative row a defined as
follows: ik is equal to 1 (or to -1 or to 0) iff the kth entry of the comparative row a that triggers
that update is equal to w (or to L or to E, respectively). Thus, in this case the update vector only
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depends on the current comparative row, and we can speak of the update vector l E {-1, 0, +1} n
CORRESPONDING to a comparative row a E {L, E, W}n . Let A be the numerical matrix obtained
by organizing one underneath the other all the update vectors - corresponding to all the rows a of
the input tableau. For instance, Pater's comparative tableau A in (82) is paired up with the numerical
matrix A in (92), obtained by replacing every w with +1, every L with -1 and every E with 0 (for
readability, I omit E's in A ad 0's in A).
W L w +1 -1 +1
W L W +1 -1 +1(92) A=[W L W [+1+1 
-1 +1
W L +1 -1
The four rows of the matrix A are by construction the four update vectors that appear in (84). In other
words, the identity (84) can be rewritten as in (93): the primal vector Ot is a linear combination17
of the rows of the matrix A with coefficients provided by the components of the corresponding dual
vector a t .is(93)[i
0t = Cet + .. + at,,
It is useful to rewrite (93) component-wise. For ease of presentation, let me preliminarily introduce
the piece of notation in (94): given two vectors v = (vi,... , Vd), w = (wl, ... , wd) E Rd both with
the same number d of components, their SCALAR PRODUCT (v, w) is the sum of the components of
one of the two vectors weighted by the corresponding components of the other.
d
(94) (v, w) = viW + ... -- +VdWd = E VhWh
h=1
Let AX1,..., An E R m be the n columns of the matrix A obtained as above by ordering all the
update vectors one underneath the other. The identity (93) can be read component-wise as follows:
the first component Ot of the current ranking vector is the sum of the first component of the first row
of A multiplied by a t plus the first component of the second row of A multiplied by at plus the first
component of the third row of A multiplied by at, and so on. Equivalently, the first component Ot
of the current ranking vector is the scalar product between the first column A1 with the dual vector
at. In the general case, we get the identity (95) for every k = 1, . . ., n.
(95) O = (Ak, a t)
The identities (93) and (95) extend to any update rule that fits into the general scheme onew
0 old + A in (46). If the update vector A only depends on the current comparative row and not on
the current ranking vector, then each comparative row of the input tableau is paired up with a single
update vector, and the analysis just presented can be repeated verbatim. Otherwise, assumption (43b)
ensures that each comparative row is paired up only with a finite number of update vectors. In this
case, the preceding analysis can be straightforwardly readapted, by introducing a dual variable for
each update vector. By (45), a theory of an update rule for the on-line algorithm (41) should provide
a bound on the worst case number of updates T and should characterize the final primal vector 0T.
By the two identities (91) and (93)/(95), this task can be carried out by investigating properties of
the dual dynamics of the corresponding on-line algorithm. Dual variables will indeed turn out to be
very useful for the developments of chapter 5.
17Actually, a conic combination, since the coefficients at,..., at are nonnegative.
18 With standard linear Algebra notation, the identity (93) says that Ot = ATCat, namely that the primal vector Ot at
time t is the row-by-column product between the transpose of the matrix A, obtained by organizing the update vectors one
underneath the other, and the corresponding dual vector act .
4.3 The OT on-line algorithm: a modeling perspective
The preceding section has introduced the OT on-line algorithm from a purely computational perspec-
tive. This section looks at the algorithm from a modeling perspective. In particular, subsection 4.3.4
makes the point that none of the update rules reviewed from the literature in the preceding section
is suitable in order to model the early stage of the acquisition of phonology prior to morphological
awareness, as described in Hayes (2004).
4.3.1 Initialization
A crucial ingredient of the OT on-line model (32) is the initialization of the current ranking to
a specific initial ranking >init. There is wide agreement in the literature that the initial ranking
should rank markedness constraints above faithfulness constraints, as stated in (96).19 For instance,
Fikkert and De Hoop (2009, p. 325) write: "The recurrent pattern in child language data is that
children's output is considerably less marked than the corresponding adult target forms. This is
true both for segmental, syllabic and higher prosodic structure. Hence, the starting hypothesis in
much research on phonological acquisition is that children begin with with markedness constraints
outranking faithfulness constraints." See Smolensky (1996a,b) for theoretical arguments in favor of
(96); see Jusczyk et al. (2002) for empirical evidence; see Davidson et al. (2004) for a review.
(96) M >init F
Assumption (96) has been refined in various ways: Smith (2000) and Revithiadou and Tzakosta
(2004) argue that positional faithfulness constraints should be initially ranked on top of the cor-
responding general faithfulness constraints; and McCarthy (1998) argues that (96) only applies to
input-output faithfulness constraints, while output-output faithfulness constraints should start out on
top.
4.3.2 Choice of the underlying form
Hayes (2004) reviews the relevant psycholinguistic literature and concludes that the knowledge of
an eight-to-ten month old child can be characterized by means of the two properties (97). He dubs
this developmental stage the EARLY STAGE of the acquisition of phonology.
(97) a. KNOWLEDGE OF PHONOTACTICS. "At more or less [eight to ten months], infants start
to acquire knowledge of the legal [...] sequences of their language. [...] In carefully
monitored experimental situations, eight-to-ten month old infants come to react differ-
ently to legal phoneme sequences in their native language than to illegal or near-illegal
ones".
b. LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF ALTERNATIONS. "Certainly we can say that there are at least
some morphological processes which are acquired long after the system of contrasts
and phonotactics is firmly in place, and it seems a reasonable guess that in general,
the learning of patterns of alternation lags the learning of the constrast and phonotactic
systems".
That morphological awareness does indeed lag behind knowledge of phonotactics, as stated in (97),
is shown by a number of case studies. Here is one of these case studies, taken from Kazazis (1969)
via Jesney and Tessier (2007). 20 Adult Greek phonotactics displays the restriction in (98), both in
non-derived and derived environments.
(98) a. Only palatals occur before front vowels (e, i):
/ce/ [ce], /ec+ete/ -- [ecete]
/xe/- [ce], /ex+ete/ [ecete]
19The only exception I know of is Hale and Reiss (1998).
2
°This case is also mentioned in Hayes (2004), who notes that an analogous case is discussed in Bernhardt and Stemberger
(1998, p. 641).
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b. Only velars occur before non-front vowels (V):
/cV/ -- [xV], /ec+Vte/ -- [ex+Vte]
/xV/- [xV], /ex+Vte/ [ex+Vte]
Kazazis (1969) documents the U-shaped learning path in (99). At an initial stage (99a), the child
has acquired the phonotactics in (98) and the fact that it applies both to derived and non-derived
environments. At a later stage (99b), the child un-learns the correct phonotactics in derived envi-
ronments. Only at a later stage (99c) does the child recover from the mistake and goes back to the
correct phonotactics.
(99) a. Stage 1: everything is correct.
b. Stage 2: everything is correct in underived forms;
but mistakes in derived forms, namely /ex+ete/ -- [exete].
c. Stateg 3: everything is correct again.
This learning path (99) is immediately accounted for if we assume that morphological awareness
kicks in at a later stage. Assume the four constraints *C, *XE, IDENTIO and IDENTOO. Assume
that at stage 1 morphological awarness has not started yet. Thus, there is no difference between
underived and derived forms and the faithfulness constraint IDENTOO does not play any role. This
stage corresponds to the ranking (100a). At stage 2, morphological awarness kicks in and IDENTOO
thus becomes active. If we assume that it starts out top ranked, then this second stage corresponds
to the ranking (100b). Since this ranking is incorrect, learning is triggered, that leads to the correct
ranking (100c) corresponding to stage 3.
(100) a. Stage 1: *XE > *C > IDENTIO
b. Stage 2: IDENTOO > *XE > *C > IDENTIO
c. Stage 3: *XE > IDENTOO > *C > IDENTIO
A child at this early stage when he knows no morphology cannot take advantage of alternations.
Thus, he has no information about underlying forms. Hence, the best he can do at this early stage is
to posit fully faithful underlying forms. In conclusion, assumption (35) makes sense not only from
the computational perspective but also from the modeling perspective, at least as long as we limit
ourselves to the task of modeling the early stage of the acquisition of phonology, when morphologi-
cal awareness is lagging behind.
4.3.3 A toy example
In this section, I illustrate the on-line model of the acquisition of phonology by reviewing a toy ex-
ample from Boersma and Levelt (2000); Curtin and Zuraw (2002) provide another almost identical
example. Levelt et al. (2000) investigate the production of stressed syllables by twelve children ac-
quiring Dutch. Adult Dutch phonotactics allows all nine syllable types. They report the remarkable
finding that, among the many learning paths in principle possible, only the two specific paths in (101)
are attested. Each syllable type in the diagram represents an intermediate stage in the acquisition
path at which the child produces that syllable type together with all the syllable types at its left but
none of the syllable types at its right. For example, the entry V in (101) represents a stage at which
the child produces CV, CVC and V, but neutralizes any other syllable type. The two acquisition paths
in (101) can roughly be described as slowly moving from the "least marked" to the "most marked"
syllable type.
(101) CV = CVC =* V = VC / , CCV = CCVC CVCC: VCC CCVCC
I % CVCC =* VCC CCV = CCVC
less marked more marked
The relevant portion of the universal specifications is provided in (102). The set of underlying forms
X and the set of surface forms Y coincide and consist of the nine syllable types. The set of candidates
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Gen(x) for any syllable type x is obtained by arbitrary consonant deletion and epenthesis in the two
margins of the syllable. The constraint set contains the four standard markedness constraints for
syllable types plus a unique faithfulness constraint (defined as the pointwise sum of traditional DEP
and MAX).
(102) a. X = Y = CV, CVC, V, VC, CCV, CCVC, CVCC, VCC, CCVCC}
b. Gen(x) = Y, for every syllable type x E X
c. NOCODA:
ONSET:
COMPCODA:
COMPONSET:
FAITH:
assigns a violation for every syllable that is closed;
assigns a violation for every syllable that lacks an onset;
assigns a violation for every syllable that has a complex coda;
assigns a violation for every syllable that has a complex onset;
assigns a violation for every input segment that does not have a
correspondent in the output or vice versa.
It is well known that the boldfaced intermediate stages in (101) do not correspond to any whole
language in the typology defined by the universal specifications (102); see Levelt et al. (2000) and
Albright et al. (2007) for further discussion. For this reason, Boersma and Levelt (2000) decide to
ignore these problematic intermediate stages and limit themselves to the simplified learning path in
(103), with only four stages (besides the initial one).
Stage I Stage II Stage III Stage IV
CV = CVC .
{ cCv,ccvc} {cvcccvcc,cccc}{V, VC} vcv {cvcCVcCCVCC}{CVCC, VCC) { CCV, CCVC, CCVCC}
Weijer (1997) provides the frequencies (104) of the nine syllable types in a child-directed corpus of
112,926 primary stressed Dutch syllables.
(104) CV:
CVC:
VC:
44.81%
32.05%
11.99%
V: 3.85%
CVCC: 3.25%
CCVC: 1.98%
From (104), the frequencies of violations of the four markedness constraints in (102c) are imme-
diately computed as in (105), by summing up the frequencies of all the forms that violate a given
constraint. The frequencies of violations in (105) of course reflect both the lexical frequencies in
(104) as well as the entailments built into the definition of the constraints (e.g. every time COMP-
CODA is violated, NOCODA is violated too).
(105) NoCODA: 44.95% COMPCODA:
ONSET: 16.26% COMPONSET:
3.93%
3.62%
Each one of the four intermediate stages in the simplified paths in (103) corresponds to one of
the four markedness constraints, in the sense that that stage arises as soon as the corresponding
markedness constraint drops below the faithfulness constraints. I illustrate this correspondence in
(106) for the upper path in (103).
(106) Stage I
Stage II
Stage III
Stage IV
FAITH > NOCODA
FAITH > ONSET
FAITH > COMPONSET
FAITH > COMPCODA
As noted in Levelt and van de Vijver (1998), once the input frequencies (104) are organized by
constraint as in (105), the order of acquisition in (103) is immediately accounted for through the
correspondence in (106): we expect syllables with simple codas to appear first, because the corre-
sponding constraint NOCODA is the one violated most often and thus the fastest one to drop below
FAITH; we expect onsetless syllables to appear next, because the corresponding constraint ONSET
is the next most often violated constraint and thus the next fastest one to drop below FAITH; we
(103)
CCV:
VCC:
CCVCC:
1.38%
0.42%
0.26%
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expect complex margins to appear thereafter, once the corresponding constraints COMPCODA and
COMPONSET drop below FAITH. The on-line model (33) straightforwardly captures this intuition
with pretty much any update rule. For concreteness, consider the specific implementation of the
model described in (107).
(107) a. Initial ranking vector: 01nTH = 0
oinit 6 iniit 0 init
ODA " ONSET = CODA = CONSET = 1000
b. Selection of the underlying form in step 1: according to (34).
c. Selection of the loser candidate in step 1: according to (39).21
d. Update rule used in step 3: if the current ranking vector 0 is not OT-compatible with the
current underlying/winner/loser form triplet (x, y*, y), demote by 1 the ranking value of
all loser-preferring markedness constraints.
The diagram in (108) reports the dynamics of the ranking values of the five constraints over time
in one run of the model. The faithfulness constraint stays put at its null initial ranking value. The
markedness constraints fall down with a slope that is determined by the violation frequencies in
(105). The succession of the four stages (103) is thus straightforwardly predicted.
(108) ooo1000
800 "
600
400 ' '
200 NOCODA COMPONSET "..
ONSET COMPC6IAj'
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 x10
I II III IV
I'll consider quite more complicated test cases in chapter 6, once I'll have refined the description of
the model in chapter 5.
4.3.4 How to choose update rules
To complete the description of the on-line model (33) for the acquisition of phonology, repeated in
(109), we need to go back to the small arsenal of update rules (47) reviewed in the preceding section,
and decide which one of them is best suited to be used in step 3. Let me consider each one of the
update rules listed in (47) in turn.
(109) not OT-compatible
Step 1: Step 2: Step 3:
get a surface form y*; check whether the current 0 is update the current 0 in
guess an underlying form z; OT-compatible with the comparative response to the comparative
pick a loser candidate y row corresponding to (x, y*, y) row corresponding to (x, y*, y)
OT-compatible
Boersma (1997) notes that non-gradual update rules, such as (66), are not suitable update rules for
21More precisely, I have broken ties according to the order with which the constraints are listen in (102). Namely, if say
NOCODA and ONSET have the same current ranking value, the corresponding ranking considered in (39) ranks NOCODA
above ONSET because the former is listed before the latter in (102).
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the on-line model (109) of the acquisition of phonology. The idea is as follows. All the action in the
on-line model is carried out by the choice of the initial ranking vector Oinit . Thus, we want update
rules that are very sensitive to the properties of the initial ranking vectors. Non-gradual update rules
are less sensitive to the properties of the initial vector than gradual update rules. This is shown for
example by a comparison between the bounds on the worst-case number of updates required by the
two rules: the bound for the gradual update rule (51) depends on the properties of the initial vector
o init, summarized in the quantity A(Oinit) defined in (63); the bound for the non-gradual update rule
(66) does not depend on the properties of the initial vector, that indeed does not figure at all in the
bound.
(110) The non-gradual update rule (66) is not suitable for the on-line model (109) of the acquisition
of phonology.
Let me suggest next that non-minimal update rules, such as (71) and (78), are not suitable update
rules either for the on-line model (109) of the acquisition of phonology. The issue here is not that
they are slower than minimal update rules, as noted in subsection 4.2.5. Indeed, the new update rules
that I will advocate in chapter 5 will turn out to be rather slow too in the worst case. The issue is
deeper than that, namely that non-minimal update rules are slower because they are "wrong", in the
sense that they do not match the intrinsic logic of OT. This intrinsic logic says that a comparative
row with multiple entries equal to L is equivalent to multiple rows each with a single entry equal to
L, as stated in claim 2. A proper update rule should reflect this fact, namely should have the property
that a single update by a row with multiple L's should be equivalent to the series of updates by the
corresponding rows with a single L. Minimal update rules ensure this equivalence, and thus capture
the intrinsic ranking logic of OT. Non-minimal update rules do not ensure this equivalence, and thus
fail to capture a crucial property of the ranking logic of OT. Because of the fact that non-minimal
update rules do not capture the intrinsic logic of OT, I postulate (111).
(111) The non-minimal update rules (71) and (78) are not suitable for the on-line model (109) of
the acquisition of phonology.
My assumption (111) rules out Boersma's non-minimal promotion-demotion update rule (78). What
about the corresponding minimal update rule (79)? I would like to suggest that that update rule too
does not qualify as a suitable update rule for the on-line model of the acquisition of phonology, for
the same reason that underlies assumption (111) just discussed. The issue here is not that this update
rule does not converge in the general case, as shown by Pater's counterexample (82). Indeed, it might
well be the case that the somewhat contrived input tableau devised by Pater never arises in a realistic
setting. The issue is deeper than that, namely that this update rule fails in certain well-constructed
cases because it is "wrong", again in the sense that it does not match the intrinsic logic of OT. I will
elaborate on this point at the beginning of section 5.1, where I will contruct a replacement of this
update rule, based on the specific properties of the ranking logic of OT. Because of the fact that the
update rule (79) does not correspond to the intrinsic logic of OT, I postulate (112).
(112) The non-convergent update rule (79) is not suitable for the on-line model (109) of the acqui-
sition of phonology.
Finally, let me argue that the on-line model (109) of the acquisition of phonology has no chances
of working if we adopt a demotion-only update rule. By assumption (34), repeated in (113), the
model assumes fully faithful underlying forms. As noted by Tesar (2008), assumption (113) makes
sense from the computational perspective, because it cannot ever lead to a mistake (under mild
assumptions on the constraint set). As noted by Hayes (2004), assumption (113) makes sense also
from the modeling perspective, at least as long as we restrict ourselves to the task of modeling the
so called EARLY STAGE of the acquisition of phonology, characterized by (some) knowledge of
phonotactics but no knowledge of morphology. In fact, lack of knowledge of morphology prevents
the learner at this stage from taking advantage of alternations, and thus from being able to posit any
underlying form different from the fully faithful one.
(113) In step 1 of algorithm (109), given a surface form y*, let the corresponding underlying form
x be defined by x = y*.
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If the underlying forms are fully faithful as by (113), then the faithfulness constraints are never loser-
preferring. A demotion-only update rule will therefore never modify the initial ranking values of the
faithfulness constraints, since a demotion-only update rule only demotes loser-preferring constraints.
In other words, whatever the phonotactics of the target language the learner has been exposed to, the
final ranking values of the faithfulness constraints at the end of the early stage will be identical to
the initial ranking values. This cannot be right, because phonotactics corresponding to different
languages require different rankings of the faithfulness constraints. One way to make this argument
more concrete is as follows. For the sake of the argument, consider a typology that has only general
input-output faithfulness constraints, thus ignoring various distinctions within the set of faithfulness
constraints, such as the distinction between general and positional faithfulness constraints and the
distinction between input-output and output-output faithfulness constraints. In this case, it makes
sense to assume that the faithfulness constraints start out equally ranked. Since the faithfulness
constraints are never loser-preferring and since a demotion-only update rule only demotes loser-
preferrng constraints, then the faithfulness constraints will remain equally ranked. In other words,
the search space of the on-line algorithm (109), implemented with assumption (113) and a demotion-
only update rule, is effectively limited to ranking vectors that assign all faithfulness constraints to
the same stratum, as stated in (114).
6F ... Fe M1+1 ... M.
(114) search space C 0= ( 01, ... O, 01, ... 0 ) 01 =... =0
This artificious restriction of the search space imposed by the choice of the update rule might be
fatal. First, there is no way for the model to account for intermediate stages where a markedness
constraint is ranked in between two faithfulness constraints, despite the fact that such intermediate
stages are indeed attested, as documented for example in Gnanadesikan (2004). Second, there is no
way to model the sequence of two intermediate stages where two different repair strategies arise by
the different relative ranking of two faithfulness constraints, despite the fact that these learning paths
are indeed attested, as documented for example in Bernhardt and Stemberger (1998). Third, there
is no way for the model to converge on the target language, if that language requires a markedness
constraint to be ranked in between two faithfulness constraints. For these reasons, I postulate (115).
(115) The demotion-only update rule (51) is not suitable for the on-line model (109) of the acqui-
sition of phonology.
Putting together (110)-(115), I conclude that none of the update rules (47) considered so far in the
literature can be used to implement the on-line model of the acquisition of phonology (109). The
preceding discussion furthermore suggests that one such suitable update rule should be gradual,
minimal, promotion-demotion and satisfy the crucial convergence condition (44). The first crucial
open issue in the theory of the OT on-line model of the acquisition of phonology is whether such
update rules exist. If some such update rules can be devised, then the OT on-line model has got
a chance. If no such rules can be devised, as suggested by the passage quoted in (81) from Tesar
and Smolensky, then the OT on-line model needs to be abandoned and alternative models need to
be pursued. I will take on this issue in the next chapter, and show that the desired update rules can
indeed be constructed.
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Chapter 5
How to get constraint promotion
The preceding chapter has introduced the OT on-line algorithm (41), repeated in (116): at each time,
the algorithm is fed a current comparative row a; it checks whether the current ranking vector 0 is
OT-compatible with that comparative row; if it is not, it updates the current ranking vector 0 to a
new ranking vector.
not OT-compatible
Step 1: Step 2: Step 3:
(116) get a row a from some -- check whether the current update the current
comparative tableau A 0 is OT-compatible with a 0 in response to aI I
OT-compatible
The core ingredient of the on-line algorithm (116) are proper update rules for step 3. Namely, update
rules that provably satisfy condition (44), repeated in (117). The intuition being that condition (117)
ensures that the corresponding update rule is "well tuned" with the ranking logic of OT.
(117) If the comparative rows in step 1 are sampled from an arbitrary OT-compatible input tableau
A, then the algorithm can perform only a finite number of updates in step 3.
As noted in section 4.2, the only update rules currently existing in the literature that satisfy condition
(117) are those that perform demotion-only. Demotion-only update rules are characterized by the
two crucial properties (118). These two properties ensure that demotion-only update rules are easy
to study by induction on the constraints, as in the proofs of claims 4, 5 and 7 in the preceding
chapter. In fact, property (118a) ensures the existence of a ranking value that is never modified
through learning (because every OT-compatible tableau contains at least one constraint that is never
loser-preferrer), and that can thus be used as the base of the induction. Property (118b) ensures a
monotonic dynamics of the ranking values, that yields a simple inductive step. The situation is very
different for update rules that perform both promotion and demotion. The only such rules considered
in the literature are Boersma's (1997) update rules (78) and (79), that were shown by Pater's (2008)
counterexample not to satisfy condition (117). Furthermore, the simple line of analysis that works
for demotion-only update rules does not seem to immediately extend to promotion-demotion update
rules. Finally, Tesar and Smolensky explicitly warn against constraint promotion, in the celebrated
passage quoted in (81).
(118) a. Only the ranking value of loser-preferring constraints is modified;
b. whenever a ranking value is modified, it is decreased.
On the other hand, subsection 4.3.4 made the point that demotion-only update rules do not seem
suitable to model language acquisition, or at least that early stage of language acquisition where
the learner entertains fully faithful underlying forms because of lack of knowledge of morphology.
In fact, if the underlying forms are fully faithful, then the faithfulness constraints are never loser-
preferrer and thus their ranking values are never modified by a demotion-only update rule. This
means in turn that, if two faithfulness constraints F, F' start out equally ranked, they will remain
equally ranked, with no chance for a markedness constraint to be ranked in between. In other words,
there is no way for the model to describe a learning path with the initial and final states in (119).
(119) M > {F,F'} -- F > M > F'.
Fikkert and De Hoop (2009, pp. 314-315) note that "the field of the acquisition of phonology in
OT is in fact split into two subdivisions. In one division, research is based on empirical data: child
language acquisition data are studied and developmental patterns are unraveled. The other division
investigates learnability issues. [...] Ideally, the model mimics real language acquisition, but this
is [not] of much concern in actual learnability studies. Often the term 'learning' is used in the
latter context, while 'acquisition' refers to child language development [...]. So far, learnability
studies have not taken actual acquisition patterns, or real learners, into account." The situation just
described illustrates well this divide between computational simplicity and modeling complexity
with a case where a computational virtue turns into a modeling drawback: the computational virtue
of demotion-only update rules is that they yield a very simple primal dynamics, that is easy to
analyze; the modeling drawback is that this dynamics is too simple to model the observed complexity
of the acquisitional path. This chapter adresses this empasse by deriving various minimal, gradual
promotion-demotion update rules for the OT on-line algorithm (116) that provably satisfy condition
(117), namely only trigger a finite number of updates. For the ease of exposition, I will start out by
considering a specific promotion-demotion update rule, constructed in section 5.1 based on heuristic
considerations on the ranking logic of OT. I will then present two different proofs that condition
(117) holds for this update rule. In section 5.2, I will present a combinatoric proof, that is close in
spirit to Tesar and Smolensky's analysis of demotion-only update rules reviewed in section 4.2. In
section 5.4, I will present an alternative very different proof, that is based on a simple strategy to
readapt to the case of OT various results on on-line algorithms for linear classification. Chapter 8
will explore further theoretical consequences of the latter line of analysis. In particular, it will make
the point that linear OT has no computational advantage over standard OT, contrary to what has been
suggested in the recent literature. Both proofs generalize to a number of variants of the specific
promotion-demotion rule of section 5.1. Some of these variants are presented in sections 5.3 and
5.5.
5.1 A principled promotion-demotion update rule
In this section, I construct an update rule for the on-line algorithm (116) that performs both pro-
motion and demotion. The construction is split up into a few steps, with each step motivated by
heuristic considerations on the ranking logic of OT. Sections 5.2 and 5.4 will then study this rule
in great detail and from different perspectives. Let a be the comparative row currently fed in step
1 of the on-line algorithm (116); assume that the current ranking vector 0old is not OT-compatible
with this row a, so that action needs to be taken. To get started, assume that this comparative row
contains a unique entry equal to L and a unique entry equal to w, as in (120). This is a particularly
simple case, because we know (just by virtue of the OT-compatibility of the input tableau) that the
constraint corresponding to the unique w of row a can and must be ranked above the constraint
corresponding to the unique L, irrespectively of the rest of the input comparative tableau. In other
words, the information contained in this comparative row alone allows us to confidently promote
the constraint corresponding to the unique w. Thus, in this case we can promote the unique winner-
preferring constraint by the same amount (say 1) we demote the unique loser-preferring constraint,
as in the case of Boersma's update rule (78).
(120) a ... W ... L ...
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Consider next the case where the current comparative row a still contains a unique entry equal to L
but now contains multiple entries equal to w. For concreteness, consider for example the case of the
comparative row a in (121), which contains the two w's corresponding to the two constraints Ch and
Ck. This case is much more delicate than the preceding case. As noted in the passage quoted in (81)
from Tesar and Smolensky (1998), the problem here is that the comparative row a by itself does not
provide information on which one of the two winner-preferring constraints Ch and Ck we should
promote. We crucially need information concerning the entire tableau. For instance, because of the
row a' in the comparative tableau (121), only the winner-preferring constraint Ch will eventually be
ranked above the loser-preferring constraint Ce, not the constraint Ck. But given the row a, with no
knowledge of other rows such as a', there seems to be no way to choose in a principled way which
one between Ch and Ck we should promote.
Ch Ck C,
(121) a ... W W ... L ...
a L W
L •
Boersma's promotion-demotion update rule (78) treats the case in (121) analogously to the preced-
ing case in (120): all winner-preferring constraints get promoted by the same amount (say 1), no
matter whether they appear in a simple row with a unique winner-preferring constraint as in (120) or
in a challenging row with multiple winner-preferring constraints as in (121). This does not look like
a good idea though: we want our update rule to be sensitive to the intrinsic logic of OT, namely to be
sensitive to the crucial difference just discussed between the two cases (120) and (121). The intuition
I would like to put forward is as follows: in the simple case of the comparative row a in (120) with a
unique winner-preferring constraint, we can confidently promote that unique winner-preferring con-
straint by 1; in the challenging case of the comparative row a in (121) with two winner-preferring
constraints, we should be cautious and split our confidence between the two winner-preferring con-
straints, by promoting each one just by 1/2. In the general case, if the current comparative row a
contains many entries equal to w, say a total of w(a) entries equal to w, then the uncertainty depends
on the size of w(a), and we should thus promote each winner-preferring constraint just by 1/w(a).
In conclusion, I suggest the new rule that updates the current ranking vector 0old to the new ranking
vector 0 new in response to a comparative row a as in (122a), described in words in (122b). This
update rule (122) performs both promotion of all winner-preferring constraints and demotion of the
unique loser-preferring constraint; thus, it is a promotion-demotion update rule. This update rule
(122) demotes by 1 but promotes by 1/w(a), where w(a) is the number of entries equal to w in the
current comparative row a; thus, this update rule is asymmetric (at least in the case of comparative
rows that have multiple entries equal to w).
(122) If the current ranking vector 0,ld is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a and the
latter contains a unique entry equal to L:1Old + 1 ifk E W(a)
a. old - 1 if k = L(a)
0old otherwise
b. i. Demote the unique currently undominated loser-preferring constraint by 1;
ii. promote all winner-preferring constraints by 1/w(a), where w(a) is the number of
winner preferring constraints w.r.t. the comparative row a.
Of course, we have the same update rule if we multiply both the promotion amount 1/w(a) and the
demotion amount 1 by the same positive constant. In particular, by multiplying both the promotion
and the demotion amounts by the total number w(a) of winner-preferring constraints, we get the
equivalent update rule (123a), described in words in (123b). Thus restated, we see another intuitive
justification for this update rule. Upon update triggered by a comparative row a according to the
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update rule (123), the highest ranked winner-preferring constraint raises by 1 and the loser-preferring
constraint sinks by the total number w(a) of winner preferring constraints. Thus, upon update
triggered by a, the separation between the loser-preferring constraint and the highest ranked winner-
preferring constraint increases by w(a) + 1. If the comparative row contains a small number w(a)
of entries equal to w, then the separation between the loser-preferring constraint and the highest
ranked winner-preferring constraint increases only by the small amount w(a) + 1. Since this is a
small separation, it will be eaten up fast by other competing rows. Thus this row will trigger many
updates over time. This is good, because we can trust the promotion triggered by a row with few
entries equal to w. If instead the comparative row a contains a large number w(a) of entries equal
to w, then the separation between the loser-preferring constraint and the highest winner-preferring
constraint will increase by the larger amount w(a) + 1 after a single update by that row. Since this is
a large separation, it will take a while for other competing rows to eat up that large separation. Thus,
this row will trigger few updates. This is good, because some of the promotions triggered by this
row should not have happened. Henceforth, I will use the variant in (123), since it has the additional
property that the components of the current ranking vector are integers at every time (provided of
course that the initial ranking vector has integer components).
(123) If the current ranking vector 0old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a and the
latter contains a unique entry equal to L:
Sod+l if k E W(a)
a. Onew -  0 ld - w (a ) ifk = L(a)
k-ld otherwise
b. i. Promote by 1 all winner-preferring constraints;
ii. demote the unique currently undominated loser-preferring constraint by w(a), where
w(a) is the number of winner preferring constraints w.r.t. the comparative row a.
So far, I have only considered the case where the current comparative row a has a unique L. If
that comparative row is not OT-compatible with the current ranking vector, then its unique loser-
preferring constraint must be currently undominated, namely it cannot be ranked below the cur-
rently top ranked winner-preferring constraint. We now need to consider the case where the current
comparative row has multiple entries equal to L. In this case, some of them might be currently
undominated and some others might not be. Consistent with the discussion of the maximal update
rule (71) in subsection 4.2.5, we wish to only demote the currently undominated loser-preferring
constraints. To this end, let L(a, 0) be the set of currently undominated loser-preferring constraints,
namely the set of loser-preferring constraints that are ranked by 0 = (01,..., 0n) above the top-
ranked winner-preferring constraint, as defined in (50) and repeated in (124); furthermore, let me
denote by e(a, 0) the total number of undominated loser-preferring constraints.
(124) L(a, 0)- {kE{1,...,n} ak=L, Ok> hmax Oh}
I hEw(a)
i(a, 0) - the cardinality of the set L(a, 0)
If only one loser-preferring constraint is currently undominated (namely L(a, 0) is a singleton),
then we can of course use again the very same update rule (123), where in this case we of course
replace L(a) by L(a, 0). What if there are more than one currently undominated loser-preferring
constraints, namely L(a, 0) is not a singleton? For concreteness, suppose that there are two cur-
rently undominated loser-preferring constraints C' and C", as in the row a in (125). As noted in
the discussion preceding claim 2, we get an OT-equivalent comparative tableau if we split up that
comparative row a into two rows a' and a" such that each of them retains only one of those two L's
of the original row a, while the other one gets replaced by an E.
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C/ C" 
C C "
•a/ ... W ... L. .
(125) a ... W ... L L ... a ... W ... L ...
a ... W ... L ...
Because of the OT-equivalence between the two comparative tableaux in (125), it makes sense to
construe the update triggered by the row a as the sequence of the two updates triggered by the
two rows a' and a". Furthermore, since the latter two rows contain a single L, then we can up-
date in response to each of these two rows using the update rule (123) devised above for the case
of comparative rows that contain a unique entry equal to L. Note that the two derived rows a'
and a" both have the same number w(a) of entries equal to w as the original row a. Thus, upon
update by a' according to (123), the loser-preferring constraint C' gets demoted by w(a) and all
winner-preferring constraints get promoted by 1. And upon subsequent update triggered by a", the
loser-preferring constraint C" gets demoted by w(a) too and all winner-preferring constraints get
promoted once more by 1. In the end, each one of the undominated loser-preferring constraints of
a gets demoted by the total number w(a) of winner-preferring constraints. Furthermore, each one
of the winner-preferring constraints gets promoted by 1 for as many times as there are undominated
loser-preferring constraints. Equivalently, each one of the winner-preferring constraints gets pro-
moted by the total number £(a, 001d) of currently undominated loser-preferring constraints. These
heuristic considerations suggest the new rule that updates the current ranking vector 0old to the new
ranking vector Onew in response to a comparative row a as in (126a), described in words in (126b).
(126) If the current ranking vector 0old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a:J 0old + (a, 0old) if k E W(a)
a. e w - Od - w(a) if k e L(a, old
Old otherwise
b. i. Promote all winner-preferring constraints by the number £(a, Oold) of currently un-
dominated loser-preferring constraints;
ii. demote all currently undominated loser-preferring constraints by the number w(a)
of winner-preferring constraints.
Of course, the update rule (126) fits into the additive scheme Onew = 0old + I in (46) once the
update vector d = (1, . . ., n), corresponding to a current comparative row a and a current ranking
vector 0old, is defined as in (127): if Ck is a winner-preferring constraint, then the corresponding
entry dk of the update vector is the number e(a, 0) of undominated loser-preferring constraints, as
defined in (124); if Ck is an undominated loser-preferring constraint, then the corresponding entry
ak of the update vector is the opposite of the number w(a) of winner-preferring constraints; all other
entries of the update vector are null. Note that the update vector R depends not only on the current
comparative row a but also on the current ranking vector 0old (even though the notation - does not
trasparently reflect the dependence on 0,ld).
J e(a, 0 l01d) if k EW(a)
(127) ak = -w(a) if k e L(a, 01d)
0 otherwise
Of course, I can again divide both the promotion amount e(a, 0old) and the demotion amount w(a)
by the same positive quantity w(a) - £(a, 0) and get the equivalent update rule in (128), where the
promotion amount only depends on the number w(a) of winner-preferring constraints and the de-
motion amount only depends on the number £(a, o0 d) of currently undominated loser-preferring
constraints. Again, I will usually prefer the variant (126) over (128), since the former has the addi-
tional property that the components of the current ranking vector are always integral (provided that
the initial ranking vector has integer components).
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(128) If the current ranking vector 0old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a:
o ld  
w(a) if k C W(a)
a. ~ ~ (a) *
a. Oew _" ld 1 if k L(aOold)a. k  (a, °id) if k E L(a,
old (a, old
kld  otherwise
b. i. Promote all winner-preferring constraints by the inverse of the number w(a) of
winner-preferring constraints;
ii. demote all currently undominated loser-preferring constraints by the inverse of the
number e(a, old) of currently undominated loser-preferring constraints.
To illustrate, the behavior of the on-line algorithm (116) with the new promotion-demotion update
rule (126) run on the input comparative tableau (15) is described in the diagram (129). Note the
non-monotonic dynamics of the ranking values of the two constraints C, and C2 over time, which
is the hallmark of update rules that perform promotion too.
0
in it 01 
2  0 3
(129) 1
row 1 row 2
C1  C2 C3 1
W W L]row 2
0o 0E L W -
row 2 row 1
The graph in (130) shows the dynamics over time of the components of the ranking vector enter-
tained by the on-line algorithm (116) with the promotion-demotion update rule (126) run on Pater's
comparative tableau (82) starting from the null initial vector. The algorithm does converge to the
right ranking vector, contrary to the case of Boersma's (1997) promotion-demotion update rule (78).
Yet, the resulting dynamics is rather complicated, with a large degree of oscillations.
(130) 21 1 1 1
How to get constraint promotion
5.2 First proof of finite time convergence
The preceding heuristic considerations motivate the new promotion-demotion update rule (126).
Sections 5.2 and 5.4 offer two different proofs that the on-line algorithm (116) with the promotion-
demotion update rule (126) satisfies condition (117), namely can only perform a finite number of
updates. These two different proofs will lead to various other families of promotion-demotion update
rules, presented in sections 5.3 and 5.5. We thus have a full arsenal of update rules that yield a
number of variants of the OT on-line model of the acquisition of phonology presented in section 4.2.
5.2 First proof of finite time convergence
In this section, I present a first proof that condition (117) holds for the promotion-demotion update
rule (126), namely that the corresponding on-line algorithm (116) can perform only a finite number
of updates. Throughout this section, I concentrate on the case where the initial ranking vector is the
null vector; the extension to an arbitrary ranking vector is straightforward. The proof presented in
this section is close in spirit to Tesar and Smolensky's analysis of the minimal demotion-only update
rule (51), as reviewed in subsections 4.2.2-4.2.4. This proof has four steps.
5.2.1 First step
The first step consists of claim 12. This claim is a straightforward generalization of Tesar and
Smolensky's claim 5 from section 4.2.1
Claim 12 Consider a comparative tableau A and a ranking >> OT-compatible with A. Without
loss of generality, assume that this ranking is C > C2 >> ... > Cn (otherwise, just relabel
the constraints). For every k = 1,..., n, let dec(k) be the set of rows whose >>-highest winner
preferring constraint is Ck, as defined in (16b) and repeated in (131).
(131) dec(k) -- a=(a1,...,an) a = .. =
I1 a, = .. * -k-1= E
The ranking vector Ot = (0 ,..., 0t ) entertained at any time t by the on-line algorithm (116) run
on the input comparative tableau A with the update rule (126) starting from the null initial vector
satisfies condition (132).
(132) O > 0
k-1
Of > - max w(a), k = 2,...,n
- aEdec(h)h=1
Proof Condition (132) trivially holds for k = 1 at any time t, since the top ranked constraint Ci can
never be a loser-preferrer for any row, and thus its ranking value 01 can only increase w.r.t. its initial
value Oinit = 0. Let me prove that property (132) holds for k = 2,.., n by induction on t. Claim
(132) trivially holds for every k = 2, .., n at time t = 0, because of the assumption that 0 init = 0.
Assume that claim (132) holds at time t - 1 for every k = 2,..., n and let me prove that it then
holds at time t for any given k = 2, . ., n. Suppose that at time t - 1 the algorithm gets the row a
of the input comparative tableau. There are three possible cases to be considered, listed in (133). If
either case I or case II holds, then claim (132) trivially holds for k at time t, because of the inductive
hypothesis that it held for k at time t - 1 together with the fact that 0 is either equal to (in case I)
or larger than (in case II) O-1.
O- 1 if O-1 is OT-compatible with a or ak = E (case I)
(133) O = O'- 1 + 1 if Ot- 1 is not OT-compatible with a and ak = W (case II)
0 - 1 - w(a) if Ot- 1 is not OT-compatible with a and ak = L (case III)
Thus, I only have to consider case III. Let Ch be the >>-highest ranked constraint that has a w in
the given row a, namely h E {1,..., n} is such that a E dec(h). Since the kth entry of the row a
is an L, then it must be h < k, otherwise the row a would not be OT-compatible with the ranking
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C1 > ... > Ch > ... > Ck > ... > Cn. Since the row a is not OT-compatible with the current
ranking vector Ot- 1, then Ch must be currently ranked no higher than Ck, namely 0-' < 0 -.
The component O can thus be lower bound as in (134).
(134) 0O ( O - - w(a)
(b)
h0 9'- w(a)
> 0 -1 - max w(a)
h aEdec(h)
(d) h-1
> - max w(a)- max w(a)
aEdec(I) aEdec(h)
h
= - max w(a)
= aEdec(f)
(e) k-1
> - max w(a)
aEdec(f)
Here, I have reasoned as follows: in step (a), I have used the hypothesis that we are in case III; in
step (b), I have used the fact that 0 - ' < 0 - ', as noted above; in step (c), I have used the fact that
a E dec(h), as noted above; in step (d), I have used the inductive hypothesis that (132) holds at time
t - 1; in step (e), I have used the fact that h < k. U
5.2.2 Second step
The preceding claim 12 provides a lower bound on the components of the ranking vector entertained
by the algorithm at a generic time, thus ensuring that these components cannot become arbitrarily
small. The next step of the reasoning is the following claim 13, that provides an upper bound on the
components of the ranking vector entertained by the algorithm at a generic time, thus ensuring that
these components cannot become too large neither. Recall that no upper bound holds for the case
of Boersma's promotion-demotion update rule (78): as shown by Pater's counterexample (82), the
components of the ranking vector can increase indefinitely with time when Boersma's update rule is
used. The following claim is thus important, because it ensures that this cannot happen in the case
of the new promotion-demotion update rule (126). The idea used in the proof of the following claim
is rather simple: since by claim 12 the components of the ranking vector cannot become too small,
then they cannot become too large either, since at any given time they must add up to zero.
Claim 13 The ranking vector 0 = (01, ... , On) entertained at an arbitrary time by the on-line algo-
rithm (116) run on an input OT-compatible comparative tableau A with the update rule (126) starting
from the null initial vector satisfies condition (135) for every k = 1,..., n.
n 3(135) Ok <
-2
Proof Let me start by showing that the components of the ranking vector 0 = (01,..., On) enter-
tained by the algorithm at a generic time add up to zero, as stated in (136).
n
(136) E0 h= 0
h=1
The claim trivially holds for the initial null ranking vector Oinit . Thus, it is sufficient to show that,
if the components of the current ranking vector 0 old = (0old,., old) add up to zero, then the
components of the ranking vector Onew =- (Onew , new)9 obtained by update (126) add up to zero
too. Since the update rule (126) fits into the additive scheme Onew = 0old + A in (46), then it is
in turn sufficient to show that the components of the update vector d = ( I,..., an) in (127) that
defined the update rule (126) sum up to zero. This is shown by the chain of identities in (137). Here,
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I have reasoned as follows: in step (a), I have split up the set {1,..., h} that h runs over into the
three sets W(a), L(a, 0 old) and their complement; in step (b), I have used the definition (127) of the
update rule.
n
(137 a =) Z h+ -dh + EU
h=1 hEW(a) hEL(a,Oold) hoW(a)UL(a,Oold)
(b) (a,Oold)
hE W(a) hEL(a,oIld)
= w(a)£(a, 0 old) - w(a)o(a, 6 old)
= 0
The identity (136) says in particular that the components of the current ranking vector 0 cannot
all have the same sign, namely that some of them must be positive and some of them must be
negative. Let P and N be the set of indices corresponding to positive and negative components of 0
respectively, as defined in (138). Note that some (possibly all) components of 0 could of course be
null, and thus belong neither to P nor to N.
(138) P = {k E {1,...,n} 1Ok>0
N = k E {1,... n} k <01
If k E N, then Ok < 0, and thus the bound in (135) holds a fortiori. Thus, I only need to prove the
bound in (135) for an arbitrary k E P. The proof consists of the chain of inequalities in (139).
(a)
(139) Ok < Ok
kEP
_E Ok
kEN
(c) k-1
Smax w(a)
kEN h= aEdec(h)
(d) k-1
kEN h=1
= n (k - 1)
kEN
(e) n
k=2
= (n -n+1
Here, I have reasoned as follows: in step (a), I have used the fact that k e P and that Ok > 0 for every
k E P; in step (b), I have used the identity (136), which indeed entails that "hEP Oh = - YhEN Oh;
in step (c), I have used the inequality (132), under the assumption that the input comparative tableau
is OT-compatible with the ranking C > C2 > ... > Cn (otherwise, just relabel the constraints);
in step (d), I have noted that w(a) 5 n; in step (e), I have used the fact that N can contain at most
n - 1 components, since at least one component must be positive, in order for the identity (136) to
hold. U
5.2.3 Third step
The third step of the proof consists of the following claim 14. This claim says that, once the current
ranking vector 0 is updated to a new ranking vector 0', there is no way for the algorithm to loop
back to that ranking vector 0. In other words, once a ranking vector is deemed unsuitable, it is never
considered again.
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Claim 14 The sequence of ranking vectors entertained by the on-line algorithm (116) with the up-
date rule (126) run on an input OT-compatible comparative tableau starting from the null initial vec-
tor cannot contain a subsequence such as (140), whereby the same ranking vector 0 is entertained
twice but with some other ranking vector 0' : 0 entertained in between.
(140) ... -- 0 -4 ... - ' . . --+ 0 --+ ...
Proof Let Ot = (0t ,..., t) E Rn be the ranking vector entertained by the algorithm immediately
after the tth update; thus 0 is the ranking vector entertained by the algorithm after the first update,
02 is the ranking vector entertained by the algorithm after the second update, and so on. I have to
prove the implication (141).
(141) Ot = Ot' =  t = tt
Let at = (at ,... , at) E Nm be the dual vector after the tth update, namely a is the number of the
first t updates that were triggered by the ith row of the input comparative tableau. As noted in (91),
the total number of updates t is equal to the number of updates at triggered by the first row plus the
number of updates t triggered by the second row and so on, namely t = = Analogously,
let at' = (a ',..., a ) E Nm be the dual vector after the t'th update, so that t' = E c4a'. Thus,
the implication (141) is equivalent to the implication (142).
m m
(142) Ot = Ot' =
i=1 i=1
Assume without loss of generality that t < t'. Note then that Em ai = 1  if at t'
since at < at' because of the fact that t < t' and that the dual variables are nondecreasing over
time. Thus, the implication (142) is equivalent to the implication (143), which says that primal
identity entails dual identity.1 Let me thus show that this implication (142) does indeed hold.
(143) 0t = O t' == a t = a t'
Claim 1 ensures that there exists an integer d < n such that, by relabeling the constraints and
properly reordering the rows and the columns of the input comparative tableau A, it takes the form
in (18), repeated in (144).
c C2  ... Cd Cd+1 ... Cn
W
dec(Cl) I . ... .
W
E W
dec(C 2) I I ... ... ... ... ...
E W
(144) E E
I ... .. .. .. ..
E E
E E W
dec(Cd) E ... I ... ... ...
E E W
The implication in (143) can thus be made more explicit as in (145), by partitioning the components
of the dual vectors into the d sets dec(Cx),..., dec(Ca). I will now prove the implication (145) by
induction on k.
(145) Ot = Ot' - a = ac' for every i dec(Ck) for every k = 1,...,d
1Note that this does not mean that in the general case we can reconstruct the dual vector from the primal vector. The
validity of the implication (143) crucially rests on the hypothesis that we are considering two ranking vectors that belong to
the same run, so that one of the two is obtained starting from the other.
To simplify the exposition, let me first present the proof under the simplificatory hypothesis that
every row of the input comparative tableau (144) contains one and exactly one entry equal to L;
then, I will show how the reasoning used in this special case can be extended to the general case.
Under this simplificatory hypothesis, the general update rule (126) reduces to the special case (123).
And the corresponding update vector l in (127) only depends on the current comparative row, not on
the current ranking vector, as made explicit in (146). Thus, given an input comparative tableau A,
I can consider the numerical matrix A obtained by organizing one underneath the other the update
vectors corresponding to the comparative rows of A, as was illustrated in 4.2.6.2. Let -i,k be the
entry of the matrix A thus obtained that sits in the ith row and the kth column.2
(146) a= [ai ... ak ... an] = a =[al ... k ... an ]
+1 if ak = W
ak E {L, E, W} Uk - 0 ifak = E
-w(a) if ak = L
To establish the base case of the induction, let me show that the implication (145) holds for k = 1,
namely that Ot = Ot ' entails that a = a' for every i E dec(C1). The proof consists of the chain
of implications in (147). Here, I have reasoned as follows. In step (a), I have expressed the primal
variables 01O and 0' in terms of the corresponding dual variables a t and at', reasoning as for the
identity (95) in subsection 4.2.6. In other words, I have reasoned as follows. The ranking value
of the constraint C1 starts out at 0. The update rule (123) modifies the ranking value of constraint
C1 only when update is triggered by a row in dec(Cl). Furthermore, each time a row in dec(Cx)
triggers an update, the ranking value of constraint C1 gets incremented by 1. Thus, the ranking value
O of constraint C1 after the tth update is equal to the number of those t updates that were triggered
by a row in dec(C1). Equivalently, O is equal to the sum of a i over all i dec(Cl). Analogous
considerations hold of course for Of'. In step (b), I have used the fact that at < at', since t < t' by
hypothesis and furthermore the dual variables are nondecreasing over time.
(147) Ot = Ot '  t = t
iEdec(Cx) iEdec(CI)
( t Ot
(b a = a' for every i E dec(C1)
Before I turn to the general case, let me show that the implication (145) holds for k = 2, namely
let me show that Ot = Ot ' entails that a = a' for every i E dec(C2). The proof consists of the
chain of implications in (148), which is completely analogous to the one in (147). Here, I have
reasoned as follows. In step (a), I have expressed the primal variable O after the tth update in terms
of the corresponding dual variables at and the coefficients ?i,2 through (95). In other words, I have
reasoned as follows. The ranking value of the constraint C2 starts out at 0. The update rule (123)
2The high-level idea of the proof of the implication (143) can now be made explicit as follows, using standard facts
from Linear Algebra. As noted in footnote 18, the relation (i) holds: the primal vector Ot at time t is the row-by-column
product between the transpose of the matrix A, obtained by organizing the update vectors one underneath the other, and the
corresponding dual vector act .
(i) a. Ot XT at
b. at- (A-1)Tot
Suppose now that the input comparative tableau in (144) had the property that d = n and furthermore that dec(Ck) was a
singleton for every constraint Gk. Then, the corresponding matrix A of update vectors would be a square triangular matrix.
A triangular matrix is invertible. Thus, we could invert (i) into (ii). The relation in (ii) says that the primal vector determines
the dual vector, and thus in particular it entails (145). In the general case, the numerical matrix A is not even a square matrix,
hence it is not invertible and therefore it is not true that the primal vector determines the dual vector. Yet, in the general
case, OT-compatibility of a comparative tableau A entails that the corresponding matrix A of update vectors is in some sense
"close" to a triangular matrix. This ensures that the primal vector determines the dual vector at least if we restrict ourselves
to primal and dual vectors in a single run, as stated in (143).
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modifies the ranking value of constraint C2 only when update is triggered by a row in dec(C1) or in
dec(C2 ). Furthermore, each time a row in dec(C2) triggers an update, the ranking value of constraint
Ci gets incremented by 1. And each time a row ai in dec(Cl) triggers an update, the ranking value
of constraint Ci gets modified by the amount 7i,2. Thus, the ranking value 0t of constraint C1 after
the tth update is equal to the sum of a over all i dec(C2 ) plus the sum of a over all i C dec(C1)
each multiplied by ai,2. Analogous considerations hold of course for 90'. In step (b), I have used
the inductive hypothesis that a = c' for every i G dec(C1); in step (c), I have used the fact that
at < at', since t < t' by hypothesis and furthermore the dual variables are nondecreasing over
time.
(148) 0 = t '
(a) t __- t t
'6iz20Z + a ~ di a~ 2 a ± Z
iEdec(C1) iEdec(C2 ) iEdec(Ci) iedec(C2 )
at .t/2 02
(b) Z =
iEdec(C2 ) iEdec(C2 )
(C), t = ' £ / la a o ' for every i e dec(Ck)
Assume now that at = c4' for every i c dec(C1) U ... U dec(Ck-1) for some k < d and let me
prove the inductive step that a = a!' for every i G dec(Ck). The proof consists of the chain of
implications in (149), which is completely analogous to the ones in (147) and (148). Here, I have
reasoned as follows: in step (a), I have expressed the primal variables Ok and O' in terms of the
corresponding dual variables at and at' and the coefficients ai,k through (95); in step (b), I have
used the inductive hypothesis that a = a' for every i G dec(Ci) U .. dec(Ck-1); in step (c), I
have used the fact that at < at', since t < t' by hypothesis and furthermore the dual variables are
nondecreasing over time.
(149) t  t '  k = Okt'
ai,ka - Z o
iEdec(Cl)U...Udec(Ck_1) iEdec(Ck)
iEdec(C1)U...Udec(Ck_1) iEdec(Ck)Oat
k
iEdec(Ck) iCdec( Ck)
c a= al' for every i E dec(Ck)
To conclude the proof, I need to consider the case where the input comparative tableau A contains
rows with multiple entries equal to L, so that the general update rule (126) does not reduce to the
special update rule (123). The crucial difficulty in this case is that the contribution of the ith row
of the input tableau to the primal vector depends on the number of currently undominated loser-
preferring constraints, and thus cannot be distilled into a unique coefficient ii,k. To overcome this
difficulty, we just need a more careful definition of the dual variables. Suppose that the ith row of the
input tableau has £ entries equal to L, corresponding to the loser-preferring constraints Ci, ... , Cit.
Let C1,... ,C,,... ,C2 - 1 be all the non empty subsets of the set {Ci ,... ,Cit}. For every j =
S1,..., 2 - 1, let al,1 be the number of the first t updates that were triggered by the ith row of
the input tableau because all and only the loser-preferring constraints in the set C, were currently
undominated. I can thus repeat the preceding reasoning using these refined dual variables a i.
5.2.4 Fourth step
I am now ready to conclude my reasoning with a trivial proof of finite time convergence of the
on-line algorithm (116) with the promotion-demotion update rule (126).
Claim 15 The on-line algorithm (116) run on an input OT-compatible comparative tableau starting
from the null initial vector with the promotion-demotion update rule (126) can only make a finite
number of updates in step 3.
Proof By claims 12 and 13, the search space of the algorithm is a bounded region of Rn . Fur-
thermore, the algorithm can only consider integral ranking vectors. Thus, the search space of the
algorithm is finite. Since the algorithm cannot entertain the same ranking vector twice by claim 14,
then the algorithm must converge after a finite number of updates. U
5.3 Variants
In this section, I discuss under which conditions the reasoning presented in the preceding section
extends from the specific promotion-demotion update rule (126) to a general minimal promotion-
demotion update rule of the form (46), repeated in (150). Or equivalently, from the update vector
(127) to a general update vector R = (,..., an).
(150) If the current ranking vector 0old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a:
Onew - - oold - -
5 0 if k E L(a, Oold
a. O ew  kld + k where Uk is > 0 if k E W(a)
= 0 otherwise
new old
o n J L ni J - I
update vector
b. If the constraint C k is winner-preferring, promote it by adding the nonnegative constant
ak > 0; if the constraint Ck is loser-preferring and undominated, demote it by adding
the nonpositive constant Uk < 0.
This discussion will allow me to further comment on and clarify the reasoning presented in the
preceding section.
5.3.1 First variant
Without loss of generality, assume that the ranking that the input comparative tableau is OT-compatible
with is C1 > C 2 > ... > Cn. For every h = 1,..., n, for every row a E dec(Ch) of the input
comparative tableau and for every update vector i corresponding to a, let me also write d E dec(Ch).
Claim 12 straghtforwardly extends from the specific promotion-demotion update rule (126) to the
general minimal update rule (150) with the bound (132) generalized to (151), without any special
restrictions on the update vector d = (~, .. ., an).
(151) 0' > 0
k-1
O > ,(c)max min{ak,0}, k = 2,...,nk E Edec(Ch)h= 1
Consider the update vector d = (a ,... ,an) defined by k = -1 for k e L(a, Oold) and uk = 0
otherwise, that corresponds to the update rule (51). In this case, the invariant (151) entails (152).
The latter is exactly the invariant (53) proven by Tesar and Smolensky for the update rule (51), as
reviewed in subsection 4.2.3.1. Thus, here I am really just pointing out that Tesar and Smolensky's
invariant does not in any way depend on the fact that the update rule (51) performs demotion only.
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Rather, that invariant only depends on the fact that the update rule (51) is minimal (i.e. only demotes
currently undominated constraints), and thus essentially carries over to the general minimal update
rule (150).
(152) Ok > -k + 1, k = 1,...,n
Claim 13 does not extend from the specific promotion-demotion update rule (126) to the gen-
eral promotion-demotion update rule (150). As a counterexample, consider the case of Boersma's
promotion-demotion update rule (78), and recall that when that rule is used with Pater's counterex-
ample (82), the components of the current ranking vector keep incresing indefinitely. The crucial
property of the update rule (126) that was used in the proof of claim 13 is that the sum over the
promotion amounts (namely the amount £(a, 0old) times the total number w(a) of winner-preferring
constraints) is equal in size to the sum over the demotion amounts (namely the amount w(a) times
the total number e(a, 0old) of undominated loser-preferring constraints). Of course, the proof of
claim 13 given above immediately extends to the case where the sum over the promotion amounts
is not larger than the sum over the demotion amounts. In other words, the proof extends to the gen-
eral promotion-demotion update rule (150) provided that the condition (153) holds for every update
vector i.
11
(153) Z k <0
k=1
Claims 14 and 15 extend from the specific promotion-demotion update rule (126) to the general
promotion-demotion update rule (150), as long as the update vectors can only take a finite number
of integer values. In other words, as long as there exists some bound B G N such that condition
(154) holds for every update vector i.
(154) IE { -B,...,-1,0,1,...,B}
n
In conclusion, I can generalize claim 15 as claim 16. This conclusion is rather intuitive: promotion-
demotion update rules that promote overall less than they demote, in the sense of condition (153),
plausibly retain the good convergence properties of demotion-only update rules.
Claim 16 The on-line algorithm (116) run on an input OT-compatible comparative tableau start-
ing from the null initial vector with a promotion-demotion update rule (150) that satisfies the two
conditions (153) and (154) can only make a finite number of updates in step 3.
5.3.2 Second variant
An immediate consequence of the general claim 16 is the following claim 17, that guarantees finite
time convergence for the case of the promotion-demotion update rules (155) and (156). The former
update rule (155) is the update rule already considered in (123), but used here also in the case of
comparative rows that have multiple currently undominated loser-preferring constraints; this update
rule will be used extensively in chapter 6. The update rule (156) was already considered in Boersma
(1998), but the issue of its finite time convergence was open until now. Note that the statement
(156) of this update rule does not in any way specify how the unique winner-preferring constraint
CT that gets promoted should be chosen. We can immagine a variety of ways: we could choose at
random; we could stubbornly always choose the same one; we could always choose the constraint
corresponding to the smallest index, etcetera. Finite time convergence for all these cases is not
intuitively obvious.
(155) If the current ranking vector 0,ld is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a:
kld  1 if k G W(a)
a. ew _ ld - w(a) if k e L(a, 0 ° ld
a0old otherwise
b. Promote by 1 all winner-preferring constraint; demote all currently undominated loser-
preferring constraints by the total number w(a) of winner-preferring constraints.
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(156) If the current ranking vector Old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a, pick an
arbitrary winner-preferring constraint k E W(a) and update as follows:
{Old+l ifk=kEW(a)
a. ke w = Od -1 if k E L(a, Old)
Oold otherwise
b. Promote by 1 only the designated winner-preferring constraint CT; demote by I all cur-
rently undominated loser-preferring constraints.
Claim 17 The on-line algorithm (116) run on an input OT-compatible comparative tableau starting
from the null initial vector with one of the two promotion-demotion update rules (155) or (156) can
only perform a finite number of updates in step 3.
Pmroof The claim for the case of the update rule (155) is a trivial consequence of the general claim
16, since this update rule (155) is obviously a special case of the general update rule (150) that
satisfies the two conditions (153) and (154). The case of the update rule (156) does not strictly
speaking constitutes a special case of the general case (150), since the former allows for different
updates upon exposure to the same row (depending on the choice of the designated winner-preferring
constraint that gets promoted), an option that the scheme (150) does not allow for. But this slight
difficulty can be straightforwardly circumvented as follows. Suppose that the input tableau contains
a comparative row a with two entries equal to w corresponding to the two constraints Ch and Ck.
Replace that row with two identical copies a' and a". Define the update vector 9' corresponding to
the row a' as in (157a) and the update vector " corresponding to the row a" as in (157b). 3
(157) a. Z' = 1 k = 0 U for every £ E L(a', Gold)
b. '' = 0 Z' = 1 U1 for every E L(a"/, 0old)
Then, update by row a and the choice of Ch (respectively, Ck) according to (156) is equivalent to
update by row a' (respectively, a") according to (150). U
5.3.3 Third variant
So far, I have only considered the case of gradual update rules. That is indeed the case that I am
interested in, because that is the case that is relevant for the OT on-line model of the acquisition
of phonology, as discussed in section 4.3.4. Yet, let me close this section with a digression on
promotion-demotion non-gradual update rules. To simplify the presentation, assume that all rows of
the input tableau contain exactly one entry equal to L and let me denote by CL(a) the unique loser-
preferring constraint w.r.t. row a. Claim 2 guarantees that this auxiliary assumption does not affect
the generality of the analysis, since a general comparative tableau can be preprocessed and turned
into an OT-equivalent comparative tableau with a unique entry equal to L per row. Consider the rule
that updates the current ranking vector 9 old to the ranking vector onew in response to a comparative
row a as in (158).
(158) If the current ranking vector 0 ld is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a:
kd + 6+1 if k E W(a)S w(a) + 1
Oew old w(a 6 - w(a) if k= L(a) 6= Ol(a) -  max Old
w (a) + 6- w)ifI
0 old otherwise
This update rule is non-gradual, namely one update by a comparative row a ensures that the updated
vector Onew is right away OT-compatible with a, as shown by the chain of inequalities in (159).
3 Note that it would not do the job to replace the comparative row a with the two rows a' and a" each of which retains
only one of the two w's, while the other is replaced by an E. In fact, this transformation does not preserve OT-compatibility:
the tableau obtained this way could very well not be OT-compatible, even though the original tableau was OT-compatible. If
the derived tableau is not OT-compatible, then claim 16 does not apply.
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Here, I have reasoned as follows: in step (a), I have used the definition (158) of the update rule; in
step (b), I have just shuffled the terms around and simplified; in step (c), I have used the definition
of 6.
19 a new new a)( olid 1 I wa_1_-_ wa_
(159) max oe aX + 6+1 _ 0mold) w(a)( hEW(a) heL(a) hW(a) w(a) + 1L(a) w(a) + 1
b) / old)
S +  
+  + w(a)h w ( )
> [max 0old - ±+Id
h h+(a)]w(a)
(C) -6 + 6 + 1 + w(a)
> 0
Claim 18 trivially follows from claim 16. The idea is of course to reinterpret an update by the non-
gradual update rule (158) as a succession of updates by the gradual rule (123), as in the proof of
claim 10 in section 4.2.1.
Claim 18 The on-line algorithm (116) run on an input OT-compatible comparative tableau starting
from the null initial vector with the non-gradual promotion-demotion update rules (158) can only
perform a finite number of updates in step 3.
Proof Update triggered by a comparative row a according to rule (158) can be described as a
sequence of 6 + 1 updates triggered by that same comparative row according to rule (123), namely
(160a) is equivalent to (160b).
(160) a. 0old a > Onew
a and Oold
not OT-comp.
I
update
w.r.t. (158)
b. oold a 01 02 ... 8 a onew
I I I
a and Oold a and 01  a and O'
not OT-comp. not OT-comp. not OT-comp.
I I I
update update update
w.r.t. (123) w.r.t. (123) w.r.t. (123)
Thus, claim 18 immediately follows from claim 15. U
5.4 Second proof of finite time convergence
In this section, I offer an alternative, very different proof that condition (117) holds for the promotion-
demotion update rule (126), namely that the corresponding on-line algorithm (116) can perform only
a finite number of updates. This alternative proof is interesting for two reasons. First, because it will
extend to further promotion-demotion update rules that cannot be analyzed by means of the com-
binatoric line of proof presented in section 5.2, as discussed in section 5.5. Second, because it will
shed some light on the interesting issue of the relationship between standard OT and linear OT, as
discussed in chapter 8. The reader might indeed want to skip ahed to chapter 8 right after this section.
This second line of proof has three steps.
5.4.1 First step
As noted in section 5.1, the new promotion-demotion update rule (126) fits into the additive scheme
0new = 0old + - in (46) once the update vector A = (aU,... an), corresponding to a current
comparative row a and a current ranking vector 0 1od, is defined as in (127), repeated in (161).J £(a, old) if k e W(a)
(161) ak - -w(a) if k e L(a, 0old)
0 otherwise
The core of the second line of analysis of the new promotion-demotion update rule (126) is the
following very simple claim 19.
Claim 19 If the ranking vector 0old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a, then the
inequality (162) holds, where A is the update vector corresponding to Oold and a according to (161).
(162) (Oold,a) < 0
In (162), I have used the notation (., .) for the scalar product defined in (94).
Proof To simplify the notation, let me drop the superscript "old", and thus write just 0 = (01, .. ., On)
instead of 0old . The proof of the inequality (162) consists of the chain of inequalities in (163).
n
(163) (O, ) = Ohah
h=1
E Ohah + Okk+ hh
hEW(a) kEL(a,O) hVW(a)UL(a,0)
(b)
£(a, 0) Oh - w(a) Ok
hEW(a) kEL(a,O)
< £(a, 0)w(a) max Oh- w(a) Ok
-- he W(a)
hEW(a) kEL(a,O)
(d)
< £(a,O)w(a) max Oh - w(a)£(a, 0) mmin Ok
hEW(a) kEL(a,O)
= e(a, 0)w(a) max Oh - min Ok)
hEW(a) kEL(a,0)
(e) (.)
< 0
Here, I have reasoned as follows: in step (a), I have split the set {1,..., n} that h ranges over into
the three sets W(a), L(a, 0) and their complement; in step (b), I have used the definition (161) of
the update vector 1; in step (c), I have upper bounded the sum -hEW(a) Oh with its biggest term
maxhEw(a) Oh multiplied by the number w(a) of terms; in step (d), I have lower bounded the sum
h~EL(a,O) Oh with its smallest term minhEL(a,e) AOh multiplied by the number £(a, 0) of terms; in
step (e), I have used the fact that 0 is by hypothesis not OT-compatible with the comparative row a,
namely there exists a loser-preferring constraint whose ranking value is at least as large as the largest
ranking value of winner-preferring constraints, so that minkEL(a,e) _ maxhEW(a) and the quantity
(*) is therefore nonpositive. U
5.4.2 Second step
The next claim 20 provides a global properties of the set of all update vectors (161) corresponding
to OT-compatible comparative rows. The idea of the proof is rather straightforward. Let me first
illustrate it with a concrete example. Consider the OT-compatible comparative tableau A in (164).
For each row a of this comparative tableau, consider the corresponding update vector " as defined
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in (161). Organize these numerical vectors one underneath the other, thus obtaining the numerical
matrix A in (161), where I am omitting O's for the sake of readability.
C1 C2 C3 04 C 5  C 1 02 03 04 05
W W L W 1 1 -3 1
W L 1 -1
(164) A= W L = 1 -1
W W L 1 1 -2
W L 1 -1
Note that the comparative tableau A is OT-compatible with the ranking C1 > C2 > ... > C5
and is in the form (18). Here is a way to construct a ranking vector 0 that satisfies (165). Start from
the bottom, and set 05 to an arbitrary value, say 0. In order for property (165) to hold for the last
row of A with this choice of 05, it must be 04 _ 1; so, let's set 04 = 1. In order for property (165)
to hold for the third and fourth rows of A with these choices for 05 and 04, it must be 03 > 1; so,
let's set 03 = 1. And so on. The idea is thus as follows: we arbitrarily pick the ranking value of
the bottom ranked constraint and we determine the ranking values of the other constraints one at the
time moving upward in the comparative tableau.
Claim 20 If a comparative tableau A is OT-compatible, then there exists a vector 0 such that con-
dition (165) holds for the update vector 5 corresponding to any row a of the tableau A and to any
ranking vector according to (161).
(165) (0,a) > 1
In (165), I have used again the notation (., .) for the scalar product defined in (94).
Proof Claim 1 ensures that there exists an integer d < n such that, by relabeling the constraints
and properly reordering the rows and the columns of the comparative tableau A, it takes the form in
(18), repeated once more in (414).
C1 C2 ... Cd Cd+1 ... Cn
w
dec(C1) ... ...
w
E W
dec(C 2 )
E W
(166) E E
I I ..
E E
E E W
dec(Cd) I E ... I
E E W
If the comparative row a belongs to dec(Ck) for some k, then let me also say that an update vector
! corresponding to a (and to some ranking vector) as in (161) belongs to dec(Ck). Consider the
ranking vector 0 = (0 1,... , On) defined in (167), starting from the bottom components Od+1,.. - , ,On
and moving up from Od to 01. Note that the definition is well-posed because ak 5 0 (in fact, since
- E dec(Ck), then ak = w and thus ak > 0); and furthermore because the maximum is finite (since
I am taking the maximum over a finite set).
(167) Od+ 1 =...= On 0
Ok max 1- Ohih , k = d,d -1,...,2,1
Edec(Ck) ak E +
h=k+l
Consider an arbitrary update vector a as in (161), and let k E {1,..., d} be such that a G dec(Ck).
The chain of implications in (168) shows that condition (165) holds for this update vector I.
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n(168) (0, d) 1 4- O h h 1
h=1
k-i n
,(a)> 1 Zehah+e0k+ Z Ghh >l1
h=1 h=k+1
n
Ok' k + E h0h > 1
h=k+l(b) >O( _ hah)44 Oak E
h=k+11( n
Ok> max 1- E h-h
-KEdec(Ck) k h=k+
Here, I have reasoned as follows: in step (a), I have split up the set {1,..., n} that h runs over into
the three sets {1,..., k - 1}, {k} and {k + 1,... , n}; in step (b), I have used the hypothesis that
E dec(Ck), that entails that , = ... = k-1 = 0; in step (c), I have used again the hypothesis
thatd E dec(Ck).4
5.4.3 Third step
I am now ready to present the following, alternative proof of claim 15 repeated below. The idea of
this proof is to deduce finite time convergence of the OT on-line algorithm (116) with the promotion-
demotion update rule (126) from the famous convergence theorem for the Perceptron algorithm,
recalled as claim 25 in the Appendix that closes this chapter. The specific strategy used here actually
illustrates a general strategy to import within standard OT methods and results from the theory of
linear classification. This general strategy will be outlined in chapter 8. The interested reader might
want to skip ahead to chapter 8 right after this section.
Claim 15 The on-line algorithm (116) run on an input OT-compatible comparative tableau starting
from the null initial vector with the promotion-demotion update rule (126) can perform only a finite
4 Another way of constructing a vector 0 that satisfies (165) is (i) below, based on the fact that the components of any update
vector (161) cannot be larger (in size) than n - 1 (in fact, there must be at least one entry equal to L and at least one entry
equal to w in every comparative row a that triggers an update, so that both the number w(a) of winner-preferring constraints
and the number 1(a, 0God) of undominated loser-preferring constraints cannot be larger than n - 1). This observation is in
essence due to Prince and Smolensky (2004). Claim 20 is indeed a special version of the well known fact that typologies
corresponding to standard OT are smaller than typologies corresponding to linear OT.
(i) 01 n
O k  = n-k+l
On = n
Yet, the ranking vector in (i) has very large components for large n, no matter whether such large components are necessary
or not, given a specific comparative tableau. The alternative definition (167) indeed tries to keep the components as small as
possible, in the sense that the ranking vector defined in (167) satisfies the component-wise identity in (ii), starting from the
bottom component On and moving up. In fact, since 0k as defined in (167) belongs to the set (*), then of course Ok _ min(*).
Let (**) be the set obtained by replacing the condition "for every update vector " in the definition of (*) with the condition
"for every update vectors E dec(Ck)". Since (*) is a subset of (**), then min(**) 5 min(*); furthermore, Ok, as defined
in (167) coincides with min(**); hence Ok < min(*).
{ there exist 0l,..., O',- 1 > 0 such that
(ii) Ok = min O0 O' (01,... , 0,0k+1,. .., n) for k = n, n -1, ...,2,1
satisfies (0' , W) 1 for every update vector f
Indeed, it will turn out useful for the developments of subsection 7.1.3, concerning estimates on the actual number of updates,
to keep as small as possible the components of the vector 0 that ensures (165).
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number of updates.
Proof Assume by contradiction that the claim is false, namely that there exists an input OT-
compatible comparative tableau A with a unique entry equal to L per row such that there exists
a way of ordering the rows of this tableau into an infinite sequence ao, a1 , ... , at, ... such that, if
the rows are fed to the algorithm in this order (namely, the row a1 is fed to the algorithm at the first
iteration, the row a 2 at the second iteration, ... , the row at at the tth iteration, ... ), then at every
time t it happens that the current ranking vector Ot entertained by the algorithm at the tth iteration
is not OT-compatible with the comparative row at fed to the algorithm at that iteration, and thus the
current ranking vector 0 t gets updated to Ot+l according to the update rule (126). This situation is
depicted in (169).
(169) O. I
1  
f
2  
ft
0 init 0 1 02 . .
t  
.at
I I I I
ao and Oinit al and 01 a 2 and 02 at and 0
t
not OT-comp. not OT-comp. not OT-comp. not OT-comp.
I I I I
update update update update
w.r.t. (126) w.r.t. (126) w.r.t. (126) w.r.t. (126)
For every time t, let !t be the update vector corresponding to the current comparative row at and the
current ranking vector 0t as in (161). Since the current ranking vector 0 t is not OT-compatible with
the current comparative row at, claim 19 then ensures in particular that (0t, !t) < 0. The situation
depicted in (169) thus in particular entails the situation depicted in (170). The latter situation is
entirely described in terms of the update vectors it: at each time t, we get a vector it such that
(0 t , it) < 0 and we update Ot to Ot+l by adding it to Ot as prescribed by (161).
(170) 0 init N 0 1 6 o 2  ± ... 0t - ...
I I I I
(0init, -g0 ) :_ (01, -d1 ): o (02, -&2) <_0 (01, -ft ) :0
I I I I
update update update update
w.r.t. (126) w.r.t. (126) w.r.t. (126) w.r.t. (126)
Claim 20 ensures that the vectors ao, a i, .. , t... in (170) satisfy all hypotheses of the conver-
gence theorem of the Perceptron algorithm, namely claim 25 in the Appendix that closes this chap-
ter. Therefore, the latter theorem ensures that the situation depicted in (170) can never arise, thus
providing the desired contradiction. U
5.5 More variants
In this section, I discuss under which conditions the reasoning presented in the preceding section
extends from the specific promotion-demotion update rule (126) to a general minimal promotion-
demotion update rule of the form (46), repeated in (171). Or equivalently, from the update vector
(127) to a general update vector i = (i,... , an).
(171) If the current ranking
9ew
a. new =k
9new
n L
vector 0 old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a:
0 old - a-1
(< 0 if k c L(a, 0old)
Old + ak where a is >0 if k W(a)
,= 0 otherwise
0old
update vectorupdate t r
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b. If the constraint Ck is winner-preferring, promote it by adding the nonnegative constant
ak > 0; if the constraint Ck is loser-preferring and undominated, demote it by adding
the nonpositive constant ak < 0.
This discussion will allow me to further comment on and clarify the reasoning presented in the
preceding section.
5.5.1 First variant
The proof of claim 15 presented in the preceding section immediately extends to the following
generalization.
Claim 21 Consider an update rule of the general form (171) such that there exists a constant B > 0
and a ranking vector 0 such that for every pair (a, 0) of a ranking vector 0 not OT-compatible with
a comparative row a, the corresponding update vector I satisfies the three properties (172).
(172) a. (R, ) < B
b. (0,)> 1
c. (0, ) 0
The on-line algorithm (116) run on an input OT-compatible comparative tableau starting from the
null initial vector with that promotion-demotion update rule can perform only a finite number of
updates.
We now need to ensure that the three conditions (172) hold. If the components of the update vectors
S= (a, . . ., an) can only take a finite number of values, then condition (172a) is trivially satisfied.
One way of enforcing that the components of the update vectors can only take a finite number of
values is to require them to be bounded integers, as in (173).
(173) fE {- B,...,-1,0,+1,...,B}
n
Consider next the hypothesis (174), that says that for every comparative row a = (a,,..., an) (and
for every ranking vector 0), the corresponding update vector R = (al,..., an) has the property
that all the components k corresponding to winner-preferring constraints are positive. The proof of
claim 20 ensures that, if both hypotheses (173) and (174) hold, then condition (172b) holds.
(174) If ak = W, then uk > 0
Thus, we only need to worry about condition (172c). Claim 19 showed that condition (172c) does
indeed hold in the case of the specific update vectors defined in (161). The proof of claim 19
immediately extends to any definition of the update vectors that satisfies the identity (175a); more in
general, it extends to any definition that satisfies the condition (175b).
n
(175) a. E h=0
h=1
n <0 if max 0old> 0b. ah hEW(a)
h= > 0 if max 0 d < 0h=1 I hEW(a) -
In conclusion, I can generalize claim 15 as claim 22. Condition (173) is condition (154). And
condition (175) is a slight variant of condition (153). Condition (174) is instead peculiar to this line
of analysis. In conclusion, claim 22 is a variant of claim 16.
Claim 22 The on-line algorithm (116) run on an input OT-compatible comparative tableau starting
from the null initial vector with a promotion-demotion update rule (150) that satisfies the three
conditions (173), (174) and (175) can only make a finite number of updates.
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5.5.2 Second variant
In subsection 4.2.2, I have reviewed Tesar and Smolensky's observation that finite time convergence
(117) holds for minimal update rules with null promotion amounts. In subsection 4.3.4, I have mo-
tivated the goal of devising convergent update rules with nonnull promotion amounts. We know that
the promotion amounts cannot be too large w.r.t. the demotion amounts, as shown by the failure
of Boersma's update rules (78) and (79). So, how large can the promotion amounts be, without
affecting convergence? Claim 16 has shown that finite time convergence holds as long as the sum
over promotion amounts is not larger than the sum over demotion amounts, as required by condition
(153). Claim 22 has further extended this conclusion, by showing that this condition (153) can be
relaxed as long as the ranking value maxhew(a) 0 ld of the top ranked winner-preferring constraint
is nonpositive, namely that condtion (175a) can be replaced by the looser condition (175b). At this
point, the following question naturally arises: can we construct update rules where the sum over
promotion amounts is larger than the sum over demotion amounts even when the ranking value of
the top ranked winner-preferring constraint is nonnegative? Let me rephrase this question more ex-
plicitly. Consider the variant (176) of the main update rule (126) studied in this chapter. According
to this variant, demotion is only performed when condition (*) holds. In other words, the demotion
amounts in cases where the ranking value of the top ranked winner-preferring constraint is nonpos-
itive is as small as possible, namely null. If condition (*) holds and thus demotion is performed,
then the demotion-amount is defined as the demotion amount w(a) of the update rule (126) studied
so far, multiplied by a constant (k > 0. Of course k _ 1 (respectively, (k _ 1) iff the sum over
promotion amounts is smaller (respectively, larger) than the sum over demotion amounts. Thus, we
already know that finite time convergence holds for (k > 1. The question I am interested in can be
stated as follows: does there exists a constant k < 1 such that finite time convergence holds for the
update rule (176)?
(176) If the current ranking vector 0old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a:
S0Old + e(a, 0old) if k E W(a)
Onew 0 o
ld - w(a) k if k E L(a, 6 old), max 0old > 0
hew(a)
90old otherwise
Claim 23 offers a positive answer to this question. The constant (k in (177) is well defined and
positive. In fact, if demotion is performed, then condition (*) holds, namely there exists at least
a winner-preferring constraint with currently positive ranking value; hence, the ranking value 0 ,ld
of the demoted constraint must be positive too, since it must be larger than the ranking value of
every winner preferring constraint. Furthermore, k 5 1, since maxhew(a) 0old Ok, because
k e L(a, Oold). The proof uses the general claim 21.
Claim 23 The on-line algorithm (116) run on an input OT-compatible comparative tableau starting
from the null initial vector with the promotion-demotion update rule (176) with the constant 6 defined
in (177) can only make a finite number of updates.
max 0,ldhew(a)
(177) 6k = h W(a)
9 old
Proof To simplify the analysis, divide both the promotion and the demotion amounts of the update
rule (176)-(177) by the constant £(a, 0old). The update rule thus derived fits into the schema (171)
with the corresponding update vector i = (i, ... , dn) defined in terms of the current ranking vector
0°ld and the current comparative row a as in (178). 5 By claim 21, I just need to show that the three
properties (172) hold for the update vectors defined in (178).
5 The same line of reasoning ensures finite time convergence also for the update rules obtained with one or more of the
modifications listed in (i).
(i) a. Replace the denominator e(a, old)d in (178) with kEL(aold) I
0b. replace w(a) maxEW(a) 0 ld in the numerator of (178) with Ehew(a) ld;
b. replace w(a) maxhEW(a) 0 dhe nueao f(18 ihEhEW(a) h d
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1 if k E W(a)
w(a) max O ld(178) k= hEW(a) if k E L(a,Oold), max old >0
£(a, Oold)6 old hEW(a)
0 otherwise
Let me show that condition (172a) holds. To this end, let me show in particular that lak I < n. The
only non trivial case is that of the components Uk corresponding to currently undominated loser-
preferring constraints k e L(a, 0 old) under the hypothesis that maxh~w(a) 0old > 0, since the
other components are either 1 or 0 by definition. In this case, the bound is proved by the chain of
inequalities in (179). Here, I have reasoned as follows: in step (a), I have used the definition (178);
in step (b), I have dropped the absolute value because maxhEw(a)0Old > 0 by hypothesis and
furthermore Okl d > maxhEW(a) o ld > 0 since k E L(a, 0old); in step (c), I have upper bounded by
replacing maxheW(a) 9 ld by 0old, since the latter is larger than the former because k E L(a, 0 old).
Ik (a) w(a) maxhEw(a) hld
(179) k(aoldOld
£(a, 01d)0ld
(b) w(a) maxhE W(a) Old
. (a, oold) old
() w(a)Old
£(a, Gold)0 ld
w(a)
(a, 0old)
< n
Let me show that condition (172b) holds. Consider the numerical matrix A = [ai,k] E R m n
derived from the input comparative tableau A E {L, E, W}mxn as in (180): every entry equal to w
in A is replaced by 1 in A; every entry equal to E is replaced by 0; and every entry equal to L is
replaced by -n.
1 if ai,k = W
(180) ai,k = if ai,k = E
-n if ai,k = L
By reasoning as in the proof of claim 20, I conclude that there exists a ranking vector = (01,.. , n)
such that the strict inequality (181) holds for every row W of the derived numerical matrix A. Fur-
thermore, the construction used in that proof of claim 20 can straightforwardly be modified to ensure
that all components of 0 are strictly positive.
(181) (#,a) > 0
Now let me show that the strict inequality (182) holds for every update vector d defined in (178).
Let me distinguish two cases. Let me start with the case where the update vector R corresponds to a
current ranking vector 0 old and a current comparative row a such that maxhEW(a) 0Old < 0. In this
case, all the components of R are either 0 or 1 and at least one of its components is 1 (because each
row of the input tableau must admit at least a winner-preferring constraint in order for the tableau to
be OT-compatible); since furthermore 0 is strictly positive, then the strict inequality (182) holds.
(182) (,i ) > 0
Let me now turn to the case where the increment vector d corresponds to a current ranking vector
0 old and a current comparative row a such that maxhEW(a) Ohld > 0. In this case, the proof of
c. replace the condition maxhEW(a) h0 ld > 0 in (*) with the condition EhEW(a) Oold > O.
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the inequality (182) consists of the chain of inequalities in (183). Here, I have reasoned as follows:
in step (a), I have used the definition (94) of scalar product; in step (b), I have split up the set
{1,..., n} that h runs over into the three sets W(a), L(a, 0 l01d) and their complement; in step (c), I
have used the definition (178), that ensures that ah = 1 for every h e W(a) and ah = 0 for every
h V W(a) U L(a, 0old); in step (d), I have used the fact that h -n for every h E L(a, 0old), as
proven in (179); in step (e), I have used the fact that L(a, 0, ld) C L(a); in step (f), I have used the
definition (180) of the numerical vector = corresponding to the comparative row a; in the last step
(g), I have used the hypothesis (181).
(183) (0, ) Zoh
h=l1
(b) Z Oa+ Z Oa+ ZOa
hEW(a) hEL(a,Oold) hoW(a)UL(a,Oold)
hEW(a) hEL(a,Oold)
(d)> + Oh Z Oh(-n)
hEW(a) hEL(a,Oold)
(e)
> Z Oh Z O(-fl)
hEW(a) hEL(a)
(1)
> a
(g)
> 0
Let me show that condition (172c) holds. Consider a current comparative row a and a current
ranking vector 0old not OT-compatible with it; let 1 be the corresponding update vector (178). The
proof of condition (172c) consists of the chain of inequalities in (184). Here, I have reasoned as
follows: in step (a), I have used the definition (94) of scalar product; in step (b), I have split up the
set {1,..., In} that h runs over into the three sets W(a), L(a, 0 ,1d) and their complement; in step
(c), I have used the definition (178); in step (d), I have used the fact that £(a, 0old) is the cardinality
of the set L(a, 6 old)
n(184) (0 °lda a) ZOold-(184) h ah
h= 1
(b) z old -- ±" old; ±
Shd h + h ah h
hEW(a) hEL(a,Oo ld) hVW(a)UL(a,Oold )
(c z(~a nxkWa) d old Q o ld\hEW(a) heL(a,Oold) d(a 0a old
S 9 old- w(a) max 0oold d 1
hEW(a) h lkEW(a) Z old ( ° iold)
eWaa heL(a,Oold)
(dol) 0 d - w(a) max 0old
kEW(a)
hEW(a)
< 0
Note the following difference between the two chain inequalities in (163) and (184) used to prove
that (0 l01d, j) < 0 in the case of the two update rules (126) and (176)-(177), respectively: in the
former case, I used the hypothesis that 0 old is not OT-compatible with a; in the latter case, I did not
use that hypothesis, namely the inequality holds no matter what. U
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5.5.3 Third variant
So far, I have considered update rules that fit into the additive scheme (46). Let me close this section
by considering an update rule (42) for the OT on-line algorithm that does not fall into this broad
schema. Given a comparative tableau A, pair up each row a of the tableau with a numerical vector
a. Consider the update rule (185), defined in terms of these update vectors R.
(185) If the current ranking vector o ld is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a:
0 new = oldexp kk k D(R)
where I have used the following positions:
a. Z is the normalization coefficient;
b. e > 0 is a positive constant;
c. D(R) = max ah + max (-h) is the sum of the maximum promotion amount and
hEW(a) hEL(a)
the maximum demotion amount.
Assume that the update vector = (l ,... , an) e R" corresponding to a comparative row a =
(a, . .. , an) E {L, E, W} n satisfies the following condition (186), that in particular entails condition
(174). This condition (186) ensures that D(1) is never null, so that the definition (185) makes sense.
(186) Fork = 1,...,n:
a. if ak = w, then Uk > 0;
b. if ak = E, then Uk = 0;
c. if ak = L, then Uk < 0.
The current ranking vector entertained by the on-line algorithm (116) with the update rule (185) is
nonnegative by construction. Thus, condition (175) in this case boils down to (187).
n
(187) ah < 0
h=1
Choose the constant e in (185) in such a way that there exists a probability vector 0 such that the in-
equality (188) holds for every update vector R. Such a constant can be determined by ?1-normalizing
the nonnegative vector constructed in (167).
(188) (0,R) >
The proof of claim 24 is identical to the proof of clam 22. The only difference is that it uses the
linear on-line algorithm described by claim 26 in the Appendix that closes this chapter, instead of
the Perceptron algorithm described in claim 25. I provide it explicitly for completeness. In this
work, I do not study this update rule (185). See Magri (2009) for a small application of this update
rule to modeling the data in (101).
Claim 24 The on-line algorithm (116) run on an input OT-compatible comparative tableau starting
from the initial vector Oin = (, ... , L) with the update rule (185) that satisfies the four conditions
(173), (186), (187) and (188) can only make a finite number of updates.
Proof Assume by contradiction that the claim is false, namely that there exists an input OT-
compatible comparative tableau A such that there exists a way of ordering the rows of this tableaux
into an infinite sequence ao, a1, ... , at, ... such that, if the rows are fed to the algorithm in this
order (namely, the row a 1 is fed to the algorithm at the first iteration, the row a 2 at the second itera-
tion, ... , the row at at the tth iteration, ... ), then at every time t it happens that the current ranking
vector Ot entertained by the algorithm at the tth iteration is not OT-compatible with the comparative
row at fed to the algorithm at that iteration, and thus the current ranking vector Ot gets updated to
Ot+ 1 according to the update rule (185). Let Ut be the update vector used at time t. This situation is
depicted in (189).
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NO 41 -2 at(189) Hin it  01 0 2  t po ti
I I I I
ao and 0
i n it a 1 and 01 a 2 and 02 at and Ot
not OT-comp. not OT-comp. not OT-comp. not OT-comp.
I I I I
update update update update
w.r.t. (185) w.r.t. (185) w.r.t. (185) w.r.t. (185)
At each time t the current ranking vector Ot is not OT-compatible with the current comparative row
at. The hypothesis (187) together with the fact that the current ranking vector Ot is nonnegative by
construction ensure that (Ot, t) < 0 for every vector in the infinite sequence ao, a,... t, ....
The proof of this fact is a trivial variant of the chain of inequalities in (163). The situation in (189)
thus entails the situation in (190).
(190) 0 in it  NO 0 1 '6 30o 2  -& "' o t  -at '
I I I I
( init, -0) 0 (01, (O1t)0 (02, -2x))0 ( o, t)<0
I I I I
update update update update
w.r.t. (185) w.r.t. (185) w.r.t. (185) w.r.t. (185)
The two hypotheses (173 and (188), together with the hypothesis that the input comparative tableau
is OT-compatible, ensure that the hypotheses of claim 26 in the Appendix that closes this chapter are
all satisfied. The latter claim says that the situation depicted in (190) can never arise, thus providing
the desired contradiction. U
Appendix: some classical results on linear on-line algorithms
The proof of claim 15 provided at the end of section 5.4 rests on the the following classical claim 25,
also known as the convergence theorem for the perceptron algorithm in the separable case. I recall
the proof for completeness; see for instance Cristianini and Shawe-Taylor (2000, Theorem 2.3).
Claim 25 Given a sequence { t} ~o of vectors !t = (i, ... , ) E R n , consider the correspond-
ing sequence {0 t}t 1 of vectors O= (,... , Ot ) E Rn defined as in (191).
(191) 00 = 0
ot+1  = Ot + at
There exists no infinite sequence {at}to C RI such that the the three properties (192) hold.
(192) a. there exists a vector 0 = (01,..., O,) G Rn and a positive constant p > 0 such that
(0, Idt) /| 10 11 for every t = 1, 2, .. .;
b. there exists a constant R such that IIat 12 < R2 for every t = 1, 2,...;
c. (0 t , - t ) < 0 for every t = 1, 2, ...
Proof The proof has three parts. Thefirst part of the proof estimates the norm of 0 t as in (193).
Here, I have reasoned as follows: in step (a), I have used the definition (191); in step (b), I have used
the identity IIv + w112 = IIvII 2 + IIwI12 + 2(v, w); in step (c), I have used the hypothesis (192b); in
step (d), I have used the hypothesis (192c). The inequality (193b) immediately follows from (193a)
together with the hypothesis that 00 = 0.
(193) a. O10 t+1 12 ( a) lOt i1 2
cb? iiot112 + IIaJIll + 2(Ot, ,>)
(b)
< 1101 12 + 2 + 2(O t , iij)
_W 1101112 + 2
(d)
< II0tII%+R 2
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b. I0t J12 < tR2
The second part of the proof estimates the scalar product (0, 0t+1) as in (194). Here, I have reasoned
as follows: in step (a), I have used the definition (191); in step (b), I have used the linearity of the
scalar product; in step (c), I have used the hypothesis (192c). The inequality (194b) immediately
follows from (194a) together with the hypothesis that 0O = 0.
(0, Ot+ 1)  (a) (0, Ot + Rit)(194) a. 11= 10
(b) (0,0Ot) (0, Ri)
Ilell Uell11011 + 11011
(c) (0, Ot)
11011
b. (01 t) l
The third part of the proof connects the two inequalities (193b) and (194b) as in (195). Here, I have
reasoned as follows: in step (a), I have used (194b); in step (b), I have used the Cauchy-Schwartz
Inequality; in step (c), I have used (193b).
(195) (t) 2  (a) (0, t))2(195) <ty 11011
(b) 110112110 J12
- 110112
II6tII2(c)
< tR2
The chain of inequalities (195) entails in particular that t < R 2/ 2 .
The proof of claim 24 rests on the the following classical claim 26, fully parallel to the preceding
claim 25. Here, I report the proof of claim 26 provided in Cesa-Bianchi (1997, Lemma 3). See
Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006, Ch. 12) for a broader perspective.
Claim 26 Given a sequence {lt}0o of vectors t = ( ... , E R1, consider the correspond-
ing sequence {s}Oc of probability vectors O = (0t,..., Ot) E An defined as in (196), where Z
is the corresponding normalization coefficient and e, R > 0 are positive constants.
1
(196) 00 = -
n
t+1 = -O exp{ k}
There exists no infinite sequence {# } o C R n such that the the three properties (197) hold.
(197) a. There exists a probability vector such that (6, At) > e for every t = 1, 2,...;
b. D(at)= max 7h- min A < R 2 foreveryt= 1,2,...;
h=1,...,n h=1,...,n
c. (Ot, Rt) 5 0 for every t = 1, 2,....
First part of the pmroof The crucial ingredient of the proof is the inequality (198), that holds for
any probability vector 0 e An. The quantity D(.I.) is the Kullback-Liebler divergence, defined as
D(pIq) - -'n 1Pi log E for any two probability vectors p, q E An. I will review the proof of
(198) in the second part of the proof.
(198) (0 - O, ) <; R D(010 ) - D(o1ot+ )) +
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The chain of inequalities in (199) holds for every T = 1, 2, ... Here, I have reasoned as follows:
in step (a), I have used the hypothesis (197a) that (0, -t) > E, that entails that a ') 1; in step
(b), I have used the hypothesis (197c) that (ot, at) 5 0; in step (c), I have used (198); in step (d), I
have used the fact that the sum (*) is telescopic; in the step (e), I have used the fact that D(.I.) _ 0.
(a) 1T
(199) T ( -1 (, t
t=1
at Z (Ot - t
t=1
T
t=1
t=1 t=1
(e) R
2
(.)(i} R 2(D(OIO1) - D(oIoT1 +I)--1C2 82D(Ol1) + T
The inequality derived through (199) entails that T must be finite.
Second part of the proof Let me now turn to the proof of the crucial inequality (198). The bulk of
the proof of (198) consists of the chain of inequalities in (200). Here, I have reasoned as follows: in
step (a), I have used the definition (196) of 0t , with the position 7 = E/R 2 to simplify notation; in
step (b), I have used the fact that the E= Oi = 1; in step (c), I have made explicit the normalization
coefficient Z; in step (d), I have added and subtracted the quantity q (9t, Rt) from the exponent.
(200) D(0|9t ) - D(01O t+1) -
n O h log - Oh log
h=1 h i=1 h0t+1
S Oh log "-
h=1 h
(a1 0 
t 
er7l-5t
1Oh log t
h=1 h
71 n
= 9h -E Oh 1og Z
h=1 i=1
q (0 ,-t) - log Z
-q(0, t) -logt t -og
h=1
(h=1
206
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To conclude the proof, I need to bound the term (*) in (200). To this end, we use the following fact:
if Y is a random variable with zero mean and range [a, b], then the inequality (201) holds for every
scalar t E R; see Cesa-Bianchi (1997, Lemma 2).
t2
(201) loglE[ et] (b - a)2
Consider the random variable Y defined as follows: it takes values U - (0 t, t) for h = 1,..., n
with probability 0O. The expected value of the random variable Y is null, as shown in (202), where
in step (a) I have used the fact that Ot is a probability vector.
n
(202) E[Y] - (Ott
h=1
n nio= - Z o (ot, t)
h=1 i=1
( (0 tXt) - ( 0 t, i)
= 0
And the range [a, b] of Y can be described as in (203).
(203) b-a = max(th - (ot,t)) - min (. - (ot,t))
h=1,...,n h=l,...,n h
= max Zt)-( min, Z
(h=l ,...,n 1h= .... n= D( )t)
I can thus bound (*) by means of the chain of inequalities in (204). Here, I have reasoned as follows:
in step (a), I have introduced the random variable Y just defined; in step (b), I have used (201); in
step (c), I have used the hypothesis (197b).
(204) log Oten(-a(,)) (a) log E [e'y]
(b) -72 -t)2
< -D( t 28
(c) e2  2
< 8R 4 R
The inequality (198) thus follows by combining the two inequalities (200) and (204). E
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Chapter 6
How to study constraint promotion:
the final ranking vector
Chapter 4 has introduced Hayes' (2004) problem of modeling the early stage of the acquisition of
phonology and has suggested that, in order for the OT on-line algorithm (205) to count as a suitable
model, it needs update rules in step 3 that perform promotion too. The goal of this second part of
the dissertation is to develop the beginning of a theory of constraint promotion for the OT on-line
model of the acquisition of phonology.
(205) not OT-compatible
Step 1: Step 2: Step 3:
get a row a from some check whether the current update the current
comparative tableau A 0 is OT-compatible with a 0 in response to a
OT-compatible
As noted in subsection 4.2.1, a theory of a given update rule for step 3 of the OT on-line algorithm
(205) should address (at least) the three questions (45), repeated in (206). Chapter 5 has introduced
a number of new promotion-demotion update rules and has presented different techniques to show
that they can only trigger a finite number of updates, thus settling the issue (206a). This chapter and
the next one start the research project of studying the properties of these promotion-demotion update
rules, by focusing on the two issues (206b) and (206c), respectively.
(206) a. Does the OT on-line algorithm (205) with a given update rule converge in finite time,
namely is true that it can only perform a finite number of updates when run on an OT-
compatible input comparative tableau?
b. If it does converge, how can the final vector Oan be characterized in terms of the input
comparative tableau A and the initial ranking vector Oinit
c. And what is the worst case number of updates in step 3 for an arbitrary input comparative
tableau A with n columns and an arbitrary initial vector Oinit?
In this chapter, I concentrate on the issue (206b) concerning the characterization of the final vector
entertained by the OT on-line algorithm (205) run with a promotion-demotion update rule in step
3. As reviewed in subsection 4.2.3.2, the issue (206b) of the characterization of the final vector was
easy to settle in the case of (minimal) demotion-only update rules. The strategy used in that case was
to look for (PRIMAL) INVARIANTS, namely for properties that hold of the current ranking vector Ot
entertained by the algorithm (205) at any time t. If a property holds of the current ranking vector at
any time, then it holds of the final vector O n . In the case of minimal demotion-only update rules, this
simple strategy led to the very sharp characterization of the final vector in claim 8, as the component-
wise maximum over all integral non-positive ranking vectors OT-compatible with the input tableau
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A. In section 6.1, I try to replicate this strategy for promotion-demotion update rules. I present a
simple DUAL INVARIANT, namely a property that holds of the current dual vector a t entertained
at a generic time t by the algorithm (205) run with promotion-demotion update rules. Again, this
dual invariant applies in particular to the final dual vector afin. And the final dual vector a fi n can
in turn be used to characterize the final primal vector 0 fin , since the dual vector always determines
the primal vector, as noted in subsection 4.2.6. Unfortunately, contrary to the case of demotion-only
update rules, the characterization obtained in this way for the case of promotion-demotion update
rules turns out to be rather loose in the general case. In section 6.3, I thus switch gears: instead
of tackling question (206b) in the general case, I turn to a few specific case studies. In particular,
I study the final vector entertained by the on-line algorithm (205) with promotion-demotion update
rules in the case of input phonotactics comparative tableaux, as defined in section 6.2. I consider
both artificial phonotactics tableau and "naturalistic" ones. The discussion of these case studies has
two goals. First, to illustrate various methods to study the behavior of the algorithm in full detail
with paper and pencil, by exploiting in various ways the invariant introduced in section 6.1. Second,
to put forward a bold but very preliminary conjecture, namely that the strong symmetry of the w's in
naturalistic phonotactics tableaux, coupled with the sensitivity of promotion-demotion update rules
to those w's, might actually help the algorithm to reach the correct final ranking vector.
6.1 An invariant
To simplify the discussion, I will assume throughout this section that the input comparative tableau
A c {L, E, W}mxn contains exactly one entry equal to L per row. Claim 2 guarantees that this aux-
iliary assumption does not affect the generality of the analysis, since a general comparative tableau
can be preprocessed and turned into an OT-equivalent comparative tableau with a unique entry equal
to L per row. For concreteness, I will concentrate on the promotion-demotion update rule introduced
in section 5.1, that in this case takes the form (123), repeated in (207); yet, the reasoning presented
in this section extends to any promotion-demotion update rule. For the case of (minimal) demotion-
only update rules, Tesar and Smolensky were able to derive the primal invariants stated in claims 5
and 7. These invariants say that the components of the current ranking vector cannot become too
large (in absolute value) over time. As noted in subsection 4.2.6, once we switch from demotion-
only to promotion-demotion update rules, it is easier to carry out theoretical analyses at the dual
level rather than at the primal level. In this section, I thus look for dual invariants for the on-line
algorithm (205) with the promotion-demotion update rule (207). Again, the idea is to try to show
that the components of the current dual vector cannot become too large. Throughout this section, I
assume that the initial vector is the null vector; the extension to the case of an arbitrary initial vector
is straightforward.
(207) If the current ranking vector 0old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a that
contains a unique entry equal to L:
S0 ld  1 if k G W(a)
a. Onew 0old - w(a) if k = L(a)
a k okld otherwise
b. Promote every winner-preferring constraint by 1; demote the loser-preferring constraint
by the number w(a) of winner-preferring constraints.
Let me introduce the invariant intuitively, step by step. Consider a generic row ai of the input
comparative tableau. Let Ce be the unique loser-preferring constraint w.r.t. row ai. For concreteness,
let me start by assuming that the row ai also has a unique winner-preferring constraint Ch. How
many times ai will this row ai trigger an update? For concreteness, suppose that ai is the first row
fed to the algorithm. Since the initial vector is the null vector, the current ranking vector will be
OT-compatible with the row ai after a single update triggered by it. So, how many further updates
will the row ai trigger? namely, how can we bound ai - 1? The answer of course depends on how
many rows in the input comparative tableau will later on trigger an update that disrupts the ranking
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configuration Ch > Ce necessary for the OT-compatibility with the row ai. Let me refer to any
such row as an ENEMY of row ai and let me denote by enemies(a) the set of all rows of the input
comparative tableau that are enemies of the row ai. Since only updates triggered by enemies justify
further updates by the row a1 , then we expect that the number ai -1 of updates by the row ai besides
the first one must be bound by the numbers aj of updates triggered by enemies aj E enemies(ai)
of row a, multiplied by some proper constant constj that reflects properties of the specific enemy
a3 , as stated in (208).
(208) ai - 1 < constj - aj
aj Eenemies(ac)
What should the constants constj look like? Recall that the enemies of row ai are those rows aj
of the input tableau that are able to potentially disrupt the ranking configuration Ch > Ct required
for OT-compatibility with the row a1 . Thus, there are three types of enemies aj, described in (209):
either aj is an enemy because it pushes down the constraint Ch that aj pushes up, as in (209a); or
because aj pushes up the constraint Ct that a pushes down, as in (209b); or because both situations
hold at the same time, as in (209c).
•... Ch C1 ... Ch C1 Ch C1
L. ... ai ... OW CL ... ai ... CW L ...C
(209) a. [ W a' b. [ W L ] a W L
a( ... L E ... aj ... E W a... j ... L W ...
We expect the constant constj to depend on which of the three types of enemies (209) the row
aj is. Let w(aj) be the number of winner-preferring constraints w.r.t. row a3 . Suppose that aj
is an enemy of type (209a). In this case, row aj has an L corresponding to constraint Ch; upon
update by aj according to (207), the ranking value of Ch will decrease by w(aj); thus, update by
aj disrupts the ranking configuration necessary for a by w(aj). For this reason, it makes sense to
let the constant constj be proportional to w(aj) in this case. Next, suppose that aj is an enemy
of type (209b). In this case, row aj has a w corresponding to constraint Ce; upon update by aj
according to (207), the ranking value of C, will increase by 1; thus, update by aj disrupts the
ranking configuration necessary for a by 1. For this reason, it makes sense to let the constant
constj be proportional to 1 in this case. Finally, suppose that aj is an enemy of type (209c). In this
case, row aj has a w corresponding to constraint Ce and an L corresponding to constraint Ch; upon
update by aj according to (207), the ranking value of Ce will increase by 1 and the ranking value of
Ch will decrease by w(aj); thus, update by aj disrupts the ranking configuration necessary for a
by w(aj) + 1. For this reason, it makes sense to let the constant constj be proportional to w(aj) + 1
in this case.
w(aj) if aj is an enemy of type (209a)
(210) constj - 1 if aj is an enemy of type (209b)
1 + w(aj) if aj is an enemy of type (209c)
So far, I have stuck by the simplifying assumption that the row ai contains only one entry equal to
w, corresponding to the constraint Ch. Now let's remove this assumption, and let w(ai) be the total
number of winner-preferring constraints w.r.t. the row ai. We expect the discussion so far to hold
for each one of these winner-preferring constraints. The set enemies(ai) of row ai will of course
depend on the specific winner-preferring constraint considered: a given row aj can be an enemy,
say an enemy of type (209a), w.r.t. to a winner-preferring constraint of row ai but not with respect
to another one. Thus, let me replace the notation enemies(aj) with enemies(aj, h), that is the set
of enemies of row ai with respect to its winner-preferring constraint Ch e W(ai). Furthermore,
the constants constj will of course depend on the specific winner-preferring constraint Ch, since
the classification of an enemy into one of the three types (209) depends on the winner-preferring
constraint considered. Let me make this dependence explicit, by replacing the notation constj with
const4 , as in (211)
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(211) a. ai - 1 s constp aj
a j Eenemies(a.,h)
w(aj) if aj is an enemy of type (209a) w.r.t. Ch
b. const4 1 if aj is an enemy of type (209b) w.r.t. Ch
1 + w(aj) if aj is an enemy of type (209c) w.r.t. Ch
Furthermore, once we consider the case of a row ai with possibly multiple winner-preferring con-
straints, then we expect the constants consth to depend on that number, because of the following
intuition, already discussed above (123). After update by row aj, the separation between the ranking
value of the loser-preferring constraint Ce and the ranking value of the winner-preferring constraints
will have increased by w(ai) + 1, since the former is demoted by w(ai) and the latter are promoted
by 1. If the row ai has few winner-preferring constraints, then w(ai) is small, hence the gained
separation w(ai) + 1 is small too, hence it will be eroded fast by enemies and row ai will therefore
require many updates. If instead row ai has many winner-preferring constraints, then w(ai) is large,
hence the gained separation w(ai) + 1 after an update is large too, hence it will be eroded slowly by
enemies and row ai will therefore require few updates. These heuristic considerations suggest that
the constants consth should also be inversely proportional to the number w(ai) + 1. Let me make
this dependence explicit, by replacing the notation consth with consti'h and by defining the latter
constants as in (212).
(212) a. ai - 1 < const3 ' . a j
a Cenemies(a.,h)
Sw(aj) if aj is an enemy of type (209a) w.r.t. Ch
w(ai) + 1
b. constih 1 if aj is an enemy of type (209b) w.r.t. Ch
consth w(ai) + 1
w(aj) + 1 if aj is an enemy of type (209c) w.r.t. Ch
w(aj) + 1
Claim 27 Consider an input OT-compatible comparative tableau A G {L, E, W}mxn whose rows
contain exactly one entry equal to L. The dual vector a t entertained at a generic time t by the on-
line algorithm (205) with the promotion-demotion update rule (207) run on this input comparative
tableau starting from the null initial vector satisfies the invariant (212), for every row i = 1, . ., m
and every winner-preferring constraint h E W(a).
Proof For every row ai of the given comparative tableau A, let W(aj) be the set of corresponding
winner-preferring constraints, let L(a) be the unique corresponding loser-preferring constraint. Let
Ri be the update vector corresponding to the update rule (207) w.r.t. update triggered by the ith
row ai of the input comparative tableau, as defined in (161) and repeated in (213). Here, I am
using the notation i = (ai,1,... ,a,1 . .., ai,n) so that ai,h is the hth entry of the update vector
corresponding to the ith comparative row. Let A be the numerical matrix obtained by organising
these numerical vectors 1,..., ~mrn one underneath the other. Let A1,..., Ah,..., An be the n
columns of the numerical matrix A.
1 if h e W(a)
(213) i,h - -w(a) if h = L(a)
0 otherwise
For every row i = 1, . ., m and for every constraint h G W(ai), let dh,i = (d, .. , dhi) Rm• '' -- , 1 ' ' -m
be the vector whose generic jth component d h ' i is defined as in (214) for every j = 1,..., m. In
words, dh,i is the difference between the hth column Ah and the column AL(aj) of the derived
matrix A with all positive components set to zero but the ith one. Thus, by construction we have
that dh i is nonpositive for every j , i; and furthermore that dh' i = w(ai) + 1.
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djih a- aj,L(ai) if aj,h - aj,L(a.) < 0 or j = i(214) d.'
3 0 otherwise
With this notation, the invariant (212) can be rewritten compactly as in (215). In the rest of the proof,
I show that the inequality (215) holds.
(215) (di,h,a t ) 5 w(ai) + 1
Fix an arbitrary i = 1, . . . , m. If al = 1, then the proof of the invariant (215) for any h E W(ai)
consists of the chain of inequalities in (216). Here, I have reasoned as follows: in step (a), I have used
the definition (94) of scalar product; in step (b), I have just singled out a special value of the index
j E {1,..., m}, namely the value i; in step (c), I have upper bounded by dropping the term (*),
which is nonpositive because the dual variables are by definition nonnnegative and the components
of the vector di,h in are all nonpositive but for the ith one; in step (d), I have used the hypothesis
that a t = 1; in step (e), I have used the fact that d h'i = w(ai) + 1
m
(216) (di,h, at ) (a) d3',h t
j=1
m(b) -i1h h
id' ai + d -' at
(c) h t
< d s (*)
(d) ih
(e) w(ai) +
If a > 2, then the proof of the claim (215) consists of the chain of implications in (217), that
completes the proof of the claim.
(217) s < t S.t. a = al - 1, 0 not OT-compatible with ai(b)7 05 <_0
() Is < t s.t. al = a- - 1 L(a)
1Is < t s.t. C=t - 1, (Xh, a) < (XL(a,), a)
( ]s<ts.t.a i =c 1,(za 8 )<(   ts.  a  al X - _~&O'5
(e h'l d i h a s ) < 0Is < ts.t. al = at , d
mIs < ts.t. a! = a i - j 11 d _0
j=1
m=~2~ ]s s ct1 1,-,hc± dh<
j=1, j~i
m(g)l d 'h 8+ E ih 8 < 0I- 3s < t s.t. a= a a3 a
j= l, j~i
m
(M>, h(a -1) + Z at < 0
==- d at + E aj'h atd' < , h
j=, ji
== (di,h , at) < d
'
,h
(-2 (di ' h at) < w(ai)+ 1
Here, I have reasoned as follows: in step (a), I have noted that if at has grown to at least 2, then there
has got to exist a time s prior to t where update has occurred in response to a failure in accounting
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for the corresponding row a4; in step (b), I have noted that the hypothesis that the ranking vector
0' at time s is not OT-compatible with the row ai entails in particular that the winner-preferring
constraint Ch is not ranked above the unique loser-preferring constraint CL(ai) or equivalently that
0 L _ 0(a); in step (c), I have expressed the primal variables 0' and OL(ai) in terms of the dual
variables, using the corresponding columns Ah and AL(a) of the derived numerical matrix, as in
(320); in step (d), I have used linearity of the scalar product; in step (e), I have used the fact that the
vector di,h coincides with the vector Ah - AL(a,) with the positive components set to zero, and thus
(di ',h, as) < (Ah - AL(ai), as); in step (f), I have used the definition (94) of scalar product; in step
(g), I have singled out one specific value of the index j E {1,..., n}, namely j = i; in step (h), I
have used the fact that s < t implies that aj < a (because the dual variables can only increase over
time) and thus that d'h a h > d ' a (because the components of the vector di,h are nonpositive by3 3- 3
construction); in step (i), I have just rewritten ac as a - 1; in the last step (1), I have used the fact
that dhi = w(ai) +1.
As noted at the beginning of the chapter, the dual invariant provided by claim 27 applies in particu-
lar to the final dual vector. Furthermore, the final dual vector determines the final primal vector, as
noted in subsection 4.2.6. In conclusion, the invariant provided by claim 27 offers an indirect char-
acterization of the final ranking vector returned by the algorithm, thus tackling question (206b). Yet,
the invariant provided by claim 27 is rather weak, and thus the corresponding characterization of the
final vector is rather loose. Here is a way to illustrate this point. Let a DIAGONAL TABLEAU of order
n be a tableau with the form (56), namely a tableau with n columns and n - 1 rows, whose entries
are all equal to E but for the ith entry in the ith row that is equal to w and the entry immediately to its
right that is equal to L. Let a PATER' S TABLEAU of order n be a tableau with the form (??), namely
a diagonal tableau with an extra entry equal to w at the immediate right of the entry equal to L in the
first n - 2 rows. Finally, consider the variant of Pater's tableau obtained by adding two entries equal
to w at the immediate right of the entry equal to L in the first n - 3 rows, only one in the penultimate
row and none in the last row. I illustrate in (218) the three types of comparative tableaux for the case
n = 5.
C1 C2 Ca C4 C5
W L
(218) a. w L
W L
W L
C1 C2 C3 C4 05
W L W
b. W L W
W L W
WLWW LC1 C2 C3 C4 C-5W L W W
W L W W
c. W L W
W L
Multiple simulations show that the final vector entertained by the on-line algorithm (205) with the
update rule (207) run on any of these three families of comparative tableaux with an odd number
n of columns always has the shape in (219), no matter the order in which the rows are fed to the
algorithm.
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n-1(219) n  =
Ofinn- = 02
n-I0an  = -
= 2
In other words, the final vector Oen entertained by the on-line algorithm (205) run with the promotion-
demotion update rule (207) on any of the three families of tableaux exemplified in (218) with odd
n can be uniquely characterized as in (220). Yet, the characterization of the final vector obtained
through the invariant of claim 27 does not in any way provide such a sharp characterization.'
(220) Oan = min 110111 = 1N 0 E 2Z, 0 OT-compatible with A
h=1
The reason why the invariant provided in claim 27 is loose is rather obvious. Given a row ai of
the input tableau, this invariant only considers rows aj that are enemies of that row, namely that
potentially disrupt the ranking configuration necessary for OT-compatibility with the row ai. This
invariant does not take into account rows aj that help establishing the ranking configuration neces-
sary for OT-compatibility with the row aj. Let me call these rows HELPERS. Analogously to (209),
an helper of row ai is a row aj of one of the three types illustrated in (221): either both ai and aj
push up the constraint Ch, as in (221a); or both ai and aj push down the constraint C1, as in (221b);
or both situations hold at the same time, as in (221c).
Ch C1 ... ... Ch C1 ... ... Ch C1 ...
ai ... I L "'".b.a ... W L ... ai  ... W L ...
(22 1) a. ag W L , b. ai C. sa ... W E ... ' aj ... E L ... aj ... w L ...
Let helpers(ai, h) be the set of helpers of row ai relatively to a winner-preferring constraint Ch E
W(a). Of course, we expect the number ai of updates triggered by row ai to depend also on the
number of updates aj triggered by helper rows aj, in the sense that if the helpers aj E helpers(ai, h)
trigger many updates, then the row ai will trigger few updates. In other words, we expect that the
invariant (212) should be strengthened into something like (222), for some properly defined constants
const.,h for aj E helpers(ai, h).
(222) a - 1 < consj , aj - const a
aj Eenemies(ai ,h) aj Ehelpers(ai ,h)
But so far I have not been able to prove anything like (222).
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Given a language £ in the typology corresponding to some universal specifications (X, Y, Gen, C),
let me say that a ranking > OT-CORRESPONDS to the phonotactics of the target language £ iff it
satisfies condition (223), namely the language generated by the corresponding OT-grammar OT>
coincides with the target language . In this section, I am interested in the following problem: given
a target language £, how can I characterize the rankings that OT-correspond to it? I will discuss this
problem under various restrictive assumptions on the universal specifications (X, Y, Gen, C). The
investigation of this problem will turn out very useful in the discussion of the various case studied
considered in the next section.
1It is trivial to prove that (219) does indeed hold for diagonal tableaux (218a). But to understand why it holds in the case
of the other two families of comparative tableaux (218b) and (218c) is not trivial.
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(223) 1Z(OT>) = L
Let me start by introducing a first set of assumptions on the universal specifications (X, y, Gen, C).
I assume that the set of underlying forms X and the set of surface forms y coincide, as stated in
(224a). This assumption makes sense for many realistic cases, although admittedly not for cases
such as syllabification, stress assignment, and so on, where the set of output forms is richer than the
set of input forms. Furthermore, I assume that a given surface form y E Y belongs to the language
1Z(OT>) corresponding to a ranking > iff the corresponding grammar OT> maps that form y,
construed as an underlying form by virtue of (224a), faithfully into itself, as stated in (224b). Tesar
(2008) calls any grammar that satisfies this condition an OUTPUT-DRIVEN MAP. Furthermore, he
proves that OT-grammars are output-driven maps under mild assumptions on the constraint set C.
(224) a. X=y
b. yE 1Z(OT>) (-= OT>(y) = y
Given the two assumptions in (224), I can pair up a language C with the corresponding PHONOTAC-
TIC COMPARATIVE TABLEAU defined as the comparative tableau obtained by listing one underneath
the other the comparative rows corresponding to all underlying/winner/loser form triplets (y, y, z)
for all underlying/winner forms y E £ in the target language and all corresponding loser candidates
z E Gen(y) \ {y}. I will denote by AC the phonotactic comparative tableau corresponding to a
language C. A phonotactic comparative tableau is made up of two blocks: the block corresponding
to the faithfulness constraints, that does not contain a single entry equal to L; and the block corre-
sponding to the markedness constraints, that can contain entries equal to L. I will call any row of a
phonotactic comparative tableau a PHONOTACTIC COMPARATIVE ROW.
faithfulness constraints markedness constraints
(225) AC = E, W L, E, W
Of course, a ranking > is OT-compatible with the phonotactic comparative tableau Ac correspond-
ing to a language C iff C C Z(OT>>), namely the target language £ is a subset of the language
corresponding to the ranking >. In order to establish (223), we thus need to worry about the reverse
inclusion C D 7Z(OT>>). To this end, let me introduce some more assumptions on the universal
specifications (X, Y, Gen, C). I assume that the generating function Gen, construed as a relation
on X = Y, is symmetric, as stated in (224c). This assumption makes sense if the set Gen(x) of
candidates for x is construed as the set of those forms that can be obtained from x by performing
reversible operations (epenthesis, deletion, modification of the value of a feature, etcetera). Further-
more, I assume that all faithfulness constraints are binary, namely either F(x, y) = 0 (if the pair
(x, y) does not differ along the dimension relevant to F) or else F(x, y) = 1 (if the pair (x, y) does
differ along the dimension relevant to F). Thus, a faithfulness constraint F can be construed as a
relation over X x Y. Since X = Y by assumption (224a), then I can assume that this relation is
symmetric for all faithfulness constraints F, as stated in (224d). This assumption makes sense for
(binary) faithfulness constraints of the IDENTITY type, but does not hold for DEP and MAX. All four
assumptions (224) will hold for the test cases studied in the next section.
(224) c. y E Gen(x) iff x E Gen(y)
d. F(x, y) = F(y, x)
Each row of a phonotactic comparative tableau corresponds to a underlying/winner/loser form triplet
(y, y, z), for some y E C and some z E Gen(y). Thus, there are two different, interesting ways to
organize the rows of a phonotactic comparative tableau: by their underlying/winner form y; or by
their loser form z. In this section, I use the latter ordering. Thus, let me denote by A(.,.,z) the block
of all those rows of the phonotactic comparative tableau that correspond to the triplets (y, y, z) for
some y E £ such that z e Gen(y), as in (226).
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(226) A(.,.,,)= (y,z) yE C, z E Gen(y)\{y}}
A phonotactic comparative tableau can thus be reorganized as in (227), by ordering its rows into the
different blocks A(.,.,z). Note that this blocks can be classified into two types: the blocks A(.,.,z)
corresponding to a loser candidate z that belongs to the target language C and the blocks A(.,.,z)
corresponding to a loser candidate z that does not belongs to the target language L.
faithfulness constraints markedness constraints
r
A(.,.,zl) E, W L, E, W
L
r
(227) A(.,',z 2 ) E, W L, E, WL
E,W L,E, W
The universal specifications in (1) in subsection 4.1.1 satisfy all four assumptions (224). Consider
the corresponding language (7), repeated in (228a). The only ranking that satisfies condition (223)
and thus 01T-corresponds to this language is the ranking in (3), repeated in (228b). The phonotactic
comparative tableau corresponding to the language £ in (228a) is given in (228c). We can think of
the three rows of this comparative tableau as three different blocks A(.,.,z), namely the three blocks
A(.,.,ta), A(.,.,da) and A(.,.,rat), with the irrelevant peculiarity that each block contains a unique
row. The ranking (228b) can be characterized in terms of the phonotactics tableau (228c) by means
of the following two conditions. First, it is OT-compatible with the phonotactic comparative tableau
(228c), namely it satisfies the condition that either Fpos or Fgen are ranked above M. Second, it has
the property that the decisive constraint corresponding to the third row is a markedness constraint.
Note that the third row is the only one among the three blocks A(.,.,z) that make up the phonotactic
comparative tableau (228c) that corresponds to a loser form z = [rad] that does not belong to
the target language £ in (228a). The following claim says that the this characterization of OT-
corresponding rankings that we have devised in the special case of (228) actually extends to the
general case.
(228) a. £ = {[ta], [da], [rat]}
b. Fpos8 > M > Fgen
Fpo0 . Fgen M
(da, da, ta) W W L
C. (ta, ta, da) W W W
(rat, rat, rad) E W W +-- only block A(.,.,z) corresponding to z § £
Claim 28 Consider universal specifications (X, Y, Gen, C) that satisfy all four assumptions (224).
Consider an entire language £ in the corresponding typology. A ranking > satisfies condition (223)
and thus OT-corresponds to the target language L iff > is OT-compatible with the phonotactics
tableau AC and furthermore for every y E Y \ C there exists at least one row a in the block A(.,.,y)
such that dec> (a) E M.
Proof As noted above, assumption (224b) entails that R(OT>) _D C iff > is OT-compatible with
the phonotactic comparative tableau Ac. Thus, consider one such ranking >. The proof of the
claim then consists of the logical equivalences in (229). Here, I have reasoned as follows: in step
(a), I have used the hypothesis that > is OT-compatible with the phonotactic comparative tableau
corresponding to L and thus £ C R(OT>); in step (b), I have used the fact that y E dom(OT>),
by RICHNESS OF THE BASE; steps (c) and (d) are less trivial, and are explained in detail below; step
(e) is just a restatement.
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(229) Z(OT>>) = L 4£
,(-a. -(OT>>) CC£
M
== for every y V £:
there is z E f n Gen(y) s.t. OT (y) = z
( for every y V £:
there is z E £ n Gen(y) s.t. > is OT-comp. with (z, z, y) and (y, z, y)
(d)4= for every y V £:
there is z E £ n Gen(y) s.t. dec> (z, z, y) E M
(e)4 for every y V £:
there is a row a in the block A(.,.,y) such that dec> (a) E M
Let me explain the implication ==* in the step (c). Since z e £ and £ C R(OT>), then
z e R(OT>). By (224b), z E (OT>>) entails that OT>(z) = z. By (224c), z c Gen(y) entails
that y E Gen(z). Since OT>(z) = z and y E Gen(z), then > is OT-compatible with the under-
lying/winner/loser form triplet (z, z,y). Furthermore, since OT>(y) = z and y E Gen(y), then >
must be OT-compatible with the underlying/winner/loser form triplet (y, z, y). Let me explain the
reverse implication #= in the step (c). By contradiction, assume that this implication were false,
namely that there exists y V £such that there exists no z E £nlGen(y) such that OT> (y) = z. This
means in turn that there exists g E £c n Gen(y) such that OT>> (y) = V. This means in particular
that V E 1(OT>) and thus that OT >>() = V, by (224b). The conclusion that there exists E £
such that OT> (y) = g contradicts the hypothesis that there exists T E C n Gen(g) such that > is
OT-compatible with (y, , ). Let me explain the last step (d). By (224d), a faithfulness constraint F
has a w in the row corresponding to (z, z, y) iff it has an L in the row corresponding to (y, z, y); and
it has an E in the row corresponding to (z, z, y) iff it has a E also in the row corresponding to (y, z, y).
Furthermore, a markedness constraint M has a w or an E or an L in the row corresponding to the
triplet (z, z, y) iff it has the same entry w or E or L in the row corresponding to the triplet (y, z, y).
The relationship between the two rows corresponding to the two triplets (z, z, y) and (y, z, y) is thus
as depicted in (230).
F F' M M' M
(230) (z,z, y) [... W ... E ... L ... E ... W ...
4
(yzy) [... L ... E ... L ... E ... W ... ]
Thus, a ranking > is OT-compatible with these two rows iff the highest-ranked winner-preferring
constraint in the row corresponding to (z, z, y) is a markedness constraint. I
The preceding claim 28 considers blocks A(.,.,y) corresponding to a form y e Y \ £, and ensures
that at least one row in that block must have a decisive markedness constraint. What about blocks
A(.,.,,) corresponding to a form y e £? The following claim 29 points out that in this case no row
of the block admits a decisive markedness constraint.
Claim 29 Consider universal specifications (X, Y, Gen, C) that satisfy all four assumptions (224).
Consider an entire language £ in the corresponding typology. If a ranking > is OT-compatible with
the phonotactics comparative tableau At corresponding to , then for every y E C and for every
row a in the block A(.,.,,), we have that dec> (a) E F.
Proof Assume by contradiction that the claim were false, namely that there exists a form y E C
such that there exists a row a in the block A(.,.,,) such that dec>(a) E M. This row a must
correspond to a triplet (x, x, y) for some x E £ fn Gen(y). Since y E L and x E Gen(y), then
the row corresponding to the triplet (y, y, x) belongs to the phonotactic comparative tableau AC
corresponding to £ too, together with the comparative row corresponding to (x, x, y) that we started
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with. A markedness constraint M has a w (or a E or an L) in the row corresponding to (x, x, y) iff it
has an L (or a E or a W, respectively) in the row corresponding to (y , , x). Furthermore, assumption
(224d) ensures that a faithfulness constraint F has a w (a E) in the row corresponding to (x, x, y)
iff it has a w (a E, respectively) in the row corresponding to (y, y, x). The relationship between the
rows corresponding to the two triplets (x, x, y) and (y, y, x) is thus as depicted in (231).
F F' M M' M"
(231) (x,x,) [ ... W ... E ... L ... E ... W ...
4
(yY,) ... W ... E ... W ... E ... L ...
Suppose that the >>-decisive winner-preferring constraint in the row corresponding to (x, x, y) is
a markedness constraint. This means that there exists a markedness constraint M that has a w in
the row corresponding to (x, x, y) and furthermore every constraint >>-ranked above M has a E
in that row (x, x, y). This means in turn that that markedness constraint M has an L in the row
corresponding to (y, y, x) and furthermore every constraint >>-ranked above M has a E in that row
(x, x, y). Since the latter row (x, x, y) belongs to the phonotactic comparative tableau corresponding
to the target language, then the ranking >> is not OT-compatible with that tableau, contradicting the
hypothesis that it is. U
Given a ranking >> over the constraint set C, let me define the sub-relation >>im of > as in (232).
If C >im C', then I will say that C is ranked IMMEDIATELY above C'. For example, given the
ranking C1 > C2 > C3 , we have that C1 >>im C 2 but that C, *im C3 . Obviously, >> is the
transitive closure of >im.
(232) We have C >im C' iff C >> C' and there exists no C" such that C > C" > C'.
It is useful to concentrate on immediate rankings, because it is easier to study what happens when
we revert them. Given a ranking >> that contains the immediate ranking C >im C', let >>[c,c'] be
the ranking identical to >> but for the fact that the two constraints C and C' have been swamped.
We say that the immediate ranking C >im C' of >> is CRUCIAL w.r.t. Z iff > OT-corresponds to
the target language C but >>[c,c] does not, namely the two conditions (233) hold.
(233) a. Z(OT>>) = C
b. R(OT>[cc,1 ) # C
The preceding claim 28 entails the following characterization of crucial immediate rankings. This
simple claim will turn out very useful in the discussion of the test case in subsection 6.3.3.
Claim 30 Consider a language £ and a ranking >> that OT-corresponds to it, namely such that
Z(OT>>) = L. If an immediate ranking M >im F of a markedness constraint M above a faith-
fulness constraint F is crucial in >> w.r.t. L, then there exists a block A(.,.,,) in the phonotactic
comparative tableau corresponding to the target language £ such that the properties in (234) hold.
(234) a. y V
b. there is a row a in the block A(.,.,y) such that dec>> (a) = M and F has a w in a;
c. for any other row a' in the block A(.,.,y), we have dec> (a') e F.
If an immediate ranking F >im M of a faithfulness constraint F above a markedness constraint F is
crucial in >> w.r.t. L, then there exists a row a in the phonotactic comparative tableau corresponding
to the target language £ such that the property (235) holds.
(235) dec> (a) = F and M has an L in a
Finally, the immediate ranking F >>im F' of a faithfulness constraint F above another faithfulness
constraint F' can never be crucial in >> w.r.t. L.
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6.3 Test cases
In section 6.1, I have tackled question (206b) by looking for a characterization of the final vector
entertained by the on-line algorithm (205) with a promotion-demotion update rule that holds in the
general case. In this section, I switch gears and turn to the study of the final vector in a few test
cases. In section 4.3, I have motivated the need for promotion-demotion update rules for the on-
line algorithm (205) by means of cases where the input tableau is a phonotactics tableau. It thus
makes sense now to consider test cases where the input tableau is indeed a phonotactics comparative
tableau. All test cases considered in this section correspond to universal specifications that satisfy
the four assumptions (224). Thus, the target ranking corresponding to a comparative tableau can be
characterized as in (236), by virtue of claim 28.
(236) a. >> is OT-compatible with the input phonotactics comparative tableau;
b. every block A(.,.,z) that corresponds to a loser form z that does not belong to the target
language contains at least a row whose >>-decisive constraint is a markedness constraint.
Following the discussion of section 4.3, I will assume a BIASED initial ranking vector Oinit whereby
the markedness constraints start out with a ranking value larger than the ranking value of the faithful-
ness constraints. More in detail, if the constraint set only contains general faithfulness constraints,
then I will assume the initial ranking vector described in (237a): the faithfulness constraints all start
out with an initial null ranking value; the markedness constraints all start out with an initial ranking
value equal to a given positive constant Oinit . If the constraint set contains both general and posi-
tional faithfulness constraints, then I will assume the initial ranking vector described in (237b): the
general faithfulness constraints start out with a null initial ranking value; the positional faithfulness
constraints start out with an initial ranking value equal to a positive constant 0init; the markedness
constraints start out with an initial ranking value equal to twice that positive constant. The choice
of the actual ratio between the different initial ranking values is completely arbitrary. The advan-
tage of the choice in (237) is that the initial vector is determined by a unique constant 0init . Note
that this choice of the initial ranking vector ensures that the current ranking vector has nonnegative
components at every time.
(237) For some positive constant 0 init > 0
a. Onit = 0, Oinit = init
b. 0 init 0, 0 init = 0
i
nit, 0 it = 29
in it
Egen Fpos
As noted in section 4.3, we cannot adopt a demotion-only update rule in step 3 of algorithm (205) in
the case of an input phonotactics comparative tableau. In fact, since the faithfulness constraints are
never loser-preferring, their ranking values would never be modified by a demotion-only update rule.
Thus, I need to use a promotion-demotion update rule in step 3. Among the arsenal of convergent
promotion-demotion update rules devised in chapter 5, I will adopt the one in (238) in the following
test cases. The rationale for this choice is that the promotion amount is always 1, and thus yields
a simple dynamics that is easier to study with paper and pencil. Convergence of this update rule
is ensured by both lines of analysis presented in chapter 5. It is ensured by the line of analysis of
section 5.2, as noted in subsection 5.3.2. And it is also ensured by the line of analysis of section
5.4, since the update rule satisfies all hypotheses of claim 22 - in particular it satisfies hypothesis
(175b), since the ranking values of all constraints stay nonnegative throughout learning.
(238) If the current ranking vector 0old is not OT-compatible with the comparative row a:
ld 1 if k c W(a)
a. few" Old - w(a) if k = L(a)
Old otherwise
b. Promote every winner-preferring constraint by 1; demote the unique loser-preferring
constraint by the total number w(a) of winner-preferring constraints.
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Finally, I will assume that the rows of the input phonotactics comparative tableau are sampled uni-
formly. The simulations of the on-line algorithm (205) with the promotion-demotion update rule
(238) and the implementation details just described have been performed using the Matlab file
AdditiveGLA, available on the author's website.
6.3.1 First test case
Let me start with the artificial, very simple case of the input comparative tableau in (239). Assume
that each row corresponds to a different block A(.,.,z) and that the last two blocks correspond to
loser forms that do not belong to the target language. By (236), the target ranking is therefore
Fi > M1 > M2 > F2.-
F1 F 2  M 1  M 2
W LwW L
(239)
w w
The last two rows of the comparative tableau (239) never trigger any update. In order to study the
behavior of the algorithm on this input tableau, I can thus get rid of these last two rows, and simplify
the tableau as in (240). This case is also considered in Prince and Tesar (2004).
F1  F 2  M 1  M 2
(240) A= [w w L ]L
I W W L
To get a sense of what happens in the case of the input comparative tableau (240), consider the
case where the two rows of the tableau are sampled uniformly. The dynamics over time of the
ranking values of the four constraints entertained by the on-line algorithm (205) with the promotion-
demotion update rule (238) starting from the biased initial vector (237a) with Oinit = 10,000 is
reported in (241). The diagram shows two crucial facts: first, the two markedness constraints M1 and
M2 sink with approximately the same speed, as shown by their overlapping trajectories; second, the
two faithfulness constraints F1 and F2 raise with different speeds, namely F raises faster than F2.
Thus, at the time M: and M2 both cross F1, the latter constraint is well above F2. From this moment
on, the first row of the comparative tableau (240) is accounted for, and will therefore not trigger any
further update. Furthermore, since the two markedness constraints are so close, M1 will get above
M2 much faster than it would take for M 2 to drop below F2. From the moment M1 gets above M2
on, also the second row of the comparative tableau (240) is accounted for, and the algorithm does
not perform any further update. Since nothing requires the two markedness constraints to further
sink and cross F2, they end up in between the two faithfulness constraints, as desired.
(241) 12000
10000
8000 -
6000 -
4000 -
F1
2000 - F2 .
0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 1400
Why is it that the two markedness constraints M1 and M 2 stay so close? and why is it that F1 raises
faster than F2? To start getting a grasp on these two questions, let's approximate random sampling
2216.3 Test cases
of the two rows of the comparative tableau (240) with a deterministic sampling whereby the first
row is sampled first, then the second row, than again the first row, and so on. The beginning of the
corresponding primal path described by the algorithm is given in (242). Here I only provide the
ranking values of the two markedness constraints M1 and M2 , and I leave the two ranking values
blank when the current ranking vector is OT-compatible with the current comparative row and thus
no update is performed. We see in (242) that row 2 triggers an update one third of the times it is fed
to the algorithm, while row 1 always does trigger an update. Since F is only pushed up by the first
row and F2 is only pushed up by the second row, then we expect F to raise three times as fast as F2 .
This agrees well with the simulation in (241). Furthermore, we see in (242) that the ranking values
of the two markedness constraints differ over time by at most 3, namely they are basically identical.
Again, this agrees well with the simulation in (241).
[100 row [1 99 row2 100 row 99 row 2 row 1 98 row 2 99(242) 1100 1100 098 98] 98 96
row [ 981 row 2 row 1 row 2 row 1 6 row 2 97]
[row 1 ]row 2 row 95 row 2 row 1 94 row 2 95]
30[9 1 1 a 94' 311 94' [92
So far, I have crucially relied on assumptions on how the two rows of the comparative tableau (240)
are sampled and fed to the algorithm: either uniformly or in a fixed order one after the other. Quite
surprisingly, it turns out that the algorithm ends up in the desired ranking no matter how the rows are
fed to the algorithm, as stated by the following claim 31. The proof hinges on the invariant presented
in section 6.1. An intuitive explanation of the proof concludes this section.
Claim 31 The on-line algorithm (205) with the promotion-demotion update rule (238), starting from
the initial vector (237a), run on on the input comparative tableau (240) converges to a final ranking
vector 0 that represents the desired ranking F1 > M1 > M 2 > F2 , no matter how the two rows are
sampled, provided that the initial ranking value 0 init of the markedness constraints is large enough.
Proof We know that the on-line algorithm (205) with the promotion-demotion update rule (238)
converges to a ranking vector OT-compatible with the input tableau (240). Thus, OT-compatibility
with the first row of the input tableau entails that the final ranking vector satisfies the strict inequality
F1 > 0m' that corresponds to the immediate ranking (243a). Suppose furthermore that the final
ranking vector satisfies the strict inequality Oi2 > 0f, that corresponds to the immediate ranking
(243c). In this case, OT-compatibility with the second row of the input tableau (240) entails that the
final vector must satisfy the strict inequality Of > Of that corresponds to the immediate ranking
(243b). In conclusion, to prove the claim it is sufficient to show that the final ranking vector satisfies
the inequality 0f > 0 n.
(243) F > M1  > M 2  > F2
I I I
(a) (b) (c)
Let at = (a , at) be the dual vector entertained by the algorithm at a generic time t, namely at
(respectively, at) is the number of times that the algorithm has updated its current ranking vector
in response to a failure in accounting for the first (respectively, the second) row of the comparative
tableau (240). The ranking values of the two constraints F2 and M2 at a generic time t can then be
expressed in terms of the dual variables at that same time t as in (244).
(244) 0F2  = at
0 = -20at + Oinit
Thus, the desired primal strict inequality Ot > 02 holds at a given time t iff the dual strict
inequality (245) holds at that same time. In the rest of the proof, I will show that the inequality (245)
does indeed hold at any time t.
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(245) 3a2 < Oi n it
To this end, let me start by noting that the dual vector at = (at, at) entertained by the algorithm at
a generic time t satisfies the two inequalities (246); I will then derive the strict inequality (245) from
these two inequalities (246).
1(246) a. at < 1 + 2(a 2 + Oinit2
b. a min + Oinit 1 + at}2 ~ ±- 3 v 3
The two inequalities (246) are an instance of the invariant presented in section 6.1, readapted to the
case where the initial ranking vector is not null. For completeness, let me sketch the proof again.
If at = 1, then the inequality (246a) trivially holds. Otherwise, the proof of the inequality (246a)
consists of the chain of implications in (247), where I have reasoned exactly as in the case of the
chain of implications in (217). Analogously, if a t = 1, then the inequality (246b) trivially holds.
Otherwise, the proof of the inequality (246b) consists of the two chains of implications in (248) and
(249), where again I have reasoned exactly as in the case of the chain of implications in (217).
(247) at > 1 ==- Bs < t s.t. as = at - 1 and 0 not OT-compatible with a,
== s < t s.t. a = a t - 1 an d 0 < 0'
== Is < t s.t. a' = at - 1 and a" < -a' + a' + O
in it
== s < t s.t. as = at - 1 and 2as < a s + Oinit
= 2(a - 1) < + Oinit
2
at 1 + 2(a + Oinit)
(248) a _ 1 = Is < t s.t. a' = at - 1 and 0 not OT-compatible with a2
== s < t s.t. a' = at - and 0 2 <~2
== Is < t s.t. a' = at - 1 and a < -2a2 + 0
i n it
== s < t s.t. a' = at - 1 and 3a' < 0 init
S3(a - 1) < Oinit
tinit
_a 1 + 3
(249) at > 1 == s < t s.t. a' = at - 1 and 0 not OT-compatible with a 2
== s < t s.t. a = a t - 1 and 0 ' < 0 ' ,
= ' s < t s.t. a = at - 1 and - ai + a 2 + 6init < -2a2 + oinit
= s < t s.t. a = a - and3a' < a '
i tt
= at < 1 + 3a
In order to finally derive the strict inequality (245) from the two inequalities (246), let me distinguish
two cases: either at < Oin it - 3 or else at > Oinit - 3. In the former case at < Oinit - 3, the strict
inequality (245) always holds, as shown by the chain of inequalities in (250). Here, I have reasoned
as follows: in step (a), I have used the invariant (246b); in step (b), I have used the fact that we are
considering the case at < Oin it - 3.
(a) 1 (b) 1 1(init
(250) a < 1 + a I < 1+ - 3) ginit
To conclude the proof, I thus only need to show that the opposite case aj > Oi 0 nit - 3 can never
arise. Let me start by noting that the case a >_ 0 init indeed can never arise. In fact, in this case the
inequality (246b) would become (251 a); by replacing (251 a) in (246a), we get (25 1b); the conclusion
aI-Z + 0 init contradicts the hypothesis that we are in a case where 0 init < at (provided that
0 init is large enough that the additive term can be ignored).
1
(251) a. at < 1 + in i t .
b. a t < 1+ 2 1 +- 0init + init ) 2 ini.
By reasoning in the same way, one immediately sees that also the three remaining cases Oinit
a -3, init = a - 2 and 0init = a1 - 1 can never arise. U
Let me make explicit the intuitive idea behind the preceding proof. Consider an arbitrary promotion-
demotion update rule (77). Let v be the amount by which this rule promotes F2 and M1 in response
to a failure in accounting for the second row of the input comparative tableau (240); let A be the
amount by which this rule demotes M 2. By reasoning as in the first part of the preceding proof,
we conclude that the on-line algorithm (??) with this update rule ends up in the right final vector
iff the inequality (252) holds, that generalizes the inequality (245) obtained in the preceding proof
for the specific case of the promotion-demotion update rule (238). This inequality (252) says that
a2 must remain small, namely that the second row of the input comparative tableau cannot trigger
too many updates. How can we get this effect? The answer was already sketched in the comments
above the update rule (123) in section 5.1: if we make A fairly large, then one exposure to the second
row of the input tableau will have the effect of pulling apart the w corresponding to M1 from the L
corresponding to M 2 by a large amount; since that amount is large, it will take a while for it to be
eroded; thus, it will take a while for the current ranking vector to become again not OT-incompatible
with the second row; in conclusion, the second row will trigger few updates no matter how the rows
are fed to the algorithm.
(252) (v + A)a 2 < Oin it
The promotion-demotion update rule (238) considered here crucially meets this desideratum, be-
cause it uses a large value of A, namely A = 2. This explanation immediately predicts that, if we
make A smaller, then the effect of updating the current ranking by the second row of the input tableau
will not last long enough, namely the second row will trigger too many updates, namely condition
(252) will not hold and the algorithm will end up with the wrong final vector. This prediction is
indeed borne out: consider for example the case A = 1, so that we in effect have Boersma's (1997)
promotion-demotion update rule (79). The on-line algorithm (205) with this update rule might in-
deed end up with the wrong ranking vector, as shown by the counterexample in (253) and the choice
Oinit = 7.
[81a2[ ~ ~ EL a []al[1 [ 1a [2[.1 a2 [ R2 K a, Wa 2(253) 7 - 8- -7 6 5 4 5 6 5 45
Note that in the case of the counterexample (253), the second row triggers a total of four updates
before the algorithm converges. This is too much, since a2 = 4 does not satisfy the corresponding
inequality (252), with v = A = 1 and 0init = 7. The case of the update rule (238) considered here is
very different. The on-line algorithm (240) with this promotion-demotion update rule and Oinit - 7
admits only 13 learning paths, listed in (254). And in all 13 paths, the second row of the input
comparative tableau triggers only two updates. Indeed the value a 2 = 2 does satisfy the inequality
(252), with v = 1, A = 2 and 0 init =7.
(254) 0 1 2 -3 i4 4 4 50 0 a,, a 0 a, 0 a2 1 a2 22
7 6 5 4 3 4 5 4
71 -1 2 a 2 2
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6 234 4
-2- ~-----4- 5 5S Ial I1 l 1 1 2
~6 5 44
-- -5--
2 2 3a2 1 a 1 a 1 2 2 2 a 27 65 65 4
-3 54
-- [4-.]
2 a 2 a2[ 2
4 [4[6 53S 4 ] 2 [ 4 [ [ 5O1 a2 1 ±4 1 !4 1 a2 l2 2 a 2787 6 5 6 5 41 4 [1 27 ._ 554 3 4
The specific shape of the promotion-demotion update rule (238) was motivated in chapter 5 from the
point of view of finite-time convergence. The case of the comparative tableau (240) shows that the
specifics of the promotion-demotion update rule might actually also turn out useful in accounting
for restrictiveness.
6.3.2 Second test case: pseudo-korean
In this section, I study in detail the case of pseudo-Korean from Hayes (2004). Consider the universal
specifications (X, Y, Gen, C) in (255). The set of underlying forms X and the set of surface forms
Y coincide, and contain voiced/voiceless and aspirated/unaspirated stops in prevocalic, postvocalic
and intervocalic position. The faithfulness constraints target the two features [VOICE] and [ASPIRA-
TION]; both general faithfulness constraints F2 and F4 are paired with a positional variant sensitive
to the pre-vocalic environment, namely F1 and F3 respectively. The markedness constraints M1 , M3
and M 4 rule out specific patterns of values of the features [VOICE] and [ASPIRATION]; the constraint
M2 rules out sequences of two voiced segments with a voiceless one in between. The generating
function Gen is the one associated with the features [VOICE] and [ASPIRATION].
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(255) a. X = =
ta,
at,
ata,
da, tha, dha,
ad, ath, adh,
ada, atha, adha
b. F = IDENT[ASPIRATION][_V]
F 2 = IDENT[ASPIRATION]
F3 = IDENT[VOICE][_ V]
F4 = IDENT[VOICE]
c. Gen(ta)
Gen(at)
Gen(ada)
Gen(da)
Gen(ad)
Gen(ata)
M1
M2
M3
M4
= *[-SONORANT, +VOICE]
= * [+VOICE] [-VOICE] [+VOICE]
= *[+SPREAD GLOTTIS]
= *[+SPREAD GLOTTIS, +VOICE]
Gen(tha)
Gen(ath)
Gen(atha)
Gen(dha)
Gen(adh)
Gen(adha)
{ta, da, tha, dha},
{at, ad, ath, adh },
{ada, ata, adha, atha}
Consider the target (whole) language £ in (256). This language corresponds to voicing and aspiration
in Korean: voicing is allophonic, namely voicing is allowed only for unaspirated stops in intervo-
calic position; aspiration is contrastive in prevocalic position but allophonic elsewhere, namely only
unaspirated stops are allowed elsewhere.
(256) £ = {ta, at, tha, ada, atha}
Let me construct the phonotactics input tableau corresponding to the target language (256). I start
by pairing up the language (256) with the set of underlying/winner/loser form triplets in (257).
The second element of each triplet represents the winner surface form, and is taken from the set £
in (256); the first element represents the corresponding underlying form, which is identical to the
winner surface form by assumption (34); the third element of the triplet represents a loser surface
form; for each pair of an underlying form with the corresponding identical winner surface form, all
candidate loser surface forms are considered, displayed on the same row.
(ta, ta, da),
(at, at, ad),
(tha, tha, ta),
(ada, ada, ata),
(atha, atha, ata),
(ta, ta, tha),
(at, at, ath),
(tha, tha, da),
(ada, ada, ath a),
(atha, atha, ada),
(ta, ta, dha),
(at, at, adh),
(tha, tha, dha),
(ada, ada, adha),
(atha, atha, adha)
Next, I construct the comparative tableau corresponding to the set of triplets in (257), as in (258).
Of course, the columns corresponding to the faithfulness constraints contain no single L. In (258),
I have ordered the rows by underlying/winner form in blocks of the form A(x,), with the various
blocks corresponding to various forms x e £ separated by a horizontal line. As usual, I am omitting
E's for readability.
(ta, ta, da)
(ta, ta, tha)
(ta, ta, dha)
(at, at, ad)
(at, at, ath)
(at, at, ad h )
(tha, tha, ta)
(258) (tha, tha, da)
(tha, tha, dha)
(ada, ada, ata)
(ada, ada, atha)
(ada, ada, adha)
(atha, atha, ata)
(atha, atha, ada)
(atha, atha, adha)
F1 F2 F3
W
M 2 M 3 M 4
W W W W W W W
W W
W W
W W W W W
W W L
W W W W W L
W W W W
W W L W
W W W W L W W
W W W W
The rows in the comparative tableau (258) that do not contain a single L do not contribute to OT-
compatibility, and can therefore be dropped. Furthermore, the row corresponding to (ada, ada, atha)
(257) {
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can be ignored, because it is entailed by the row corresponding to (ada, ada, ata). The row cor-
responding to (tha, tha, da) can be ignored, because it is entailed by the row corresponding to
(tha, tha, ta). Finally, the row corresponding to (atha, atha, ata) can be ignored, because it is
identical to the row corresponding to (tha, tha, ta). In conclusion, we are left with the smaller
OT-equivalent comparative tableau (259), with only four comparative rows.
FI F2 F3  F4  MI M 2 M 3  M 4
(atha, atha, ada) W W W W W L L
(259) (tha, tha, ta) W W L
(ada, ada, ata) W W L W
(atha, atha,adha) W W W L W
Next, let me construct the sub-tableau of the comparative tableau (258) that only contains the rows
corresponding to triplets (x, x, y) such that the loser form y does not belong to the target language
(256), as in (260). Here, I have ordered the rows by loser form in blocks of the form A(.,.,y), with
the various blocks corresponding to different loser forms y E Y \ £ separated by a horizontal line.
F1 F2 F3 F4 M 1 M 2 M 3 M 4
(at, at, ad)
(at, at, ath)
(at, at, adh)
(ta, ta, dha)
(tha, tha, dha)
(260) (ta, ta, da)
(tha, tha, da)
(ada, ada, ata)
(atha, atha, ata)
(ada, ada, adha)
(atha, atha, adha)
W W
W W
W W W W W
W W W W W W W
W W W W
W W W
W W W W W L
W W L W
W W L
W W W W
W W W L W
I am now ready to characterize the ranking vectors that OT-correspond to the phonotactics of the
language (256), namely such that £ = R(OT>). All four assumptions (224) from subsection ??
are satisfied in the case of the universal specifications (255). Thus, the target rankings >> can be
characterized by means of the two properties (236), that in our case boil down to (261).
(261) a. >> is OT-compatible with every row of the comparative tableaux (259);
b. for every block A(.,.,y) in the comparative tableau (260), there exists at least one row
whose >>-decisive constraint is a markedness constraint.
In order for condition (261b) to hold for the block A(.,.,ad) in the tableau (260), the ranking (262a)
must hold. In order for condition (261b) to hold for the block A(.,.,ath) in the tableau (260), the
ranking (262b) must hold. In order for condition (261b) to hold for the block A(.,.,da) in the
tableau (260), the ranking (262c) must hold. In order for condition (261a) to hold for the row
(ada, ada, ata) in the comparative tableau (259) given the two rankings (262a) and (262c) estab-
lished so far, the ranking (262d) must hold. Condition (261b) is then satisfied for the block A(.,.,ata)
in the tableau (260). In order for condition (261a) to hold for the row (ath, atha, adha) of the com-
parative tableau (259) given the rankings (262a), (262c) and (262d) established so far, the ranking
(262e) must hold. Condition (261b) for the blocks A(.,.,adha), A(.,.,dha) and A(.,.,adh) in the com-
parative tableau (260) is satisfied by the rankings already established. In order for condition (261 a)
to hold for the row (tha, tha, ta) in the comparative tableau (259) given the ranking (262b)already
established, the ranking (2620f) must hold. Finally, in order for condition (261a) to hold for the
row (atha, atha, ada) in the comparative tableau (259) given the rankings already established, the
ranking (262g) must hold. In conclusion, a ranking vector
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(262) M 4 = *[+ASP, +VOICE]
(e)I
M2 = *[+voI][-VOI][+VOI]
(d) I
M1= * [-SON, +voI]
(c)3 = IDENT[VOI][V] F4 IDENT[VOI]
F3 = IDENT[iVOI]EV] F4 = IDENT[VOI]
F 1 = IDENT[ASP][_V]
- jjf)
M 3 = *[+ASP]
(b)
2 = IDENT[ASP]
F2 = IDENT[ASP]
I have run the on-line algorithm (205) with the promotion-demotion update rule (238) starting from
the biased initial vector (237b) with oinit = 40, 000 on the input comparative tableau (259) with the
rows sampled uniformly. The dynamics of the ranking values in one such run is reported in (263),
and the corresponding final ranking vector is provided in (264), which correctly accounts for all the
rankings in (262). The reason for such a high value of the constant oinit is that it smoothes down the
randomness in the choice of the rows, thus yielding the apparently straight lines in (263).
(263) lI I
M4
8
7 3 .M1, M2
M3
6
F1
5
3
2
F2
1 -
- F4
0 ,-,, . ,I , I1,
0.- 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
x 10
I II III IV
F1  F 2  F 3  F 4  M 1
(264) 0 = [58043 18043 55685 15685 58041
M 2  M 3  M 4
58042 56460 80001 ]
In the rest of this section, I study in detail with paper and pencil the behavior of the algorithm, thus
exaplain the diagram in (263).
6.3.2.1 Stage I
At the beginning of the learning process, we have all markedness constraints ranked above all faith-
fulness constraints. After at most one exposure to the fourth row of the comparative tableau (259),
that row will be accounted for by the decisive constraint M 4 . And any subsequent ranking vector
entertained by the algorithm will still account for that row, since the constraint M4 will not move
further while the constraint M2 will keep dropping. Let T be the time at which M4 crosses M2
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and thus stage I ends. Under the assumption that the rows of the input comparative tableau (259)
are sampled uniformly, stage I is over very soon,2 namely Ti is very small. If Oinit is rather large,
I can safely assume that no substantial modification has happened to the initial ranking of the other
various constraints. I will thus assume that the ranking vector 0 T1 entertained at the end of stage I is
identical to the initial ranking vector 0 init, as stated in (265).
(265) 0, = OT = 0 = 2 0init
0 T I  0T  = O0 initF1  F3
S =T = o
F2  F4  -
Note indeed that stage I is so short in the simulation described in (263) that it is not even visible in
the diagram.
6.3.2.2 Stage II
From now on, the bottom row of the comparative tableau (259) can be ignored, since it won't trigger
any further update. And constraint M4 can be ignored as well, since its ranking value won't change.
The initial ranking vector of stage II is the final ranking vector (265) of stage I. Thus, to study stage
II means to study the behavior of the algorithm with the initial ranking vector (265) and the input
tableau (266), obtained from (259) by deleting the last columns and the last row.
F 1 F 2  F 3 F 4 M 1  M 2 Ms
row 1 W W W W W L L
(266) row2 W W L
row 3 W W L W
Let al, a2 and a' be the dual variables corresponding to the three rows of the comparative tableau
(266) at a generic time t of stage II. More explicitly, at is the number of times that the algorithm has
updated its current ranking vector in response to a failure in accounting for the ith row of the tableau
(266) among the first t updates performed within stage II.
First part of the analysis The analysis of the behavior of the algorithm in stage II rests on the two
approximate relations (267) between the two dual variables a' and a' at a generic time t in stage II.
Let me explain intuitively why these two relations hold.
3 t(267) a. a t ; at
b. at+ a t1 3 4
The approximate relation (267a) immediately follows from the two inequalities in (268), since the
two different terms -3/2 and +1 at the left and at the right of (268) can be ignored when aj and at
are large.
3 t  3 3 t(268) + - at < 3 at 1
Let me prove the right hand side inequality in (268). If at = 0, then this inequality trivially holds.
Otherwise, the proof of this inequality consists of the chain of implication in (269), where I have
reasoned exactly as in the case of the chain of implications in (217).
21f they are not sampled uniformly, then it might take a very long time for the fourth row to be fed to the algorithm and
thus stage I might in principle take very long.
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(269) a' > 1 == Bs < t s.t. as = at - 1 and 0' not OT-compatible with the third row
= s < t s.t. a = a - l and 0 < 09M2 - M1
== 3s < t s.t. aj = a - 1 and - 5a" + a' < a' - 3a'
== s < t s.t. a = at - 1 and4a < 6as
== Bs < t s.t. aj = at - 1 and 4a' < 6at
== 3s < t s.t. al = a3 - 1 and 4(at - 1) < 6a
=4 s < t s.t.a = a3  - 1 anda< - + 1
The proof of the left hand side inequality in (268) is identical; I provide it explicitly for completeness.
If at = 0, then this inequality trivially holds. Otherwise, the proof of this inequality consists of the
chain of implication in (270), where I have reasoned once again exactly as in the case of the chain
of implications in (217).
(270) aj > 1 == s < t s.t. a' = at - 1 and 0' not OT-compatible with the first row
=a Bs<ts.t.a =a t - l andO 2 >0 O
3- s < t s.t. 3j 3 M2-1 n - M1{+a 2a a= s < t s.t.a =a' -land -5a+a' >a -3a'
==3 3s<ts.t. =3--and4a >_6c
- 3 Bs < t s.t. as = at - 1 and 4a' > 6al
3s < t s.t. a= at - 1 and 4a> -1)
3s < t s.t. al= a' - 1 and -> _(at -1
Let me now turn to the approximate relation (267b). The approximate relation (267a) between
the two dual variables a, and at entails in particular that the ranking values 01 and 02 of the
two constraints M1 and M 2 are very close to each other throughout stage II, as shown by the two
computations in (271).
(271) 01 a - 3at + 2 0 init 2 0 init - al
OtM = -5at + at + 20init  2 0 init - 7 t
Let II be the event that the current ranking vector at time t is not OT-compatible with the first
row and let Qt be the probability that it is not OT-compatible with the third row. The approximate
relation (267b) can be explained as in (272). In step (a), I have noted that each row get sampled
approximately 1/4 of the times, since the four rows of the comparative tableau (259) are sampled
uniformly. In step (b), I have reasoned as follows: the OT-compatibility of the current ranking vector
with either the first or the third row only depends on the relative ranking of M1 and M2 , since the
constraint M3 will always be below M 2 and furthermore all faithfulness constraints are still below
all markedness constraints throughout stage II. At every time t, the current ranking vector ranks M1
above M 2 or vice versa, so that it is either OT-compatible with the first row or with the third.
(272) at + a a) t P[] + t IP[t
(b) t
4
Second part of the analysis Given the preliminary relations (267), the three dual variables a4,
a2 and a3 at each time t can be approximately expressed as a function of t as in (273). The two
approximate expressions (273a) and (273c) immediately follow from (267). The approximate ex-
pression (273b) can be justified as follows: since the four rows of the comparative tableau (259) are
sampled uniformly, we expect that at time t the second row will have been sampled approximately
t/4 times; each time the row is sampled and fed to the algorithm, it does trigger an update, because
the markedness constraint M3 is above both faithfulness constraints F1 and F2 throughout the entire
stage II; in conclusion, we thus expect that a2 ,, t/4.
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1(273) a. at . -t10
1b. a' sz -t4
c. at k3 t
20
I report in (274) the actual value of the three dual variables entertained by the algorithm in the
simulation represented in the diagram (263) at two different times. The values in (274) are in perfect
accord with the estimates in (273).
(274)(274) t =20,000 t = 40,000
a( 2,000 4,012
ta 2  5,030 10,031
a3 3,000 6,019
The approximate expressions (273) for the dual variables at a generic time t in stage II yield the
approximate expressions (275) for the primal variables at a generic time t in stage II as a function of
t. These computations are trivial, but for a small remark concerning M 3 . The column corresponding
to M3 has two L's, corresponding to the first two rows. The L in the second row will is undominated
trhoughout the entire stage II, and thus contributes to the reranking of constraint M3. But the L
corresponding to the first row is dominated by the winner preferring constraint M1 throughout the
entire stage II. The reason is as follows: clearly, M3 will be ranked below M2 throughout the entire
stage II; as noted in (271), M 2 and M1 have approximately the same ranking throughout the entire
stage II; thus, M 3 will be ranked below M1 throughout the entire stage II; hence, the L corresponding
to M 3 in the first row is never undominated and thus never contributes to the reranking of M3 . The
estimates in (275) are in very good accord with the diagram (263).
(275) = a + a + Oin +it = 1 Oini = t + Oinit
~F2 - 20~
0 = at - 3~ a + 20i n i t = lt- 3 I t + 20init = t 20init-
~F4 5T
oat 3a 1 20init'~ilt ~ iia1  3 t10 - 2OI + 20nt = 20nt1 3 T-0 20 To
0~= -5a + at + 2 0
i nit 
= -5t + - t + 20init = 20 in i t -  0 t
o
t  
-2at + 20init = -2t + 2 0init = 2 0init -tM3 2 --
From the estimates in (275), we immediately see that at every time t within stage II, we have that: the
largest ranking value among faithfulness constraints is that of F1 ; and furthermore that the smallest
ranking value among markedness constraints is that of M 3 . Thus, stage II ends when FI crosses M 3
and the second row is thus correctly accounted for by the decisive F1 . Let T be the time at which
this crossing of M 3 by F happens, and stage II thus ends. This time T, can be easily determined
as a function of Oinit as in (276). Note that for the case 0 init = 40, 000, the estimate T 1  , 0 init
derived in (276) yields T 47,059, which accords perfectly with the diagram (263).
(276) = 0h -LT + 0 init = 2 0init - T(276) FT'  M3T 20 =6x 20+l
S20 init
17<==. TII 17 -
From the general estimates (275) of the components of the ranking vector during stage II together
with the estimate (276) of the final time TIn of stage II, we get the characterization (277) of the
ranking vector 0 TII entertained by the algorithm at the end of stage II.
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(277) 0TII0TII
2
3T
OT113
TII
W 6
OTu7
S 20 0 init + Oinit
7 20 0init
20 17
S5 20 Oinit + Oinit
20 17
5 20 0 init
20 17
= 20init 7 20 oinit20 17
= 20init - 20 oinit20TO17
= 2 0 init - 20 Oinit217
24 init
S 7 0 init17
22 init
17
= 5 0 init17
27 init
17
27 init
= 17
= 0 init17
6.3.2.3 Stage III
From now on, the second row of the comparative tableau (266) can be ignored, since it won't trigger
any further update. And constraint M3 can be ignored as well, since its ranking value won't change.
The initial ranking vector of stage III is the final ranking vector (277) of stage II. Thus, to study stage
III means to study the behavior of the algorithm with the initial ranking vector (277) and the input
tableau (278), obtained from (259) by deleting the last two columns and the second ad fourth rows.
F 1  F 2 F 3 F 4 MI M 2
(278) row [W W W W W L
row 3 W W L W
Let c' and a' be the dual variables associated with the first and the third comparative rows at a
generic time t in stage III. Of course, the approximate characterization (273a) and (273c) of these
two dual variables ca and a' obtained for stage II also holds at stage III. Thus, the primal variables
at a generic time t in stage III can be approximately expressed as a function of time t as in (279).
Ot = at + F0 2 
I
Otg = at + 0 x
Ot. = at + at + OTII3 1 3 F3
04 = a + a +9 0T II
0t = at - 3at + 9Mi 1 3 M
-5a + at + T
=1 +24  Oinit
t + 17t
S t + 7oinit
= 5 22 Oinit
-T20 17
_ 5 t + 5init
= 20 17
7t + Az7init
- T 17
7 t + 270init
-T2 17
Stage III ends when a faithfulness constraint crosses the two markedness constraints, that drop ap-
proximately at the same speed. Since FI is always above F2 and F3 is always above F4 , then the
crossing faithfulness constraint must be either F or F3 . Thus, I need to determine which one is the
first crossing costraint. Contrary to the case of stage II, in the case of stage III a qualitative analysis
is not sufficient to settle the issue: in fact, (277) shows that F1 starts out higher than F3 at the be-
ginning of stage III; yet, (279) shows that F raises slower than F3 . A quantitative analysis is need
instead. This quantitative analysis is provided in (280).
(280) a. F crosses M1 , M2  1 = OM
_ }t +24 Oinit
t .= 20 init
b. F3 crosses M 1 , M2  = Ot. = O
L t+22  Oinit
20 17init
t - 25= ii
= - t + 10init
= 20 17
= t + 27 0 init
-20 17
Thus, stage III ends when F1 crosses both M1 and M 2 , and this happens after TIII = 0 Oinit updates
after the beginning of stage III. Thus, the ranking vector OTra entertained by the algorithm at the end
of stage III is (281).
(279)
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0tM2
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S1 2 0 Oinit + 14 init
10 51 17
S1 20 0init + i init
1051 17
5 20 oinit +22 init
20 i 17
S 2 0 init + 2init
S 2051 17
S 7 20 init + 20init
- 20 51 17
_ _L 10 init + 27 oinit
- 2051 17
= Oinit
- 0 init
-
init
-
init
- oinit
-
init
6.3.2.4 Stage IV
From now on, the first row of the comparative tableau (278) can be ignored, since it won't trigger
any further update. he initial ranking vector of stage IV is the final ranking vector (281) of stage III.
Thus, to study stage IV means to study the behavior of the algorithm with the initial ranking vector
(281) and the input tableau (282), obtained from (259) by deleting all rows but the third one.
(282) row 3 [
F1 F 2 F3 F 4 M 1 M 2
W W L W
As shown in (281), the ranking values of the two markedness constraints M1 and M 2 are very close
at the beginning of stage IV and far away from the ranking value of F3 . Thus, a few updates will
be sufficient in stage IV in order for M 2 to settle above M 1, so that the current ranking vector will
become OT-compatible with the tableau (282) and learning will cease.
6.3.3 Third test case: the whole Azba typology
In this subsection, I study in detail the case of the Azba typology discussed in Prince and Tesar
(2004). Consider the universal specifications (X, Y, Gen, C) in (283). These universal specifications
are centered around the two features [STOP-VOICING] and [FRICATIVE-VOICING]. Each one of the
two features is associated with a set of a general faithfulness constraint, a positional one and a
markedness one; the markedness constraint M1 = AGREE, which requires adjacent obstruents to
agree in voicing, links the two sets of constraints together.
pa,
sa,
apsa,
aspa,
I
Gen(sa)
Gen(za)
Gen(apsa)
Gen(apza)
Gen(absa)
Gen(abza)
ba,
za,
apza,
azpa,
ap, ab,
as, az,
absa, abza,
asba, azba
= {pa, ba}
= {sa, za}
S apsa, apza,
= absa,abza
Gen(ap)
Gen(ab)
Gen(as)
Gen(az)
Gen(aspa)
Gen(azpa)
Gen(asba)
Gen(azba)
= {ap, ab}
= {as, az}
apsa, azpa,
asba, azba I
F 1 = IDENT[STOP-VOICING]
F 2 = IDENT[FRICATIVE-VOICING]
F3 = IDENT[STOP-VOICING][ONSET]
c. C = F 4 = IDENT[FRICATIVE-VOICING][ONSET]
M1 = AGREE[VOICE]
M2 = *[+STOP-VOICING]
M 3 = *[+FRICATIVE-VOICING]
There are a total of 41 grammars in the typology described by the universal specifications (283), as
computed by the software OTSoft by Hayes et al. (2003). These 41 grammars correspond to a total of
(281) OF1
6F1ul
F2
F3
TlF4
TIml
MI
OTm I
M2
(283) a. X=2= I
Gen(pa)
b. Gen(ba)
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37 different languages (a given langage might correspond to two different grammars, since different
grammars might neutralize a given form in different ways). I have listed all these languages in (284),
omitting the two trivial languages, namely the maximal one corresponding to the entire set of surface
forms and the minimal one corresponding only to the unmarked forms {pa, ap, sa, as, apsa, aspa}.
(284) pa,
sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
sa,S apsa,
aspa,
pa,
sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
sa,VII. sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
VIII. sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
. sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
X. sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
X. sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa, ba, ap, ab,
sa, za, as, az,apsa, abza,
aspa, azpa, asba, azba
ba,
za,
apza,
ba,
za,
ba,
za,
apza,
ba,
za,
apza,
ba,
za,
ba,
za,
ba,
za,
ap, ab,
as, az,
absa, abza,
azba
ap, ab,
as, az,
abza,
azba
ap, ab,
as,
absa, abza,
azba
ap, ab,
as,
absa, abza,
asba,
ap, ab,
as,
abza,
azba
ap, ab,
as,
abza,
ap, ab,
as,
abza,
asba,
pa,
sal
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
sa,
apsa,
aspa,
pa,
sa,
apsa,
aspa,
ap,
as, az,
abza,
asba, azba
ap,
as, az,
asba, azba
ap,
as, az,
abza,
azba
ap,
as, az,
azba
ap,
as, az,
azba
ap,
as, az,
ap,
as, az,
abza,
ap,
as, az,
ap,
as, az,
abza,
azba
za,
apza,
za,
ba,
za,
azpa,
ba,
za,
apza,
azpa,
ba,
za,
ba,
za,
ba,
za,
apza,
za,
za,
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ba, ap, ab,
as,
ba, ap, ab,
as,
asbazba
ba, ap, ab,
as,asba J
ba, ap, ab, 1
as,
abza,
azba
pa, ba, ap, ab, pa, ap,
XII. sa, as, sa, za, as, az,
apsa, absa, apsa, apza,
aspa, asba, aspa, azpa,
pa, ba, ap, pa, ba, ap,
XIII. sa, za, as, sa, za, as,
apsa, apza, apsa, abza,
aspa, azba aspa, asba,
pa, ba, ap,
XIV. sa, za, as,
apsa, apza,
aspa, asba,
Spa, ba, ap, pa, ba, ap,
X. sa, za, as, sa, za, as,
apsa, apsa, abza,
aspa, azba aspa,
pa, ba, ap,
sa, za, as,
apsa, abza,
aspa, azbaSpa, ba, ap, pa, ap,
XVII. sa, as, sa, za, as,
apsa, apsa,
aspa, aspa,
pa, ba, ap, pa, ap,
XVIII. sa, as, sa, za, as,
apsa, apsa, abza,
aspa, azba aspa,
pa, ba, ap, pa, ap,
XIX. sa, as, sa, za, as,
apsa, apsa, apza,
aspa, asba, aspa,
Each language in the right column of (284) is obtained from the corresponding language in the left
column through the correspondences in (285), and vice versa. Since the universal specifications
(283) are symmetric w.r.t. the two features [STOP-VOICING] and [FRICATIVE-VOICING], I can then
ignore the languages in the right column and only concentrate on the languages in the left column.
In conclusion, I am left with 19 test cases.
(285) ba # za ab , az
apza # asba apsa - aspa
abza 4 azba absa o azpa
azpa 4 absa aspa 4 apsa
azba # abza asba <= apza
I have run the OT on-line algorithm (205) with the promotion-demotion update rule (238), with the
initial ranking of the form (237b) with Oinit -= 1000 and with uniform sampling of the rows of the
input phonotactic comparative tableau corresponding to each of the 19 languages in the left column
in (284). I report in (286) the final ranking vector obtained for each of the 19 languages, together with
the unique ranking it represents. Multiple simulations with the same comparative tableaux always
yielded the same result (the actual components of the final ranking vector might differ slightly from
one simulation to the other because of the randomization in the sampling of the rows, but not the
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ranking it represents). It turns out that the final ranking entertained by the model OT-corresponds to
the target language in all cases but the case of language XI.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
XII.
XIII.
XIV.
XV.
XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.
XIX.
Corresponding ranking
F4 > F3 > F1 > M1
M1 > F4 > F3 > F2
F4 > F3 > F1 > M1
F4 > M3 > F3 > F1
M1 > F4 > F3 > M3
M1 > F4 > M3 > F3
F4 > M3 > F3 > M1
M1 > M3 > F3 > F4
M1 > F3 > M3 > F4
M3 > F3 > M1 > F4
M1 > F3 > F4 > M3
M3 > F3 > F1 > M1
F3 > M2 > F4 > M1
(1000, 857,1177,1367,998,997,856)
(765,774,1174,1184,2000,763,773)
(1019,567,1206,1363,1018,1015,1016)
(990,424,1205, 1351,988,989,1349)
(787,305,1191,1208,2001,786,1188)
(809,286,1161,1286,2000,807,1285)
(876,504,1288,1334,1286,874,1332)
(873,0,1255,1000,2000,872,2000)
(869,217,1353,1000,2000,867,1349)
(922,0,1428,1000,1426,920,2000)
(790,285,1227,1146, 2001, 788,1145)
(1089,1,1336,1000,1088,922, 2001)
(521,452,1339,1292,1291,1337,1218)
(439,441,1326,1328,1322,1323,1323)
(290,334,1290,1193,2001, 1286,1192)
(301,316, 1200,1217,2001, 1199,1193)
(334,0,1334,1000,2000,1332,2000)
(357,215,1357, 1000,2001,1283,1355)
(445,1,1445,1000,1444,1332,2001)
> M2 > F2 > M3
> M3 > F1 > M2
> M3 > M2 > F2
> M2 > M1 > F2
F1 > M2 >
F1 > M2 >
F1 > M2 >
F1 > M2 >
F1 > M2 >
F1 > M2 >
F1 > M2 >
F4 > M2 >
M3 > F1 >
M1 > F2 >
M3 > F2 >
M3 > F2 >
F4 > F1 >
F4 > F1 >
F4 > F1 >
The final ranking returned by the model for the case of language XI is incorrect, because it lets [za]
surface faithfully. Let me diagnose the problem encountered by the model with the language XI. In
order to get started, let me characterize the rankings that OT-correspond to this language XI using the
two conditions in (236). The entire phonotactic comparative tableau corresponding to the language
XI is given in (287).
(pa, pa, ba)
(ba, ba, pa)
(ap, ap, ab)
(ab, ab, ap)
(sa, sa, za)
(as, as, az)
(apsa, apsa, absa)
(apsa, apsa, apza)
(287) (apsa, apsa, abza)
(abza, abza, apza)
(abza, abza, absa)
(abza, abza, apsa)
(aspa, aspa, asba)
(aspa, aspa, azpa)
(aspa, aspa, azba)
(azba, azba, azpa)
(azba, azba, asba)
(asba, azba, aspa)
P2 F3
w
M 1 M 2
w
W W L
W W
W L
w W w
w W
W W W
w W W w
W w W W w
W W L
W W W L
WW W L L
W W W Www w w
W W W
W W W W Ww w w
w w w w wW W
W
W W W
In order to check condition (236a), we can
i L
simplify the
L
Le
tableau (287) as follows. First, we can
eliminate all the rows that do not contain a single w. Furthermore, we can eliminate: the row
(286) Final ranking vector
F4 > F3 > M2 > M3:
M1 > F3 > M2 > F4:
M1 > F4 > F3 > M2 :
M1 > M3 > F3 > M2
M1 > F3 > M3 > M2
M3 > F3 > M1 > M2
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corresponding to the triplet (ba, ba, pa), because it is entailed by the row corresponding to the triplet
(ab, ab, ap); the row corresponding to the triplet (abza, abza, absa), because it is entailed by the
row corresponding to the triplet (azba, azba, absa); the row corresponding to the triplet (azba, azba,
azpa), because it is entailed by the row corresponding to the triplet (abza, abza, apza); the row
corresponding to the triplet (abza, abza, apza), because it is entailed by the row corresponding to the
triplet (ab, ab, ap); the entries equal to L corresponding to M 2 in the two rows corresponding to the
triplets (abza, abza, apsa) and (azba, azba, aspa), because they are entailed by the row corresponding
to the triplet (ab, ab, ap). In conclusion, a ranking is OT-compatible with the comparative tableau
(287) iff it is OT-compatible with the comparative tableau (288).
F 1 F2 F3 F 4  M 1 M 2 Ma
W L
(288) L
w W L
W W W L
Furthermore, I provide in (289) the list of blocks A(.,.,z) in the comparative tableau (287) corre-
sponding to a loser form z that does not belong to the target language XI.
F1  F 2 Fa F 4  MI M 2 Ma
(sa, sa, za) W W W
(as, as, as)
(apsa, apsa, absa)
(abza, abza, absa)
(apza, apza, absa)
(abza, abza, apza)
(289) (apsa, apsa, apza)
(absa, absa, apza)
(aspa, aspa, asba)
(azba, azba, asba)
(azpa, azpa, asba)
W W
w w w
W W W L
W W W W L
W W L
W W W W
W W W L W
W W W W
W W L
W W W W L
(azba, azba, aspa) W W W L
(aspa, aspa, azpa) W W W
(asba, asba, azpa) W W W L W
In order for condition (236a) to hold for the first row of the tableau (288), the ranking (290a) must
hold. In order for condition (236b) to hold for the block A(.,.,za) in the tableau (289), the rankings
(290b) and 290c) must hold. Thus, condition (236b) holds for the block A(.,.,az). In order for
condition (236a) to hold for the second row of the tableau (288), the ranking (290d) must hold. The
latter ranking ensures that condition (236a) holds for the last row of the tableau (288). In order for
condition (236a) to hold for the third row of the tableau (288), the ranking (290e) must hold. The
rankings already established ensure that condition (236b) holds for all remaining blocks A(.,.,za) in
the tableau (289). In conclusion, a ranking OT-corresponds to the target language XI iff it satisfies
the ranking conditions in (290).
(290) F1
(d)
(a)
M2 M1
j (e)
M3
(bF2 F4
F2 F4
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The reason why the model fails on the language XI can now be spelled out as follows. According
to (290), in order for a ranking to OT-correspond to the target language XI, it needs to rank the
general faithfulness constraint F above the unrelated positional faithfulness constraint F4. But this
ranking configuration is hard for the model to achieve. In fact, the initial ranking vector ranks all
positional faithfulness constraints above all general faithfulness constraints. As stated in the conjec-
ture3 (291), if the initial separation 0 init between positional and general faithfulness constraints is
large enough, then it will not be overcome during learning, namely the final ranking vector will still
rank all positional faithfulness constraints above all general faithfulness constraints. 4 Given a pair
of a positional and a general faithfulness constraints that target the same feature (say IDENT[STOP-
VOICING] and IDENT[STOP-VOICING]/ONSET), then it does make sense to only consider rankings
where the positional faithfulness constraint is ranked above the corresponding general faithfulness
constraint. But if the positional and the general faithfulness constraints target two different features
(say IDENT[STOP-VOICING] and IDENT[FRICATIVE-VOICING]/ONSET), then there might be cases,
like the case of language XI in (284), where we do want the general faithfulness constraint ranked
above the unrelated positional faithfulness constraint. There are various conceivable ways to cir-
cumvent this problem with the initial bias of positional faithfulness constraints above general ones,
that I plan to explore in future work.
(291) For every typology, there exists an initial ranking vector that ranks positional faithfulness
constraints above general faithfulness constraints with a separation large enough that that
initial ranking will be maintained through learning for every target language in the typology.
Apart from the problem with language XI just discussed, I think it is remarkable that the model does
get right all remaining 18 cases. What exactly ensures this success? In the rest of this subsection,
I address this question. Let me start by making the question more explicit. In section 4.3, I have
reviewed from the literature the idea of modeling the acquisition of phonology by means of the sim-
ple OT on-line algorithm (205). In particular, I have concentrated on the issue of modeling a special
stage of the acquisition of phonology, namely the early stage described by Hayes (2004). Somewhat
idealizing, this early stage is characterized by two crucial properties, summarized in (292). Thefirst
property is that the learner has no knowledge of the morphology of the target language £ throughout
this entire stage. Since lack of morphological awareness means inability to detect alternations, then
we can plausibly model this first property of the early stage by assuming that the underlying forms
posited in step 1 of the OT on-line model are fully faithful. The second property is that the learner
has acquired knowledge of the phonotactics of the target language £ by the end of this stage. We can
model this second property by requiring that the final ranking >fin entertained by the OT on-line
model at the end of this stage OT-corresponds to the target language, namely satisfies the identity
R(OT>fin) = £, that says that the language generated by the corresponding OT grammar OT>fin
coincides with the target language L.
(292) properties of the early stage and their modelization
a. lack of knowledge of the underlying forms posited
the morphology of == in step 1 of the OT on line model
the target language C are fully faithful
b. knowledge of the final ranking >fin
the phonotactics of == returned by the OT on-line model
the target language £ satisfies the property R'(OT>fin) = £
In subsection 4.3.4, I have noted that there is no way of modeling the early stage of the acquisition
of phonology if we implement the OT on-line algorithm with a demotion-only update rule. In fact,
if the algorithm posits fully faithful underlying forms, then the faithfulness constraints will never be
loser-preferrer. Thus, if the algorithm uses a demotion-only update rule, then the initial ranking of
3I think that the conjecture (291) can easily be proven, but I defer the proof to future work.
4Indeed, both positional faithfulness constraints F3 and F4 are ranked above both general faithfulness constraints F and
F2 in all the final ranking vectors reported in (286), with the only exception of the language XII. The latter exception is due
to the fact that the initial separation Oinit = 1000 between positional and general faithfulness constraints is too small.
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the faithfulness constraints will never be modified throughout learning. Hence, if the faithfulness
constraints (of the same type) start out equally ranked, then the algorithm will never entertain the
ranking configuration in (293), whereby a markedness constraint M is ranked in between two faith-
fulness constraints F, F'. Yet, a ranking configuration such as (293) might very well be needed in
order to capture the phonotactics of the target language, namely in order for the final ranking >fin
to satisfy the condition 1(OT>fi.n) = L.
(293) F > M > F'
To overcome this empasse, in chapter 51 have set myself the goal of devising new update rules for the
OT on-line algorithm (205), that perform both promotion and demotion. Because of the promotion
component of these new update rules, they are able to move around the faithfulness constraints
even though they are never loser-preferrer. This means that the ranking configuration in (293) is in
principle achievable starting with F and F' equally ranked, through the dynamics of the ranking
values schematized in (294).
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But will the ranking configuration (293) indeed be achieved? Let me make the issue explicit. It is
indeed plausible that through learning F and F' will be pulled apart starting from their initial identi-
cal ranking value, because they will plausibly be promoted at different rates. If they get separated in
such a way that F is above F', then we expect that M will drop only as low as required to cross F,
stopping before it crosses F' too, thus ending up in the target configuration (293). But why should
F grow higher than F'? The dynamics in (295) looks just as plausible: F' is promoted at a faster
rate that F and is thus always above F; in order for M to drop below F, it thus also has to drop
below F'. In this case, even though the algorithm has pulled the two faithfulness constraints apart
starting from their initial equal ranking value, the algorithm still ends up with the same unrestrictive
configuration F, F' > M that it would have obtained with a demotion-only update rule.
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Thus, in order for the OT on-line algorithm with a promotion-demotion update rule to have a chance
of working as a model of the early stage of the acquisition of phonology, something like the conjec-
ture (296) must hold. In the rest of this section, I restate the conjecture (296) more explicitly, and
discuss in detail its validity in the case of the Azba typology.
(296) Whenever the ranking configuration (293) is "needed" in order to account for the phonotac-
tics of the target language, then it is indeed achieved by the model, namely constraint F is
indeed promoted by the model at a faster rate than constraint F'.
Let me say that a given ranking >> is a POSITIONAL-ABOVE-GENERAL (henceforth: PAG) rank-
ing iff it ranks all positional faithfulness constraints above all general faithfulness constraints. To
simplify the discussion, I will restrict myself to target languages that OT-correspond to PAG rank-
ing. As noted above, in the case of the Azba typology, this restriction holds for all languages in the
typology but for the problematic language XI. This restriction to languages that OT-correspond to
PAG rankings reduces the number of cases that needs to be considered in discussing the conjecture
(296). In fact, since the target language OT-corresponds to a PAG ranking, then no ranking configu-
rations (293) with F a general faithfulness constraint and F' a positional faithfulness constraint can
be needed. Furthermore, the reverse case where F is a positional faithfulness constraint and F' is
a general faithfulness constraint will always be enforced. In fact, as noted in (291), the model will
plausibly return a ranking vector with all positional faithfulness constraints ranked above all general
faithfulness constraints, provided that the initial separation between the two sets of constraints is
large enough. Thus, in assessing the conjecture (296) for target languages that OT-correspond to a
PAG ranking, I only have to worry about the case where both F and F' are positional faithfulness
constraints or else they are both general faithfulness constraints. Thus, let me restate the conjecture
(296) as in (297).
(297) Whenever the ranking configuration (293) is "needed" (with F, F' both positional or both
general) in order to account for the phonotactics of a target language OT-corresponding to a
PAG ranking, then this configuration is indeed achieved by the model, namely constraint F
is indeed promoted by the model at a faster rate than constraint F'.
The condition M > F' in (293) can mean one of two things. Either M is ranked immediately
before F'; or else M is ranked above some other constraint C and this other constraint C is ranked
immediately above F', as in (298). In this intermediate constraint C is a faithfulness constraint F",
then we can forget about F' and consider the ranking configuration (293) with F' replaced by F",
namely F > M >im F". If this intermediate constraint C is a markedness constraint M', then
we can forget about M and consider the the ranking configuration (293) with M replaced by M',
namely F > M' >im F". In either case, we can always assume that the intermediate markedness
constraint M in the ranking configuration (293) is ranked immediately above the lower faithfulness
constraint F'.
(298) F > ... M > ...C >imF'
I can thus restate the conjecture (297) more explicitly as in (299). Note that the notion of "being
crucial" adopted here is extremely weak. In fact, it is a notion of being crucial relative to a specific
ranking. An immediate ranking might be crucial for a given ranking OT-corresponding to the target
language but not crucial for some other ranking OT-corresponding to the target language. The fact
that I am using a rather weak notion of "being crucial" makes of course the conjecture (299) rather
stronger.
(299) Consider a target language L that OT-corresponds to a PAG ranking >>. Assume that there
are two faithfulness constraints F, F' and a markedness constraint M such that the two
immediate rankings F >im ... M >im F' are crucial in > w.r.t. L as defined in (233).
Then this configuration is indeed achieved by the model, namely constraint F is indeed
promoted by the model at a faster rate than constraint F'.
Does conjecture (299) hold in the general case? In the rest of this section, I start to tackle this
question, by showing that it holds for the case of the Azba typology. Here, I concentrate on the
case where F, F' are the two positional faithfulness constraints F3 , F4 . The case where F, F' are
the two general faithfulness constraints F1, F2 is slightly more complicated, and I defer to future
work a through discussion of this case. By exploiting the symmetry between the two features STOP-
VOICING and FRICATIVE-VOICING, it is sufficient to consider the case F3 > ... > F4 , since the
case F3 > ... > F4 then holds too by symmetry. Thus, conjecture (299) in this case becomes
(300).
(300) Consider a target language £ in the Azba typology that OT-corresponds to a PAG ranking
>. Assume that the two immediate rankings Fa >im ... Mi >im F4 are crucial in > w.r.t.
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C for one of the three markedness constraints Mi with i = 1, 2, 3. Then this configuration
is indeed achieved by the model, namely constraint F3 is indeed promoted by the model at a
faster rate than constraint F4 .
The relative speed with which the two positional faithfulness constraints F3 and F4 raise over time
depends on two factors: the number of rows in the input phonotactic tableau that promote one of
the two but not the other; and the frequency with which those rows are sampled. In this section, I
am adopting the oversimplification that the rows of the input phonotactic comparative tableau are
sampled uniformly. This is of course an implausible assumption. But it provides a good starting point
for the analysis of the model, because it makes the relative promotion speed of the two faithfulness
constraints F and F' only depend on their number of w's in the input tableau. Let me say that a form
y is an F3-PUSHER iff the corresponding block A(y,,,.) has the following property: it contains a row
that has a w in correspondence of F3 but no w in correspondence of F4, but not vice versa. And of
course F4 -PUSHERS are defined analogously. As shown by the comparative tableau corresponding
to the maximal language in (301), F3 -pushers are [pa], [ba], [azpa], [aspa], [asba], [azba]; and F4-
pushers: pushers are [sa], [za], [apza], [apsa], [absa], [abza].
(pa, pa, ba)
(ba, ba, pa)
(ap, ap, ab)
(ab, ab, ap)
(sa, sa, za)
(za, za, sa)
(as, as, az)
(az, as, as)
(apza, apza, abza)
(apza, apza, apsa)
(apza, apza, absa)
(apsa, apsa, absa)
(apsa, apsa, apza)
(apsa, apsa, abza)
(abza, abza, apza)
(abza, abza, absa)
(abza, abza, apsa)
(absa, absa, apsa)
(absa, absa, abza)
(absa, absa, apza)
(azpa, azpa, azba)
(azpa, aspa, aspa)
(azpa, azpa, asba)
(aspa, aspa, asba)
(aspa, aspa, azpa)
(aspa, aspa, azba)
(azba, azba, aspa)
(azba, azba, asba)
(azba, azba, aspa)
(asba, asba, aspa)
(asba, asba, azba)
(asba, asba, azpa)
F1  F2
W
W
W
W
MI M2
W
L
W
L
W L W
W W L L
W W W W L
W W W
W W W W
W W W W W
W W L
W W W L
W W W L L
W L L
W W L W
W W W L W
W W L W
W L L
W W W W L
W W W W
W W W
W W W W W
W W W L
W W L
W W W L L
W W L L
W L W
W W W L W
Thus, under the assumption that the rows of the input tableau are sampled uniformly, the conjecture
(300) really becomes the following claim 32.
Claim 32 Consider a target language £ in the Azba typology that OT-corresponds to a PAG ranking
>. Assume that the two immediate rankings F3 >im ... Mi >im F4 are crucial in > w.r.t. C for
(301)
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one of the three markedness constraints Mi with i = 1, 2, 3. Then, the target language contains more
F3 -pushers than it contains F4-pushers.
Proof of the case M1 . Assume that the target language OT-corresponds to a PAG ranking > such
that the two immediate rankings F3 >im ... >im M1 >im F4 are crucial. Let me show that
the target language then has the properties (302), that show that it contains more F 3-pushers than
F4 -pushers.
(302) a. F3 -pushers:
the target language must contain [ba] and [azba];
the target language cannot contain neither [azpa] nor [asba].
b. F4 -pushers:
the target language can contain [za]
the target language cannot contain [apza], [abza], or [absa].
By claim 30, in order for the immediate ranking M1 >im F4 to be crucial, the phonotactic com-
parative tableau corresponding to the target language must contain a row (x, x, y) such that y L,
both M1 and F4 have a w in that row and dec>(x, x, y) = M1 . As shown in (301), there are only
two possible rows where both M1 and F4 have a W, namely the rows corresponding to (abza, abza,
absa) and to (apsa, apsa, apza). In either case, the condition dec> (x, x, y) = MI means that the
ranking > satisfies the conditions (303). Thus, the target language cannot contain [absa], because
>> could not be OT-compatible with the row (absa, absa, abza); cannot contain [apza], because >
could not be OT-compatible with the row (apza, apza, apsa); cannot contain [azpa], because >> could
not be OT-compatible with the row (azpa, azpa, aspa); cannot contain [asba], because >> could not
be OT-compatible with the row (asba, asba, azba).
(303) M1 > {F 2 , F4 , M 3 }.
Again by claim 30, the constraint crucially ranked immediately below F3 must be a markedness
constraint (no immediate ranking of two faithfulness constraints can be crucial). It cannot be the
constraint M3 , since we have just concluded that M3 is ranked below M1 and M1 is ranked below
F3 . Thus, the constraint crucially ranked immediately below F3 can be either M1 or M 2 . In other
words, the ranking >> must contain either the crucial immediate rankings (304a) or those in (304b).
(304) a. F3 >im M 2 > M1 >im F4.
b. F3 >>im M1 >>im F4
If case (304a) holds, then the target language contains [azba], because >> is OT-compatible with the
block A(azba, azba,.); and it contains [ba], because >> is OT-compatible with the row (ba, ba, pa);
but it cannot contain [abza], because >> cannot be OT-compatible with the row corresponding to
(abza, abza, apsa), since M2 is >>-ranked above F4 and thus also above F1 and F2 by the hypothesis
that > is a PAG. If case (304b) holds, then the ranking F3 >> M 1 is crucial. Claim 30 thus entails
that the comparative tableau corresponding to the target language contains a row where F3 has a w
and M1 has an L. The only two such rows are those corresponding to the triplets (azpa, azpa, azba)
and (asba, asba, aspa). But the input comparative tableau cannot contain neither of these two rows,
because we just concluded that the target language cannot contain neither [azpa] nor [asba]. U
Proof of the case M2 . Assume that the target language OT-corresponds to a PAG ranking > such
that the two immediate rankings F3 >>im ... >im M 2 >>im F4 are crucial. Let me show that
the target language then has the properties (305), that show that it contains more F 3-pushers than
F4-pushers.
(305) a. F3 -pushers:
the target language contains [ba]
if the target language contains [za], then it contains [azba].
b. F4 -pushers:
the target language cannot contain [apza], [abza], or [absa]
the target language may contain [za].
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6.3 Test cases
Let me start by proving claim (305b). By claim 30, in order for the immediate ranking M2 >im F4
to be crucial, there has got to exist a form y such that the three conditions (306) hold.
(306) a. y L
b. there is x E L such that Dec> (x, x, y) = M 2 and F4 has a w in (x, x, y);
c. for any other z E Gen(y) n L, we have Dec> (z, z, y) E '.
As shown in (301), there are only two possible rows where both M 2 and F4 have a w and thus
condition (306b) holds, namely the rows corresponding to the triplets (apsa, apsa, abza) and (apza,
apza, absa). In either case, the condition dec> (x, x, y) = M 2 entails that the ranking > satisfies
the condition (307).
(307) M 2 > {F 1, F2, F4, M3 }.
Thus, the target language cannot contain [abza], because the ranking > would not be OT-compatible
with the row (abza, abza, apsa). Furthermore, the target language cannot contain [absa], because
the ranking > would not be OT-compatible with the row (absa, absa, apza). Finally, the target
language cannot contain [apza]. In fact, assume by contradiction that the target language did contain
[apza]. Then, the ranking > would have to be OT-compatible with the row (apza, apza, abza)
and thus it should satisfy the condition M1 < max{M 2 , Fl}. Since M 2 > F by (307), then
max{M 2 , F1 } = M 2 and thus the latter condition becomes (308). But then condition (306c) fails
both for the case of y = [abza], because dec> (apza, apza, abza) = M 2 ; and also for the case
y = [absa], because dec> (apsa, apsa, absa) = M 2.
(308) MI < M2
Let me now turn to the proof of (305a). Assume that the target language contains [za], and thus that
F4 >> M 3 . Since the target language does not contain neither [abza] nor [absa], then the form [apza]
needs to be neutralized to [apsa]. As shown by the row (apsa, apsa, apza), this means that one of the
two rankings in (309) must hold. The ranking (309a) cannot hold, because of the assumption that
the target language contains [za] and thus F4 > M3 . Thus, the ranking in (309b) must hold.
(309) a. M3 > F2,F4,M1
b. M1 > {F2, F4, M3}
The two rankings (307) and (309b) together with F3 > M 2 entail that the ranking > is OT-
compatible with all three rows in the block A(azba,azba,.) and thus the target language must contain
[azba]. U
Pmroof of the case M 3. Assume that the target language OT-corresponds to a PAG ranking > such
that the two immediate rankings F3 >im ... >im M3 >im F4 are crucial. Let me show that
the target language then has the properties (310), that show that it contains more Fa-pushers than
F 4-pushers.
(310) a. F3-pushers:
if the target language contains [absa], then it also contains [asba] and [ba]
b. F4-pushers:
the target language cannot contain [za], [apza], or [abza];
the target language might contain [absa].
Since M3 > F4 , then the target language cannot contain [za], since the ranking > could not be
OT-compatible with the row (za, za, sa); nor can it contain [apza], since the ranking > could not be
OT-compatible with the row (apza, apza, apsa). Since M 3 > F4 and furthermore > is a PAG, then
the target language cannot contain contain [abza], because of the row (abza, abza, apsa). Assume
that the target language contains [absa]. Then, the ranking > must satisfy the two conditions (311).
(311) a. F, > Mi, M2
b. M1 < max{F2 , F4 ,M 3 } = M3
These two conditions (311) ensure that the ranking > is OT-compatible with the block A(asba,asba,.)
and with the row (ba, ba, pa), so that the target language must contain both [asba] and [ba]. N
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Chapter 7
How to study constraint promotion:
number of updates
In chapter 5, I have presented various update rules for the OT on-line algorithm (205) that can trigger
only a finite number of updates, despite the fact that they perform a certain amount of promotion
too. In chapter 6, I have started the investigation of the properties of these promotion-demotion
update rules. In particular, I have addressed the issue (206b) concerning the characterization of
the final vector returned by the OT on-line algorithm run with such update rules. I have presented
a dual invariant for the algorithm, and I have used it to study its performance on "naturalistic"
input phonotactics comparative tableaux. I have put forward the conjecture that the sensitivity of
promotion-demotion update rules to the w's in these tableaux does indeed help the algorithm to
converge to the correct final ranking. In this chapter, I pursue further the investigation of promotion-
demotion update rules, by addressing the issue (206c) concerning the number of updates required by
the OT on-line algorithm run with such update rules.
(206) c. Given a specific update rule, what is the worst case number of updates performed in step
3 by the OT on-line algorithm (205), over all possible input comparative tableaux with
n columns and all possible ways of sampling the rows of the input comparative tableau?
As reviewed in subsection 4.2.3, minimal demotion-only update rules can only perform a number of
updates small w.r.t. the number n of constraints. In section 7.1, I show that update rules that perform
promotion too might on the contrary require a large number of updates. There is thus a sharp con-
trast (312) between demotion-only and promotion-demotion update rules. The somewhat obvious
diagnosis of the contrast in (312) is as follows. A promotion-demotion update rule is sensitive to
the w's in the input comparative tableau, while a demotion-only update rule is not. An input com-
parative tableau might contain many w's that have nothing to contribute to the final OT-compatible
ranking vector. One way to construct such tableaux is to take a diagonal tableau as in (56) and to
add w's at the right of its L's. These extra w's are of course completely superfluous, namely the
tableau thus obtained is OT-equivalent to the initial diagonal tableau, namely both of them are ony
OT-compatible with the unique ranking C1 > C2 > ... > Cn. Section 7.1 shows that in such
cases, the sensitivity of promotion-demotion update rules to the w's in the input tableaux ends up
being just a distraction that slows down the algorithm. Demotion-only update rules are not sensitive
to the w's in the input tableau, and thus cannot be slowed down by useless distractions.
(312) a. Demotion-only update rules:
the worst case number of updates is always small (namely quadratic in n).
b. Promotion-demotion update rules:
the worst case number of updates can be large (namely exponential in n).
How can we make sense of the slowness (312b) of promotion-demotion update rules? how does
their slowness (312b) bear on the issue of their evaluation? Here is a preview of the answer I want to
suggest in the rest of this chapter. The task of the acquisition of phonology can of course be stated as
a formal, explicit computational problem. This statement will have something like the shape (313).
(313) given.: a comparative tableau A G U {L, E, W}mxn that satisfies certain properties Pgiven
mn
find: a ranking > that satisfies certain properties Pfind.
The problem statement (313) depends on two properties. The property Pgiven carves out of the set
Um,n {L, E, W}mxn of all possible comparative tableaux the special subset of those that are relevant
to the statement of the problem. This property Pgiven might correspond to something like the loose
statement in (314). The property Pfind establishes the criterion of success in order for a ranking >
(or, equivalently, a ranking vector 0) to represent a solution of the problem.
(314) A comparative tableau A satisfies property Pgiven iff A corresponds to some realistic set
of data corresponding to the realistic universal specifications that underly the typology of
natural language phonology.
A model for the acquisition of phonology is of course a function that takes an arbitrary input com-
parative tableau A E Um,n{L, E, W}mxn and returns a ranking > (or a ranking vector 0). One
measure of theoretical significance of a given model is its worst case running time. The worst case
can be computed over two different sets of inputs, as stated in (315): over the entire set of compar-
ative tableaux; or other the subset of those comparative tableaux that satisfy Pgiven. The measure
(315a) is of obvious theoretical significance. The measure (315b) might turn out to be an interesting
alternative, if we are not able to provide an explicit description of the property Pgiven, along the lines
of (314).
(315) a. What is the worst case running time of the algorithm over the set of comparative tableaux
that satisfies property Pgiven?
b. What is the worst case running time of the algorithm over the entire set of comparative
tableaux, no matter whether they satisfy property Pgiven or not?
The OT on-line algorithm (205) discussed so far is of course an instance of such a model. And its
running time can be identified with its number of updates. The result presented in section 7.1 and
previewed in (312) looks at the issue from the point of view of (315b): it says that the worst case
number of updates over the set of all comparative tableaux is exponential in the number of columns.
In this chapter, I want to argue that this fact should not be held against promotion-demotion update
rules. In section 7.2, I will review from the literature various formulations of the computational
problem (313) of the acquisition of phonology. And in section 7.4 I will make the point that, at least
when the property Pgiven in (314) is dropped from the formulation of the problem, then every algo-
rithm for these problems has worst case running time (315b) exponential in the number of columns
of the given comparative tableau. What about the perspective in (315a)? As noted above, the idea
behind claim (312b) is that constraint promotion can be fooled by constructing input tableaux with
many superfluous w's that slow the algorithm down since they just constitute a distraction. Yet, the
test cases discussed in the chapter 6, and especially in subsection 6.3.3, suggest the conjecture that,
once we restrict ourselves to realistic cases that satisfy the property Pgiven in (314), the sensitivity
of promotion-demotion update rules to the w's of the input tableaux does not in any way constitute
a "distraction" but rather leads the algorithm to the right solution.
7.1 Constraint promotion might require many updates
In subsection 4.2.3.1, I reviewed the answer to question (206c) provided in the literature for the case
of minimal demotion-only update rules. The core idea was to slightly refine the line of reasoning
used in the proof of claim 4 to answer question (206a) in order to get an answer to question (206c)
too, as shown in the proof of claims 5 and 6. This strategy turned out to be remarkably successful,
since the worst case bound thus obtained was tight and only quadratic in the number n of constraints,
as recalled in (312a). Also the two strategies presented in sections 5.2 and 5.4 to answer question
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(206a) for promotion-demotion update rules can be refined to obtain actual bounds on the worst case
number of updates. Subsection 7.1.3 illustrates this point for the case of the analysis presented in
section 5.4. Yet, neither of these two analyses provides a bound on the worst case number of updates
polynomial in the number n of constraints. It turns out that this failure is not due to a weakness of the
analyses. In fact, the two subsections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 show that there are indeed input comparative
tableaux such that even the corresponding best case number of updates (over all possible ways of
feeding rows in step 1) is exponential in the number n of constraints, as stated in (312b). The analysis
is independent on the details of the specific promotion-demotion update rule considered.
7.1.1 A simple lower-bound on the best-case number of updates
To simplify the discussion, I will assume once more that the input comparative tableau A contains
exactly one entry equal to L per row. Claim 2 guarantees that this auxiliary assumption does not
affect the generality of the analysis, since a general comparative tableau can be preprocessed and
turned into an OT-equivalent comparative tableau with a unique entry equal to L per row. I will
concentrate on the promotion-demotion update rule introduced in section 5.1, that in this case takes
the form (123), repeated in (316).
(316) If the current ranking vector 0,1d is not OT-compatible with a comparative row a that con-
tains a unique entry equal to L:f Old + 1 if k E W(a)
a. Onew -  Od - w(a) if k = L(a)
0Old otherwise
b. Promote all winner-preferring constraints by 1; demote the unique loser-preferring con-
straint by the total number w(a) of winner-preferring constraints.
Let d be the update vector corresponding to the update rule (316) w.r.t. update triggered by the row
a of the input comparative tableau, as defined in (161) and repeated in (317): each entry equal to
w in a gets replaced by 1 in R; each entry equal to E gets replaced by 0; each entry equal to L gets
replaced by -w(a), where w(a) is the number of entries equal to w in the comparative row a. Let A
be the numerical matrix obtained by organising these numerical vectors d one underneath the other.
Let A 1 , . .., An e Rm be the n columns of the matrix A.
(317) a = [ a, ... ak ... an R Z[l ... Gk ... ain
+1 if ak = w
Uk = if ak = E
w(a) ifak=L
The following claim 33 provides a lower-bound on the best-case number of updates. The proof is
a straightforward generalization of the reasoning used in section 4.2.6 to explain Pater's counterex-
ample. For the sake of simplicity, claim 33 only considers the case of input comparative tableaux
OT-compatible with a unique ranking; the case of compatible tableaux OT-compatible with multiple
rankings is handled analogously: consider one such ranking at the time, compute the solution of
the corresponding problem (318) and let the lower-bound on the best case number of updates be the
smallest such solution. In the next subsection 7.1.2, I will use the bound provided by claim 33 to
show that the best-case number of updates in the case of the promotion-demotion update rule (316)
can be exponential in n.
Claim 33 Consider a comparative tableau A E {L, E, W}mxn that contains a unique entry equal to
L per row and that is OT-compatible with a unique ranking. Without loss of generality, assume that
this ranking is C, > C2 > ... > Cn (otherwise, relabel the constraints). The number of updates
performed by the on-line algorithm (205) with the promotion-demotion update rule (316) run on
this input tableau A starting from the null initial vector cannot be smaller than the solution of the
program (318) in the decision variable a E Rm .
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m(318) minimize: ai
i= 1
subject to: (Xk - Xk+1, a) > 1 k = 1,..., n - 1
a_0
Proof Consider a generic run of the algorithm on the input comparative tableau A. As proved
in sections 5.2 or 5.4, the algorithm will converge to a ranking vector OT-compatible with the
input comparative tableau A after a finite number of updates. Let me introduce the following
pieces of notation: let T be the total number of updates required by the algorithm to converge;
let 0 = (01,... , On) be the final ranking vector OT-compatibe with A returned by the algorithm; for
every row i = 1,..., m of the input comparative tableau A, let ai E N be the final dual variable
associated with the ith row, namely the number of times in that run that the algorithm has updated
its current ranking vector in response to a failure in accounting for the ith row of that tableau; let
a = (ai,..., am) be the corresponding final dual vector. Let me recall two important relationships
between these three characters T, 0 and ac. The identity (319) trivially holds: the total number of
updates T is the sum of the number of updates a, triggered by first row, plus the number of updates
a 2 triggered by the second row, etcetera.
m
(319) T= ai
i=1
Furthermore, the identity (320) holds for every k = 1,..., n: the kth component Ok of the final
ranking vector is the scalar product between the kth column Ak of the derived numerical matrix A
and the final dual vector a. This identity (320) is a straightforward generalization of the identity
(95) discussed in detail in section 4.2.6 in the context of the explanation of Pater's counterexample.
(320) Ok = (Ak, 0)
Since the input comparative tableau is only OT-compatible with the ranking C1 > C2 > ... > Cn,
then the final vector 0 = (01, . . , On,) must satisfy the n - 1 strict inequalities (321a) in order to be
OT-compatible with the input comparative tableau. By (320), these primal inequalities (321a) can be
rewritten in terms of the dual variables as in (321b). By the linearity of the scalar product (., .), these
inequalities (321b) can equivalently be rewritten as in (321c). Finally, since the dual vector a has
integer components (because each component represents the number of times that update has been
triggered by the corresponding row) and since the entries of the derived numerical matrix A in (317)
are all integer, then these strict inequalities (321c) are equivalent to the loose inequalities (321d).
(321) Fork=1,...,n-1:
a. Ok > 0 k+1
b. (Xk,a) > k+1, )
c. (Xk- X k+1, Ca) > 0
d. (XAk - Ak+1,a ) > 1
By virtue of (319) and (321), the total number of updates performed by the algorithm is lower
bounded by the solution of the integer program (322).
m
(322) minimize: ai
i= 1
subjectto: (Ak-Ak+l, a) > 1 k = 1,...,n- 1
a Nm
The claim follows by relaxing the integer constraint a E Nm of the integer program (322) into the
linear constraint a > 0 of the linear program (318). U
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7.1.2 A case with an exponential best-case number of updates
Claim 33 says that we can use the solution to the linear program (318) as a lower-bound on the
best-case number of updates of the OT on-line algorithm (205) with the promotion-demotion update
rule (316). In other words, it says that if there is a family of comparative tableaux {An}keN with
n columns for every n = 1,2,... such that the solution of the linear program (318) corresponding
to the tableau An grows exponentially in n, then the number of updates required by the on-line
algorithm (116) with the promotion-demotion update rule (316) will grow exponentially with n. In
this subsection, I construct one such family of comparative tableaux {An}nEN. For every n, let
An E {L, E, W}n - 1 x n be the comparative tableau with n - 1 rows and n columns obtained from
the diagonal tableau in (56) by "adding" two extra entries equal to w at the right of every diagonal
entry equal to L. To illustrate, I give A7 in (323).
C1 C2 C3 04 C5 Ce C7
W LW W
W LW W
(323) A 7 = W LW W
W L W
W LW
W L
The MatLab code MinimumRunningTime (available on the author's website) takes a comparative
tableau A E {L, E, W}mxn compatible with the unique ranking C, > C2 > ... > Cn, constructs
the corresponding linear program (318) and solves it using the built-in Matlab LP-solver. I give in
(324) the solutions of the linear program (318) corresponding to comparative tableaux of the form
(323) for various values of n, together with a corresponding solution. 1
(324) n = 5 n = 7 n = 9 n = 11
optimal value of the LP (318) 56 594 5,036 38,413
5
4 19
3 15 55
2 11 43 143
9 31 111 356
and corresponding solution a 19 79 275 870
28 194 670 2,110
276 1,622 5,102
2,296 12,323
17,430
The data in (324) show that the best-case number of updates required by the on-line algorithm (116)
with the promotion-demotion update rule (316) can be super-polynomial in n.
7.1.3 A small remark on Pater's comparative tableaux
In the preceding subsection, I have used the counterexample of the comparative tableaux illustrated
in (323) to show that the best-case number of updates required by the on-line algorithm (116) with the
promotion-demotion update rule (316) can be super-polynomial in n. These comparative tableaux
are obtained by adding two w's immediately at the right of the L of each row of the diagonal com-
parative tableau (56). The intuition is that these two extra w's do not in any way contribute to the
OT-compatibility of the tableau and thus they just end up "distracting" the algorithm, which there-
fore takes much longer to converge. In this subsection, I note that adding only one distracting w per
row is not able to catastrophically affect the behavior of the algorithm. The goal of the discussion
is to show how the proof of finite time convergence presented in section 5.4 can be trivially refined
1 It is interesting to note that the solution on the linear program is integral for every n, so that the relaxation done at the
end of the proof of claim 33 is not needed. I do not know why that is.
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to obtain a bound on the actual number of updates. Let PATER'S TABLEAU of order n be the com-
parative tableau An e {L, E, W}n - lxn with n - 1 rows and n columns obtained from the diagonal
tableau in (56) by "adding" a single entry equal to w at the right of every diagonal entry equal to L.
The case with n = 5 was given in (82), and is repeated in (325). For convenience, in this subsection
I label the constraints starting from the right-most column of the comparative tableau.
C5 C4 C3 C2 C1
W L W
(35)W L W(325) W L W
W L
Claim 34 shows that the algorithm requires a number of update polynomial in n in the case of Pater's
comparative tableaux. For completeness, I provide in (326) the lower bound provided by the solution
of linear program (318) corresponding to Pater's comparative tableau for various values of n. These
data show that the bound provided by claim 34 is rather loose.
(326) n = 5 n =7 n =9 n = 11
optimal value of the LP (318) 25 98 270 605
5
4 14
3 11 262 8 20 40
.5 14 30 55
and corresponding solution a I 408 20 40 70
10 25 49 84
28 56 96
60 105
110
Claim 34 The on-line algorithm (205) with the promotion-demotion update rule (316) run on Pater's
comparative tableau of order n starting from the null initial vector can perform a maximum number
of updates of the order of n5 .
Proof Consider the derived numerical matrix A corresponding to the input Pater's tableau A as in
(317). The line of reasoning presented in section 5.4, based on claim 25 reviewed in the Appendix,
immediately yields the bound (327) on the number of updates of the on-line algorithm (205) run on
that input tableau A with the promotion-demotion update rule (316).
(327) # of updates < maximum 2-norm of the rows of A
- best-margin of the rows of A j
The maximum 2-norm of the rows of A can straightforwardly be bound by n2 . The best-margin
of the rows of A is the quantity defined in (328). Thus, in order to use the bound (327), we need
a lower bound the corresponding best margin (328). In the rest of this proof, I explicitly compute
(328) for the case where the input comparative tableau A is Pater's tableau of order n.
(328) best-margin of the rows of X = max min m 0,
OA 0 d011
It is well known that the best margin (328) can equivalently be described as the square root of the
inverse of the solution of the quadratic optimization problem (329); see for instance Vapnik (1998,
Theorem 10.2).
(329) minimize: 110112
subjectto: (0, i) > 1 foreveryrowa
A row " of the derived matrix A is called a SUPPORT VECTOR iff the constraint (0,i) > 1 in
the definition of the feasible set in (329) holds tight at optimality, namely (0*, ) = 1, where 0*
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is the unique solution of the optimization problem (329). Note that in the special case of Pater's
comparative tableau, all rows 1 are support vectors, so that the optimization problem (329) can be
rewritten as in (330). In fact, suppose by contradiction that there exists a row of the derived matrix
A that is not a support vector; for concreteness, suppose that it is the first row I1 (the reasoning
immediately extends to an arbitrary row). This means that for any vector 0 e R', if (0, 1)  for
every row '91= E, then also (0, E1) > 1. Consider an arbitrary nonnegative vector 0 = (01,.. , 0)
with 01 = 0 such that (0, A) > 1 for every row d, which exists by claim 20. Consider next the vector
0' = (01, ... , 0) which is identical to 0 but for the fact that n0 = 0. Of course, (0', A) _ 1 for
every row f but the first one (because (0', ~) = (0, 1) for every such row, since every row R but
the first one has null first component). If it were also (0', J1) > 1, then 0' would be OT-compatible
with Pater's tableau, by claim 19. But this cannot be, because the ranking C2 > ... > Cn > C1 is
a refinement of 0' and it is obviously not OT-compatible with Pater's tableau.
(330) minimize: 110112
subject to: (0, A) = 1 for every row -
It turns out that the optimization problem (330) is very easy to solve. Consider for instance the case
of Pater's comparative tableau of order n = 5, repeated in (331) together with the corresponding
numerical matrix A. Note that there exists a unique ranking vector 0 = (0 1,..., 05) such that
01 = 0 and furthermore (0, A) = 1 for every row I of the corresponding numerical matrix A,
namely the vector in (332). Just as in the proof of claim 20, this vector is obtained by starting from
the bottom row of A and moving upward using the condition (0, ak) = 1 for the kth row from the
bottom to univocally determine Ok+1*
C5 C4 C3  C2 C1
row 4 W L W +1 -2 +1
row 3 W L W +1 -2 +1(331) row 2 W L W +1 -2 +1
row 1 W L +1 -1
(332) 01 = 0
rowi =1 02-01=1 = 02=1
row2 = 03- 202+01=1 = 03=3
row 3 04 - 203 + 02 = 1 04 = 6
row 4 = 05- 204 + 03 =1 = 05 = 10
In the general case, there is a unique ranking vector 0 OT-compatible with Pater's comparative
tableau of order n such that 01 = 0 and (0, 1) = 1 for every row I of the derived numerical matrix,
and it is defined by the recursion in (333).
(333) 01 = 0
02 = 1
Ok = 1 + 2 0k-1 - Ok-2
It is trivial to prove by induction on k that the recursion (333) can be made explicit as in (334) for
every k = 1,...,n.
k2 - k(334) Ok = - 2
So far, I have made only one arbitrary choice, namely setting 01 to zero. I can fix this arbitrariness
as follows. Let e be the vector of Rn with all components equal to 1. Note that all the rows of a are
orthogonal to e, namely (e, I) = 0. Thus, given a nonnegative vector 0 > 0 such that (0, 1) = 1
for every row A, we also have (0 + (e, I) = 1, for every row d and for any choice of the constant
SE R. We can thus pick ( such that the 2-norm of the corresponding vector 0 + (e is minimzed.
In other words, we have to find 6 that minimizes the function f(6) = En 1 (Ok + )2 . Since the
function f(6) is strictly convex, the problem is solved by setting to zero the derivative of f, which
yields (335).
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n1(335) *= Ok = 1- ]  - -,oIi1 1
k=1
The (squared) 2-norm of the corresponding vector 0 + (e is computed in (336)
n 1 2
(336) ( a0 + *e||2 E Ok - n 110 2
k=1
k T2 1 n| Ok||0|11k=112 110112
n1
= |0|12 - -|n
In conclusion, the best margin of the rows of the matrix X derived from Pater's comparative tableau
of order n can be computed as in (337), by using (336) and (334) respectively.(337) 1 || 1||1 _ 1 110|
best-margin of the rows of n 2
P 2- k 1 k k'-
k=2 2k=2
The leading term of the final expression obtained in (337) is E= k4 and thus the claim follows
from the well-known identity E = k 4 -in 5 + n n3 - - n
7.2 Formulations of the problem of the acquisition of phonology
In this section, I review from the literature three different formulations of the problem (313) of the
acquisition of phonology within OT.
7.2.1 The Ranking problem
Consider again the example of the universal specifications in (1), repeated in (338). A language in
the corresponding typology is given in (339), corresponding to the ranking Fpos > M > Fgen.
(338) a. X = {/ta/, /da/, /rat/, /rad/}
b. Y = {[ta], [da], [rat], [rad] }
c. Gen(Ita/) = Gen(Ida/) = {[ta], [da]}
Gen(/rat/) = Gen(/rad/) = { [rat], [rad] }
Fpos = IDENT[ONSET][VOICE],
d. C = Fgen = IDENT[VOICE],
M = *[+VOICE, -SONORANT] J
(339) { [da], [ta], [rat] }
Consider a learner that is exposed to the language (339). Upon hearing many instances of the surface
forms [da] and [rat], he might decide that these forms do indeed belong to the target language he is
being exposed to. As noted in subsection 4.3.2, under mild conditions on the constraint set, it makes
sense to assume that these forms are the faithful surface realization of the corresponding identical
underlying forms. Thus, the learner might assume that the ranking > that corresponds to the target
language he is being exposed to validates the pairs of an underlying form and a corresponding
winner surface form in (340a). Or perhaps the learner will have had access to some alternations
and will thus have noticed that the grammar he is being exposed to maps the underlying form /rad/
to the surface form [rat], thus neutralizing final voicing. In this case, the learner will posit the set
of underlying/winner form pairs in (340b). For the discussion in the rest of this chapter, it is not
crucial how exactly the learner will get to a set of data such as those in (340), or which one of these
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two sets of data the learner will actually get to. The general point is just that the learner needs to
have some device to construct suitable underlying/winner form pairs such as those in (340) from the
language (339) he is being exposed to; see for instance Tesar and Smolensky (2000, Ch. 4) for much
elaboration on this point.
(340) a. D = {(/da/, [da]), (Irat/, [rat])}
b. D = { (/da/, [da]), (Irad/, [rat]) }
Suppose that the universal specifications X, Y, Gen and C in (338) are fixed and known a priori.
Then the learner needs at the very least to solve problem (341). The learner is provided with a set
of data D, namely a set of pairs of an underlying form together with the corresponding intended
winner surface form. His task is to come up with a ranking of the constraint set that "accounts" for
the data D, namely such that the corresponding OT-grammar maps each underlying form in D into
the corresponding surface form.
(341) given: a set of data D), as in (340);
find: a ranking > of the constraint set C that "accounts" for the set of data ).
Let me generalize the specific problem (341) into a general statement. Consider a set D of DATA,
namely a finite set of pairs (x, y*) of an underlying form x E X and a corresponding intended
winner candidate surface form y* E Gen(x) C 3. For future reference, it is useful to have in
place the straightforward definition (342) of OT-COMPATIBILITY between one such set of data and
an arbitrary ranking.
(342) a. A ranking > is called OT-COMPATIBLE with a data set D iff the corresponding OT-
grammar OT> corresponding to that ranking > accounts for all pairs in D, namely
OT>(x) = y* for every pair (x, y*) E D.
b. The set of data D is called OT-COMPATIBLE iff 2 is OT-compatible with at least a rank-
ing according to (342a).
Suppose that some universal specifications X, Y, Gen and C are fixed and known a priori. I can
thus generalize the specific problem (341) into the general statement (343). This formulation (343)
assumes the set of data D to be OT-compatible. This is of course unrealistic, because the data
set D might very well contain a small number of corrupted pairs that make D not OT-compatible.
But I will ignore this issue here, and stick with the assumption that the input set of data is indeed
OT-compatible. 2
(343) given: a finite OT-compatible set of data ) C X x 3Y;
find: a ranking > of the constraint set C that is OT-compatible with D.
We would like to list problem (343) among the relevant problems for the acquisition of phonology.
But of course, problem (343) would be useful to this end only if we did have knowledge of the actual
universal specifications (X, Y, Gen, C). At this stage of the development of the field, of course
we don't. Thus, problem (343) as it stands is of no use. To overcome this difficulty, we change
the problem statement (343) to (344), by letting the universal specifications figure as a variable
parameter of the problem. Thus, we don't need to worry anymore about what the actual universal
specifications look like, because we will require the model to work no matter what. This is of
course not a small modification. This modification really makes sense only if we can confidently
assume that a proper model of the acquisition of phonology should not rely on properties of the
specific, actual universal specifications. As we will see in subsection 7.4.1, this assumption will
turn out to be warranted and the switch from (343) to (344) harmless. This trick of coping with the
lack of knowledge of the actual universal specifications by quantifying universally over universal
specifications, is standard in the OT complexity literature. For example, Eisner (2000) writes: "we
follow Tesar and Smolensky (2000) in supposing that the learner already knows the correct set of
2To relax this assumption, we would have to decide what to ask for in the case VD is not OT-compatible. If we only ask
that OT-incompatibility be detected, then we get a variant of the problem (343) that is not much harder. If we ask instead for
a ranking OT-compatible with the largest number of pairs in D, then we get a much harder problem.
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constraints C. The assumption follows from the OT philosophy that C is universal across languages,
and only the [ranking] of constraints differ. The algorithms for learning a ranking, however, are
designed to be general for any C, so they take C as an input. That is, these methods are not tailored
(as others might be) to exploit the structure of some specific, putatively universal [constraint set] C."
Problem (344) is called the RANKING PROBLEM.
(344) given: a) universal specifications X, Y, Gen and C;
b) a finite OT-compatible set of data D C X x y;
find: a ranking > of the constraint set C that is OT-compatible with VD.
7.2.2 The Subset problem
Can we stop here? Is (344), or at least (343), a fair characterization of the task of the acquisition of
phonology within OT? No, it is not. Here is a way to appreciate the point. Suppose that the data
set D provided as input to the problem (344) is (340a). The corresponding Ranking problem (344)
admits the two solutions (345). These two solutions generate two different languages. The language
in (345b) is a proper subset of the language in (345a). A number of authors have suggested that
the ranking that corresponds to the small language (345b) is a better solution of the given instance
of the Ranking problem than the ranking (345a) that corresponds to the large grammar; see for
instance Berwick (1985), Manzini and Wexler (1987), Prince and Tesar (2004) and Hayes (2004) for
discussion.
(345) a. Fpos > Fgen > M =t IZ(OT>) = {ta, da, rat, rad}
b. Fpos > M > Fgen ==> R(OT>) = {ta, da, rad}
Let me encode this intuition by turning to the more demanding variant of the Ranking problem
(344) stated in (346). Suppose that some universal specifications X, Y, Gen and C are fixed and
known a priori. Again, the learner is given a data set D, that for simplicity is assumed to be OT-
compatible. But now the learner's task is not just to come up with any ranking OT-compatible with
D. Rather, the learner needs to come up with one such ranking that furthermore has the property
that the corresponding language is as small as possible, among the languages generated by rankings
OT-compatible with VD.
(346) input: a finite OT-compatible data set D1) C X x Y;
output: a ranking > OT-compatible with D such that there exists no other ranking
>' OT-compatible with V too such that R(OT>,) C IZ(OT>)
As already noted above in the case of problem (343), also problem (346) is of little use as a test case
for models of the acquisition of phonology, as long as we cannot make explicit the actual universal
specifications. To overcome this difficulty, we modify problem (346) as in (347), by letting the
universal specifications figure once more as an arbitrary input to the problem. Problem (347) is
called the SUBSET PROBLEM.
(347) input: a) universal specifications X, Y, Gen and C;
b) a finite OT-compatible data set D C X x y;
output: a ranking > OT-compatible with D) such that there exists no other ranking
>' OT-compatible with D too such that Z(OT>>,) C 'R(OT>)
Consider the special case where the learner is provided with an entire language £ in the typology
corresponding to some universal specifications (X, Y, Gen, C). Assume furthermore that X = Y
and that the learner assumes fully faithful corresponding underlying forms. In other words, the
learner is given a set of data V that coincides with the diagonal of x C. In this case, the requirement
on the output ranking vector in (347) boils down to the condition 1(OT>>) = £ that the ranking >
OT-corresponds to the language £. Thus, the problem considered in section 6.2 is a special case of
the Subset problem (347).
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7.2.3 Prince and Tesar's (2004) formulation of the Subset problem
Prince and Tesar (2004) offer an interesting alternative formulation of the Subset problem (347).
The idea behind their reformulation can be introduced as follows. Let a STRICTNESS MEASURE be
a function p that takes a ranking > and returns a number p(>) E N that provides a relative measure
of the size of the language RZ(OT>>) corresponding to >, in the sense that the (strict) monotonicity
property in (348) holds for any two rankings >, >': if the language 7I(OT>>,) corresponding to
>' is a proper subset of the language 7Z(OT>) corresponding to >, then the strictness measure of
>' is strictly smaller than the strictness measure of >. Thus, the smaller the strictness measure, the
smaller the language.
(348) 1Z(OT>>,) C R(OT>>) = p(>') < (>).
Let A be a strictness measure. Any solution of problem (349) is guaranteed to be a solution of the
Subset problem (347). In fact, if a ranking > is a solution of problem (349), then there cannot exist
any other ranking >' OT-compatible with D that corresponds to a language 1Z(OT>>,) such that
R(OT>>,) C 7R(OT>), since (348) would then imply that t(>' ) < t(>), thus contradicting the
hypothesis that > is a solution of problem (349).
(349) input: a) universal specifications X, Y, Gen and C;
b) a finite set D C X x Y;
output: a ranking > OT-compatible with D such that there exists no other ranking
>' OT-compatible with D too such that I(>' ) < A(>)
The reformulation (349) looks promising. Yet, we now need to come up with a strictness measure.
Of course, not just any strictness measure will do. For instance, the function (350), which pairs a
ranking > with the cardinality of the corresponding language R(OT>), trivially satisfies (348), and
is thus a strictness measure. Yet, this is not a good strictness measure, because there seems to be no
way to compute q(>) without actually computing the corresponding language 7R(OT>).
(350) I(>) = cardinality of the language R(OT>).
Prince and Tesar (2004) suggest a better candidate. As usual, assume that the set of constraints
C = F U M is split up into the subset F of faithfulness constraints and the subset M of markedness
constraints. They put forward the intuition (351). The rationale behind this intuition is that faithful-
ness constraints work toward preserving the contrasts present in the set X of underlying forms and
thus a large language is likely to arise from high ranked faithfulness constraints.
(351) A ranking > corresponds to a smallest language Z(OT>>) if it ranks the faithfulness con-
straints "as low as possible".
Based on this intuition (351), Prince and Tesar suggest the definition in (352). For each faithfulness
constraint F E F, determine the number t(F) of markedness constraints M E M that are >-
ranked below that faithfulness constraint and add up all these numbers 1(F) together to determine
the value t(>) for the ranking >. I will call problem (349) with the specific mesure t defined in
(352) the PTSUBSET PROBLEM.
(352) E I MEM F > M}
FEY
A(F)
According to (352), the t measure of the ranking in (345a) is 2 while that of the desired ranking in
(345b) is 1. Unfortunately, the function I defined in (352) is not a strictness measure in the general
case. Thus, the PTSubset (349) is only an "approximate" reformulation to the Subset problem (347).
7.3 How to decide whether a problem is easy or not
Given two sets 3 and 6, a corresponding PROBLEM is any relation II C 3 x 6 between the two sets
3 and 6. Any element in the set 3 is called an INSTANCE of the problem; every element in the set
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6 is called a SOLUTION of the problem. A problem HII C 2 x 6 can also be represented as in (353).
The Ranking problem (344), the Subset problem (347), and the PTSubset problem (349) illustrate
the general scheme (353).
(353) given: an instance x c 2;
output: a solution y E 6 such that II(x, y).
Assume that the set 2 of instances comes with a function | 2 - N that pairs each instance x of the
problem II with a number IxI that expresses the SIZE of that instance and reflects its complexity. A
problem HII = (HII, I 1) is called TRACTABLE iff it admits a polynomial-time SOLUTION ALGORITHM,
namely an algorithm Solven that satisfies condition (354). Intuitively, the "easy" problems are the
tractable ones.
(354) For every instance x G 2, Solven runs on input x in time polynomial in its size |xI and
returns a solution y = Solven (x) such that II(x, y).
In the next section of this chapter, I want to tackle question (355). In particular, I will show that the
Subset problem (347) and the PTSubset problem (349) are not tractable, namely that any solution
algorithm for these problems requires a large running time in the worst case.
(355) Are the Ranking problem (344), the Subset problem (347) and the PTSubset problem (349)
tractable or not?
It is relatively easy to show that a given problem is tractable: one just needs to exhibit a polynomial-
time solution algorithm, in the sense of (354). On the contrary, it is not at all trivial to show that a
given problem is not tractable. Naively, one would have to show that no polynomial-time solution
algorithm exists. This strategy is of course not viable. An alternative, more sophisticated strategy
has been devised in the computational literature. This alternative strategy is informally stated in
(356). The rationale is as follows: if there exist non-tractable problems and if H' is among the
hardest problems, then IH' must be non-tractable; thus, if our problem H is at least as hard as I',
then our problem H has got to be non-tractable too.
(356) Suppose that non-tractable problems exist. To conclude that a given problem HI is non-
tractable, show that that problem II is at least as hard as some other problem I' that is
among the hardest problems.
In the rest of this section, I review how (356) is usually formalized, one step at the time; see Garey
and Johnson (1979) and Cormen et al. (1990, Ch. 36) for details.
7.3.1 First step
A DECISION PROBLEM is a problem I C 2 x 6 whose set of solutions is 6 = {0, 1}. Intuitively,
decision problems are those problems that only ask for a "yes" or a "no". For instance, the following
problem (357) is the decision problem corresponding to the original PTSubset problem (349). Non-
tractability of the decision problem (357) entails non-tractability of the original PTSubset problem
(349). In fact, if the original problem (349) were tractable, then the decision problem (357) would
be tractable too, since I could solve the decision problem by finding a solution > of the original
problem (349) and then checking whether t(>) is smaller than k or not.
(357) given: a) universal specifications X, Y, Gen and C;
b) a finite OT-compatible set of data D C X x Y;
c) an integer k;
output: "yes" iff there exists a ranking > OT-compatible with D s.t. p(>) < k.
The preceding considerations immediately extend to the general case: a general problem II can be
paired up with a corresponding decision problem rIdec in such a way that non-tractability of the
decision problem Ildec entails non-tractability of the original problem H. Thus, let me restate the
informal statement (356) as in (358).
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(358) Suppose that non-tractable decision problems exist. To conclude that a given problem II is
non-tractable, show that that the corresponding decision problem IIdec is at least as hard as
some other decision problem II' that is among the hardest decision problems.
Note that (358) is now fully stated in terms of decision problems. The next step toward a proper
formalization of (358) consists of making explicit the condition that the decision problem Idec is at
least as hard as some other decision problem II'.
7.3.2 Second step
Given two decision problems HI c J1 x 61 and 112 C 232 x 6 2, we say that III is NOT HARDER
THAN or that it REDUCES TO 112 (in symbols: II 5p II2) iff there exists an algorithm Reductionnrl,r 2
that satisfies condition (359). The algorithm Reductionn, 1 2 is called a REDUCTION of Il to 112.
The two problems III and 112 are called EQUIVALENT iff both III :p 112 and 112 p III.
(359) For every instance x1 e 2 1 of III, Reductionnl,n 2 runs on x, in time polynomial in its
size I il and returns an instance x2 = Reductionn, 1 1 2 (xi) E 22 of 112 such that III(xi) =
1 == 112 (x2) = 1
The relation <p is reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive, namely it is a partial order among deci-
sion problems. If IIi p 12, then any polynomial-time solution algorithm Solve 12 for 112 can be
turned into the trivial polynomial-time solution algorithm Solven, in (360) for IIi.
(360) Solven1 (xi)
1 compute x2 = Reductionnl,n 2 (xi)
2 return Solve 12 (x 2)
Thus, the issue of solving problem III has been reduced to the issue of solving problem 112; namely,
problem III cannot be harder than problem II2. In conclusion, in order to show that a given decision
problem 112 is not tractable, it is sufficient to show that there is a decision problem III such that
III p 112 and furthermore III is not tractable. I thus further formalize (358) as in (361).
(361) Suppose that non-tractable decision problems exist. To conclude that a given problem II is
non-tractable, show that II' <P IIdec, where IIdec is the decision problem corresponding to
II and H' is some decision problem that is among the hardest decision problems.
The next step toward a proper formalization of (361) consists of making explicit the assumption that
there exist non-tractable decision problems.
7.3.3 Third step
The set of tractable decision problems is denoted by P. More explicitly, a decision problem II
belongs to the class P iff it admits an algorithm Solven that satisfies condition (362). This condition
(362) is a straightforward adaptation to the case of decision problems of the general condition (354).
(362) For every instance x E 2, Solven runs on input x in time polynomial in its size lxi and
furthermore II(x) = 1 iff Solven(x) = 1
Another important class of decision problems is AP: a decision problem II belongs to the class
AP iff II admits a polynomial-time VERIFICATION ALGORITHM, namely an algorithm Verify, that
satisfies condition (363) for some polynomial p. For instance, the decision problem (357) belongs
to the class AK : given a ranking (encoded as a not too long boolean vector y), it is easy to decide
whether its corresponding p-measure (352) is smaller than k or not.
(363) For every instance x E 2, II(x) = 1 iff there exists y E {0, 1}P(IxI) such that Verifyn runs
on input (x, y) in time polynomial in the size lxi and returns 1.
Given an arbitrary problem II E AP, we can use the corresponding verification algorithm Verify,
to construct the algorithm Solven in (364). Of course, Solven is a solution algorithm for HII with
worst-case running time of the order of 2P(Ix l) . Thus, AP is the class of decision problems for
which brute force search yields an exponential time solution algorithm.
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(364) Solven (x)
1 answer +- 0
2 for every y E {0, 1}P(IxI)
3 if Verifyn r (x, y) = 1 then
4 answer <-- 1
5 return answer
Of course, P C AP, since any polynomial-time solution algorithm Solven for II can be used as a
verification algorithm. Do the two classes P and A(P coincide?; namely: do all decision problems
that admit an exponential time solution algorithm also admit a polynomial time solution algorithm?
This question is currently open in the literature. Yet, there are many problems in AP for which no
polynomial-time solution algorithm is currently known and that we are thus tempted to assume not
to belong to P. The COMPLEXITY CONJECTURE (365) says that there are indeed problems in AP
that do not belong to P, namely are not tractable, namely do not admit a polynomial-time solution
algorithm.
(365) P7# A/P
The complexity conjecture (365) formalizes the crucial assumption in (361) that there exist non-
tractable decision problems. The statement in (361) can thus be formalized as in (366).
(366) Suppose that P9 AP. To conclude that a given problem H is non-tractable, show that
II' <p IIdec, where IIdec is the decision problem corresponding to II and I' is some decision
problem that is among the hardest decision problems.
The last step toward a proper formalization of (366) consists of making explicit the assumption that
II is among the hardest possible decision problems.
7.3.4 Fourth step
A decision problem I is called HARD iff the following condition (367) holds. This definition says
that NP-hard problems are at least as hard as any problem in AP. In other words, it says that, if
we had a polynomial-time solution algorithm for even just one NP-hard problem, then we would
have a polynomial-time solution algorithm for every problem in A/P. A decision problem is called
NP-COMPLETE iff it is hard and furthermore belongs to the class AP.
(367) ' <p II for every decision problem II' E APP.
In can thus conclude this section with the fully explicit restatement of (366) provided in (368).
(368) Suppose that P 7 A/P. To conclude that a given problem I is non-tractable, show that
I' <p I-Idec, where IIdec is the decision problem corresponding to H and I' is some NP-
complete decision problem.
In section 7.4, I will use (368) to show that both the PTSubset problem (349) and the Subset problem
(347) are non-tractable.
7.4 The problem of the acquisition of phonology is "hard"
In section 7.2, I reviewed various explicit computational problems that provide at least a loose,
simplified description of the task of the acquisition of phonology. The first problem considered was
the Ranking problem (344). That problem is of course tractable, as reviewed in subsection 7.4.1. But
in section 7.2, I could not stop at that problem, and had to refine it into a more demanding problem
that imposes further requirements on the output ranking. I thus introduced the Subset problem (347)
and its reformulation as the PTSubset problem (349). In subsections 7.4.2 and 7.4.3, I show that the
latter two problems are not tractable.
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7.4.1 Complexity of the Ranking problem
In this subsection, I quickly address the question of whether the Ranking problem (344) is "easy" or
not. On the background of the preceding section, this question boils down to the question of whether
the Ranking problem is tractable or not, namely whether it admits or not a polynomial-time solution
algorithm in the sense of (354). In order to address this question, we need preliminarily to complete
the statement (344) of the problem with the specification of the size of an instance of the problem,
namely the parameters that we allow the running time of a solution algorithm to depend on. To this
end, let the WIDTH of the generating function Gen on the data set V given with an instance of the
Ranking problem (344) be the number width(V) defined in (369) as the cardinality of the largest
candidate set over all underlying forms that appear in V.
(369) width(V) = max IGen(x)(X,Y*)EV
As stated in (370), I assume that the size of a given instance of the Ranking problem (344) depends
on three parameters: the cardinality Cl of the constraint set, the cardinality ID of the data set, and
the width of the generating function width(V) on the given data set V. It is uncontroversial that the
size of a given instance of the Ranking problem should depend on the cardinalities Cl and DIV. It
is more delicate to let it depend on width(V) too. The potential difficulty with this assumption is
as follows: that width(V) could be very large, potentially exponential in the number of constraints
JCl; thus, letting the size depend on width(D) might make the problem too easy, by loosening up
too much the tight dependence on JCl. This difficulty would indeed arise in the case of the original
formulation (343) of the Ranking problem, where we do not have control over the generating func-
tion Gen. But we have replaced that formulation (343) with the alternative formulation (344), where
we have provided for our lack of knowledge of the relevant universal specifications by universally
quantifying over universal specifications. Thus, the difficulty just discussed does not arise for this
latter formulation, since an alleged solution algorithm is required to work also for cases where the
number of constraints C| is large but the width of the generating function width(V) on the data set
is small. For instance, all case studies considered in section 6.3 had this property.3
(370) given: a) universal specifications X, Y, Gen and C;
b) a finite OT-compatible set of data V C X x Y;
find: a ranking >> of the constraint set C that is OT-compatible with V;
size: max {ICl, IDI, width(V)}.
The set of data V given with an instance (370) of the Ranking problem can of course be paired
up with its corresponding comparative tableau, obtained by considering all underlying/winner/loser
form triplets (x, y*, y) corresponding to a pair (x, y*) in the set D and a loser candidate y E Gen(x)
different from y*. I can thus state the Ranking problem (370) in terms of comparative tableaux as
in (371). The size of the Ranking problem (371) is given of course by the number n of columns
and the number m of rows of the input comparative tableau A. Consider the set of data 2 given
with an instance (370) of the classical formulation of the Ranking problem. The corresponding
comparative tableau AD has n columns and a number m of rows that can of course be bound by
m < IVIwidth(D), where Vj is the number of pairs in the data set V and width(V) is the width of
the generating function on the set V, as defined in (369). Thus, an instance of the classical Ranking
problem (370) can be transformed through into a corresponding instance of the Ranking problem
(371) with comparable size. In conclusion, in order to prove that the original problem (370) is
tractable, it is sufficient to prove that the reformulation (371) in terms of comparative tableaux is
tractable.
(371) given: an OT-compatible comparative tableau A E {L, E, W}mxn;
find: a ranking > that is OT-compatible with the comparative tableau A;
size: max{m, n}.
3Furthermore, letting the size of an instance of the Ranking problem depend on width(D), as well as on the cardinalities
ICl and IVI, immediately ensures that the problem is in ATM, namely that it admits a polynomial time verification algorithm.
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Tesar (1995), Tesar and Smolensky (1998) and Tesar and Smolensky (2000, Ch. 7) (henceforth:
Tesar and Smolensky) prove the following important claim 35. This result has had a profound
impact on the field.
Claim 35 The Ranking problem (371) is tractable.
A proof of claim 35 is provided by the quadratic running time of he OT on-line algorithm with
demotion-only update rules. An alternative faster solution can be obtained as follow. Let me illus-
trate the idea as in (372) for the instance of the Ranking problem corresponding to the comparative
tableau (15) repeated at the top of (372). Our goal is to come up with a ranking >> OT-compatible
with the input tableau according to (13a), namely such that the tableau obtained by >>-reordering
the columns from left to right in decresing order has the property that the leftmost non-E entry of
each row is a w. The top ranked constraint must head a column that does not contain a single L. In
our case, the only such constraint is Fpos, that thus gets assigned to the top stratum. The constraint
that can be assigned to the next stratum must head a column whose only L's belong to rows where
the top ranked constraint PPo, has a w. In other words, it must head a column that does not contain
a single L once we strike out the rows where the top ranked constraint Fpo, has a w. In our case,
the only such constraint is M, that thus gets assigned to the second stratum. The constraint that can
be assigned to the next stratum must head a column that does not contain a single L once we strike
out rows where at least one of the two top ranked constraints Fpo, and M have a w. In our case, the
only such constraint is Fgen, that thus gets assigned to the bottom stratum.
Fpos Fgen M
(372) w w L
E L W
F , Fgen M
Fpo, assigned to 1st str. L
L W
M assigned to 2nd str. [1'3S I ,
Fgenassigned to 3rd str.
The procedure just illustrated can be straightforwardly extended to the general case, thus obtain-
ing the algorithm in (373). Step (373a) corresponds to the diagonal arrows in (372); step (373b)
corresponds to the vertical arrows in (372). Algorithm (373) is due to Tesar and Smolensky and is
called RECURSIVE CONSTRAINT DEMOTION (henceforth: RCD). Obviously, if the input compar-
ative tableau A is OT-compatible, then RCD returns a ranking OT-compatible with A in n steps.
Furthermore, all rankings OT-compatible with A belong to the search space of RCD. Finally, if the
input tableau is not OT-compatible, RCD detects that, in the sense that it gets stucked before all
constraints are ranked. 4 I will come back to RCD in chapter 5 and note that it can be reinterpreted
4 The definition of RCD given in (373) is slightly different from the original definition by Tesar and Smolensky. The dif-
ference between Tesar and Smolensky's original definition of RCD and the one given here shows up for comparative tableaux
that have more than one constraint with no undeleted L's. According to the definition (373), RCD arbitrarily chooses one
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as the old Fourier-Motzkin Elimination Algorithm for polyhedral feasibility.5
(373) For t = 1 to n:
a. assign to the tth stratum6 a yet unstroken constraint whose column in A does not contain
any unstroken L;
b. strike out every row of A that has a w under the constraint just picked in step (a) and
then strike out the entire column corresponding to that constraint.
RCD repeats n iterations each of which takes at most nm time (the algorithm might need to scan n
columns with m entries each). Thus, RCD constitutes a polynomial-time solution algorithm for the
Ranking problem (371), in the sense of (354). This shows the tractability of the Ranking problem
(371) and thus also of the Ranking problem (370), thus concluding the proof of claim 35.
7.4.2 Complexity of Prince and Tesar's Subset problem
Let me restate the Subset problem (349) in terms of comparative tableaux, as in the formulation
(374). The set F provided with an instance of the problem says which one of the n columns of the
input comparative tableau A correspond to faithfulness constraints. For completeness, I have also
made explicit the size of an instance of the problem, which of course depends on the two dimensions
of the comparative tableau.
(374) given: a) an OT-compatible input tableau A E {L, E, W}mxn;
b) the set F C {1, .. ., n} of faithfulness constrains;
output: a ranking > OT-compatible with A such that there exists no ranking >'
OT-compatible with A too such thatu(>') is smaller than I(>), where /
is defined as in (352);
size: max{m, n}.
The goal of this subsection is to prove the following claim 36, that says the Subset problem (374)
is not "easy", contrary to the Ranking problem. Prince and Tesar's formulation (374) of the Subset
problem has been very influential in the literature, and thus claim 36 is interesting in its own right.
Furthermore, it will allow me to straightforwardly derive the intractability of the Subset problem
(347) in the next subsection. The proof of claim 36 presented in this section works even if we
restrict ourselves to instances of the problem (374) whose comparative tableau A has a very simple
disjunctive structure, namely contains no more than two entries equal to w per row; 7 and even if we
furthermore restrict ourselves to instances of the problem whose comparative tableau A does not
contain a single entry equal to L in the columns corresponding to faithfulness constraints F.
Claim 36 Under the conjecture that P : KAP, the PTSubset problem (374) is not tractable.
such constraint and assigns it to the highest available stratum. According to Tesar and Smolensky's original definition, RCD
assigns all such constraints to the highest available stratum ad then outputs a total ranking which is an arbitrary refinement of
the non-total ranking thus constructed. To illustrate how the two definitions differ, consider the comparative tableau in (i).
C1 C2 C3[WE
(i) E W W
Tesar and Smolensky's original RCD first computes the non-total ranking {C 1 , C2 } {C 3 } and then outputs one of its
two refinements, namely either C1 > C2 > Ca or C2 > C 1 > Ca. Thus, the ranking C 1 > C 3 > C2 lies
outside of the search space of Tesar and Smolensky's RCD, despite the fact that this ranking too is OT-compatible with the
given comparative tableau (i). Instead, the version of RCD defined in (373) might output such a ranking, provided that the
algorithm chooses C1 at the first step, C3 at the next step and C 2 at the last step. More generally, the version of RCD defined
in (373) poses no artificious restrictions on the search space, which indeed contains any ranking OT-compatible with the given
comparative tableau.
5 See Eisner (2000) for a reinterpretation of RCD as a generalization of Topological sort to directed hypergraphs.
6 With the understanding that the 1st stratum is the top stratum and the nth stratum is the bottom stratum.
7 0f course, if the input comparative tableau A has a unique entry equal to w per row, then it is OT-compatible with a
unique ranking, and thus the corresponding instance of the PTSubset problem (374) reduces to the Ranking problem, and is
therefore easy.
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Let me start by noting that the statement of the problem (374) can be simplified slightly. Given a
ranking > of the constraint set C = {C 1,..., Cn}, let me represent it with the permutation ir :
{C1,..., Cn} -- {1,..., n} such that 7r(Ck) is the stratum to which the constraint Ck is assigned
by >, with the understanding that the top stratum is the nth stratum. Thus, Ck > Ch iff 7r(Ck) >
ir(Ch). I will denote by Sn the set of all such permutations. By virtue of this correspondence
between a ranking > and a permutation 7r, all the notions pertaining to rankings introduced so far
straightforwardly extend to permutations. Thus, I can speak of a given permutation 7r E Sn being
OT-compatible with a comparative tableau A according to (13a). And I can think of the strictness
measure l in (352) as being defined over permutations 7r E Sn, obviously as in (375).
(375) E(r) = IM E M r(F) > ir(M)}
FE."
Once restated as in (375) in terms of permutations, Prince and Tesar's strictness measure can be
equivalently described as in (376). In words, the strictness of a ranking r coincides with the sum of
the strata to which 7r assignes the faithfulness constraints, apart from an additive constant that does
not depend on the specific ranking ir considered.8
(376) (7r) = 1 7r(F) - constant
FEY
The constant term that appears in (376) can of course be ignored. Thus, the PTSubset problem (374)
can be restated as the equivalent problem (377). Since the two problems are equivalent by (376), I
will concentrate on showing that the latter problem (377) is not tractable.
(377) given: a) an OT-compatible input tableau A;
b) the set .F C {1,..., n} of faithfulness constrains
output: a ranking 7r e Sn OT-compatible with A such that there exists no ranking 7r'
OT-compatible with A too such that -FF 7r'(F) < EFE. 7r(F).
The decision problem corresponding to problem (377) is (378). From now on, I will refer to (378)
as the PTSUBSET PROBLEM. As noted for the general case in section 7.3, the non-tractability
of the decision problem (378) entails the non-tractability of the original problem (377). In fact,
if the original problem (377) can be solved in polynomial time, then the corresponding decision
problem (378) can be solved in polynomial time too: given an instance of the decision problem
(378), find a solution 7r of the corresponding instance of the problem (377) and then just check
whether EFEY 7r(F) < k.
8The identity in (376) is obvious. For completeness, I prove it explicitely in this footnote. Let I < n be the total number
of faithfulness constrains F1, . . ., Ft. Let jk E {1, . . ., n} be the stratum to which the ranking r assignes the faithfulness
constraint Fk, namely jk = 7'(Fk) for k = 1, . . ., 1. Assume without loss of generality that ji < j2 < ... jt (otherwise,
just relabel the constraints). Thus, the lowest stratum to which ir assigns a faithfulness constraint is the jith stratum, the next
lowest stratum to which 7r assigns a faithfulness constraint is the j 2th stratum, and so on. The proof of the identity (376)
consists of the chain of identities in (i). In step (a), I have used the definition (375) of the strictness measure p. In step (b), I
have reasoned as follows: the number of markedness constraints ranked by ir below the faithfulness constraint Fk is equal to
the total number of constraints ranked by 7r below Fk (namely jk - 1, since Fk is assigned to the jAth stratum) minus the
number of faithfulness constraints ranked by ir below Fk (which is k - 1, since Fk is the kth faithfulness constraint starting
from the bottom of the ranking).
k=1
t t
k=1 k=1
t
= Z lr(Fk) - constant
k=1
Prince and Tesar (2004) stick to the slightly more complicated definition (375) because they consider nontotal hierarchies. In
fact, the equivalence in (376) only holds for total hierarchies, as it is obvious from the proof (i).
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(378) given: a) an OT-compatible input tableau A with n columns;
b) the set .F C {1,. .., n} of faithfulness constraints;
c) an integer k;
output: "yes" iff there exists a ranking ir E Sn that is OT-compatible with A and
furthermore such that -FE.F r (F) < k.
By (368), in order to prove claim 36, I only need to exhibit a decision problem II such that II is
NP-complete and furthermore II <p PTSubset. Let me introduce the decision problem II that I will
use to this end. Given an arbitrary finite set A = {a, b, ... } with cardinality A1, consider a set S
of pairs of elements of A. The set S is called LINEARLY COMPATIBLE iff there exists a one-to-one
function r : A - {1, 2,..., JAI} such that for every pair (a, b) E S we have 7r(a) < ir(b). This
notion is illustrated in (379): the set S in (379a) is linearly compatible; the one in (379b) is not.
(379) A= {a, b, c, d}
a. S= {(a,b), (b,c), (c,d)}
b. S= {(a,b), (b,c), (c,a)}
It is useful to let S be not just a set but a MULTISET, namely to allow for the possibility that S
contains multiple instances of the same pair. The notion of cardinality and the subset relation are
trivially extended from sets to multisets. Thus, consider the decision problem (380), that I will call
the MAX-ORDERING PROBLEM. This problem is obviously in A(', namely it admits a verification
algorithm in the sense of (363).
(380) given: a) a finite set A;
b) a multiset P C A x A of pairs of the elements of A;
c) an integer k < IPI;
output: "yes" iff there exists a multiset S C P with ISI > k linearly compatible;
size: max {IAI, IPI}.
The next claim 37 ensures that the MaxOrdering problem is NP-complete. The following claim 38
shows that MaxOrdering <p PTSubset. By (368), I can thus conclude that the problem (378) is
non-tractable, thus completing the proof of claim 36.
Claim 37 The MaxOrdering problem is NP-complete. 9
Proof By (367), in order to prove that MaxOrdering is NP-complete, I need to prove (381a). To
this end, it is sufficient to prove (381b). In fact, the NP-completeness of II in (381b) ensures that
II' <p II for every decision problem I' E AlP; this fact together with the transitivity of the relation
<p entail that also II' <p MaxOrdering for every decision problem I' E AfP, namely that (381a)
holds.
(381) a. For every decision problem II' E A':
II' <p MaxOrdering.
b. For some NP-complete problem II:
II <p MaxOrdering.
Let me introduce the decision problem II that I will use for proving (381 b). Given an arbitrary finite
set A = {a, b, ... } with cardinality IAI, consider a set T of triplets of elements of A. The set
T is called LINEARLY CYCLICALLY COMPATIBLE iff there exists a one-to-one function -r : A -
{1, 2,..., Al} such that for every triplet (a, b, c) E T either 7r(a) < r(b) < 7r(c) or ir(b) < r(c) <
ir(a) or 7r(c) < r(a) < 7r(b). This notion is illustrated in (382): the set T in (382a) is linearly
cyclically compatible; the one in (382b) is not.
(382) A= {a, b, c, d}
a. T = {(a,b,c), (b,c,d)}
9The MaxOrdering problem looks general enough for people to have proven its NP-completeness already. Yet, I couldn't
find it in the literature, but for a rather similar claim in Cohen et al. (1999).
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b. T = {(a,b,c), (a,c,b)}
Consider the CYCLICORDERING PROBLEM in (383).1o Its NP-completeness was proven by re-
duction from 3SATISFABILITY in Galil and Megiddo (1977); CyclicOrdering is problem [MS2] in
Garey and Johnson (1979, p. 279).
(383) input: a) a finite set A;
b) a collection T C A x A x A of triplets of elements of A;
output: "yes" iff T is linearly cyclically compatible;
size: the cardinality JAI of A.
Given an instance instance (A, T) of CyclicOrdering, consider the corresponding instance (A, P, k)
of MaxOrdering defined as in (384). For every triplet (a, b, c) in the set T, we put in the multiset P
the three pairs (a, b), (b, c) and (c, a). Furthermore, we set the threshold k to twice the number of
triplets in the set T.
(384) P = {(a,b), (b,c), (c,a) (a,b,c) E T}
k = 21TI
The construction is illustrated in (385): given the instance of CyclicOrdering in (385a), we construct
the corresponding instance of MaxOrdering in (385b). Note that P is a multiset because it contains
two instances of the pair (b, c), coming from two different triplets in T.
(385) a. (A = {a, b, c, d}, T = {(a,b,c), (b,c,d)})
b. A =f{a, b,c,d }, P = (a )b ) ) , k =4b ~ -'b ~ - (b, c), (c, d), (d, b)
In order to show that CyclicOrdering <p MaxOrdering, let me show that the correspondence defined
in (384) is a reduction algorithm according to (359). This correspondence is trivially computable in
time polynomial in I AI. Thus, I only need to show that an instance (A, T) of CyclicOrdering admits
a positive answer iff the corresponding instance (A, P, k) of MaxOrdering admits a positive answer.
If the instance (A, T) of CyclicOrdering admits a positive answer, then there exists a linear order
ir on A cyclically compatible with T; this means in turn that for every triplet (a, b, c) E T, there
are at least two pairs in P compatible with r and thus there are a total of k = 21TI pairs in P
compatible with 7r. l Vice versa, if the instance (A, P, k) of MaxOrdering admits a positive answer,
then there exists a linear order 7r on A compatible with 21TI pairs in P; since the three pairs that
come from a given triplet are inconsistent, then each triplet must contribute two pairs to the total of
21TI compatible pairs and thus ir must be cyclically compatible with all the triplets in T. U
Claim 38 MaxOrdering <p PTSubset.
Proof Given an instance (A, P, k) of the MaxOrdering problem (380), let n = JAI and £ = |P|;
pick an integer d E N that satisfies (386).1 1(386) d > n(£- k)+ £ 2+ £
2 2
Consider the corresponding instance (A, .F, K) of the PTSubset problem (378) defined as follows.
Let the numbers N and M of columns and of rows of the tableau A and the threshold K be defined
as in (387).
1lt makes sense to let the size of an instance of the CyclicOrdering problem (383) be just the cardinality of the set A. In
fact, the cardinality of the set T can be at most I Al3 . On the other hand, it makes sense to let the size of an instance of the
MaxOrdering problem (380) depend also on the cardinality of the multiset P rather than only on the cardinality of the set
A, as in the case of the CyclicOrdering problem (383). In fact, being P a multiset, its cardinality cannot be bound by the
cardinality of A.
SI Note that, in order for the latter claim to hold, it is crucial that P be a multiset, namely that the same pair might be
counted twice. In fact, T might contain two different triplets that share some elements, such as (a, b, c) and (a, b, d).
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(387) N = e+n+d
M = £+nd
K = (gf-k)(n+d)+ £2+ !K 2
The sets F and M of faithfulness and markedness constraints are defined as in (388). There is a
faithfulness constraint FI,..., F for every pair in the multiset P given with the instance of Max-
Ordering. Markedness constraints come in two varieties, annotated with and without the prime. In
particular, there is a markedness constraint M 1,..., Mn for every element in the set A given with
the instance of MaxOrdering.
(388) F = {Fi,...,Fe}
M = {M1,...,Mn} U {M1,...,M}
The comparative tableau A E {L, E, W}MxN is built in two steps. First, the smaller comparative
tableau A E {L, E, W}ex (+n) is built as in (389). This small comparative tableau A has a row
for every pair (as, aj) E P. This comparative row contains all E's but for three entries: the entry
corresponding to the faithfulness constraint F(i,j) corresponding to that pair, which is w; the entry
corresponding to the markedness constraint Mi corresponding to the first element ai in the pair,
which is L; the entry corresponding to the markedness constraint Mj corresponding to the second
element aj in the pair, which is w. The intuition is that a linear order a over A is compatible with
a given pair (as, aj) E P iff the entry L in the corresponding row of the comparative tableau A is
accounted for by ranking Mj over Mi without any need for the corresponding faithfulness constraint
F(ij) to do any work.
F(i i) ... ... Mi ... Mi
(389) (ai,a)EP== ... W ... ... L ... W ... =
I illustrate this construction in (390): given the set A and the multiset of pairs P in (390a), the
corresponding small comparative tableau A is (390b).
(390) a. A = {a, b, c}, P = {(a,b), (b,c), (c,a)}
F(.,b) F(b,c) F(c,a) Ma Mb Me
(a,b) W L W
b. (b,c) W L W =
(c,a) W W L
Suppose that an L corresponding to a markedness constraint Mi in the small comparative tableau A
in (389) is not accounted for by high ranking the corresponding markedness constraint Mj so that the
corresponding faithfulness constraint F(,ij) needs to be high ranked instead. What consequences has
this fact for the overall strictness measure (376)7 Not much: all I can deduce is that the faithfulness
constraint F(,ij) has at least the two markedness constraints Mi and Mj ranked below it. To get a
more dramatic effect, I adopt the following simple trick: I add a bunch of new markedness constraints
M(,..., Md and force them to be ranked below every markedness constraint M 1 , ... ., Mn. Thus,
if the faithfulness constraint F(i,) is ranked above Mi and Mj, then it must also be ranked above
all these extra markedness constraints MI,..., Md. If the number d of these extra constraints is
properly chosen, as in (386), then the corresponding effect on the strictness measure (376) is rather
dramatic. Here are the details. Embed the small comparative tableau A E {L, E, W}ex (e+n) into
the larger comparative tableau A E {L, E, W}MxN as in (391). The first horizontal block of the
comparative tableau A basically is just a copy of the small comparative tableau A, with many E's
underneath the new markedness constraints Mi,..., Md. This first horizontal block is followed by
n new horizontal blocks. For every i = 1,..., n, the effect of the ith such block is to force all the
new constraints MI,..., Md to be ranked underneath the markedness constraint Mi.
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F1  ... F1  Mi ... Mn M, ... Ma
£rows A
L
r W L
first block of d rows
(391) L w L - A
[ W L
nth block of d rows I
L W L
In order to show that MaxOrdering 5p PTSubset, let me show that the correspondence just defined
is a reduction algorithm according to (359). Clearly, this reduction can be computed in polynomial
time. In the rest of the proof, I show that the instance (A, P, k) of MaxOrdering admits a positive
answer iff the corresponding instance (A, Y, K) of PTSubset admits a positive answer. Let me start
by assuming that the instance (A, P, k) of MaxOrdering admits a positive answer. Thus, there exists
a sub-multitset S C P of cardinality k compatible with a linear order o- E Sn on A. To simplify the
notation, assume without loss of generality that the k pairs in S are the first k pairs in P. Consider a
permutation ir E SN that corresponds to a ranking > that satisfies (392): 7r assigns the k faithfulness
constraints that correspond to pairs in S to the k bottom strata of the hierarchy in any order; 7r assigns
the d special markedness constraints Mi,..., Md to the next d strata; 7r assigns the n markedness
constraints M 1,..., Mn to the next n strata ordered according to a; finally, 7r assigns the remaining
£- k faithfulness constraints to the top e - k strata in any order.
(392) {Fk+1,... ,FI} > Ma (n)> ... > Ma (1) > {Ml, .. .,Md} > {F 1,...,Fk
This permutation ir E SN is OT-compatible with the comparative tableau A in (391). In fact, it is OT-
compatible with the bottom n horizontal blocks, since M 1 , . . . , Mn are ranked above M, ... , Md. It
is OT-compatible with the bottom £- k rows of the small comparative tableau A, since Fk+1,... , F,
are ranked at the top. Finally, it is OT-compatible with the top k rows of the small comparative
tableau A. In fact, asume by contradiction that it were not. This would mean that there exists one
such row such that 7r is not OT-compatible with that row; this means in turn that that row has a
w under the column Mj, a L under the column Mi and 7r(Mj) < 7r(Mi); this means in turn that
a(aj) < a(ai) and thus a is not compatible with the pair (as, aj) contradicting the hypothesis that
that pair belongs to S. Finally, the chain of inequalities in (393) shows that "FE. 7r(F) < K and
thus that the corresponding instance of PTsubset admits a positive answer.
(393) > 7r(F)=
FEF
k
Sr(Fh)+ >
h=1 h=k+1
= (1+2 +...+k) + ((k+n+d+ 1)+ (k+n+d+2)+...+ (k+n+d+ (£-k))
= -k(k+l)+(k+n+d)(£-k)+ (£-k)(£-k+1)
k 2k +1k+kt+nf+df-k 2-kn-kd+ 1j2 _1ki- 1 kf+1 k2+ 'f_ k2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2= n + k+t+n  d k - kn - kd + lek -k 2 + lf1 1
= n£+de-kn-kd+ £2+.£
2 2
=K
Vice versa, assume now that the instance (A, F, K) of PTSubset admits a positive answer. This
means that there exists a permutation 7r E SN OT-compatible with the comparative tableau A such
that EF. ,7r(F) < K. Let a be the linear order on A = {a, ... , an} defined by o(ai) > a(aj)
iff 7r(Mi) > 7r(Mj). Consider the multiset S C P in (394).
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(394) S = (ah,ak) P r(Mh) <7r(Mk)}
Clearly, S is compatible with the linear order a. To prove that the instance (A, P, k) of MaxOrdering
has a positive answer, it is thus sufficient to show that ISI > k. Assume by contradiction that
ISI = x < k. This means that there are t - x rows in the small comparative tableau A such that
the markedness constraint with a w in that row is 7r-ranked below the markedness constraint with a
L in that row; hence, in order for ir to be OT-compatible with that row, it must rank the faithfulness
constraint corresponding to that row above the two markedness constraints involved in that row and
thus also above all the d extra markedness constraints Mi,..., Md. This means in turn that each of
these f - x faithfulness constraints has at least d markedness constraints ranked below. The chain
of inequalities in (395) thus holds. Here, I have reasoned as follows: in step (a), I have used the
definition (387) of the constant K; in step (b), I have used the hypothesis that ir verifies the given
instance of the PTSubset problem; in step (c), I have used the fact just noted that there are at least
£ - x faithfulness constraints F E F such that 7r(F) > d; in step (d), I have used the contradictory
assumption that x < k - 1.
(395) (f- k)d + (f- k)n + £2 + 1 K
(b)
> Z7r(F)
FE.F
(c)
> (f- x)d
(d)
> (- (k - 1))d
= (£-k)d+d
But the inequality d < (£ - k)n + j 2 + e thus derived in (395) contradicts the choice (386) of the
constant d. U
7.4.3 Complexity of the Subset problem
Let me now turn to the original formulation of the Subset problem (347), repeated in (396). The
problem could in principle be restated by replacing data sets with comparative tableaux, as done in
the preceding subsection for the PTSubset problem. Yet, in the case of the Subset problem, I would
still need to provide, along with the comparative tableau, also the universal specifications X, Y, Gen
and C, in order to be able to compute the language R.(OT>) corresponding to a ranking >. And
I would also need to make sure that the universal specifications and the comparative tableau given
with an instance of the problem do match each other. For this reason, it is more convenient to stop
at the formulation (396), and avoid restating it in terms of comparative tableaux. In a sense, Prince
and Tesar's (2004) formulation (349) of the problem in terms of strictness measures can indeed be
seen as a way of formulating the Subset problem in terms of comparative tableaux, thus bringing it
closer to the successful formulation given by Tesar and Smolensky for the Ranking problem.
(396) given: a) universal specifications X, Y, Gen and C;
b) a finite OT-compatible data set VD C X x Y;
output: a ranking > OT-compatible with VD such that there exists no other ranking
>' OT-compatible with V too such that Z(OT>,) C R(OT>).
The issue just discussed is strictly connected with the issue of the proper definition of the size of
an instance of the Subset problem (396). In (370), I have let the size of an instance of the Ranking
problem depend on the complexity of the data set V, measured in terms of its cardinality VD and in
terms of the maximum number width(D) of candidates that an underlying form in V is paired with,
as defined in (369). But in the case of the Subset problem (396) it makes sense to let the complexity
of an instance of the problem depend on the complexity of the universal specifications, that of course
upper bounds the complexity of any corresponding data set. Thus, I complete the definition of the
problem as in (397), whereby the size of an instance of the problem depends on the complexity
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of the universal specifications, measured in terms of the number X I of underlying forms and the
maximum number width(X) of candidates that an underlying form is paired with. From now on, I
will refer to (397) as the SUBSET PROBLEM.
(397) given: a) universal specifications X, Y, Gen and C;
b) a finite OT-compatible data set D C X x y;
output: a ranking > OT-compatible with D) such that there exists no other ranking
>>' OT-compatible with D too such that 7Z(OT>,) C Z(OT>).
size: max {ICI, IX|, width(X)}
The goal of this section is to prove the following claim 39, that says the Subset problem (397) is not
"easy", contrary to the Ranking problem. This claim says in particular that the non-tractability of
Prince and Tesar's (2004) formulation of the Subset problem is not an idiosyncratic property of that
specific formulation but plausibly reflects the intrinsic complexity of the problem.
Claim 39 Under the conjecture that P 5 P'P, the Subset problem (397) is not tractable.
As usual, consider the decision variant (398) of the Subset problem (397). Once again, in order
to show that problem (397) is not tractable, it is sufficient to show that the corresponding decision
problem (398) is not tractable. In fact, if (397) can be solved in polynomial time, then (398) can
be solved in polynomial time too: given an instance of the decision problem (398), find a solution
>> of the corresponding instance of the problem (397) and then just check whether I7Z(OT>>)I 5 k
(note that the definition of the size of the problem allows us to check in polynomial time whether
1R.(OT>)I < k for any given ranking >>).
(398) given: a) universal specifications X, Y, Gen and C;
b) a finite OT-compatible data set D C X x Y;
c) an integer k;
output: "yes" iff there exists a ranking > OT-compatible with D such that the
corresponding language 7I(OT>) contains at most k surface forms;
size: max {ICI, XIJ, width(X)}.
The following claim 40 ensures that the PTSubset problem (374) can be reduced to the Subset
problem (398). Since the PTSubset problem is NP-complete by claim 36, then I conclude by (368)
that the Subset problem (398) is NP-complete too, thus completing the proof of claim 39.
Claim 40 PTsubset <p Subset.
Proof Given an instance (A, Y, k) of the PTSubset problem (378), let n be the number of columns
of the comparative tableau A, namely the total number of constraints; let m be the number of
rows of the comparative tableau A; let e be the cardinality of the set .F, namely the total number
of faithfulness constraints. Let the corresponding instance (X, Y, Gen, C, D), K) of the Subset
problem (398) be defined as follows. Define the threshold K, the set X of underlying forms, the set
Y of surface forms, the generating function Gen and the data set D) as in (399).
(399) a. K = m + k + d, where d = (n - )
b. X=1' U X2 U' 3,
where X1= {x1,...,Xm,X2= {x',...,x'} andX 3 = , X
C- Y 1YUY 2 UY 3 ,c. U = r1 , U U2 U  U
where Y,= Ul... m, Y2  ul,...,du andY 3= Wi,... ,Ud,
1 m ••,..., ••.,Vd Wl•*•, Wd
d. Gen(xi) = {yi, zi} C Y1 for every x E X'1
Gen(x) = {u_, vi} 9 Y2  for every x E X2
Gen(x ') = {ui, wi} Y3 for every xm' E A3
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e. (Xly),o..., (xmm)} 1 X Y
Let the constraint set C contain a total of n constraints C1,..., C,,; let Ck be a faithfulness constraint
iff k e F; let Ck be a markedness constraint otherwise. Define these n constraints separately on
1 x Y1, X2 x Y 2 and 23 x Y3 as follows (there is no need to define the constraints on 24 x yj for
i : j, because of the definition of the Gen function). The set X1 contains a total of m underlying
forms x1 ,... xm, one for every row of the given comparative tableau A. Each of these underlying
forms xi E X1 comes with two candidates yi and zi that together make up the entire set of surface
forms Y1. Define the constraints C1,..., Cn over 2X x Y, according to the condition (400). This
condition ensures that the comparative tableau Av corresponding to the set of data D in (399e) is
indeed the given comparative tableau A.
(400) Ck(xi, yi) < Ck (xi, zi) 4= thekthentryintheithrowof A isaw
Ck(xi, yi) = Ck(xi, zi) 4= the kth entry in the ith row of A is aE
Ck(xi, yi) > Ck(xi, zi) 4= the kth entry in the ith row of A is aL
The set 2 contains a total of d = £(n - f) underlying forms x ,..., x', one for every pair of
a faithfulness constraint and a markedness constraint. Pair up (in some arbitrary but fixed way)
each underlying form x E X2 with a unique pair of a faithfulness constraint and a markedness
constraint; thus, I can speak of the markedness and the faithfulness constraints "corresponding" to a
given underlying form x E 2X2. Each of these underlying forms x,...,x E X2 comes with two
candidates ui and vi that together make up the entire set of surface forms Y2. Define the constraints
C1, .. , Cn over X2 x Y 2 according to the condition (401). This condition ensures that the grammar
OT> corresponding to an arbitrary ranking >> maps the underlying form x to the surface form vi
iff the faithfulness constraint corresponding to the underlying form x is ranked >>-higher than the
faithfulness constraint corresponding to x.
(401) Ck(x , vi) < Ck(x , ui) if Ck is the faithfulness constraint corresponding to x!
Ck(x, vi) > Ck (x , ui) if Ck is the markedness constraint corresponding to x
Ck(x, vi) = Ck(x, ui) otherwise
Finally, define the constraints C1,..., Cn over 23 x Y3 according to the condition (402). This
condition ensures for any ranking > that the corresponding language R(OT>) contains the surface
forms Ux,..., Ud, namely that these forms are unmarked (as the forms [ta] and [rat] in the typology
(1) considered at the beginning of the chapter).
(402) Ck (xi, ui) Ck(x , wi) for every constraint Ck
In order to show that PTSubset <p Subset, let me show that the correspondence just defined is a
reduction algorithm according to (359). Clearly, this reduction can be computed in polynomial time.
In the rest of the proof, I show that an instance (A, F, k) of the PTSubset problem (378) admits a
positive answer iff the corresponding instance (X, Y, Gen, C, D, K) of the Subset problem (398)
admits a positive answer. If the instance (A, .F, k) of the PTSubset problem admits a positive an-
swer, then there exists a ranking > OT-compatible with the comparative tableau A such that there
are at most k pairs of a faithfulness constraint and a markedness constraint such that that faithfulness
constraint is >>-ranked above that markedness constraint. Since > is OT-compatible with A and
sinceA is by construction the comparative tableau corresponding to the data set D, then >> is OT-
compatible with the data set V. Furthermore, the language 7R(OT ,) corresponding to the ranking
>> contains at most K = m + k + d surface forms, namely: the m surface forms yl, . . ., Ym E Y1
(because >> is OT-compatible with the data set V); all the d surface forms u1,..., ud (because no
ranking prefers the pair (x ', wi) to the pair (x ', ui) by construction) and at most k of the surface
forms vi,..., va (because one of these forms vi belongs to a given language iff the corresponding
ranking ranks the faithfulness constraint corresponding to the underlying form x i above the corre-
sponding markedness constraint). The vice versa holds for exactly the same reasons. U
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Chapter 8
Consequences for the relationship
between standard and linear OT
In the preceding chapters, I have worked squarely within the framework of STANDARD OT, as
defined by Prince and Smolensky (2004). Let me recall from section 4.1 the basic shape of this
framework. Given some universal specifications (X, Y, Gen, C), consider a ranking vector 0 E Rn ,
an underlying form x E X and two corresponding candidates y*, y E Gen(x), with the understand-
ing that y* is the intended winner while y is a loser candidate. We say that the ranking vector 0 is
OT-COMPATIBLE with the underlying/winner/loser form triplet (x, y*, y) iff condition (403) holds.
For every constraint Ck, we call the quantity Ck(x, y) - Ck(x, y*) the corresponding CONSTRAINT
DIFFERENCE. It is the difference between the number Ck (x, y) of violations w.r.t. constraint Ck in-
curred by the mapping of the underlying form x into the loser candidate y and the number Ck(x, y*)
of violations w.r.t. the same constraint Ck incurred by the mapping of the underlying form x into
the winner candidate y*. As stated in (8), constraints with positive difference are called winner-
preferring and constraints with negative difference are called loser-preferring. Condition (403) thus
just states the usual requirement that there be at least one winner-preferring constraint that is ranked
above every loser-preferring constraint.
(403) max Oh > max Ok{h I Ch(z,y)-Ch (X,y*)>O} {k I Ck (x,y)-Ck(z,y*)<0}
Condition (403) is only sensitive to the sign of the constraint differences, not to their actual values.
For this reason, it is useful to actually get rid of the actual values of the constraint differences, by
pairing up an underlying/winner/loser form triplet (x, y*, y) with the corresponding comparative row
a= (a,,...,ak,... ,an) C {L, E, W} n in (14),repeatedin(404).
(404) winnerI
(x, y*, y) a= [ ... ak ... an
I w if Ck is winner-preferrin)
loser where ak - L if Ck is loser-preferring
E if Ck is inactive
Recall from (26), that W(a) and L(a) are the sets of winner- and loser-preferring constraints w.r.t.
(the underlying/winner/loser form triplet corresponding to) the comparative row a. Condition (403)
can then be rewritten more compactly as in (405).
(405) max Oh > max Ok
hEW(a) kEL(a)
In this chapter, I wish to compare the framework of standard OT just reviewed with the alternative
framework of LINEAR OT. This alternative framework only differs from the standard framework
because of the fact that the condition (403) for compatibility between a ranking vector 0 and an
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underlyng/winner/loser form triplet is replaced by condition (406). Let me call this alternative notion
of compatibility LINEAR COMPATIBILITY (henceforth: L-compatibility).
n
(406) E (Ck(x,y) - Ck(X ,y*))Oh > 0
h=1
Contrary to condition (403), condition (406) does depend on the actual values of the constraint
differences. For ease of comparison, let me make the notation as parallel as possible between the
two frameworks and thus denote by ik the constraint difference corresponding to constraint Ck.
(407) winner1
(X, y*, y) = [ ... ... ]
I where ik Ck (x,y) - Ck(x,y*)
loser
With this piece of notation, condition (406) can be rewritten more compactly as in (408), where I am
using again the scalar product (., .) introduced in (94) in chapter 4.
n
(408) (0,) = 00h > 0
h=1
It turns out that some of the developments presented in chapter 5 have interesting consequences for
the issue of the relationship between the two frameworks of standard and linear OT. I discuss some
of these consequences in this final chapter.
8.1 The relationship between OT-compatibility and L-compatibility
The following claim 41 says that OT-compatibility of a comparative tableau A can be characterized
in terms of L-compatibility of the corresponding derived numerical matrices. This claim patterns
with claims 1, 12 and 15 in trying to distil computationally useful consequences from the strong but
somewhat mysterious assumption that a given comparative tableau is OT-compatible. The proof of
the implication from L-compatibility to OT-compatibility is basically identical to the proof of claim
19 in subsection 5.4.1; the proof of the reverse implication from OT-compatibility to L-compatibility
is basically identical to the proof of claim 20 in subsection 5.4.2. A couple of remarks at the end of
the section spell out the intuition behind the proof. In the next section, I will discuss an obvious but
important consequence of this claim 41.
Claim 41 Given a comparative tableau A, consider the numerical matrix A defined row by row as
in (409): given a row a of A, we construct the corresponding row d of A by replacing every entry
equal to w by a 1, every entry equal to E by a 0 and every entry equal to L by -w(a), where w(a) is
the number of entries equal to w in the row a.
(409) a= [ ai ... ak ... an] = ... "k ... n
+1 if ak = W
ak E {L, E, W} ak - 0 if ak = E
S-w(a) ifak = L
The Ranking problem (410) is equivalent to the new problem (411), in the sense that the set of
rankings that solve (410) coincides with the set of refinements of ranking vectors that solve (411).
If the given comparative tableau A has a unique L per row (recall that by claim 2 I can transform a
given comparative tableau A into another tableau A' OT-equivalent to A such that A' has a unique
entry equal to L per row), then the condition that 0 be nonnegative can be dropped in the statement
of problem (411) while retaining the equivalence with problem (410).
(410) given: an OT-compatible comparative tableau A;
find: a ranking >> that is OT-compatible with A.
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(411) given: an OT-compatible comparative tableau A;
find: a nonnegative ranking vector 0 that is L-compatible with the corresponding derived
matrix A defined in (409).
More in general, given a comparative row a = (a, ... , ak . ., an) E {L, E, W}n , let me say that
a numerical vector A = (a1,... ,ak,... ,n) E Rn is DERIVED from the comparative row a iff
condition (412) holds, namely every entry equal to w in a corresponds to a positive entry in N, every
entry equal to E in a corresponds to a zero entry in d, and every entry equal to L in a corresponds to
a null or negative entry in A. Given a comparative tableau A E {L, E, W}mxn with m rows and n
columns, let me say that a numerical matrix A E R' x n with the same number of rows and columns
is DERIVED from the comparative tableau A iff each row of A is derived from the corresponding
row of A according to definition (412).
(412) Fork = 1,...,n:
a. if ak = W, then ak > 0;
b. if ak = E, then k = 0;
c. if ak = L, then Zk < 0.
Then, a comparative tableau A is OT-compatible iff every numerical matrix A derived from A is
L-compatible with a ranking vector with nonnegative components.
First part of the proof Consider a nonnegative ranking vector 0 that solves the problem (411),
namely such that (0, A) > 0 for every row - of the numerical matrix A defined in (409). Let me
show that 0 is OT-compatible with the comparative tableau A, so that every refinement of 0 solves
problem (410). The following chain of inequalities (413) holds for every row a of the comparative
tableau A and every k e L(a). This chain of inequalities is basically identical to the one in (163).
Here, I have reasoned as follows: in step (a), I have used the hypothesis that 0 solves problem (411);
in step (b), I have used the definition (94) of the scalar product (0, R); in step (c), I have split up the
set {1,..., n} that h runs over into the three sets W(a), L(a) and their complement; in step (d), I
have noted that ah = 1 for every h E W(a), that Uh = -w(a) for every h E L(a) and that ah = 0
for every h V W(a) U L(a), by the definition (409) of = (7!,..., ,n); in step (e), I have upper
bounded the sum EhEW(a) Oh with its biggest term maxhEW(a) Oh multiplied by the number w(a)
of terms; in step (f), I have used the hypothesis that all the components of 0 are nonnegative and thus
EhEL(a) Oh Ok provided that k e L(a).
(413) 0 <( (0, a)
n(b) ZOhah
h=1
Wc -d hh+ E Ohah + ~ O
heW(a) hEL(a) hVW(a)UL(a)
E Oh - w(a) E Oh + 0
heW(a) heL(a)
(e)
< w(a) max Oh- w(a) E Oh
- hoW(a)hEW(a) hEL(a)
(f)
< w(a) max Oh- w(a)Ok
heW(a)
By reordering the inequality (413), I obtain maxhew(a) Oh > Ok. Since this conclusion holds for
every k e L(a), then I also have maxhEW(a) Oh > maxkEL(a) Ok. This conclusion says that 0 sat-
isfies condition (405a) and is thus OT-compatible with the comparative row a. Since this conclusion
holds for every row a, then 0 is OT-compatible with the comparative tableau A. If the row a has a
unique entry equal to L, then we can drop the assumption that the ranking vector 0 be nonnegative
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and still ensure that it is OT-compatible with the comparative tableau A. In fact, this hypothesis that
0 be nonnegative was used only in the last step (413e); if A has a unique entry equal to L per row,
then this last step trivially holds also if 0 is not nonnegative, since in this case L(a) is a singleton. Fi-
nally, assume that every numerical matrix derived from the comparative tableau A is L-compatible
with a nonnegative ranking vector. Then in particular the numerical matrix A defined in (409) is
L-compatible with a nonnegative ranking vector, since it satisfies conditions (412) and is therefore
derived from the comparative tableau A. The preceding reasoning thus ensures that the comparative
tableau A is OT-compatible.
Second part of the proof Consider a ranking > that solves problem (410) and let me construct a
nonnegative ranking vector 0 that solves problem (411) such that > is a refinement of 0. Without
loss of generality, assume that the ranking > is C > C 2 > ... > Cn. Claim 1 ensures that there
exists an integer d < n such that, by relabeling the constraints and properly reordering the rows and
the columns of the comparative tableau A, it takes the form in (18), repeated once more in (414).
C 1  C 2  ... Cd Cd+1 ... Cn
W
dec(Cl) I ... . ... ... . . .
W
E W
dec(C 2) I I ... ... ... ... ...
E W
(414) E E
I I ... ....
E E
E E W
dec(Cd) I E ... I ... ... ...
E E W
Consider the ranking vector 0 = (01, . . ., On) defined in (415), starting from the bottom components
0n,..., 0d+1 and moving up from Od to 01. Note that the definition is well-posed, because Nk : 0
(in fact, since a E dec(Ck), then ak = w and thus Uk > 0).
(415) 0 d+1 =...= On - 0
Ok = max nk+, m 1 - Oa k=d,d-1,...,1Ok max 0 k+l, max =- O~
aEdec(Ck) -ak h=k+1
Clearly, 0 is nonnegative and furthermore the ranking > is a refinement of the ranking vector 0.
Let me show that 0 is L-compatible with the derived matrix A. Consider an arbitrary row a of the
comparative tableau A; let k E {1, ... , d} be such that a E dec(Ck); and let 5 be the corresponding
row of A. The chain of implications in (416), is identical to the one in (168).
n
(416) (0,A) > 1 ,(.a) E Ohah > 1
h=1
k-1 n
h=1 h=k+1
n
Okak+ E Ohah 1
h=k+1
4# k> - 1- E O~
ak h=k+l
1(A
== Ok > max - 1 - Oh-ah
aEdec(CAk) ak k1h=k+1
8.1 The relationship between OT-compatibility and L-compatibility
The chain of implications in (416) says that 0 satisfies condition (408) and is thus L-compatible with
a. Since this conclusion holds for every row d, then 0 is L-compatible with the numerical matrix
A. Note that this reasoning does not depend on the specific definition (409) of the numerical matrix
A, but only on the fact that the entries in A corresponding to w's in A are positive. Thus, this
reasoning extends from the specific derived matrix (409) to an arbitrary derived matrix (412), thus
showing that all derived matrices of an OT-compatible comparative tableau are L-compatible. U
Why is the numerical matrix A in (409) defined the way it is? In other words, what is the intuition
behind pairing up entries corresponding to L's with the opposite of the number w(a) of winner-
preferring constraints? In order to bring out the intuition, let's restrict ourselves to the case of
comparative tableaux that have a unique entry equal to L per row. To illustrate, I give in (417) the
derived matrix (409) corresponding to Pater's tableau (82). For the sake of readability, I am omitting
E's in A and 0's in A. Note that the numerical matrix A in (417) has the following crucial property:5
for every row R = (a,... , 5), the sum Z _ ai over its corresponding entries is null. This is a
property that holds of the numerical matrix A defined in (409) in the general case, and it is ensured
by the fact that the L of a comparative row a is replaced precisely by -w(a). Let me now point out
the intuition for why this property that rows sum up to zero is crucial.
W L W +1 -2 +1
W L W +1 -2 +1(417) A= [ W W L W [=+1 
-2 +1
W L +1 -1
Let e be the vector of RI with n components all identical to 1. Thus, 0' = 0 + Ae denotes the
ranking vector obtained from the ranking vector 0 by summing the same constant A E R to each one
of its components. Of course, if a vector 0 is OT-compatible with a comparative tableau A, then the
vector 0' = 0 + Ae is OT-compatible with A too for every A E R, since OT-compatibility is not
sensitive to the absolute size of the components of a ranking vector, but only to their relative sizes.
Thus, in order for L-compatibility with some derived numerical matrix A to entail OT-compatibility
with the original comparative tableau A, it is necessary to define A in such a way that, if a vector 0
is L-compatible with A, then the vector 0' = 0 + Ae is L-compatible with A too for every A E R.
The numerical matrix A satisfies this property, as shown in (418): the crucial property that the rows
of A sum up to zero ensures that step (*) holds.
(418) (0 + Ae, ) = (0, ) + (Ae, )
n
k=1
null(*)
- (01,A)
Here is another way of making sense of the definition (409) of the derived matrix A used in the first
part of the preceding proof. Let a LOSS FUNCTION Loss be a function that takes a piece of data and
a ranking vector 0 and returns 0 if 0 accounts for that piece of data and 1 otherwise. In the case
of standard and linear OT, the piece of data are respectively a comparative row a and a numerical
vector I, and the conditions for succes are respectively OT-compatibility and L-compatibility. Thus,
we get the definitions in (419).
(419) a. LossL(a, 0) = otherwise(0) 00 otherwise
1 if max Oh- max Ok<O
b. LossoT(, 0) = hEW(a) kEL(a) -
0 otherwise
The idea of the derived numerical matrix A is to ensure that the inequality in (420a) holds for every
comparative row a and the corresponding derived numerical vector R. This inequality in turn trivially
entails the inequality (420b.ii).
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(420) a. (0, ) 5 w(a) max h - max k 0O
(hEW(a) kEL(a)
(i) (ii)
b. 0 < LossoT(, 0) < LOSSL (, 0)
The inequality (420b) says that the problem of minimizing the OT-loss can be replaced by the prob-
lem of minimizing the L-loss.
8.2 Computational consequences
Because of the fact that the core notion of OT-compatibility (405) is stated in terms of the maximum
operator, standard OT displays the crucial property of strict domination, according to which the
highest ranked relevant constraint "takes it all". Because of this property, OT looks prima facie
like a rather exotic combinatorial framework. Exotic in the sense that it does not seem to have any
close correspondent within mainstream Learning Theory. For this reason, computational OT has
been developed in the current literature along the lines described in (421). The literature reviewed
in section 4.2.1 exemplifies well the classical approach (421) to computational OT.
(421) The classical approach to computational OT. Computational problems that arise in modeling
the acquisition of phonology within the framework of OT are tackled by means of ad hoc
combinatorial algorithms tailored to the exotic framework of OT, developed from scratch
with no connections to methods and results from mainstream Learning Theory.
In order to bridge this gap between computational OT and mainstream Learning Theory, various
scholars have recently started to explore the hypothesis of replacing standard OT by linear OT, since
the latter falls within the general class of linear models very well studied in mainstream Learning
Theory. Some recent examples of this line of research are Hayes and Wilson (2008), Coetzee and
Pater (2008), Boersma and Pater (2007, 2008), Pater et al. (2006), Jesney and Tessier (2007, 2008),
Jiger (2007), Potts et al. (2008), Goldwater and Johnson (2003), etc.
(422) Linear OT is superior to standard OT because it comes with well established algorithms from
the theory of linear classification, that standard OT does not.
Here are some quotes that document (422), from Pater (2009): "[I will] illustrate and extend existing
arguments for the replacement of [standard] OT's ranked constraints with [linear OT's] weighted
ones: that the resulting theory can be adapted relatively straightforwardly to deal with various types
of non-categorical linguistic phenomena, and that it can make use of well understood algorithms
for the modeling of learning and for other computational implementations. [...] The strengths of
[linear OT over standard OT] in this area are of considerable importance" (p.3); "[linear OT] allows
the use of existing, well-understood algorithms [such as the Simplex Method] for computational
implementations" (p. 9); "One broad argument for [linear OT] is that [...] [it is] compatible with
existing well-understood algorithms for learning variable outcomes and for learning gradually [...].
Since these algorithms are broadly applied with connectionist and statistical models of cognition,
this forms an important connection between the [linear OT] version of generative linguistics and
other research in cognitive science" (pp. 18-19). In this section, I want to point out that claim (422)
is wrong, as stated in (423).
(423) Linear OT is not in any way computationally superior to standard OT, since pretty much any
algorithm for linear OT can be readapted to standard OT through the equivalence between
OT-compatibility and L-compatibility guaranteed by claim 41.
Let me elaborate on claim (423). Given a comparative tableau A, I have paired it up with the
numerical matrix A in (409). By working at the level of the comparative tableau A, we have the
notion of OT-compatibility in (405). By working at the level of the numerical matrix A, we have
the notion of L-compatibility in (408). We are thus confronted with the situation in (424a). The
preceding claim 41 ensures that it does not make a difference at which level we decide to work.
276
(424) a. tableau A matrix X
OT-compatibility L-compatibility
SOE R1
b. tableau A matrix A
ad hoc OT algorith , algorithms for linear classification
0 E Rn
Thus, there are two strategies to devise algorithms for computational OT, as described in (424b).
One strategy is to work at the level of comparative tableaux, and devise ad hoc combinatoric algo-
rithms for OT-compatibility. This strategy yields the classical approach described in (421), which
has been explored in the literature as illustrated in section 4.2.1. Another strategy is to rephrase
problems in computational OT in terms of L-compatibility and import within OT algorithms for lin-
ear classification. The latter strategy yields the alternative approach to computational OT described
in (425).
(425) An alternative approach to computational OT. Rather than devising from scratch ad hoc
combinatorial algorithms, computational problems that arise in modeling the acquisition of
phonology within the framework of OT can be tackled by importing and straightforwardly
adapting well known algorithms from the theory of linear classifiers developed within main-
stream Learning Theory.
I think that the alternative approach (425) might have significant implications. Section 5.4 has pro-
vided a first application of this alternative approach (425). Let me make this point explicit. The
general shape of the on-line algorithm for standard OT is repeated once more in (426a). In step 1,
the algorithm receives a comparative row a E {L, E, w}n; in step 2, the algorithm checks whether
the current ranking vector 0 is OT-compatible with that comparative row a, namely whether condi-
tion (405) holds; if it doesn't, then the algorithm takes action in step 3. Analogously, the general
shape of the on-line algorithm for linear OT is repeated once more in (426b). In step 1, the algorithm
receives an n-tuple A = (d, ... , Uk,... , Un) E Rn of numbers; in step 2, the algorithm checks
whether the current ranking vector 0 is L-compatible with the numerical vector l, namely whether
condition (408) holds; if it dosen't, then the algorithm takes action in step 3.
not OT-compatible
Step 1: Step 2: Step 3:
(426) a. get a comparative - check whether 0 is OT-compati- update the current
row a E {L, E, W}n  ble with a in the sense of (405) 0 in response to a
OT-compatible not L-compatible
Step 1: Step 2: Step 3:
b. get a numerical - check whether 0 is L-compatible update the currentvector I E Rn with d in the sense of (408) 0 in response to K
L-compatible
Algorithms of the form (426b) are very well studied in the field of linear classification; see for in-
stance Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006, Chp. 12) for a modern introduction. The parallelism between
the standard OT on-line algorithm (426a) and the linear OT on-line algorithm (426b) suggests the
following strategy to obtain convergent update rules for step 3 of the standard OT on-line algorithm
(426a). Assume that the linear OT on-line algorithm (426b) converges with a given update rule in
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step 3 under certain hypotheses on the input set of numerical vectors that the data in step 1. If it were
possible to devise a mapping a E {L, E, W}n F- E Rn from comparative rows into numerical
vectors that satisfies the two properties (427), then the standard OT on-line algorithm (426a) with
that same update rule in step 3 converges too. Claim 41 ensures that such a mapping exists.
(427) a. If a comparative row a is not OT-compatible with a ranking vector 0, then the corre-
sponding numerical vector A is not L-compatible with that same ranking vector 0.
b. If a set of comparative rows is OT-compatible, then the set of corresponding numerical
vectors satisfy all the hypotheses required for the convergence of the linear OT on-line
algorithm (426b) with the update rule considered.
In other words, provably convergent promotion-demotion update rules for the OT on-line algorithm
can be obtained by readapting update rules for the linear on-line algorithm, as schematized in (428).
(428) tableau A matrix A
OT on-line algorithm linear on-line algorithms
0 6 Rn
To illustrate another application of the approach (425), let me point out that Tesar's RCD (373)
for the Ranking problem in OT can be reinterpreted as the Fourier Motzkin Elimination Algorithm
(henceforth: FMEA) for polyhedral feasibility, as depicted in (429). Let me sketch the details.
(429) tableau A matrix A
ROD ., FMEA
0 E Rn
A polyhedron is a set of ranking vectors 0 e Rn that satisfy a finite number of linear inequalities, as
in (430a). A polyhedral feasibility problem is the following problem: given (430a), establish whether
P is empty or not; in the latter case, find a ranking vector 0 that belongs to P. Here is a natural
strategy to solve polyhedral feasibility problems. We know that a set is nonempty iff its projection
along any coordinate is nonempty. Furthermore, every time we project down a set, we reduce the
dimension of the problem by 1 and thus potentially simplify the problem. Thus, to establish whether
a polyhedron is empty or not, one might keep projecting it down until dimension 1 is reached, and
then solve the feasibility problem for the 1-dimensional problem thus obtained. This is precisely the
idea of the FMEA. Yet, in the general case, this is not a very efficient strategy to solve polyhedral
feasibility problems. Here is the reason. Given an arbitrary polyhedron P C Rn as in (430a), its
orthogonal projection P' C Rn- 1 along, say, the nth axis is given in (430b).1 Thus, each time we
project down and thus reduce the dimension of the problem by 1, we run into the danger of adding
lots and lots of new linear inequalities, namely all the inequalities of type II in (430).
n
(430) a. P= 0 = (01,...,0n) E n  0,d) = gk, 0i > 1, i 1,...,m
j=1
inequalities of type I
n-1 I
Z k,ili 1 for k s.t. ak,n = 0
b. = (01,...,0n-1) E= (k,i a h ,Oi 1 1 fork, h s.t. ak,n > 0
i=1 akn ahn ak,n ah,n and Eh,n < 0
inequalities of type Iinequalities of type II
1This is a straightforward computation; see for instance Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis (1997, pp. 70-74).
278
8.3 More consequences 279
Given an instance (410) of the Ranking problem, claim 41, ensures that we can equivalently solve
the corresponding problem (411). The latter problem is of course a polyhedral feasibility prob-
lem. So we can tackle it by the FMEA. Crucially, no inequalities of type II ever arise when the
polyhedron (430a) is defined through the numerical matrix A defined in (409) corresponding to an
OT-compatible comparative tableau. In fact, if the comparative tableau A is OT-compatible, then the
corresponding matrix A has at least one column, say the nth column, whose entries are all nonnneg-
ative, namely such that we cannot find two entries h,n and ak,n with different sign. Thus, if we
project along that dimension, then we reduce the dimension of the problem by 1 without increasing
the number of linear constraints, because we get no linear constraints of type II. Instead, we get only
inequalities of type I that indeed correspond to the simplified tableau considered by RCD.
8.3 More consequences
The parallelism between the two frameworks of standard and linear OT reviewed at the beginning
of the chapter can be brought out in a particularly vivid way under the auxiliary hypothesis that
all the constraints C1 ,..., Cn are binary, namely they can only take the values 0 and 1, so that the
corresponding constraint differences can only take values -1, 0 or 1. Under this hypothesis, we have
that a ranking vector 0 = (01,..., On) is L-compatible with an underlying/winner/loser form triplet
iff condition (431) holds for the corresponding comparative row a.
(431) Linear OT: E Oh> Ok.
heW(a) kEL(a)
Condition (431) is completely parallel to the condition (432) for OT-compatibility between a ranking
vector 0 = (01, ... , On) and a comparative row a, only with the maximum operator replaced by the
summation operator.
(432) Standard OT: max Ok > max Oh.
kEW(a) hEL(a)
Let's restrict ourselves to nonnegative ranking vectors 0 = (01,..., On) > 0 (or, alternatively, to
comparative tableaux that have a unique entry equal to L per row). Consider now the new condition
(433), dependent on the positive parameter A > 0. Of course, if we pick A "small", namely A = 1,2
then condition (433) boils down to the condition (431) of L-compatibility. Claim 41 says that if we
pick A "large" enough, then condition (433) entails the condition (432) that goes into the notion of
OT-compatibility. As a starting point, I have considered in (409) the smallest value of A that ensures
that (433) entails (432), namely the number A = w(a) of w's in the row a; of course, any value
larger than that is just as good; thus a suitable candidate is A = n.
(433) A restatement of standard OT: E Ok > A E Oh
kEW(a) hEL(a)
For any A > 1, let me say that a ranking vector 0 is A-COMPATIBLE with a comparative row a iff the
condition (433) holds for the corresponding value of A. We can slide from linear OT to standard OT
just by increasing the parameter A in the condition (433) from A = 1 to any value larger than w(a).
(434) A = 1 A = w(a) A = n
I I0I
OT-compatibility
If the correct model of phonology were linear OT, then phonology would fit squarely within main-
stream Learning Theory: the constraints map the data into the inner product space Rn and any
phonology is a linear model within such space. Suppose instead that the right model of phonology
is standard OT. Why should this be? I want to speculate that standard OT has indeed two advantages
over linear OT. Thefirst advantage is that standard OT posits a model of constraint interaction very
2The choice A < 1 does not make any sense.
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simple, that thus allows restrictiveness to be approximately described by compact measures such as
Prince and Tesar's measure (352). I defer a discussion of this first advantage to future work. The
second advantage concerns processing. Every time the speaker wants to utter an underlying form x,
he needs to compute the corresponding surface form according to his own phonology. Suppose that
the right model of phonology were linear OT. Then in production the speaker would have to compute
many scalar products (0, R) between the vector 0 that represents his grammar and the vectors R of
constraints violations corresponding to various underlyng/winner/loser form triplets. The computa-
tion of one such scalar product (0, a) requires only linear time in the number n of constraints. Yet,
the number of constraints n needed to account for cross-linguistic variation might plausibly be very
large. Furthermore, it might also be plausible to assume that the vectors of constraint differences A
are not sparse, namely they do not contain many null entries. Thus, it might be too costly for the
speaker to compute all these scalar products exactly. In the face of this problem, the speaker might
want to settle for an approximation of the values of these scalar products. Here is a sensible way to
approximate one of these scalar products (0, A). First, we can of course throw away all components
Ok of the ranking vector that correspond to null constraint differences Uk = 0 as in (435a), because
the product 0k0k is null and thus doed not contribute to the overall scalar product. Next, we could
split up the remaining components of the ranking vector as in (435b) into the set of large compo-
nents and the set of small components; finally, we could approximate the scalar product (0, 1) as in
(435c), by throwing away the products Ok-k corresponding to small components Ok of the ranking
vector and using just what is left.
n
(435) (0, ) = Ok-k
k=1
n(a) Z Oa
kl,k#0
n(b) Z Okk±Oa
k=l,dk# 0, Ok large k=l,k#O0,0k small
n
k=1, Ak#0, 0k large
Standard OT arises from linear OT this way, when we make the drastic choice of retaining only the
largest component Ok corresponding to nonnull constraint differences.3
3See Eisner (2000, par. 2) makes a somewhat related point, as pointed out to me by Adam Albright (p.c.).
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List of symbols used in part II
R
X
Yxy
y*
Yy
Gen
C
Ck
n
OT>
RZ(OT>)
A
a
dec> (a)
dec>, (Ck)
W(a)
L(a)
w(a)
0
Ok
L(a, 0)
e(a, 0)
max Ok
ken
ZOkkEn
A
{L, E, W} n
{L, E, W}mxn
(., .)
set of real numbers
set of underlying forms
generic underlying form
set of candidate surface forms
intended winner surface form
intended loser surface form
generating function
constraint set
generic constraint, namely a function from X x Y into natural numbers
total number of constraints
ranking of the constraint set
OT-grammar corresponding to the ranking >
range of the OT-grammar OT>, namely the language corresponding to the ranking >
comparative tableau
comparative row, namely an arbitrary row of a comparative tableau
decisive constraint for the comparative row a w.r.t. the raking >
set of comparative rows whose decisive constraint w.r.t. > is Ck
set of constraints that have a w in the comparative row a
set of constraints that have an L in the comparative row a
number of w's in the comparative row a
ranking vector, namely an n-tuple of numbers
ranking value of constraint Ck, namely the kth component of the ranking vector 0
set of loser-preferring constraints w.r.t. a ranked by 0 above the
highest ranked winner-preferring constraint
cardinality of the set L(a, 0)
largest ranking value Ok among those that correspond to constraints Ck with k E 0
sum of the ranking values Ok that correspond to constraints Ck with k E
numerical vector corresponding to the comparative row a
set of comparative rows (for n constraints)
set of comparative tableaux (with m rows and n columns)
scalar product between two vectors
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